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ABSTRACT
This study seeks to critically examine India's relations 
with the Middle East in terms of India's political, security 
and economic interests in the region between 1947 and 1986. 
It tries to define India's general foreign policy objectives 
and the means and strategies she adopted to realise them in 
relation to the Middle East. The study focuses on the 
misperceptions and fallacies that governed India's interac­
tion with the region which over the years artificially 
restricted India's manoeuvrability and policy options in the 
region.
The first chapter provides a historical backdrop of indepen­
dent India's foreign policy with special reference to the 
Middle East. The second and the third chapters focus on 
India's politico-diplomatic interests in the region by ex­
amining India's bilateral ties with four most important 
states in the region, namely Egypt, Iraq, Iran and Saudi 
Arabia. The fourth chapter critically evaluates India's 
security concerns in the region with special emphasis on 
developments in the 70s and 80s and India's responses to 
them. The fifth chapter seeks to quantify India's economic 
interaction with the region and endeavours to put India's 
economic stake in the region in perspective. Chapters six 
and seven concentrate on India's relations with Israel and 
the PLO respectively and emphasise the need for India to 
take a fresh look at the problem in the light of new and 
far-reaching developments in the region.
This study takes the view that the constancy of India's 
Middle Eastern policy is more an outcome of lack of imagina­
tion and an absence of subtlety and sensitivity on the part 
of Indian political elite than any unwavering commitment on 
their part to any high principles and ideals. It also under­
lines the untenability of such policy in future in the con­
text of rapidly changing political and strategic landscape 
of the Middle East.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The foreign policy of India, like that of any other 
country, sought to maintain, since Independence, a balance 
between its long-term goals and short-term objectives 
through a variety of means, political, diplomatic, economic 
and military, either separately or in combination, depending 
on their appropriateness for the occasion and the existing 
national capabilities.
A detailed discussion of India's foreign policy objectives 
in general and the emphasis placed on the means to obtain 
them would throw considerable light on the question as to 
where the Middle East is perceived to stand in the eyes of 
the policy makers in Delhi in terms of its importance vis-a- 
vis India's politico-strategic, diplomatic and economic 
goals. However, the general objectives of India's foreign 
policy and their orientation towards the Middle East are 
best analysed in the context of the perspectives and at­
titudes that developed during the freedom struggle along 
with the geopolitical situation obtaining in the world at 
the time of independence.
The contacts between the Indian subcontinent and the 
Middle East almost dateback to the beginnings of recorded 
history and there have been extensive political, commercial
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and cultural ties between the two regions over the 
centuries.1 The great ancient civilizations of the Nile, 
Mesopotamia and the Indus valley were not only contem­
poraneous but also interacted with each other. The exten­
sive trade relations between the two regions led to the es­
tablishment of Arab settlements on the Western and Southern 
coasts of India and that of the Indians along the Gulf as 
well as in Alexandria in Egypt. "Although there were periods 
when the two areas were relatively isolated, periods of in­
timacy have been more typical” .2 The advent of Islam and 
subsequent penetration of the subcontinent by successive 
Muslim adventurers from the Middle East reached its apogee 
with the establishment of the Mughal empire in India in the 
16th century and brought the two regions closer than ever 
before in political and cultural spheres leading to the con­
version of a large native population to Islam."From the time 
of the first sustained Muslim influences in the eleventh 
century, the models for political structures and processes, 
as well as religious inspiration for an important segment of 
the subcontinental population and cultural influences came 
from Iran and the Arab Middle East”.3
The onset of the Industrial Revolution in Europe 
marked the beginning of a new era in human history. The new 
and superior European technology and organization led to the 
gradual penetration and conquest of Afro-Asian societies by 
the Europeans. The the Middle Eastern land mass now con­
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stituted a crucial link between the continents of Asia 
Africa and Europe and was called the "gateway of Asia and 
Africa". It was this unhappy but common experience of 
European imperial domination that brought the two regions 
together since the 18th century.
COMMON HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE OF IMPERIAL DOMINATION
Though the process of European domination, first commercial 
and later political, of the Indian subcontinent and the 
Middle East started more or less simultaneously, it was not 
until the end of World war I that the entire the Middle 
Eastern region came under European tutelage. The consolida­
tion of the British rule in India sealed the fate of the the 
Middle East as well for the latter commanded the imperial 
communication lines to India. The opening of the Suez Canal 
in 1869 linking the Mediterranean and the Red Sea made the 
region a virtual nerve-centre of international communica­
tions both over land and sea. Till the First World War, 
Britain sought to protect its lines of communication to In­
dia through the Middle East by supporting the Ottoman Empire 
in order to prevent the other European powers from getting a 
foothold in the region and by establishing a series of 
protectorates in the Persian Gulf during the 19th century. 
However, towards the end of the 19th century, Britain recog­
nized France as the dominant power in Algeria, Morocco and
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Tunisia and Libya came under Italian control. After the 
First World War, following the collapse of the Ottoman Em­
pire, Britain and France divided the Fertile Crescent con­
sisting of Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq between them­
selves under the Mandates System.
However, the interwar period witnessed the rise of 
strong nationalistic sentiments in both the regions and 
helped to forge "new bonds of Comrederie". "While the 
nationalist movement in India sympathised with the national 
aspirations of the Arabs, the latter realised that their own 
emancipation was tied up with the outcome of the Indian 
struggle".4
For Gandhi,"India is the key to the exploitation of the 
Asiatic and other non-European races of the Earth ... .
Through the deliverance of India I seek to deliver the so- 
called weaker races of the Earth from the Crushing Wheels of 
the Western Civilization".5
Such sentiments were readily reciprocated by many the 
Middle Eastern freedom fighters. An Iraqi statesman, Kamil 
El-Chadirchi wrote to Jawaharlal Nehru in 1938.
"We wholeheartedly appreciate your struggle, and wish 
we had the opportunity to share in it though in a small 
measure, for we, both are in the same boat. True endeavour 
in the campaign against imperialism and exploitation must 
not be considered in separate units, but rather that neither 
geographical frontiers nor political obstacles can suppress
it". 6
Jawaharlal Nehru, who always considered India's 
struggle for freedom as part of a larger world drama, wrote 
to his daughter Indira in 1933-
"The Nationalist movements of India and Egypt have 
adopted different methods but fundamentally the urge for na­
tional freedom is the same. And the way imperialism func­
tions in its efforts to suppress these nationalist movements 
is also much the same. So each one of us can learn much from 
the other's experiences".?
THE CONGRESS OF OPPRESSED NATIONALITIES, 1927
The Congress of Oppressed Nationalities held in Brussels in 
1927 was a momentous event in the struggle against im­
perialism because for the first time an attempt was made to 
co-ordinate the freedom movements in various parts of the 
world and to create an institutional framework for such co­
ordination. Jawaharlal Nehru, who attended the Congress of 
Oppressed Nationalities in Brussels as the official repre­
sentative of the Indian National Congress (The INC), took a 
very active and enthusiastic part in the proceedings of the 
Congress and was also made a member of the Presidium. The 
general agenda of the Brussels Congress included inter- 
alia;
"Co-operation between the national liberation movements
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in oppressed countries and the labour and anti-imperialist 
movements in imperialist countries" and "Establishment of a 
permanent world-wide organization linking-up all forces 
against imperialism and colonial oppression".8 
As Nehru pointed out "... the Brussels Congress can be con­
sidered to be very representative both of the countries 
being exploited and oppressed by others and of workers' 
organisations".9 Egypt, Persia, Syria, Morocco, French North 
Africa,the Dutch East Indies Annum, Korea, Mexico, and the 
states of Central and South America were among the par­
ticipants.
The Brussels Congress enabled Nehru to develop per­
sonal contacts with leaders of freedom movements from dif­
ferent parts of the world particularly from Asia which left 
a deep and lasting impression on him. "I had occasion to 
meet many delegates from Asiatic countries in Brussels. 
There was a very strong desire amongst them for a closer 
bond between Asiatic countries, but nothing practicable 
could be suggested".10
However, a permanent organization "the League against 
Imperialism" was formed to provide a sense of unity and 
solidarity to freedom struggles all over the world and Nehru 
was made an honorary president of the League as well as a 
member of the Executive Committee. In his report to the All 
India Congress Committee on the Brussels Congress, Nehru 
urged that India should develop close and direct contacts
11
with various nationalist organizations in Asia not only to 
publicise India's own struggle but also to broaden its out­
look on foreign affairs. The INC responded by proposing a 
session of Pan-Asiatic Federation in India some time in 1930 
which however, failed to materialise for various reasons. It 
also sent out letters of invitation to nationalist organiza­
tions in Egypt, Palestine, and Tunisia inviting "fraternal" 
delegations to annual Congress sessions and many such 
delegations from various countries attended the annual ses­
sions of the INC in the 30s and 40s. Perhaps,the most impor­
tant such delegation was the Wafd group from Egypt. 
Moreover, the 1928 annual session of the INC adopted a 
resolution declaring that Indian struggle for freedom was 
part of the general world struggle against imperialism and 
that India should develop contacts with freedom struggles 
elsewhere. Nehru's passion for Asian resurgence in world 
affairs which almost bordered on the romantic inevitably led 
to close personal rapport and friendship with leaders such 
as Mustafa Nahas of Egypt, Faris al-Khuri of Syria and 
Iraq,s Kamil al-Chadirchi.11.
THE BRITISH POLICY OF DIVIDE AND RULE
The British policy of "divide and rule" was one of the most 
significant factors that made the Middle East loom large in 
the perceptions and calculations of the Indian leaders even
12
during the freedom struggle. This was not a policy devised 
exclusively for India by the British.They found it both ex­
pedient and effective to use such tactics by pitting one 
community against another or one tribe against another when­
ever such an opportunity presented itself anywhere in their 
vast empire in order to cling on to their imperial posses­
sions. Commenting on the frequency with which the British 
resorted to these tactics Nehru once said "It is the same 
old game which we have seen in other countries under im­
perialist domination; it is curious how often it is 
repeated".12
The Muslims who constituted a substantial minority in 
India were particularly vulnerable to such tactics for cer­
tain historical reasons. The Muslim invaders from the Middle 
East were different from the earlier invaders of the Indian 
subcontinent in the sense that the former brought with them 
a new, vigorous and proselytising religion Islam which was 
fundamentally at variance with Hinduism, the predominant 
religion of the subcontinent. As a result, the Muslim com­
munity in the subcontinent successfully resisted the all- 
absorbing and integrating prowess of Hinduism and to a large 
measure retained its distinct identity. Though the two com­
munities interacted with each other at a political and so­
cial level, there was very little meeting ground between the 
two and the accent over the years was on coexistence rather 
than integration.
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The arrival of the British introduced a new element in 
to the picture. The British held the Indian Muslims largely 
responsible for the 1857 revolt and made a conscious attempt 
to sideline the community thereafter. The Muslims them­
selves, shattered by the failure of the revolt and the sub­
sequent British oppression, withdrew in to their shell.
When Sir Syed Ahmad Khan started the "Muslim 
Renaissance” in the 1870s, he was a nationalist to begin 
with.13 The fact that he sought to achieve a rapprochement 
between the British and Muslim community in India by stress­
ing the loyalty of the latter to the British rule somewhat 
diluted his nationalist sentiments. However, the prospect of 
progressive introduction of representative institutions in 
India by the British made him positively hostile to the idea 
of Indian nationalism. He wrote to Badruddin Tyabji in 1888 
"I do not understand what the words "national congress” 
means. Is it supposed that the different castes and creeds 
living in India belong to one nation, or can become one na­
tion , and their aims and aspirations be one and the same? I 
think it is quite impossible and when it is impossible there 
can be no such thing as a National Congress, nor can it be 
of equal benefit to all peoples”.14
Referring to the logic of electoral politics in India 
he said "It is certain the Hindu members will have four 
times as many {votes} because their population is four times 
as numerous. Therefore, we can prove by mathematics that
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there will be four votes for the Hindu to every one vote for 
the Mahomedan. And now how can the Mahomedan guard his 
interests? It would be like a game of dice, in which one man 
had four dice and the other only one”.15
The fear of being reduced from proud overlordship to 
the status of a permanent minority haunted the Indian Mus­
lims and found expression in their representation to Lord 
Minto in 1906 which urged that "... the position accorded to 
the Mahomedan community in any kind of representation, 
direct or indirect, ... should be commensurate not merely 
with their numerical strength but also with their political 
importance ... [ and to ] give due consideration to the
position which they occupied in India a little more than a 
hundred years ago ...".16
The founding of the All-India Muslim League in 1906 was 
the logical consequence of such fears and aspirations and 
came as godsend to the British administration in India which 
was confronted with the increasingly militant tide of 
secular nationalism of the Indian National Congress. This 
development also sensitised the INC to the fears, aspira­
tions and sensibilities of the Indian Muslims and it started 
taking an active interest even in issues that affected the 
Indian Muslims exclusively. This period also witnessed the 
INC's increasing interest in and attention to the Muslim 
states of the Middle East. While this could be partly ex­
plained in terms of the necessity of solidarity among anti­
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imperialist movements world over, it was also partly aimed 
at the domestic Muslim constituency in India which was in­
creasingly being used by the British to counter the growing 
popularity and strength of the INC.
THE KHILAFAT ISSUE
The arrival of Gandhi on the Indian political horizon 
heralded the dawn of mass-based politics. His basic 
strategy was to transform the INC in to a political institu­
tion which would represent and reconcile the interests of 
the divergent religious, ethnic and ideological groups so 
that it could present a united front to the British im­
perialism. When the Khilafat issue came to the forefront in 
1920, Gandhi grabbed it with both hands as a golden oppor­
tunity to forge Hindu-Muslim unity. He, in fact, considered 
it as providing " such an opportunity of uniting Hindus and 
Muhammedans as would not arise in a hundred years".
The issue itself was fairly simple.17 The Sultan of 
Turkey known as Caliph or Khalifa was considered by Muslims 
all over the world as their spiritual head. However, the 
first world war saw Turkey join the side of Germany in 
fighting Britain. This placed the Indian Muslims in a real 
predicament as they were torn between their fears about the 
fate of Khalifate and their loyalty to the British. Since 
the British Indian Army had a large chunk of Muslims, the
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British government took pains to assure the Indian Muslims 
that Turkey would get a fair deal in any post-war settle­
ment. However, the armistice which ended the war not only 
deprived Turkey of its lands but also put the Sultan under 
the control of allied powers. The khilafat movement was 
aimed at defending the Khilafat. In a nutshell, it sought 
"Muslim control over every portion of the Jazirat- ul- Arab, 
the Khilafa's wardenship of the Holy Places, and the in­
tegrity of the Ottoman empire".18
The Indian National Congress had been sensitive to the 
feelings of Indian Muslims towards the fate of Turkey from 
the beginning.At the annual session of the Congress in 1912, 
its President R.N.Mudholkar referred to the profound sorrow 
and sympathy which all non-Muslim Indians felt for their 
Muslim countrymen because of the misfortunes of the 
Caliphate. He hoped that it might be possible to meet the 
legitimate aspirations of the Christian provinces of the Ot­
toman empire without destroying the latter or making it 
powerless. 19 At the next session of the Congress in 1913, 
the President Nawab Syed Mohammad made further reference to 
the troubles of the Islamic world outside India and the 
anxiety they caused among Indian Muslims.20
However, with the advent of Gandhi, the entire com­
plexion of the Congress started changing rapidly. The 
Congress was no longer content with passing resolutions. 
These resolutions had to be supported by mass action in or­
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der to put pressure on the government. Gandhi found the time 
opportune for such movement following the Jallianwala Bagh 
massacre which shocked the whole country and the Khilafat 
issue which greatly agitated the Indian Muslims for a long 
time. In his letter to the Viceroy Gandhi said
"Events, which have happened during the past one month, 
have confirmed me in the opinion that the Imperial Govern­
ment have acted in the Khilafat matter in an unscrupulous, 
immoral and unjust manner and have been moving from wrong to
wrong in order to defend their immorality......The attitude
of the Imperial and your Excellency's Governments on the 
Punjab question has given me an additional sense for grave 
dissatisfaction".21
The Non-Cooperation Resolution adopted by the INC at 
its Calcutta session in 1920 emphasised the importance of 
the Khilafat issue to the Indian Muslims and called upon the 
non- Muslim Indians to support their Muslim brethren in 
their hour of trial and tribulation.
"In view of the fact that on the Khilafat question both 
the Indian and Imperial Governments have signally failed in 
their duty towards the Musalmans of India and the Prime Min­
ister has deliberately broken his pledge word given to them, 
and that it is the duty of every non-Moslem Indian in every 
legitimate manner to assist his Musalman brother in his at­
tempt to remove the religious calamity that has overtaken 
him".22
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The Hindu-Muslim unity which Gandhi desperately tried 
to promote by making the Congress adopt the Khilafat issue 
proved to be extremely short-lived because it had very 
little to do with the real issue that haunted the Indian 
Muslims i.e., their position in the post British political 
dispensation in India. As long as this issue remained un­
solved, no amount of support to Pan-Islamic issues was going 
to win the confidence of the Indian Muslims. As one writer 
points out " ... it [ Khilafat ] was a movement which might 
have taken the road towards some form of Muslim nationalism 
if it had not started on the wrong - i.e., Pan-Islamic - 
foot”.23
Nehru made a very accurate assessment of the Non- 
Cooperation movement in his Glimpses of World History. 
"Looking at this question from the point of religious 
groups, the Muslims had joined the movement, as a body, 
chiefly because of the Khilafat. This was a purely religious 
question affecting the Muslims only, and non-Muslims had 
nothing to do with it. Gandhi, however, adopted it and en­
couraged others to do so, because he felt it his duty to 
help a brother in distress. He also hoped in this way to 
bring the Hindus and Muslims nearer each other. The general 
Muslim outlook was thus one of Muslim nationalism or Muslim 
internationalism and not of true nationalism. For the moment 
the conflict between the two was not apparent".24 Moreover, 
the shallowness of the Khilafat issue became quite clear
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when the Turks themselves, under Kemal Pasha abolished the 
Caliphate and declared Turkey a Republic in 1923.
This approach of the INC to win the approval and con­
fidence of the Indian Muslims by strongly supporting Pan- 
Islamic issues which had little more than an emotional ap­
peal to them, which were essentially external in nature and 
had no relevance or bearing on the real issues confronting 
the Indian Muslims spilled over in to the thinking of the 
post-independent India as well and influenced its policy 
towards the Middle East, as we shall see later.
THE PALESTINE PROBLEM
The Palestine problem which came to the forefront following 
the Balfour declaration in 1917 was another issue related to 
the Middle East which caught the attention of Indian leaders 
during the freedom struggle. The attitude of the Indian 
leaders towards this issue was of considerable importance 
for the perceptions and predilections that evolved in rela­
tion to this issue have had an important bearing on the 
policies of free India towards the region.
As Turkey joined World War I on the side of Germany and 
Austro-Hungary against Britain, France and Russia, the Sul­
tan of Turkey, who was considered the spiritual head of Mus­
lims the world over, issued an appeal to all Muslims for 
loyalty in a jihad. This made the British jittery because
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they feared that this appeal might touch a respondent chord 
among Muslims in the Middle East and even in British India. 
At about the same time, Arab nationalists sent feelers to 
the British to gauge their war aims. In 1915, an agreement 
was reached between the British representative, Sir Henry 
McMohan and the Arab leader Hussain who was the Sheriff of 
Mecca, under which Hussain was to call an an Arab revolt 
against Turkey with the help of British funds, arms and ad­
visors, while the British government committed itself in 
writing that once the Turks were defeated it would recognise 
one independent Arab state all over Syria (which then in­
cluded Palestine, Jordan and Lebanon) and Iraq.
However, in 1916, Britain and France signed a secret 
agreement known as Sykes - Pilcot agreement which sought to 
divide the Eastern Arab World into British and French 
spheres of influence, partly under Arab suzerainty but sub­
ordinate to and subserving the dominant power concerned.
Britain also sought to woo the Jews for the allied 
cause because they were sympathetic to Germany out of their 
hatred for the Anti-Semitic Czarist Russia. It was felt that 
the pacifist tendencies of American Jews who played a cru­
cial role in American industry had to be overcome. It was 
further argued that American entry into the War and at least 
American financial help would be encouraged by some promise 
to Zionism.
On November 2nd, 1917, Lord Balfour, the Foreign
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Secretary of Britain, made an official statement in relation 
to the Jewish demand for a homeland, popularly known as the 
"Balfour Declaration". It stated that,
"His Majesty's Government view with favour the estab­
lishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish 
people and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the 
achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that 
nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and 
religious rights of the existing non-Jewish Communities in 
Palestine...",25
The multiplicity of contradictory promises made to dif­
ferent parties by the allied powers in order to gain their 
support for the war effort were not meant to be kept. Even 
without waiting for the formal convening of the League of 
Nations which was supposed to bestow the mandates, the 
Allied Powers shared the mandates amongst themselves. Two 
independent states of Syria and Lebanon were created to be 
under the French influence. Iraq and Palestine were to be 
under British mandate with a special clause providing for 
giving effect to the Balfour Declaration.
However as Nehru points out "Palestine was not a 
wilderness or an empty, uninhabited place. It was already 
somebody else's home".26 Wile expressing "sympathy for the 
Jews in the terrible trials they are passing through in 
Europe", Nehru did not lose sight of the basic fact that 
"Palestine is essentially an Arab country, and must remain
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so, and the Arabs must not be crushed and suppressed in 
their own homelands”.27. Nehru was also quite convinced that 
the real issue in Palestine was not religion but im­
perialism. ”... England pits Jewish religious nationalism 
against Arab nationalism and makes it appear that her 
presence is necessary to act as a arbitrator and to keep 
the peace between the two”.28 The future of Palestine could 
be secured only " on the stable foundation of Arab-Jew 
Cooperation and the elimination of imperialism”.29
He bemoaned the fact that the Jews in Palestine chose 
to take the side of British imperialism "which had its day 
and was fading away" and warned that "it was not wise for 
the Jews to risk the displeasure, not only of the entire 
Muslim world, but also of most Asian countries for this 
vanishing support".30
Like Nehru, Mahatma Gandhi also had nothing but sym­
pathy for the age old persecution of the Jews whom he 
described as the "untouchables of Christianity". However, 
this sympathy he had for Jews, he said should not obscure 
the requirements of justice. His reasoning was clear, simple 
and logical.
"Palestine belongs to the Arabs in the same sense that 
England belongs to the English or France to the French. It 
is wrong and inhuman to impose the Jews on the Arabs... 
Surely it would be a crime against humanity to reduce the 
proud Arabs so that Palestine can be restored to the Jews
23
partly or wholly as their national home.
The nobler course would be to insist on a just treat­
ment of the Jews wherever they are born and lived. The Jews 
born in France are French in precisely the same sense that 
Christians born in France are French. If the Jews have no 
home but Palestine, will they relish the idea of being 
forced to leave the other parts of the world in which they 
are settled ? or do they want a double home where they can 
remain at will ? This cry for national home affords a 
colourable justification for the German expulsion of the 
Jews".31
It is expected that the Indian National Congress would 
reflect the views of its two most important leaders, Gandhi 
and Nehru. As early as 1921, the congress Working Committee 
passed a resolution "to assure the Musalman States, that 
when India has attained self-government her foreign policy 
will naturally be always guided so as to respect the 
religious obligations imposed upon Musalmans by Islam".32. 
In 1922, the INC asserted that unless "the Jazirat-el-Arab 
(The Arab World) were freed from all non-muslim control 
there can not be peace and contentment in India". 33. The 
Congress session in Madras in 1927 asked for the withdrawal 
of Indian troops from Mesopotamia (Iraq) and Persia (Iran) 
and from all other countries.34 In 1928, sympathy was ex­
tended to Egypt, Syria, Palestine and Iraq in their struggle 
against Western imperialism.35.
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In 1936, the Congress Working Committee sent its greet­
ings to the Arabs in Palestine and expressed its sympathy 
for their struggle for freedom. At its instance, September 
27, 1936 was observed as "Palestine Day" and meetings and
demonstrations were organised all over the country. In 1937, 
the AICC protested vigorously against the reign of terror in 
Palestine and strongly supported the Arab opposition to the 
proposed partition of Palestine.36 In 1938, it appealed "to 
the Jews not to seek the shelter of the British Mandatory 
and not to allow themselves to be exploited in the interests 
of British imperialism".37. Again in 1939, the Congress in 
its annual session, adopted a resolution on Palestine ex­
pressing its sympathy with the Arabs and looking forward to 
the emergence of an independent democratic state in Pales­
tine with adequate provision for the protection of Jewish 
rights. In the same year, it adopted another resolution con­
demning Hitler's pogroms against Jews and offered them 
asylum in India but criticised Jews for relying on "British 
armed forces to advance their special privileges in Pales­
tine and thus aligned themselves on the side of the British 
imperialism".38. While the consistent support of the INC to 
the Arab cause in general and the Palestine issue in par­
ticular can be explained in terms of anti-imperialism, a 
growing sense of Asian solidarity and the innate justness of 
the issues involved, it must be noted that there were more 
mundane and less altruistic motives behind this support. The
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political stalemate between the INC and the Muslim League 
over the issue of the status of the Muslims in post-British 
India, and the skilful exploitation of this stalemate by the 
British in order to perpetuate their increasingly tenuous 
hold over the subcontinent necessitated such support. Gandhi 
himself made it very clear when he said the following with 
reference to the khilafat movement.
"If I were not interested in the Indian Mohammedans, I 
would not interest myself in the welfare of the Turks any 
more than I am in that of the Austrians or the Palestinians. 
But by helping the Mohmmadens of India at a critical moment 
in their history, I want to buy their friendship".39 
Similarly, leaders like Gandhi and Nehru and the Indian Na­
tional Congress could not but have opposed the partition of 
Palestine on the basis of religion while repudiating and 
resisting such a demand from Indian Muslims. It should suf­
fice to say that there was as much pragmatism involved in 
this approach as principle and it was one of those rare oc­
casions when policy coincided with precept. However, the 
more the Congress tried to win over the support of Indian 
Muslims by supporting Pan-Islamic issues the less it 
addressed itself to the domestic issues that affected them. 
It was this stalemate which eventually led to the partition 
of the sub-continent and the creation of Pakistan.
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THE CREATION OF PAKISTAN
The question of relative status between the Hindu majority 
and Muslim minority has always been an underlying current of 
the Muslim separatist tendencies in the Indian sub­
continent. Muslim separatism and the subsequent demand for 
Pakistan was essentially a quest for parity on the part of 
Indian Muslims vis-a-vis Hindus who were numerically in a 
majority. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan broached this question as 
early as 1888. "Is it possible that under these cir­
cumstances two nations —  the Mohammedan and Hindu —  could 
sit on the same throne and remain equal in power ? Most 
certainly not. It is necessary that one of them should con­
quer the other and thrust it down. To hope that both could 
remain equal is to desire the impossible and the 
inconceivable”.40
This claim and clamour for parity on the part of the 
Muslims was based on certain historical grounds, of course 
as seen by the Muslims themselves. First, the Muslims con­
quered India from the Hindus despite the latter1s numerical 
superiority. So, minority status which would have implied 
permanent political subordination and inferiority vis-a-vis 
the Hindus was not acceptable. As Sisir Gupta observes, "It 
ought to be remembered that the demand for Pakistan and the 
two-nation theory was advanced by the Muslim League as a 
culmination of its demand for parity, essentially parity of
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status between the 25 per cent Muslims and the rest in In­
dia. It is because of the impossibility of solving the 
status problem in terms of majority and minority, which al­
most by definition determines the status of the two groups, 
that the two-nation theory was advanced”.41
Secondly, since the English conquered India from the 
Muslims, its was incumbent upon the former to ensure that 
the Muslims got an equal share of the power which would 
befit and be commensurate with their status as the erstwhile 
rulers of India.
Krishna Menon explains: "Their [Pakistani] minds work
in this way —  that it was from the Mughals that the British 
took over. Now, the British having gone, they must come 
back".42
Thus, the partition of India on the basis of religion 
did not solve the problem of relative status of the two com­
munities but only institutionalised it.43
Another factor that complicates Indo-Pak relations is the 
divergent ideological foundations of the two states. While 
India proclaimed itself as a liberal secular state, Pakistan 
declared itself to be an Islamic country. In a nutshell, 
the two states represented irreconcilable ideological con­
flict between secularism and theocracy. Prima facie, each 
country has a vested interest in the collapse of the other. 
If India's secularism is successful, given its large Muslim 
minority even after partition, the raison d'etre for the
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very creation of Pakistan is undermined. Further fragmenta­
tion of Pakistan along regional or linguistic lines would 
also dilute the two-nation theory. On the other hand, if 
India's experiment with secularism fails, it would only 
validate and strengthen the two-nation theory. In other 
words, if secular nationalism is an essential prerequisite 
for the survival of India's unity and integrity, religion is 
an inseparable part of Pakistani nationalism. This 
ideological antagonism would remain more or less a permanent 
feature in Indo-Pak relations.44
Moreover, the bloodbath that accompanied partition and 
the mass exodus that took place across the border in both 
directions made it almost impossible to establish normal 
relations between the two countries.
THE KASHMIR ISSUE
The Kashmir issue45 which closely followed on the heels of 
partition, more or less symbolised the underlying the con­
flict between the two countries and buried any hopes of rap­
prochement in the foreseeable future. At the time of Indian 
independence, the Princely states which enjoyed nominal in­
dependence under the British rule, were given the freedom of 
choice to join either India or Pakistan or remain indepen­
dent. However, problems arose only in relation to three 
Princely states namely Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir. In
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case of Junagadh and Hyderabad, though the rulers were Mus­
lim, both the states were predominantly Hindu and neither 
had geographical contiguity with Pakistan. Hence, their ac­
cession to India, though causing tension and acrimony, did 
not poison Indo-Pak relations as Kashmir did.
The case of Kashmir was unique. It was the only 
Princely state which was geographically contiguous to both 
India and Pakistan and had a Muslim majority with a Hindu 
ruler. The situation was further complicated by the exist­
ence of a popular movement, National Conference, led by 
Sheik Abdullah which fought the autocratic and oppressive 
Dogra ruler Hari Singh for decades. Sheik Abdullah was a 
secular nationalist who refused to subscribe to the two na­
tion theory of Jinnah and was a close associate of Nehru and 
a sympathiser with the goals and values of the Indian Na­
tional Congress.46
Hari Sigh, who initially toyed with the idea of inde­
pendence, sought to buy time by signing a "Standstill 
agreement" with both India and Pakistan. While Pakistan 
agreed to the proposal, there was no response from the In­
dian Government because there was a delay in communicating 
the proposal. According to Mountbatten it was this initial 
reluctance of Hari Singh to accede either to India or to 
Pakistan that lay at the root of the problem of Kashmir as 
it unfolded later.
Suspicious of India's intentions and not trusting Sheik
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Abdullah, Pakistan leaders tried to force the events by en­
couraging if not abetting a tribal invasion of Kashmir.47 
When the tribesmen were knocking on the doors of Srinagar, 
Hari Singh panicked and sought India's military assistance. 
India insisted on formal accession before any help could be 
rendered and Hari Singh had little choice but to sign on the 
dotted line, though the accession was to be later confirmed 
by a plebiscite after law and order had been restored in the 
state. Indian troops which were air lifted to Srinagar saved 
the city in the nick of the time and cleared three-fourths 
of Kashmir of raiders48 before Nehru sought U.N. arbitration 
to settle the dispute primarily at the instance of Mountbat­
ten, a decision which he regretted later.
The battle over Kashmir was as much ideological as it 
was over material gains in terms of security and economic 
advantage. As Josef Korbel sums up,
"The real cause of all the bitterness and bloodshed, 
the recalcitrance and the suspicion that have characterised 
the Kashmir dispute is the uncompromising and perhaps uncom- 
promisable struggle of two ways of life, two concepts of 
political organisation, two scales of values, two spiritual 
attitudes, that find themselves locked in deadly conflict, a 
conflict in which Kashmir has become both symbol and 
battleground".49 
Pakistani leaders considered it almost axiomatic that Kash­
mir should join Pakistan without which the latter would be
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incomplete both ideologically and geographically. For Nehru, 
Kashmir would "give a demonstration to all India and to the 
world how we can function unitedly and in a non-communal way 
in Kashmir. In this way this terrible crisis in Kashmir may 
well lead to a healing of the deep wounds which India has 
suffered in recent months".50 India and Nehru had never ac­
cepted partition along confessional lines in 1947 but only 
as an established fact. They, therefore, did not allow 
religous concerns to guide their actions over Kashmir.
The issue got further complicated by the fact that it 
got enmeshed in power politics once it was referred to U.N 
for arbitration. Nehru was furious that the "fundamental 
issue" i.e., the Pakistani aggression "has been slurred over 
and bypassed and passed over". He was convinced that- "The 
United States and Britain have played a dirty role, Britain 
probably being the chief actor behind the scenes".51. The 
general feeling in India was that the British support to 
Pakistan was a continuation of British support to the Muslim 
League in the pre-independence days and was at least partly 
aimed at winning back the support of the Muslim world which 
was alienated by the British policy in Palestine.52.
More importantly, what enabled India to take such a 
firm stand over Kashmir in defiance of Britain and the U.S. 
was the fact that the state power was securely in the hands 
of Indians and Britain could no longer act as an arbitrator 
between the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League
32
as it did before independence.
INDIA'S GENERAL FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES
At this juncture, it is essential to dwell at some length on 
two general tendencies which seem to permeate the whole 
gamut of India's foreign relations. The first is the status 
that was envisaged for India in the comity of nations by its 
leaders at the time of independence and the second is the 
centrality of security considerations to India's foreign 
policy endeavours from the very beginning.
First, the Indian elite either before the attainment of 
independence or after it, were anything but modest about 
India's future status as a great power.53 They were aware of 
India's potential as a great power and were determined 
towards the attainment of such status for India in right 
earnest.
Nehru also believed that India had the wherewithal to 
become the fourth most important power in the world after 
the United States of America, the Soviet Union and China. 
In his own words, "Leaving aside for a moment these three 
countries, the United States, the Soviet Union and China, if 
you look at the world there are other great countries, very 
advanced countries, but if you peep into the future and if 
nothing goes wrong, wars and the like, then obviously the 
fourth great country in the world is India".54
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Secondly, it is no exaggeration to say that the over­
riding consideration of India's foreign policy has been the 
security of the nation, both in internal and external terms. 
This is but natural for a country which has experienced 
colonial domination for almost two centuries and whose ser­
vitude was at least partly due to its perennial and endemic 
lack of internal cohesion. Nehru conceived India's security 
interests in a very broad and comprehensive terms. For him, 
defence meant much more than mere military preparedness. 
His security perceptions were largely, as we will see, a 
product of India's freedom movement though they were 
adequately tempered by a strong sense of realism which he 
displayed in the handling of foreign policy issues.
It was Nehru's firm conviction that the greatest danger 
to the stability and security of the infant Indian state 
came from within and not without. He saw the danger on two 
fronts. First, he realised that India's groaning poverty 
made it a fertile ground for internal communist subversion 
and the most effective way of countering this threat was 
rapid economic development coupled with distributive jus­
tice. For him, this was essentially a political battle to 
be won or lost on the political plane. Hence, he con­
sidered India's economic development as an integral part of 
India's security in the long run.
Nehru also conceived India's development as a genuinely 
secular entity as an essential prerequisite for its long
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term viability as a strong and stable state. In a multi­
religious country like India, only a secular framework could 
ensure national unity, integrity and solidarity. The parti­
tion of the country on the basis of religion only confirmed 
Nehru*s worst fears. It opened the pandora*s box which could 
potentially sound the death-knell of India*s unity and lead 
to its Balkanisation. Secessionist voices were heard at the 
time of independence in different parts of the country par­
ticularly among the Tamils in the South, the Akali Sikhs in 
the Punjab and in the tribal North-East. Both Nehru and 
Congress adamantly refused to accept the thesis that accept­
ing the creation of Pakistan was tantamount to accepting the 
two-nation theory. They knew full well that once two-nation 
theory was accepted, it would be illogical and untenable not 
to accept, at least in theory, a twenty-nation theory or 
whatever the number. For them, partition was the price the 
country had to pay to get rid of both the imperialist 
British and the intransigent Muslim League but certainly not 
the Muslims. This was the reason why they pooh-poohed any 
idea of exchange of populations as suggested by people like 
Raj agopalachari.
It is quite revealing that he once told Chester Bowles, 
the then US Ambassador to India that he personally con­
sidered the establishment of a secular state in India as his 
greatest contribution.55 However, by failing to act 
decisively in this regard particularly in relation to the
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Muslim community in India, Nehru left the job only half- 
done thereby creating problems for his successors in con­
tinuing with the process of political integration and mod­
ernization of the Indian state, as we shall see later.
NON-ALIGNMENT: RATIONALE AND RESILIENCE
Very few concepts in International Relations have, in recent 
times, evoked so much comment, controversy and confusion as 
that of non-alignment. From being labelled as "immoral" to 
the present status of "respectability", non-alignment has 
passed its uncertain youth to enter a more mature middle 
age. India, apart from being one of the founding members of 
the non-aligned group, has always been in the forefront of 
the movement. Non-alignment, in simple terms, is an asser­
tion of India's independence and sovereignty, of its ability 
and desire to guide its destiny according to her own free­
will without outside influence or intervention, both in ex­
ternal as well as internal affairs. "Non-alignment is 
simply an expression of the desire to attain maximum inde­
pendence in national decision-making whether on foreign or 
domestic issues".56
It is also necessary to emphasise the point that non- 
alignment has never had anything to do with either 
neutrality or isolationism. Nehru was aware that the tech­
nological revolution of the 20th Century has made the world
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rather small and interdependent. Hence, isolation of any 
kind is neither feasible nor desirable. Moreover, Nehru, 
being aware of India*s great potential, sought to place In­
dia in the thick of things by deliberately adopting a high 
profile in international affairs in order to develop a posi­
tive and profitable relationship with the rest of the world.
It is also a mistake to assume that non-alignment im­
plies equidistance in any sense. For instance, Werner Levi 
sees in non-alignment a perennial trend towards the "middle 
of the road" with the "middle" determined by the positions 
of other nations.57
However, non-alignment never had such a connotation. A 
cursory glance of India's attitude towards various interna­
tional issues clearly demonstrates that while India tried to 
maintain a semblance of balance in its dealing with contend­
ing parties in order to play the role of an honest broker, 
it never lost sight of, or shied away from the fundamental 
question involved. Korea, the Suez crisis of 1956 and Al­
geria may be cited as examples in this regard. Hence, India 
did take a definite stance over an issue whenever the occa­
sion demanded it. However, once that was done, India tried 
to achieve some sort of consensus on the procedures to be 
adopted in solving the problem.
As a corollary to the foregoing point, it is important 
to examine the relationship between alliances and non- 
alignment. Does non-alignment preclude any type of align­
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ment or alliance? The simple answer is no. Non-alignment 
is merely a diplomatic posture which enables a state to keep 
its options open till the very last moment. For Nehru 
alignment was "war-time psychology” and he saw no reason why 
it should be imported into times of relative peace. States 
have no permanent friends but only permanent interests. ”In 
international affairs”, said Nehru, "one can never be dead 
certain, and the friends of today might be enemies of 
tomorrow". Hence, it would be diplomatically imprudent to 
foreclose one's options with regard to matters as serious as 
war. Nehru said as early as 1952, "It is open to us to be 
associated in an alliance with any country. We have avoided 
alliances that might entangle us....In an alliance, one in­
evitably takes something and gives something in return....An 
alliance, nevertheless, need not stand in the way of inde­
pendence of the country".58
On another occasion he was even more forthright. "We 
are not going to join a war if we can help it. We are going 
to join the side which is to our interest when the time 
comes to make the choice."59
It follows from the above that non-alignment does not 
represent a rigid and doctrinaire approach to international 
relations but a flexible and pragmatic one. "It is flexible 
because it is a policy of independence and therefore, na­
tionally determinable. It is flexible because it is based 
on mutuality of interest. It is flexible because it does
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not involve ideological commitments to capitalism or com­
munism. It is flexible because it is pragmatic and takes 
into account the dynamism of change.”60
Nehru himself once stated that while non-alignment was 
a basic policy, ”its application to a particular cir­
cumstance or resolution is a matter of judgement”.61
There are also strong psychological reasons beneath 
India*s nonaligned stance as explained by Selig S. Harrison. 
Nehru "perceived in alignment the danger of psychological 
return to deep-rooted feelings of dependence and inferiority 
that he saw still lurking beneath the surface of the Indian 
national consciousness after the trauma of imperialism. 
Should India ever lose its sense of a great national des­
tiny, Nehru reflected, it could all too easily succumb once 
again to divisive centrifugal stresses”.62
It is for these reasons that Nehru called non-alignment 
the "natural policy” for India. He had no doubt that India 
"would follow it even if there was no other country in the 
world that followed it".63 He went to the extent that "he 
would rather India be reduced to dust than to give up Non- 
alignment. "64 Was Nehru being doctrinaire and fetish about 
non-alignment? No. Not at all. Nehru saw India as a great 
power in the making because of its history, civilization, 
size, population and resources. He simply could not en­
visage India playing anything less than an independent and 
assertive role in world affairs. It is her right and it is
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her destiny. Non-alignment symbolizes and epitomises this 
urge and aspiration. That is why he once described non 
-alignment as a "summary description" of India's foreign 
policy.65 It is in this sense, not in any ethical sense 
that he once remarked that it would be a "terrible moral 
failure" on the part of India if it ever gave up its non- 
aligned policy. To him, it was tantamount to admitting 
India's failure to live up to her potential and destiny 
which should be hers as a matter of right.
However, it must be noted that while Nehru's insistence on 
nonalignment for India was understandable and justified, his 
political and probably intellectual aversion to aligned na­
tions did adversely affect India's relations with important 
Middle Eastern countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia which 
were otherwise well disposed towards India. Nehru also 
seemed to have made a distinction between radical and con­
servative states in relation to the Middle East which was 
unwarranted. Consequently, Indian policy lost some of its 
flexibility and adaptability, which in turn, circumscribed 
India's already limited options in the region as we shall 
see later.
NON-ALIGNMENT AND BALANCE OF POWER
At this juncture, it is essential to explain at some length 
the relationship between non-alignment and the theory of
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balance of power. However, this will be done in two stages. 
First, we will consider the linkage between non-alignment 
and the theory of balance of power in general and later we 
will discuss the balance of power theory in specific rela­
tion to India which, of course, is our main interest.
Non-alignment is neither an abstention from nor an al­
ternative to the theory of balance of power, but an integral 
part of it. "The doctrine and practice of non-alignment 
suggests that it is a form of power politics —  albeit a 
form that is suitable for a weaker state that either by in­
clination or compulsion, must be externally involved if it 
is to shape its immediate external environment and if it is 
to direct internal economic and social change through peace­
ful means.”66
However, the modern theory of balance of power is dif­
ferent from its classical version in so far as it takes into 
account three important new variables of the post-war era, 
namely the emergence of the super powers, the advent of 
nuclear weapons, and the crystallization of a Third World 
consisting of newly independent Afro-Asian nations, which 
make ■ it a different sort of game altogether in the second 
half of the 20th century.
As Penrose explains, "A preliminary explanation...may 
best start by considering the position of the statesmen 
entrusted with the conduct of foreign affairs in any inde­
pendent State. Obviously, their first concern must be the
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survival of the State and the preservation of its indepen­
dence ....".
"In meeting these responsibilities statesmen are 
obliged to take account of the distribution of power in 
mind. They must strive to establish such relations with 
other countries as will ensure that no preponderance of 
power among the latter, singly or collectively, will 
threaten their independence or encompass their downfall. In 
the pursuit of this defensive aim they may decide, from time 
to time, to enter into or form alliances with other Powers, 
particularly when those countries whose designs they fear 
are linked by treaty engagements. In other circumstances 
they may eschew all alliances, fearing that by entering into 
one they would provoke a hostility of a rival group and be 
drawn into conflicts which they might avoid by remaining 
dissociated from either group. Much depends upon the 
geographical position and natural resources of the State in 
question: each State is unique in size, however defined in 
resources and in geographical position in relation to other 
States. Consequently the precise measure appropriate to the 
maintenance of a defensive balance of power differ in dif­
ferent countries. What is common is the aim of survival". 67
There can be very little doubt that the non-aligned 
countries as a group sought to exploit the rough balance of 
power that emerged in the world after the second World War 
between the Western countries led by the U.S., and the
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Socialist bloc under the Soviet auspices. The material and 
military weakness of the non-aligned made it impossible for 
them to adopt a confrontationist attitude towards the power 
blocs. On the other hand, it was neither possible nor 
desirable for them to remain aloof from them, for they 
needed the goodwill and the assistance of both in the mod­
ernization of their nations. In other words, non-alignment 
made it both possible and feasible for the Third World 
countries to combine simultaneously their contradictory 
yearnings for strategic isolation and an active role in in­
ternational affairs which "reflects at once a desire to 
avoid commitment — an understandable attitude for any people 
of meagre resources — and a wish to be among those who count 
in world affairs".68
The Afro-Asian countries which had just become free 
from colonial control were in no mood to brook any inter­
ference in their affairs. The non-aligned stance enabled 
them to insulate themselves from cold war politics by mini­
mising opportunities for outside intervention.
It also enabled them to shift the focus from power 
politics i.e., Cold war issues to issues which were more im­
portant and urgent to the Third World countries i.e., 
economic and social issues.
The non-aligned also facilitated the trend towards 
loosening of blocs and towards multi-polarity by providing 
an alternative to bloc politics through the formation of
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what is termed as "the area of peace”. The Non-aligned were 
never peace-makers in the conventional sense. They only 
facilitated it. The major powers knew the consequences of a 
global conflict and were as much interested as the non- 
aligned in de-escalating and localising conflicts so that 
they could stop short of reaching a point of no return 
without complete loss of face. And therein lay the 
strength, utility and relevance of the non-aligned.
The non-aligned countries were also able to increase 
their manoeuvrability vis-a-vis power blocs for non- 
alignment always carried within itself the implied threat of 
alignment. As Harrison points out, "Non-aligned countries 
as a whole enjoyed an artificially strong bargaining posi­
tion during the early years of the Cold War".69
Nehru was both annoyed and puzzled that the powers that 
were either failed or refused to take notice of the changing 
power equation between Western world and the newly emerged 
Afro-Asian world. He bemoaned
"...the countries which enjoyed the privileged position 
in that 19th century set-up, many of them have lost their 
position. It is not easy for them to adjust themselves to 
the new thinking, the new balance in the world, the new 
balances — apart from the giants coming up—  and the new 
renaissance in Asia and Asian countries becoming independent 
in their different ways, whether it is India or China, or 
Indonesia or Burma or other countries. The old balances go
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on being changed and governments, very wise governments, 
cannot easily keep pace with those practical developments. 
Of course the most remarkable fact about this lack of aware­
ness, proper awareness, (is) that a great country like China 
is there (and) of course they know it. Nevertheless, they 
seem to lack something, or otherwise, their policy would be 
different. But it is not merely a question of China. It is 
really a question of the outlook on all Asian problems or 
African problems and the idea that, as previously they have 
to be settled by the great Powers whom we all respect, 
hardly taking into consideration what the countries of Asia 
might feel about it....So this kind of difficulty is there 
and facts and events have gone on, bringing about enormous 
changes, and yet, the mind of man cannot keep pace, and it 
keeps in the old ruts....".70
As M.M. Rahman observes, "The greatest significance of 
non-alignment perhaps lies in the fact that it announced the 
desire of the Asian and African States to enter the balance- 
of-power struggle in their own right. Not all the Afro-Asian 
States had the geographical and other advantages to realise 
this aim. It was, therefore, fitting that those who had the 
advantage took the lead".71
It was, therefore, in the fitness of things that India, 
potentially the most powerful and important of the non- 
aligned countries, was the torch-bearer of this struggle of 
the Afro-Asian countries to redefine and refashion their
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relationship vis-a-vis the West. This is the theme of the 
next stage of our discussion.
INDIA AND THE BALANCE OF POWER THEORY
It goes without saying that Nehru was, from the beginning 
acutely aware of and alive to the realities and require­
ments of the balance of power game. "India talked about the 
undesirability of power politics during the 1950s, but in 
practice it did not try to exempt itself from the oppor­
tunities and obligations of power politics”.72
At the time of independence, Nehru realised that 
India*s material and military weakness would come in the way 
of India playing an assertive and independent role in inter­
national affairs. Nevertheless, he also saw certain advan­
tages, which were unique to India and would help her hold 
her own in the international arena despite her apparent lack 
of material power.
So he came up with the idea of nonalignment or an inde­
pendent foreign policy. As Ashok Kapur asserts, "Indian 
non-alignment is nothing but a strategy of being engaged in 
power politics but of a doing so preferably through 
diplomacy, given India's military and economic 
weaknesses".73
Krishna Menon explains,"This is a policy of indepen­
dence and peace; that is, materially speaking, a weak man's
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policy. In a sense. ..it is like Gandhi's non- 
cooperation”. 74 In other words, "nonalignment is a strategy 
to gain influence on the cheap; it is a low-key strategy". 
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Nehru also sought to take advantage of the general 
goodwill and sympathy that existed for India in the world at 
large. India's culture and civilization coupled with 
Gandhi's moral leadership obtained for India high and 
favourable standing in the international community. India 
should try and benefit from and reservoir of goodwill that 
existed for her.
More importantly, Nehru was quite conscious of the 
tremendous potential that India possessed and the sort of 
leverage that such potential would entail India even in the 
shortrun. He was quite confident of India's importance, her 
lack of physical strength notwithstanding.
"The fact of the matter is that in spite of our weak­
ness in a military sense...India even today counts in world 
affairs....If we had been some odd little nation somewhere 
in Europe or Asia it would not have mattered much. But be­
cause we count and because we are going to count more and 
more in the future, everything we do becomes a matter for 
comment".76
Ironically, India's non-aligned stance which sought to 
diminish and de-escalate the intense cold war tensions of 
the years immediately following the World War II, found sus­
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tenance and gained in importance and stature from the same 
Cold War tensions. As Surjit Mansingh explains, "The unique 
configuration of world politics after the Second World War 
admirably suited the establishment of India*s non-alignment 
and gave it greater significance than it would have had in 
other circumstances. The great power rivalry, which Nehru 
had almost prophetically anticipated before the war ended, 
tended to attract most states into one or the other of the 
antagonistic coalitions, each putting forward its ideologi­
cal system to achieve global adherence. India would have 
pursued nonalignment vis-a-vis any greater powers as an as­
sertion of its true independence, but when that posture was 
proclaimed, and later achieved, with respect to the two 
coalitions dominating the global arena India's uniqueness 
gained for it a special kind of influence or power".77
Thus, the cold war was not one of the fundamental 
stimuli for India's non-aligned stance; it merely acted as a 
catalyst and brought non-alignment into sharp focus giving 
it a lot of verve and veracity.
India insisted upon each state actor, particularly the 
newly independent Afro-Asian countries, participating in the 
balancing process in their own right as independent and 
sovereign nations rather than taking shelter behind other 
powers or going on crutches. This must have been in Nehru's 
mind when he said in the Lok Sabha in 1957,
"It seems to me to really lead to the conclusion that
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where circumstances compel an imperialist power to withdraw, 
necessarily you must presume that is has left a vacuum. If 
so, how is that vacuum to be filled? Surely if somebody 
else comes in, it is a repetition of the old story, perhaps 
in a different form. It can only be filled by the people of 
that country growing and developing themselves economically, 
politically, or otherwise”.78
Non-alignment seems to have served this purpose par­
ticularly well. "As a concept it [non-alignment] has sub­
tlety and richness; and the policies which derive from it 
are eminently respectable, not only helping this large 
country to maintain its independence, but also helping in­
ternational society to continue as a society of independent, 
sovereign, co-existing states; and this at a time, when that 
society has expanded enormously and yet bears more soft 
spots than during any of its past historical phases. Much 
of this help is effected without economic power and a 
military capability absurdly limited for such large 
obj ect ives".79
India's balance of power policy operates on three broad 
planes i.e., sub-continental, regional and global. It suits 
India to be non-aligned on all the three planes for dif­
ferent reasons. "Indeed, nonalignment is no new 
manifestation; it is but a particular balance of power 
policy to suit the particular circumstances of India's posi­
tion in the World".80
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GLOBAL BALANCE
Nehru, long before independence, realised that India was 
protected by a global balance of power, if only she took ad­
vantage of it and played her cards shrewdly. Nehru saw no 
reason to change his views in 1947 when India entered the 
international arena characterized by bipolarity as a free 
nation. He implicitly acknowledged the existence of a rough 
but uneasy balance in the global context. "As things are 
today, we have reached a certain kind of balance —  it may 
be very unstable balance, but it is still some kind of 
balance —  when any kind of major aggression is likely to 
lead to a world war. That itself is a restraining factor." 
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It was Nehru's appreciation that such unstable balance 
could easily be disturbed with grave consequences for the 
world at large. He was also aware that this acted as a 
restraining factor on all the major powers in general and on 
the super powers in particular. Hence, he sought to take 
advantage of the nuclear paralysis of the super powers to 
carve out a niche for India and the materially weak Third 
World by creating and enlarging what he called an "area of 
peace" not geographically but "politically, diplomatically, 
morally". Super powers themselves took notice of and 
availed themselves of the "cushioning effect" that the non-
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aligned produced and paraded.
Nehru was only too well aware of India's great poten­
tial. He also appreciated the fact that it really did not 
require great weight to tilt the scales in the unstable 
balance that existed in the world. For these two reasons 
India counted despite its weaknesses.
As Surjit Mansingh explains, "India's non-alignment was 
the main source of its power in international political 
relations. The power derived from non-alignment existed 
only in relation to those states whose peculiar interests 
were affected when that posture was assumed by another 
state. That came to be the case with the US and the 
USSR.... Neither side was able to obtain any sort of commit­
ment from New Delhi to provide support, and therein lay 
India's power".82
REGIONAL BALANCE
China has been India's principal rival for regional in­
fluence and leadership. Nehru saw this much earlier than 
others. He said in 1927, "The Chinese Revolution is not an 
event of local interest and importance. It is a world 
phenomenon of the greatest historic importance.... the 
country which will be most affected by the issue will be 
India".83 He told Frank Moraes in 1952, "Never forget that 
the basic challenge in Southeast Asia is between India and
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China. That challenge runs along the spine of Asia”.
Nehru saw quite early that, at least, in military 
terms, the regional balance between India and China was ad­
verse to India. He had two options before him for respond­
ing to this potential threat to India's security, physical 
as well as ideological. The first was to join the western 
alliance aimed at containing China. This option had two 
serious shortcomings. First, joining any such al­
liance, apart from incurring the immediate wrath of China, 
would inevitably alienate the USSR and that was the last 
thing that Nehru wanted. In fact, he anticipated the Sino- 
Soviet schism much earlier than many and joining the Western 
alliance would have meant that India foreclosed the option 
of exploiting Sino-Soviet differences to its advantage.
Secondly, he was also aware that any alliance would en­
tail mutual obligations which would inevitably lead to a 
dilution of India's independence of action. Neither India 
nor Nehru, just free from Western colonial domination, were 
prepared for such a possibility.
Nehru, however, reasoned that China, despite its cur­
rent military superiority, could not pose an immediate 
threat to India. To quote Bowles, "Nehru expressed concern 
over the long-term problem Communist China posed for In­
dia. ...He staked his hopes for a peaceful relationship, not 
on Chinese goodwill, but on the assumption that the Chinese 
leaders needed a period of peace in which to solidify their
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revolution”.84
Nehru's strategy was to buy time for India so that In­
dia would be able to take on the Chinese challenge on its 
own when the time came. He told the Lok Sabha in 1958,
"Security can be obtained in many ways. The normal 
idea is that security is protected by armies. That is only 
partly true; it is equally true that security is protected 
by policies. A deliberate policy of friendship with other 
countries goes further in gaining security than almost any­
thing else".85
Hence, he made an unceasing and unabashed effort to 
cultivate and woo China without losing sight of India's 
primary interests. So non-alignment became India's first 
line of defence vis-a-vis China. However, the regional 
plane proved to be the most tricky ground for the opera­
tional efficacy of non-alignment. As Surjit Mansingh points 
out,
"...non-alignment was powerless against such states as 
Pakistan and China whose interests vis-a-vis India would 
have been constant regardless of New Delhi's diplomatic 
stance".86
SUBCONTINENTAL BALANCE
India always considered the sub-continental sphere as its 
own backyard. It has always been the predominant power in
this sphere from the beginning and it could pursue and 
protect its interests on its own without any alignment. In 
fact, its endeavour, has been to keep the sub-continent free 
from outside influence so that outside powers could neither 
restrict nor restrain Indiafs freedom of action nor bolster 
other powers in the sub-continent vis-a-vis India. India 
also had the material and military strength to back up its 
policies in this sphere and it never shirked or shied away 
from doing so when the occasion demanded it. Since indepen­
dence it has been India*s endeavour to preserve the balance 
that existed in its favour in the sub-continent and to in­
crease it progressively with the passage of time. It is in 
this context that Indo-Pak relations acquire significance 
for Pakistan almost has a mirror-image of India's percep­
tions, policies and interests.
This three-fold division of India's balance of power 
approach is not rigid and in fact, there is, of necessity, a 
lot of overlapping and interaction. Nevertheless, it serves 
as a useful analytical framework. Nor should it be forgot­
ten that India also shifted its emphasis on non-alignment on 
the three planes depending on the exigencies of the situa­
tion. In other words, India sought to take advantage of the 
existence of rough global and regional balance to preserve 
and promote the sub-continental balance which was in its 
favour by insulating the sub-continent from outside inter­
vention or influence. Nehru propounded a Monroe doctrine for
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the sub-continent when he said in 1955, "Any attempt by a 
foreign power to interfere in any way with India is a thing 
which India can not tolerate and which subject to her 
strength, she will oppose. That is the doctrine I lay 
down".87
India’s approach to the concept of balance of power can 
be summed up in the words of G.S. Bajpai, the Secretary- 
General of India's External Affairs Ministry in 1952, "India 
. . . has to develop her strength to support her foreign 
policy. The inherent goodness of that policy is insuffi­
cient to sustain or further it. On this view the inference 
that politics cannot be divorced from power holds true also 
for India....Today, India is the major stabilising factor 
for peace in Asia; the measure of stability that she can im­
part to this part of the world is not a matter of good in­
tentions but of power....It is not power but its misuse or 
abuse which is morally reprehensible....Thus viewed the 
ideal of balance of power is nothing evil or incompatible 
with India's highest ideals".88
It goes without saying that Pakistan and the Middle East 
constituted important factors in India's balance of power 
calculations at the subcontinental, regional and global 
levels. Indian policy makers perceived that Pakistan had a 
direct and the Middle East a derivative bearing on India's 
internal cohesion and regional aspirations. Hence, this had 
a more direct impact on India's foreign policy than its more
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general nonaligned stance because of the immediacy of its 
consequences. India*s contest with Pakistan also had an ef­
fect on her relations with China. Both China and Pakistan 
considered India's nonaligned stance to have no bearing on 
their respective interests vis-a-vis India. It was this 
basic community of interests between Pakistan and China that 
alerted India to a potential adverse balance of power at the 
regional level. Pakistan and the Middle East were also fac­
tors in India's global balance of power concerns. Pakistan 
joining the Western alliance in the 50s and its close rela­
tions with the Middle Eastern states such as Iran which were 
part of the Western alliance system caused concern to the 
Indian policy makers of a possible adverse global balance 
and the problems that a nonaligned India might face in coun­
tering such adverse balance. It is in this three-fold 
balance of power framework that we would examine India's 
relations with the super powers, China and Pakistan respec­
tively in order to explain and appreciate India's interac­
tions in these spheres in the context of its overall foreign 
policy objectives.
INDIA AND THE SUPER-POWERS
India's relations with the two super powers, the USA and the 
USSR, more or less epitomise India's great power aspirations 
and also throw considerable light on India's preferred means
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of achieving them.
As we have already seen, Nehru saw India1s opportunity 
in the rough global balance that existed between the two 
power blocs at the time of Indian independence. Nehru was 
quite convinced that the cold war primarily represented the 
conflict of geopolitical interests between the United States 
and the Soviet Union with ideological divergence only adding 
a sharp edge to it. Nehru saw quite early the awesome 
potential of the United States and its implications for the 
rest of the world. He wondered whether "the great problem of 
the near future will be American imperialism, even more than 
British imperialism, which appears to have had its day and 
is crumbling fast. Or, it may be, that the two will unite 
together in an endeavour to create a powerful Anglo-Saxon 
bloc to dominate the world".89
Nehru no doubt saw the Soviet Union as the only 
credible and effective countervailing force to the ever in­
creasing and all-pervading power and influence of the United 
States. His instructions to the Indian Ambassadors to USA 
and China about sums up India1 s approach to the two power 
blocs. "The two leading groups today are the Russian bloc 
and the Anglo-American bloc. We must be friendly to both 
and yet not join either. Both America and Russia are ex­
traordinarily suspicious of each other as well as of other 
countries. This makes our path difficult and we may well be 
suspected by each of leaning towards the other. This cannot
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be helped....”. India needs America because "There is much 
goodwill for America and expectation of help from her in 
many fields, especially technical". Nor could India afford 
to antagonise the Russians. "The Soviet Union being our 
neighbour, we shall inevitably develop closer relations with 
it. We can not afford to antagonise Russia merely because 
we think that this may irritate someone else".90
Explaining the geopolitics of India*s approach to super 
powers, Nehru said,"Situated between the vast Communist land 
mass of Eurasia and the Indian Ocean controlled by the West 
we had to cooperate with both".91
However, the fact remains that Nehru generally speaking 
displayed a greater sensitivity to Russian sensibilities 
than to that of the Americans. The reasons for this are not 
far to seek.
First, Nehru considered the United States "too far away 
for effective action". The Americans on the other hand felt 
that their interests in South Asia were only marginal, it 
would follow that the incentive for United States to inter­
vene in the region on behalf of India would also be limited.
The USSR, however, is a different kettle of fish. 
Nehru was aware of the proximity of the USSR to India and 
realised that it could easily be a "thorn in India's side" 
if relations became strained. In 1940, Nehru surmised that 
the Russians "were not likely to ignore India which touched 
their frontiers in Asia". If Russia had greater stake in
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South Asia than the US, then it follows that the Russian 
need to intervene in the region either on behalf of or 
against India was also greater to that extent. Hence, the 
need not to antagonise the USSR. This, at least, partly ex­
plains India's rather mild and muted criticism of the USSR 
when it chose to intervene militarily in Hungary in 1956 and 
Czechoslovakia in 1968. Nehru, at least from the mid-50s 
began to consider the USSR as the most effective counter 
against the growing Chinese pressure vis-a-vis India both 
because of the Chinese dependence on the USSR and the 
ability of the USSR to intervene physically in any future 
Sino-Indian conflict to the advantage of India if USSR so 
desired.
At the height of the cold war, India along with the 
other nonaligned countries tried to act as a "bridge" be­
tween the USA and the USSR. The existence of a rough global 
balance and the advent of nuclear weapons both necessitated 
and facilitated such a role.
Nehru was quite aware of the similarity of interests 
between the US and the USSR. Hence, once detente, however 
limited, was achieved between the two super powers, India 
manoeuvred to become an area of agreement between them. This 
process was facilitated by two factors: 1) the acceptance of 
super powers of India's middle path based on ideological as 
well as methodological moderation; and 2) the rise of China 
as an independent factor in international politics.
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Explaining the international significance of India's 
internal experiment Nehru said, "...today there is almost 
universal understanding and appreciation of what we are 
trying to do on the economic plane — that is, planning under 
a democratic pattern of socialism. This has set a new pat­
tern for Asian and African development and it is significant 
that economists and other experts from both the worlds...are 
extremely interested in our development plans and progress. 
We are giving a lot of consideration to this issue and are 
tackling it in a big way with organised thought behind it. 
This makes of India itself a kind of an area of agreement 
between the opposing ideological forces".92
Consequently, both the super powers developed a stake 
in the stability and security of India and sought its 
cooperation in countering China on two planes. First, both 
the super powers sought to cultivate India's active coopera­
tion in moderating the Third World's political and economic 
demands and keeping the radical elements within the movement 
under check. India too became a willing partner for it 
eminently suited India's interests. India even bilaterally 
needs to maintain a working and workable relationship with 
both the super powers and continue to be an area of super 
power agreement to the extent possible. This would not be 
possible if third world countries, of which India is the 
unofficial spokesman and leader, overtly show a tilt in 
favour of one super power or the other. Secondly, the ad­
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vent of nuclear weapons, according to Indian perceptions had 
changed the rules of the game which the nations of the world 
can ignore only at great peril to themselves. The most im­
portant issue confronting the mankind is the threat of a 
nuclear holocaust. And if the USA and the USSR should come 
to some sort of understanding in order to avoid nuclear 
catastrophe, third world countries should also moderate 
their demands and the means of achieving them, however jus­
tified and urgent they may be, in order to avoid disaster. 
As Nehru argued, "The only way to avoid conflicts is to ac­
cept things more or less as they are. No doubt, many things 
require to be changed, but you must not think of changing 
them by war".93
There were at least two occasions when the nonaligned 
movement appeared to have confronted the problem of divi­
sions within between radical and confrontationist elements 
on the one hand and moderate and reformist elements on the 
other.
The first occasion was in the early 60s, when 
Indonesia*s Sukarno under the Chinese influence and inspira­
tion sought to persuade the third world to adopt a more 
militant and confrontationist attitude towards the developed 
countries in making their demands and tried to wrest the 
leadership of the Third World from moderate and reformist 
oriented leadership. Addressing the Non-aligned Conference 
at Cairo in October 1964, he made it clear that he saw no
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special need for the third world to strive for better under­
standing between the two super powers. He also saw nothing 
evil or unnatural in the third world adopting a confron­
tationist approach. Sukarno just as if to prove his point 
later withdrew Indonesia from the United Nations.
However, the ascendancy of the radical elements in the 
Third World movement proved to be short-lived. First, the 
radical approach did not find favour with most Third World 
leaders. The fall of Sukarno was also a great blow to the 
radical elements. More importantly, moderate countries like 
India seized this opportunity to assert themselves and bring 
the movement back under their control.
In 1966, as if to make a formal assertion of their as­
cendancy, the moderate elements within the Third World saw 
to it that "an explicit declaration was made by the develop­
ing countries in their meeting at Algiers that there was no 
need for a confrontation between the developed and the 
developing countries for the creating of what was called a 
just economic order".94
The second occasion was when the nonaligned movement 
showed a slight drift to the left under the Chairmanship of 
Cuba on the basis of the argument that Socialist bloc was 
the "natural allies" of the Third World. India was not 
amused. As soon as India took over the Chairmanship from 
Cuba, she made an assiduous and persistent effort to restore 
balance to the movement and put it firmly on the middle path
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once again. Thus, whatever may be their differences with 
India, neither the US nor the USSR can afford to ignore the 
moderating role that India has been playing in the politics 
of the Third World.
Secondly, both the super powers, at one time or the 
other wanted India to play a more active regional role in 
opposition to China. USA, from the beginning wanted India 
to take Southeast Asia under its wings vis-a-vis China.
In 1969, after serious clashes between the Russian and 
Chinese forces along the Ussuri river, the Soviet Union 
proposed what it termed as the Asian Collective Security as 
a counter to China and tried to rope in India.
On both the occasions, India shied away from the 
responsibility. India, perhaps, does not want to enter into 
any overt anti-Chinese alliance sponsored by either of the 
super power for it could seriously restrict its own 
diplomatic options and freedom of manoeuvre.
India also possibly does not want to get entangled in 
regional issues which could be a drain on its scarce 
resources and distract its attention from domestic 
reconstruction which remains her top priority.
India would also not like to alienate China at a time 
when sensitive border talks have been going on and Sino-Pak 
collusion causing considerable concern. It may be that India 
discounts China to be a very real threat to Southeast Asia 
under the changed circumstances.
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Though India resisted the overtures of both the USA and 
the USSR to enter into any formal alliance with either of 
them to protect Southeast Asia from a possible Chinese 
threat, the fact remains that both the USA and the USSR have 
a stake in the stability and security of Southeast Asia and 
hence this makes it another important area of agreement be­
tween them with regard to India.
While India certainly desired and worked to remain an 
area of agreement between the super powers and sought to 
solve its own problems as well as those of the Third World 
in concurrence rather than in confrontation with them, the 
last thing it ever wanted was a super power condominium. 
Though the existing differences in the perceptions and 
policies of the super powers make such a possibility rather 
remote, nevertheless India stoutly resisted any such ten­
dencies, however incipient, on the part of the super powers.
India*s policies, both individually and in concert with 
other Third World countries have been geared to check and 
curtail the power and influence of the super powers and to 
ease gradually their stranglehold over the international 
system. This objective has been pursued relentlessly on dif­
ferent planes through different forums.
Politically, this manifests itself in the Nonaligned 
movement (NAM) which came into existence in defiance of the 
cold war logic of inevitability of bloc polarisation and 
carved out a niche for the Third World in international
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politics despite their military and material vulnerability.
Economically, this urge culminated in the demand for a 
New International Economic Order (NIEO) which seeks to alter 
the structure and functions of the existing economic order 
which, according to the Third World, is heavily loaded and 
oriented in favour of the developed world and tends to per­
petuate the Western dominance and the Third World depen­
dency. This objective is pursued through various forums such 
as NAM, UN, North-South Dialogue and the Group of 77.
Diplomatically, the Third World sought to tame the su­
per powers through the strengthening of the United Nations 
thereby limiting their opportunities to intervene 
unilaterally and arbitrarily. The overwhelming strength 
that the Third World enjoys in the UN proved to be a stum­
bling block for the super powers on many an occasion and put 
them on the defensive in a diplomatic sense.
Strategically, the Third World tried to diminish and 
circumscribe the influence of the super powers by gradually 
loosening the rigidity of bipolar politics and helping the 
trend towards multi-polarity. It is in this context that 
the rise of Western Europe, China, Japan and India as inde­
pendent power centres must be seen. The enthusiasm of the 
Third World for regional organisations and groupings must be 
understood against this background.
Militarily, the Third World chose to check the super 
power domination by their crusade against military bases and
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by their persistent demand for general and global disarma­
ment though not very successfully. They also sought to place 
limits on their military expansion by declaring space, An­
tarctica and different oceans as Zones of Peace.
The Third World also sought to neutralise the domina­
tion of the world by the Western mass media, which it 
thought was giving a negative and distorted image to events 
in the Third World. A "New Information Order" was declared 
as the avowed goal and the "Nonaligned News Pool" was 
created as the first concrete step towards the realisation 
of this goal. In fact, "...military defense, aspirations 
for regional and global influence, leadership in the build­
ing of a new international economic order, and the gradual 
curtailment of super power dominance over world affairs have 
been the central policies of the Government of India since 
its founding in 1947".95
Another important area where India has serious dis­
agreements with both the super powers and stubbornly and 
persistently refused to yield to their pressures and blan­
dishments is on the issue of nuclear technology. India has 
pursued a zealously independent line with regard to the 
nuclear issue ever since independence and defied both the 
super powers in refusing to sign the NPT which it branded as 
discriminatory. India's approach to the issue can be summed 
up in the words of V.C. Trivedi. "The problem of negotiating 
a treaty on non-proliferation has implications far beyond
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the realm of proliferation of nuclear weapons or even of 
general and complete disarmament. The attitudes that we take 
and the approaches we adopt on this will reflect our at­
titudes and approaches on international relations in 
general. It is therefore imperative that we take a global 
approach on this issue, take into account the needs and 
requirements of all members of the international community 
and follow an approach which reflects our firm adherence to 
the sovereign equality of all nations and to the principles 
of equality and mutual benefit".96
India1s approach to the issue of Indian Ocean is yet 
another example of India's ability and willingness to differ 
from and oppose both the super powers wherever and whenever 
she considered her own vital interests to be at stake. India 
considers Indian Ocean to be her own lake and considers any 
intrusions from outside as unwarranted and undesirable. 
Since she would not possess the naval strength to dominate 
the Indian Ocean in the near future, India utilised her 
diplomatic means to persuade the UN General Assembly to pass 
a resolution declaring "Indian Ocean to be a Zone of Peace". 
Though India has been putting a lot of diplomatic pressure 
on both the super powers to leave the Indian Ocean alone, 
she has been particularly worried about the American base at 
Diego Garcia which would make it that much more difficult 
for India to nudge US out of Indian Ocean some time in fu­
ture when India is ready to take on the responsibility her­
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self. An American official acknowledged this in an interview 
with an Indian scholar while discussing India's objectives 
in general. "Obviously regional supremacy in South Asia and 
in the India Ocean region". He went on to add, "India wants 
to be the dominant power.It opposes Diego Garcia because it 
affects its position".97
India has also been fairly ambivalent to the super 
powers, particularly with regard to the United States, in 
relation to two issues. The first issue is India's desire to 
evolve as an independent and autonomous power centre and the 
response of USA and USSR to such a desire. It has been 
India's experience that USSR rather than the USA has ap­
peared to be much more sympathetic and helpful in assisting 
India achieve this goal. The United States, in the 50s and 
60s, refused to help India in setting up basic industries 
like steel mills and refused to transfer technology for the 
establishment of an indigenous arms industry whereas the 
Russians helped India on both the counts.
In the words of Baldev Raj Nayar, "...in its economic 
aid programme the US refused to provide such aid as would 
help in the building of an independent centre of power in 
India, first in the economic sphere and later in the 
military sphere as well, even when India was confronted by a 
security threat from China, the supposedly ideological an­
tagonist of the United States".98
The second issue is the attitude of the super powers to
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Pakistan in relation to India. While both the US and the 
Soviet Union at some time or the other tried to follow an 
even-handed policy with regard to India and Pakistan and 
used economic aid and arms sales for this purpose, it was 
the US again that the Indians suspected of shoring up Pakis­
tan under the illusion of maintaining parity between the two 
countries and what was worse of trying to build up Pakistan 
as a counter to India.
As Baldev Raj Nayar sees it, "In its surge towards ex­
tending American power and influence and in forcing India to 
come to terms with it, the United States adopted the policy 
of containment toward India by building up Pakistan 
militarily, thus neutralising Indian power in the region. 
This was not a novel element in American foreign policy 
specifically forged for India, but was part of an axiomatic 
principle in U.S. foreign policy to create regional balances 
favourable to the United States in order to ensure American 
influence and control".99
These are very sensitive issues and the attitude of su­
per powers to these issues would significantly determine the 
nature and content of future interaction between the USA and 
the USSR on the one hand and India on the other. However, 
generally speaking, for most Indians "an appropriate en­
vironment for Indiafs strategic interaction with the great 
powers is one that simultaneously precludes their country 
from being ignored or coerced".100
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INDIA AND CHINA
As we have already stated, China has been India's rival for 
regional leadership and non-alignment was most vulnerable 
and least effective against China in a diplomatic sense. 
Hence the policy of deliberate friendship with China.
It appears that at least, initially, Nehru considered 
China to be a counter to Russia and not vice versa. Nehru 
reasoned that China was beset with internal problems and 
would need time to consolidate its revolution whereas Rus­
sia, which was already a super power, appeared to be poten­
tially a greater threat to IndialOl. Hence cultivating 
China would be useful counter to any possible Russian 
threat.
Nehru was also swayed by his strong sense of Asian 
solidarity. He was piqued by the fact that Asia's view 
point was not being given the attention that it deserved. 
For him the treatment that was being meted out to China was 
at least partly due to the arrogance and ignorance of the 
Western powers with regard to problems relating to the inde­
pendent and resurgent Asia.
Nehru did envisage some sort of Sino-Indian coalition 
as a counter to the West in a political and diplomatic sense 
if not military. However, being conscious of potential 
Sino-Indian regional rivalry, Nehru must have been aware of
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the serious limitations of such a coalition if ever it 
materialised.
India's championing of China's case in international 
forums has a less noble and more pragmatic side to it. 
Nehru foresaw the Sino-Soviet rift and was keen on 
facilitating if not hastening it. The best way to do it, as 
he saw it, was to reduce China's exclusive dependence on the 
Soviet Union for political and diplomatic support. The 
first step towards a friendly relationship with China was 
India's immediate recognition of the Communist regime. As 
Krishna Menon describes "The recognition of China was an act 
of political maturity; not to do so would be just closing 
your eyes to stubborn reality."102
When the Chinese armed forces marched in to Tibet in 
1950, there was very little that India could have done to 
stop it India refused to represent Tibet in the United Na­
tions and discouraged it from taking the issue to the UN. 
India, however, mediated a 17 point agreement which en­
visaged large degree of autonomy for Tibet coupled with an 
assurance to preserve the distinct culture and traditions of 
the Tibetans. In other words, the Tibet episode was 
deliberately played down in order not to alienate China.103
Nevertheless, the Indian Government was quite alive to 
the changed strategic situation on its northern borders and 
"responded to the altered Himalayan situation in a manner 
that must be described as politically discreet, diplomati­
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cally cautious, economical of financial and material 
resources and projected over a long time."104
Moreover, the Indian Government also tried to avoid a 
"vigorous and publicised program of Himalayan security 
measures" which it thought would be contrary to the 
"government's professions of friendship and goodwill toward 
China and provoke the very response which Indian diplomacy 
sought to prevent an overt challenge along the long 
Himalayan frontier".105
The outbreak of the Korean War and China's involvement 
in it also gave Nehru an opportunity to demonstrate his 
goodwill towards China. He refused to brand China as an ag­
gressor and was critical of the US for bringing the Seventh 
Fleet into the Taiwan straits. He was also opposed to the 
American policy in Indo-China. This was not exactly 
designed to please the Chinese but it couldn't but have gone 
down well with the Chinese who were actively involved in the 
region.
The Panch Sheel which was signed in 1954 was the high 
water mark of the "Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai era". The five 
principles which constituted the Panch Sheel were: 1) mutual 
respect for each other's territorial integrity and 
sovereignty; 2) mutual nonaggression; 3) mutual noninter­
ference in each other's internal affairs; 4) equality and 
mutual benefit; and 5) peaceful coexistence.
Nehru seemed to have been quite keen on committing the
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Chinese formally to these principles which he thought might 
act as a restraint on the Chinese future behaviour. Ex­
plaining the significance and utility of Panch Sheel he said 
that it was "a question of following a policy which.. .makes 
it more and more difficult progressively for the other 
country to break trust we can create an environment wherein 
it becomes a little more dangerous to the other party to 
break away from the pledges given”. 106 However, it is dif­
ficult to assess as to what extent Nehru considered the 
Panch Sheel effective in moderating the Chinese behaviour.
India also adopted a deliberately low-key approach to 
Southeast Asian security problems, at least partly, not to 
offend China. The United States was quite keen on India 
taking Southeast Asia under its wings in order to protect it 
from any possible Chinese threat. Though, Nehru was aware 
of India's need to protect its flanks, he was convinced that 
China posed no immediate threat to the region. Nor was he 
prepared to take on new responsibilities which had no direct 
or immediate relevance to India and distract attention from 
the more pressing needs of economic development.
The general policy of deliberate friendship with China 
was also greatly responsible for India's low-key and ostrich 
like approach to the border question which led to disastrous 
consequences laterl07. When India protested to the Chinese 
about maps showing large tracts of territory claimed by In­
dia as its own, the Chinese non-committal reply was that
73
they were published by the previous government and that the 
Communist government did not revise them for want of time. 
On another occasion the Chinese expressed the opinion that 
the time was not yet "ripe" to settle the border issue. But 
the Chinese gave the impression that they accepted the Mac- 
Mahon line as the boundary in general. As Krishna Menon ex­
plains, "They [the Chinese] had told us that there was no 
dispute between us and that since they had agreed to the 
MacMahon Line in regard to Burma, they would do the same 
thing in regard to us, and that there was no question of 
frontier disputes”.108
In the event, the Chinese were to claim in 1960, "It is 
both illogical and inconceivable to argue that an outstand­
ing issue will automatically cease to exist merely because 
it is not mentioned during certain negotiations".109
It was not until September 1957 that the Indian Govern­
ment came to know about the existence of the Karakoram high­
way linking Tibet with Sinkiang which ran through Aksai Chin 
area of Ladakh which India claimed to be its own territory. 
In October 1958, India protested against the Chinese 
"violation of its territorial sovereignty". In March 1959, 
"a full scale popular uprising" in Tibet followed a high­
handed Chinese attempt to "Sinicization" of Tibet. The sub­
sequent flight of the Dalai Lama to India vitiated the at­
mosphere further. Chou En-lai*s visit to Delhi in April 
1960 failed to break the deadlock. In the meantime, public
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opinion in India hardened against the Chinese and the 
criticism in Parliament of Nehru's China policy became 
virulent leaving him with little elbow room.
The more extravagant the Chinese claims became, the 
more difficult it became for Nehru to keep incensed Indian 
public opinion in check. The Chinese were in possession of 
more or less all the territory they claimed in Ladakh and 
made wild claims in the eastern sector as a sort of bargain­
ing chip. In other words, they presented Nehru with a fait 
accompli and made it clear that any attempt on the part of 
India to change the status-quo would be met with force. 
They did not appear to be keen on even going through the mo­
tions of a compromise based on a give and take approach. It 
is clear that the Chinese wanted a settlement on their terms 
and also wanted the world to know that it was so.110
Krishna Menon was to say later, "They the Chinese] 
could have got whatever they wanted within reason from us at 
any time to our mutual advantage had they only tried to get 
it in a different, more reasonable way".111
Why, then, were the Chinese so implacable and 
intransigent? By 1962 the Sino-Indian border issue had ad­
vanced well beyond bilateral territorial dispute between the 
two countries and got enmeshed in the quagmire of interna­
tional politics. With the thaw in the cold war in Europe and 
a limited detente between the USA and the USSR, the focus of 
attention shifted to Asia and Africa. In order to insulate
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the region which provided many an opportunity for super 
powers to fish in the troubled waters, the nonaligned 
declared the Third World as an area of peace on the basis of 
super power agreement which was fairly status quo oriented. 
China, fearing a super power condominium and having failed 
to convince the Third World that it was one of them, proved 
a new threat to the idea of Third World as an area of peace 
which generally speaking acceptable to the US and the Soviet 
Union. There were also countries within the Third World 
such as Indonesia which accepted the Chinese line. Here 
again India played a moderating role and checked the radical 
elements within the Third World movement. This was one of 
the reasons for Chinese wrath against India. This left 
China rather isolated. Once moderation and accommodation 
became the watch-words for the capitalist, the Soviet Com­
munist and the Third World, led by the USA, the USSR and In­
dia respectively, China could not fit into any of these 
categories. While joining the capitalist bloc was out of 
question for obvious reasons, sticking to the Communist bloc 
meant playing second fiddle to the Soviet Union which was 
not acceptable to China. Nor could China sell itself as a 
developing country to the Third World and replace India as 
its leading light because of its ideological militancy and 
its clamour for major power status which was confirmed when 
it accepted with alacrity the permanent membership of 
Security Council. The emerging order was an anathema to
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China for it tended to push China into political, diplomatic 
and military isolation. What it feared was a super power 
condominium with India lending a helping hand to the exer­
cise on behalf of the Third World. So China chose to strike 
against India, the weakest link in the chain, in order to 
demonstrate its ability to act independently of both the su­
per powers and the expose the hollowness of India*s claim as 
a rival to China and undermine India*s status in the Third 
World by exposing its nonalignment in reality to be bialign­
ment. The Chinese were to say later, "They [the Indians] 
thought that with the backing of the imperialists and the 
support of the Soviet leaders they had nothing to fear".112 
The serious military reverses that India suffered at 
the hands of the Chinese in the winter of 1962 were the 
result of a combination of factors. Nehru and Menon refused 
to believe till the very end that there could be a large 
scale conflict with China. Hence, precious little was done 
by way of strategic thinking and tactical refinement in case 
of a general war with China. 113 Nehru also placed too much 
faith in the Russian ability to restrain China. The more he 
flaunted the Indo-Soviet friendship to deter China, the more 
the Chinese felt compelled to put India and through her the 
Soviet Union in its place.114 The emphasis on self-reliance, 
though justified in the long run, was taken to such absurd 
limits that it came in the way of buying weapons and equip­
ment abroad to meet a possible emergency in the short
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run.115
India's military debacle on the Himalayan frontier 
brought India's nonalignment and Nehru's China policy under 
close scrutiny and review. Nehru vigorously defended both 
and reiterated their continued utility and relevance for 
India.116 The Sino-Indian conflict, if anything 
strengthened India's nonaligned stance in the sense that In­
dia could now depend on both the United States and the 
Soviet Union to come to its aid in case of a massive Chinese 
attack. Exclusive alignment with any one of them would 
needlessly alienate the other.
India resumed diplomatic relations with China in 1976 
and intermittent talks have been going on between the two 
countries over the border issue with no solution in sight. 
In the light of Sino-Indian rivalry for regional influence, 
it is difficult to see how even a satisfactory solution to 
the border issue can really give a big boost to the rela­
tions between the two countries. More than the border 
issue, the Chinese attitude to Southeast Asia and the inter­
nal developments within China are likely to influence the 
future relations between the two Asian giants.
SELF-SUFFICIENCY
Perhaps, the most crucial segment of India's nonalignment 
policy has been India's passionate search for self­
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sufficiency. Self-sufficiency constitutes an integral part 
of India's nonaligned stance and is its very core and es­
sence.
India's search for self-sufficiency can be broadly 
divided into three categories, i.e., economic, technological 
and military. It goes without saying that these three 
categories are not mutually exclusive. They are, in fact, 
so closely interrelated and interwoven that it is almost im­
possible to discuss any of these categories without a 
reference to or implications for the others. Moreover, 
there has been in India, over the years a deliberate, con­
scious and systematic attempt to integrate these categories 
into a comprehensive and compact whole. At this stage, it 
would be suffice to state that India's Five Year Economic 
Plans are supplemented and supplanted by Five-Year 
"Technological" and Five-Year "Military" plans.
However, it must be noted that India's goal of self- 
sufficiency is only a relative one. No country in history 
has ever been able to achieve absolute self-sufficiency and 
no country is likely to achieve it in future either. Hence, 
India's endeavour has been to achieve self-reliance at least 
in those critical areas where dependence on foreign assis­
tance is neither possible nor desirable.
Another interesting element in India's approach to the 
issue of self-sufficiency is the principle of diversifica­
tion. India, ever since independence, sought to diversify
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its sources of economic assistance, technological transfer 
and military hardware in order to overcome the problem of 
dependence in the short run. Though this created problems 
in terms of integration and maintenance this was considered 
a relatively small price to pay for the relative autonomy 
that India gained which would not otherwise be available to 
her.
The philosophy behind India's crusade for self- 
sufficiency and self-reliance can be best described in the 
words of an "Indian official" who wrote in Foreign Affairs 
in 1949: "India, at any rate, is too conscious of her
responsibilities, and of the need to preserve and develop 
the innate strength and self-reliance of her people, to par­
ticipate in any arrangement that might induce a sense of de­
pendence or compromise her freedom of action".
"It is time for a wider recognition in the west that we 
have come to the end of an historical epoch. The eclipse of 
India in the eighteenth century was not an isolated 
phenomenon; it was part of the world movement by which the 
science and technology of Europe captured Asia and turned 
it, under different forms, into an appendage of the west. 
India's re-emergence is likewise related to the revival of 
the entire continent ... . Its ultimate result must neces­
sarily be to transform the politico-economic map of the 
world, and establish a new relationship between east and 
west".117
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BILATERALISM
Bilateralism is another important and striking feature of 
India's political and diplomatic stance over the years which 
has its roots in India's nonalignment or India's policy of 
independence. It is but another facet of India's nonalign­
ment and represents India's desire to emerge as an indepen­
dent and autonomous actor in international politics who 
could hold her own in matters that are of relevance and sig­
nificance to her. However, India's application of the prin­
ciple of bilateralism lacked conviction and verve in rela­
tion to the Middle Eastern states. The exaggerated fears of 
an Islamic bloc and an overemphasis on Pakistan and Islam as 
factors in India's interaction with the Middle East made the 
Indian policy makers place too much premium on anti­
imperialist rhetoric and on extending vociferous support to 
general Arab causes such as Palestine. This, in turn, 
resulted in India paying less than adequate attention to 
cultivating the Middle Eastern states on a more durable 
bilateral basis as we shall see in the subsequent chapters. 
It is against this general framework of India's foreign 
relations since independence that we need to critically 
evaluate India's policies and postures towards the Middle 
East, the motives and assumptions that prompted them and as 
to how realistic and effective these policies were in serv­
ing India's perceived interests in the region.
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CHAPTER 2
INDIA'S POLITICO-DIPLOMATIC INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
The fact that India had substantial and enduring politico- 
diplomatic interests in the Middle East has been recognised 
by the Indian political leadership from the early days of 
independence in 1947. Addressing the Constituent Assembly in 
1949, Nehru underlined the importance of the linkage between 
the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent when he said: 
"If you have to consider any question affecting the Middle 
East, India inevitably comes in to the picture. If you have 
to consider any question concerning South-East Asia, you can 
not do so without India.... While the Middle East may not be 
directly connected with South-East Asia, both are connected 
with India".1
The fact that both the Indian subcontinent and the Middle 
East had experienced centuries of imperial domination 
created an emotional bond between the leaders of the two 
regions and fostered a certain similarity in their political 
outlook and orientation after they attained their indepen­
dence from colonial rule. This, in turn, provided oppor­
tunities as well as challenges for the Indian leadership 
towards the region in the post independence era. How well 
and how effectively did India seize these opportunities and 
try to counter and overcome the challenges constitutes the 
main theme of this chapter.
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THE PAKISTAN FACTOR
Pakistan or no Pakistan, the Middle East would have been an 
extremely important and crucial region for India in 
politico-diplomatic terms. It constituted about a dozen in­
dependent states of varying sizes and potential, occupied 
some five million square miles or one-tenth of the earthfs 
land surface and inhabited by about a hundred million 
people.2
However, the creation of an avowedly Islamic state in the 
Indian subcontinent and the fact that a large number of 
Muslims remained in India after partition added a sharp edge 
to Indo-Pak rivalry and made it almost imperative for them 
to vie with each other to cultivate the states of the 
Middle East. This, in turn, put the Indian policy makers on 
the defensive from the word go and made them extremely sen­
sitive and cautious in their dealings with the Middle East. 
Pakistan, of course, enjoyed a natural advantage over India 
in wooing a predominantly Muslim Middle East because in a 
manner of speaking, the creation of Pakistan "undercut the 
most obvious basis for unity between post-independence India 
and the Muslim states of West Asia: a continuous land bridge 
and a common religion. Pakistan inherited the advantages of 
both and used them for its own benefit".3
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Hence, one of the most overriding objectives of Indiafs for­
eign policy goals in the Middle East from the outset has 
been to counter and neutralise the sympathy and support that 
Pakistan was likely to evoke as a Muslim country. India also 
had to safeguard its secular credentials against the Pakis­
tani "propaganda” onslaughts of ill-treatment of Muslim 
minority in India. According to K .M .Panikkar, this 
propaganda did have some effect in the region initially and 
as a result Arab governments were "suspicious" of and the 
Arab public "anti-pathic" to India. However, general Indian 
support for Arab causes in due course changed their attitude 
to India.4
a) Fears of an Islamic bloc
The Indian government also conjured up visions of the entire 
Muslim Middle East including Pakistan acting as one single 
bloc to the disadvantage and detriment of India. Nehru 
expressed such fears to a veteran journalist Durga Das. 
Eminent Muslim leaders like Chagla and Ali Yavar Jung were 
critical of Nehru for supporting progressive Muslims among 
the Arabs while he chose to lend his ear to conservative 
Muslims in India.
Nehru defended this dichotomy in his approach by explaining 
to Durga Das that his friendship with Nasser and other 
progressive Arab leaders was "designed to counterbalance the
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conservative Muslim bloc, which stretched from Pakistan to 
Jordan and posed a threat to India's security and 
secularism".5 However, he was hesitant to attempt any 
reforms in the domestic sphere because of his fear that Mus­
lim obscurantists would rise the cry "Islam in danger".
It should, however, be admitted that Pakistan did make a 
strenuous and persistent effort to forge an alliance of the 
Muslim countries of the Middle East in order to bolster its 
own political and diplomatic strength vis-a-vis India which 
was much bigger in size and enjoyed considerable prestige 
and goodwill under the premiership of Nehru.
Between the years 1947 and 1954, Pakistan tried to bring 
various Muslim countries of the Middle East and beyond 
together on the basis of religious solidarity by playing 
host to various conferences.
In 1949, Pakistan invited the members of the Arab League as 
well as other Muslim countries to a "government level" Is­
lamic Conference at Karachi to be held in the following win­
ter for the purpose of "signing treaties of formal 
alliances" with them. But the Conference never took place 
for want of sufficient support for the idea.6 
The third and fourth Matamar-e-Alam-e-Islami sessions were 
held in Karachi in 1949 and 1951 respectively and were 
moderately successful.
The International Islamic Economic Conference was held in 
Dec. 1949 and was attended by delegations from North Africa
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and the Middle East. However, Indonesia chose to stay away 
from the Conference. Despite high expectations at the in­
augural session, the Conference "did not have lasting 
results". The second session of the Conference was held in 
Tehran and the third in Karachi in 1954. After the 1954 
meeting, the Conference "silently expired".7 
Chaudhuri Khaliquzzaman, the then President of the ruling 
Muslim League party, undertook a two month tour of the 
Middle East in 1949 and advocated the forming of "United 
Islamistan" which he described as an "Atlantic Pact" embrac­
ing all countries of the Middle East from Pakistan to 
Turkey. This idea, of course, proved to be a non-starter.8 
While Pakistan did enjoy considerable sympathy and good will 
in the Middle East because it was a predominantly Muslim 
country, its efforts to forge an alliance on the basis of 
religion in the region were bound to fail for various 
reasons.
First, the imperial rule that preceded the independence of 
the countries of the region over a period of time resulted 
in strong nationalistic sentiments based on anti-imperialist 
and territorial loyalties.9 The disappearance of the Ot­
toman empire and the abolition of the Caliphate by the 
Turkish nationalist Kemal Pasha was ample proof of this.
The first Arab regional organization which was formed in 
1945 was called the "Arab League" not "Muslim League". Azzam 
Pasha, the first Secretary General of the Arab League who
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was an Egyptian declared "We are Egyptians first, Arabs 
second and Muslims third". President Nasser too made his 
priorities clear when he placed the Islamic brotherhood in 
the third and last circle after the Arab circle and the 
African Continent circle.
"The Arab world experienced a sharp clash between ter­
ritorial and pan-Arab loyalties, but Islam as a basis of 
regional or international political alliance had clearly 
receded in to the background".10 Hence, in such a political 
environment, Pakistani efforts to cultivate Middle Eastern 
countries on the basis of religion were overly optimistic 
and not surprisingly unsuccessful.
Secondly, the Muslim League's demand for Pakistan did not 
find much support in the Middle East for it conjured up the 
examples of partition of Ireland, proposed partition of 
Palestine and the separation of Sudan from Egypt.For the 
Arabs, the partition of India was "yet another manifestation 
of the same imperialistic strategy of divide and rule".11 
The Muslim League, by demanding Pakistan"was playing in to 
hands of British imperialism, while the Congress Party was 
putting up a genuine fight for freedom, just as they them­
selves were doing".12
Thirdly, Middle Eastern countries saw in Pakistani efforts 
to forge an Islamic alliance a thinly disguised attempt at 
the leadership of the Islamic world. Some Pakistanis 
referred to Pakistan as the "biggest Muslim country" and the
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"natural leader" of the Muslim nations. This naturally did 
not go down well with many Middle Eastern countries which 
themselves entertained leadership ambitions. King Farouq 
ridiculed Pakistan*s overzealous devotion to Islamic causes 
when he told his courtiers "Do n*t you know that Islam was 
born on 14 August 1947 ?" Thus, Pakistan*s ambition to the 
leadership of the Muslim world was "wholly unrealistic and 
. .. tactics manifestly amateurish" and did precious little 
to improve its image and standing in the Middle East.13 
Finally, the countries of the region were far too seasoned 
politically to be unaware of the power realities of the sub­
continent. Unfortunately for Pakistan, the general impres­
sion in the early days of its creation was that "India was 
going to be a world power while Pakistan might very well be 
a transitory phenomenon ...*'. 14 Hence, most of these 
countries were reluctant to make an absolute choice between 
the friendships of India and Pakistan. However, if a choice 
were to be made , as Keith Callard pointed out "India as 
more powerful, more stable and more influential was likely 
to have the advantage".15
Besides, Pakistan had to contend with a bitter border dis­
pute with Muslim Afghanistan which exposed the chinks in the 
Islamic solidarity which Pakistan was trying to propagate. 
Indonesia, the largest Muslim country in the world, found 
itself more in tune with India politically in the 50s be­
cause it made secularism, socialism and nonalignment the
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pillars of its own policy.
The Arab world itself was a divided house with Arab- Non- 
Arab, Shia-Sunni and Progressive-Conservative divides and 
power rivalries cutting across the apparent unifying force 
of Islam.16
Against this backdrop, it is amazing, at least in 
retrospect, that India*s leaders entertained fears of a 
unified Islamic bloc siding with Pakistan in its bilateral 
disputes with India, primarily on the basis of religious 
solidarity. Such fears were greatly exaggerated and 
misplaced because realistically the Muslim Middle East 
could never attain the sort of unity that the Indian policy 
makers feared nor were Middle Eastern countries so naive or 
romantic as to automatically side with Pakistan in her 
rivalry with India just because Pakistan happened to be an 
Islamic state.17
"Curiously, there was a tendency both in Pakistan and in In­
dia to rate the political efficacy of pan-Islamism higher 
than was warranted by empirical realities".18 However, 
Pakistan was the first to realise the limitations of pan- 
Islamism as a political force and started looking for an al­
ternative source of support in its dealings with India. 
Pakistan's joining of the Western alliance in the mid 50s 
was the clearest proof, if any was needed, of its disillu­
sionment with pan-Islamism as a means of achieving political 
objectives.
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But it was India's fears of Pakistan making use of the 
"Islamic card" which persisted much longer than they should 
have. While India's initial misgivings were understandable, 
its persistence in this folly to this day is as incomprehen­
sible as it was then.
What is worse is that these unwarranted and far-fetched 
fears not only led to a distorted and self-conscious 
policy towards the region, but also introduced an element of 
inflexibility to it.
"In order to counteract the threat of being completely iso­
lated from the Islamic world, India opposed the mixture of 
religion with politics, publicised its secular state 
doctrine, and deplored international ties based on religion 
alone. But at the same time, it tried to project the image 
of India as the third most populous Muslim country, thereby 
courting the approval of traditional Islamic leaders".19 
India's attempt to have it both ways was neither practicable 
nor desirable. There was no way India could have convinced 
anyone that it was as Islamic as Pakistan if not more. Play­
ing the Islamic card would only mean playing in to 
Pakistan's hands for that was its trump card. Nor was it 
necessary. It may be politically expedient to refer to India 
as the second or third largest Muslim state in the 
world."How much violence it tended to do to its secular 
character, which was the real strength of India, is another 
matter".20
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It was this rather curious and naive logic that led India to 
seek representation at the Islamic Conference held in Rabat 
in 1969. "In the misplaced fear of isolation among the Mus­
lim countries and an unfriendly resolution on the Kashmir 
issue, the External Affairs Ministry energetically pursued 
the chimera of an invitation to participate”.21 Pakistan 
firmly opposed India's participation and threatened to 
boycott the Conference if India was allowed to participate. 
Pakistan's viewpoint finally prevailed and India was kept 
out cutting a rather sorry figure.
The Indian government, in its anxiety to forestall any 
Pakistani attempt to score diplomatic points over India at 
Rabat, failed to take note of the significant fact that 
quite a few important Muslim countries declined the invita­
tion to the Rabat Conference. Nasser could not attend the 
Conference because of "influenza”. Iraq and Syria too ab­
sented themselves from the Conference. The Presidents of 
Turkey and Indonesia declined to attend on the ground that 
they were secular states. Against this background, India's 
clamour to attend an Islamic Conference on overtly 
religious lines was a "disgrace".22
Secondly, these Islamic Conferences, in reality were any­
thing but "Islamic"."The game was being played in interna­
tional forums with an air of urgency and an eye on the 
political advantages to be gained for the delegates' own 
nation".23 The Rabat Conference itself was plagued by the
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rivalry between King Feisal of Saudi Arabia and King Hassan 
of Morocco.24
Moreover, the whole exercise was the brainchild of politi­
cally conservative states like Saudi Arabia and Iran which 
found it politically convenient to use the Islamic card to 
counter the growing influence of radical pan-Arab ideology 
represented by Egypt, Syria and Iraq. Indian policy makers, 
however, betrayed a pathetic lack of appreciation of inter- 
Arab rivalries and jealousies and hence failed to get over 
the outdated and worn-out assumptions of their predecessors. 
This was borne out by the fact that even though the later 
Islamic groupings attracted more countries their "net im­
pact on world developments has been politically nil".25 
Lastly, the Indian government, in its indecent haste to 
secure an invitation to Rabat in this game of political one- 
upmanship with Pakistan ignored a very practical and realis­
tic approach that Nehru laid down for India in relation to 
attending Muslim Conferences of pan-Islamic nature. In a 
directive issued in 1955, Nehru emphasised that while India 
should oppose any Islamic grouping, it could send non­
official delegations to such conferences.26
Such an approach would have at once emphasised the secular 
credentials of the Indian state, would have been politically 
consistent with India's opposition to mixing religion with 
politics and given an opportunity to Indian Muslims to 
renew their emotional and cultural bonds with fellow Muslims
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elsewhere without such occasions acquiring significant 
political overtones.
It is easy to describe Rabat episode a an "aberration”. 
While the incident itself is not very significant, the 
misplaced fears and assumptions which prompted such an at­
titude on the part of the Indian government are.If anything, 
the Rabat episode demonstrated that the Indian policy makers 
even with the passage of time failed to absorb and assimi­
late the realities of Arab politics and continued to allow 
imaginary fears and anxieties to distort and debase their 
approach to the region.
b] KASHMIR
Another issue that made the Indian political leadership 
tread gingerly in relation to the Middle East was the 
problem of Kashmir the outlines of which have already been 
mentioned in the first chapter. Three elements in relation 
to the Kashmir dispute made it difficult for India to treat 
the issue either as an internal affair of India or even as a 
bilateral dispute between India and Pakistan and led to its 
internationalization. This, in turn, made it imperative for 
India to solicit the support at best and neutrality at the 
least, of the Middle Eastern countries in relation to Kash­
mir.
1] Kashmir has always been portrayed as a religious issue
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between the Hindu India and Islamic Pakistan by the latter. 
The partition of India on the basis of religion, the fact of 
Kashmir being predominantly Muslim and its geographical con­
tiguity with Pakistan gave some substance to such claims. 
Pakistan*s use of Islam in supporting Kashmir*s right to 
self-determination was designed to make it a pan-Islamic 
issue and thereby internationalise it. Such tactics are un­
derstandable in view of India's superior size and resources 
and thus power in relation to Pakistan. Consequently, 
"Kashmir as an ideological obsession will remain an obstacle 
not only in Indo-Pak relations but also more generally in 
Pakistan's aim to achieve a flexible foreign policy".27 
Thus, Indian policy makers in addition to dealing with Kash­
mir as an ideological battle had to contend with the 
rigidity that the Kashmir issue had introduced in to the 
foreign policies of the two countries. Since both countries 
saw it as a zero-sum game, they saw no alternative to drum­
ming up support for their respective stands on the issue in 
the world in general and the Middle East in particular. The 
fear that Pakistan would score over India in such endeavours 
in a predominantly Muslim Middle East made Indian policy 
makers extremely touchy in dealings with the region.
2] India's decision to take the Kashmir issue to the UN gave 
a legal basis to the internationalization of the Kashmir 
issue. Once the issue got enmeshed in power politics at the 
UN, it became imperative for both India and Pakistan to cul­
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tivate member countries for voting purposes. Under the cir­
cumstances, the twelve or so votes that the Arab countries 
possessed at the UN became crucial for both countries. 
These votes became particularly important for India in view 
of the unsympathetic attitude of the Western powers, par­
ticularly the US and the UK to the Indian position.
3] The very division of Kashmir with India in possession of 
3/4 of it and Pakistan the rest kept the issue alive for 
various reasons. First, the line of control that divided 
Kashmir is arbitrary and hence quite porous and not easily 
defensible. Secondly, the line of control separates families 
and friends from each other in their own land. The human 
tragedy that resulted as a consequence kept the issue boil­
ing and attracted international attention.
India sought to counter Pakistani attempts to gain the sup­
port of the Muslim Middle East in its dealings with India in 
general and in relation to Kashmir issue in particular by 
extending vigorous support to Arab causes in general and to 
the Palestinian issue in particular.
Apart from sustained support for the just rights of Pales­
tinians, India tried to neutralise at best and minimise at 
the least the Arab support to Pakistan by using its nascent 
relationship with Israel as a bargaining chip. Upgrading 
relations with Israel has always been an implicit threat in 
India's posture towards the region, if Arab support to 
Pakistan extended beyond what India might consider as
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tolerable or acceptable.
Nevertheless, India failed to obtain such a quid pro quo 
from the Arabs over the years either in relation to Kashmir 
or in relation to Indo-Pak disputes in general.28 Most of 
the Arab states, generally speaking, either supported the 
Pakistani position or tried to take a sort of neutral stance 
whose only virtue, from the Indian point of view, was that 
it was not anti-Indian. This was true of even Egypt which 
was considered a close friend of India under Nasser. Even 
during the Sino-Indian war of 1962 when Pakistan was not a 
direct factor, most of Arab countries including Egypt 
adopted a more or less neutral stance.29
"That the twin obsession with Pakistan and Kashmir prevailed 
and Pakistani influence in Arab circles was thus sought to 
be neutralised during Nehru's tenure is not as surprising as 
the fact that having found this quid pro quo arrangement 
with the Arabs to be a failure, later Indian leaders per­
sisted in it".3 0
While Kashmir has been an important foreign policy con­
sequence for India over the decades and it is quite under­
standable that it sought to gain the support or at least the 
neutrality of Muslim countries of the Middle East over the 
issue, it is difficult to fathom why Indian policy makers 
adopted such a defensive posture in relation to Kashmir. 
India has had considerable advantage over Pakistan with 
regard to Kashmir. First, the word partition was anathema to
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the Arabs because they had opposed it vehemently in Pales­
tine. India, therefore, should have made a more effective 
use of this Arab opposition to the '‘divide and rule" policy 
of Britain by drawing an analogy between Kashmir and Pales­
tine. That would have made the Arab countries think twice 
before lining up behind Pakistan.
India was also in effective physical control of 3/4 of Kash­
mir and Pakistan was in no position militarily to wrest it 
from India. This ground reality gave India a tremendous ad­
vantage which any number of unfavourable UN resolutions 
could not neutralise.
More importantly, the change in the Soviet attitude towards 
India and subsequently to Kashmir in the early 50s 
strengthened the Indian position substantially. Till 1952, 
the Soviet participation in the Security Council debates 
over Kashmir was not extensive and generally remained non­
committal. The Soviet representative occasionally used the 
opportunity to question the motives of the US and the UK as 
they wrestled with the problem and tried to score points 
over them.
However, in 1952, the Soviet representative openly alleged 
that "... the purpose of these plans in connexion with Kash­
mir is to secure the introduction of Anglo-American troops 
in to the territory of Kashmir and to convert Kashmir in to 
an Anglo-American colony and a military and strategic base". 
31
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Thus, the Soviet Union perceived strategic advantage of 
Kashmir remaining in Indian hands and started supporting the 
Indian stand. In 1957, the Soviet representative extended 
total support to the changed Indian position on Kashmir that 
the elections held in the Indian part of Kashmir were an ex­
pression of the will of Kashmiri people to stay with India 
when he stated that "the Kashmir question has in actual fact 
already been settled in essence by the people of Kashmir 
themselves, who consider their territory an integral part of 
the Republic of India".32
A couple of days later, the USSR cast the first ever veto of 
the Kashmir dispute when it vetoed a draft resolution sub­
mitted by Australia, Cuba, the UK and the USA. The consis­
tent Russian support to India over Kashmir since at least 
the mid 50s should have made Indian policy makers more con­
fident and relaxed in their dealings with the Middle East 
but that was not to be.
Even after the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971 when 
Pakistan's pretensions to parity with India were finally put 
to rest, India as the dominant power in South Asia failed to 
show any flexibility and dynamism in its policy towards the 
Middle East. All this makes one wonder whether it was really 
fears over Kashmir which made the Indian policy makers adopt 
the sort of policy that they actually did. While Kashmir 
could have been a contributory factor, it alone can not ex­
plain the whole rationale behind the policy as we shall see
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later.
NONALIGNMENT
India, quite predictably, sought to take advantage of the 
anti-colonial sentiments that existed in both the regions to 
project the concept of nonalignment to provide community of 
interests between India on the one hand and the Middle East­
ern countries on the other. Externally, nonalignment sought 
to emphasise the independence of these countries by eschew­
ing military alliances with either of the two super powers 
in the context of the cold war. Internally, it sought to 
reinforce territorial nationalism in these countries by de­
emphasising religious or political orthodoxy.
In a nutshell, India sought to reinforce secular and 
nationalistic forces in the region in the political garb of 
nonalignment in order to counter the possibility of 
religious resurgence in the region and to preclude Pakistan 
from exploiting its religious affinity with the region to 
its political advantage.
However, it must be admitted that India's propagation of 
nonalignment did not make much impact on the Arab states in 
the initial years. But within a decade or so nonalignment 
made considerable headway in the region though its accept­
ance was less than universal. "After the conclusion of the 
Baghdad Pact, which deeply embittered Arab nationalist
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opinion, the concept of non-alignment found vigorous and 
widespread support in the Arab world. It also helped to 
create conditions for active cooperation between India and 
the Arab states in political, economic and commercial 
spheres”.33
Be that as it may, nonalignment was essentially India's pos­
ture towards the super powers in the context of cold war. 
India still had to evolve its policy towards the rest of the 
world on a bilateral basis. It is here that Nehru's penchant 
for political proselytising in favour of nonalignment got in 
the way of India cultivating even a working relationship 
with the so called conservative or aligned states in the 
Middle East.
Nehru's attitude to aligned nations, in the words of former 
Foreign Secretary of India Mr. A.P. Venkateswaran, was 
"self-righteous".34 Hence, he failed to appreciate the 
genuine fears and suspicions of countries like Iran, Turkey 
and even Saudi Arabia which prompted them to seek external 
props for self-defence. This is not to say that India should 
have approved or even acquiesced with either the domestic or 
external policies of these countries. Far from it. However, 
realism required that India should have tried its utmost to 
make the best out of a bad bargain by trying to cultivate 
these countries bilaterally by a willingness for greater ac­
commodation and understanding of the reasons that neces­
sitated their aligned posture without only being moralistic.
This would have given the Indian political leadership a bet­
ter chance of keeping in check the support that Pakistan 
could have managed to obtain from these countries since 
there were no serious bilateral disputes between India and 
any of these countries. But that was not to be. 
Consequently, India*s rather unrealistic policy towards 
these countries introduced an element of rigidity in India*s 
approach and severely restricted India*s manoeuvrability in 
the region and foreclosed a number of potentially promising 
diplomatic openings.
a] A Cairo-centric policy
As a corollary to the foregoing analysis, Nehru*s strong 
political preference in favour of nonalignment and his 
political prejudice against aligned nations adversely af­
fected the flexibility of Indian approach to the Middle East 
in two ways.
First, it made Nehru throw his entire diplomatic lot with 
Nasser whom he once described as "the most prominent symbol 
of Arab nationalism”. This was tantamount to India putting 
all her political eggs in the Egyptian basket with regard to 
the Middle East, a folly Nehru sought to avoid in relation 
to super powers by propounding the concept of nonalignment.
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Secondly and more importantly, "the close tie with Cairo 
seemed to hamper New Delhi's interest in cultivating other 
West Asian states more actively”.35 This led to unnecessary 
and avoidable complications with a number of other states in 
the Middle East. India's vocal and personal support for Nas­
ser "was taken amiss by many an Arab state which otherwise 
swore by Arab unity and neutralism".36
To sum up, it goes without saying that Indian policy makers 
displayed a singular lack of sophistication and finesse in 
understanding the complexity of the political process in the 
post-colonial Middle East. India's exaggerated fears of a 
unified Muslim bloc favouring Pakistan solely on the basis 
of religious affinity and Nehru's passion in favour of non- 
alignment which needlessly alienated the so called conserva­
tive or aligned nations seriously cramped the style and sub­
stance of Indian diplomacy in the region.
It is against this backdrop that we shall now analyse 
India's bilateral ties with the four most important states 
in the region namely Egypt and Iraq (the supposedly radical 
states) in this chapter and Iran and Saudi Arabia (the so- 
called conservative states) in the next in order to estab­
lish as to how India's imaginary fears and anxieties and a 
rather rigid ideological posture got in the way of India 
adopting a more flexible and imaginative policy which would 
have served her politico-diplomatic interests in the region 
much more effectively than it actually did over the years.
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INDIA AND EGYPT
It is a truism to say that cultivating Egypt has been the 
corner-stone of India's foreign policy pursuits in the 
Middle East in the 50s and the 60s. The "special 
relationship" that evolved between Egypt and India in the 
two decades following India's independence was anything but 
an accident. It was, in fact, a product of historical cir­
cumstances, political affinity that existed between the 
leaders of the two countries and the exigencies of the in­
ternational situation that was obtaining at that time.
The struggle against British colonial role brought the two 
countries together even before India attained its indepen­
dence. This common crusade against imperialism gave birth to 
similarity of political outlook among the political elites 
of the two countries which was essentially anti-colonial, 
anti-racist and emphasised the solidarity of the newly inde­
pendent nations.
The advent of the cold war and the pressures and blandish­
ments that the super powers applied in the third world to 
find converts to their respective causes was seen by the 
Afro-Asian nations as infringing on their newly won indepen­
dence. Hence their gravitation to nonalignment was a logical 
corollary. "A new core was formed, Nehru, Nasser and Tito.
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Together they began to provide the political impulse, the 
elan, the dynamism and the guidance to the non-alignment 
movement; at once sober but sufficiently radical, for peace 
as well as for liquidation of colonialism, taking initia­
tives to assert independence of the newly emerging countries 
and resolve world tangles but at the same time trying to 
moderate the cold war and bring great powers in dialogue 
with each other".37
The mutual respect and admiration and the personal 
friendship that developed between Nehru and Nasser, no 
doubt, gave an extra thrust to the relationship between the 
two countries. Nasser's own outlook on foreign policy and 
economic planning by his own admission bore the imprint of 
Nehru.38
Besides, both India and Egypt saw each other as leading 
countries in their respective regions destined to play a 
positive and a progressive role which would be to mutual ad­
vantage. "Egypt, lacking Western support and cautious of a 
too deep involvement with the communist states, relied on 
India's prestige and support for its own independent foreign 
policy and its standing in world affairs. It courted India's 
pro-Arab stance on the Palestine issue. India gained the 
goodwill of the largest Arab state and thereby undermined 
any Pakistani plans to promote a pan-Islamic bloc hostile to 
India".39
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"THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP"
At this stage, it is essential to critically evaluate 
India*s "special relationship" with Egypt in order to assess 
its advantages and costs for India and see if India's close 
ties with Cairo served India's overall and long-term inter­
ests in the region.
FEARS OF ISLAMIC BLOC
The first and foremost gain, it is argued, that accrued to 
India because of its close friendship with Egypt was the 
latter's firm and consistent opposition to the formation of 
any Islamic bloc for political purposes. It must be granted 
that Egypt's secular approach to politics acted as a check 
on Islamic resurgence in the region and was at least partly 
responsible for checkmating the persistent Pakistani moves 
to forge an Islamic alliance with an anti-Indian slant in 
the region.
However, the secular approach to politics was not the ex­
clusive preserve of Egypt in the Middle East. Countries like 
Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, despite occasional lip service 
to Islam, were essentially secular and nationalistic in 
their outlook. Moreover, the so called Islamic groupings, as 
we have already seen, were anything but Islamic. They were 
mere projections of the rivalries, suspicions and jealousies 
of various states in the Middle East, with each state trying
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to promote its own interests in the garb of Islam.
Egyptians were also aware of and proud of their pre-Islamic 
civilization which was one of the most ancient and sophisti­
cated in the world. So they were reluctant to overemphasise 
the importance of Islam to the point of overshadowing their 
pre-Islamic cultural heritage.
Egypt also considered itself the natural leader of the Arab 
world because of its size, population and history. Too much 
accent on Islam might have diluted such leadership ambitions 
by bringing countries like Saudi Arabia, the custodian of 
Muslim Holy places who had greater claims to Islamic creden­
tials than Egypt to the forefront of Arab politics.
Also, Egyptians, because of their geographical location, 
considered themselves part of both Asian and African con­
tinents. Hence, nonalignment provided them with an oppor­
tunity to play a much larger role on the bigger Afro-Asian 
stage rather than to tie themselves down to the Middle East 
in the name of Islamic solidarity.
The idea of an Islamic alliance has been a recurrent theme 
in Middle Eastern politics. It was first mooted by the 
British after the world war II in order to organise conser­
vative elements in the region to perpetuate their imperial 
interests culminating in the Baghdad Pact of 1955. The Pact 
countries, predictably, opposed Egypt's claim to sovereignty 
over the Suez Canal and supported the Anglo-French invasion 
of Suez in 1956. The Iraqi revolution in 1958, however,
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sounded the death-knell of the Baghdad Pact. Subsequently, 
the Headquarters of the Pact was shifted to Tehran and the 
Pact was renamed Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). 
Thereafter, the idea of an Islamic alliance, whenever it was 
resurrected, acquired a definitely anti-Nasser slant. For 
instance, in 1965, the idea resurfaced at a conclave in Teh­
ran between the Shah of Iran and King Feisal of Saudi 
Arabia. It was stated that Iran and Saudi Arabia would
jointly exert themselves to hold a Conference of Islamic
countries bound together by common interests.40 When 
Mrs.Gandhi visited Cairo in July 1966, she reportedly dis­
cussed the move to form an Islamic alliance with Nasser and 
fully appreciated and supported the UAR's opposition to the 
move. 41
During a visit to New Delhi in October in the same year, 
Nasser denounced the move for an Islamic alliance as "a new 
edition of the Baghdad Pact". He contended that the main
purpose behind the move was to use Islam "in the interests
of conservatives and reactionaries in collaboration with 
colonial powers".42
Though Nasser's opposition to the so called Islamic alliance 
was principally aimed at preserving Egypt's dominance of 
Arab politics by preventing his opponents in the region from 
coming together against Egypt, he must have also realised 
how much such denunciation would please his Indian hosts and 
earn their goodwill for Egypt at practically no cost.
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When an Islamic Conference did finally materialise in Rabat 
in 1969 in the aftermath of the burning of the A1 Aqsa 
mosque in Jerusalem, Nasser stayed away because of 
"influenza". It is revealing at this stage to see as to how 
seriously and nervously the Indian Government reacted to 
these attempts at forging an Islamic alliance in the Middle 
East.
The Indian Foreign Minister Mr.Dinesh Singh, addressing the 
Lok Sabha in April 1970 stated: "It (Pan-Islamism) is one of 
the most dangerous thoughts that has been prevailing in that 
part of the world ... It is the mixing up of the religion 
with politics and the creation of a Pan-Islamic bloc. It 
constitutes a danger not only for us in India but for other 
countries in Asia, Africa and the world as a whole".43 
While it must be admitted that Nasser*s opposition to the 
creation of an Islamic bloc suited India admirably, it 
should not, however, be forgotten that the stimulus for such 
a policy came from Egypt's own conception of its national 
interests and ambitions rather than from any goading or 
coaxing from India. Nor should it be forgotten that India 
did pay a price for closely identifying itself with Nasser 
by alienating politically conservative states like Iran, 
Saudi Arabia and Jordan which had no animosity towards India 
but felt threatened by the Arab radicalism espoused by Nas­
ser and were loathe to accept Nasser's leadership of the 
region entirely on his terms which India seemed to endorse
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unequivocally.
This is borne out by the fact that after the rout of Arab 
armies by the Israelis in the six day war in 1967, there was 
a general realisation in Cairo that it was a mistake to seek 
unity in the region on an ideological basis. The unrelenting 
hostility towards monarchical regimes only forced them to 
lean even more heavily than before on Western support for 
survival. The new strategy was to revolve around a broad 
Arab nationalist front based on an entente between Nasser, 
Hussein and even King Feisal. Socialism and the struggle 
against feudalism were to take a back seat in this new 
strategy.44
THE PAK-EGYPT EQUATION
Also, Pakistan's less than satisfactory relationship with 
Egypt in the 50s and 60s was understandably comforting to 
India in political terms. However, Nasser's antipathy to 
Pakistan had much less to do with his aversion to Islamic 
groupings which Pakistan was trying to promote in those 
days. His annoyance with Pakistan was primarily the result 
of the fact that he considered Pakistan's policies and at­
titudes at that time to be inimical to Egypt's interests and 
ambitions. India was little more than a marginal factor in 
this Pak-Egyptian equation.
Firstly, the general belief that Pakistan was aspiring for 
the leadership of the Muslim world irritated Egypt most be­
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cause Egypt considered itself the most prominent country in 
the region and hence its natural leader. "Pakistan with a 
population five times that of UAR and economic resources 
more varied and developed than of any of the Arab countries 
was suspected to be a constant obstacle, if not a possible 
rival, to Egyptian leadership of the area”.45 
Secondly and more importantly, there was a definite clash of 
interests between Egypt and Pakistan in the 50s and the 60s 
primarily because of Pakistan's alliance with the Western 
powers. When the proposal for a Middle East Defence or­
ganization was mooted by the British in the early 50s, Egypt 
demanded the evacuation of the Suez base by Britain and a 
satisfactory settlement of the Sudanese question as condi­
tions for joining such an alliance. Egypt was anxious that 
other powers in the region should not join any such alliance 
until Anglo-Egyptian differences were settled to Egypt's 
satisfaction. If Western countries were to make progress in 
forging such an alliance without Egypt, it was feared that 
there would be less need and incentive for Britain to come 
to terms with Egypt.
Egypt, therefore, was furious when Turkey and Pakistan an­
nounced their intention to join the alliance in February 
1952 while Britain was still holding the Suez base and 
Anglo-Egyptian talks were at a critical stage. The Cairo 
Radio described it as a "catastrophe for Islam ... the first 
stab in our back".46 Nasser was also furious that during the
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crisis itself, the Pakistani Foreign Minister Hamidul Huq 
had gone back on his promise of full support to the Egyptian 
position. Nasser later complained to Frank Moraes of the 
Times of India : 1 Do you know that before the London Con­
ference the Pakistani Foreign Minister, who came to see me, 
spoke for three hours and he vowed support for Egypt*s cause 
? You know what he did ?"47 Nasser retaliated by rejecting 
the Pakistani offer of a contingent for the UNEF While ac­
cepting a similar offer from India. A little later, when the 
Pakistani Prime Minister Suhrawardy was about to leave for 
Cairo, the Egyptian Ambassador warned him that Nasser did 
not consider it a suitable time for a visit to Cairo. Later, 
Nasser "pricked Pakistan's tenderest spot" when he declared 
"Suez is as dear to Egypt as Kashmir is to India".48 
These events generated bitterness and ill-feelings in both 
the countries and Pak-Egyptian relations failed to take off 
despite a few feeble attempts at reconciliation later. The 
fact that this suited the Indians was a stroke of political 
good fortune because Nasser was primarily guided by Egypt's 
own interests and was not in any sense trying to curry 
favour with India.
INDO-EGYPTIAN COOPERATION
Nevertheless, India and Egypt did try to help each other on 
a number of occasions, though either side was not prepared
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to go overboard in assisting the other in spite of the so 
called "special relationship" that existed between the two 
countries.
In 1961, when the Indian army marched in to Goa, the UAR 
moved a resolution in the UN Security Council supporting the 
Indian position that the Portuguese enclaves in India came 
in the way of Indian unity and constituted a threat to in­
ternational peace and security.
Regarding Kashmir, Egypt though never totally endorsed 
India's position, it did maintain a discreet neutrality over 
the issue which itself was not unhelpful to India. Egypt 
also occasionally tried to bloc resolutions at the UN which 
could have caused embarrassment to India. To cite just one 
example, in June 1962, Egypt refused to sponsor a draft 
resolution inimical to India and also influenced the other 
non-permanent members not to press too hard for it. The use­
fulness of the Egyptian stand from the Indian point of view 
was highlighted by the reaction of the Pakistani newspaper 
"Dawn" which observed that "the UAR's resolve not to go 
along with the text of the draft which had been agreed to 
after several weeks of intense discussions has created a 
critical situation on the eve of the resumption of the 
debate" and added that "this great Middle East nation has 
now become a principal obstacle in the way of the Security 
Council adopting a fairly constructive resolution".49 Even­
tually, when the resolution was moved by Ireland, the USSR
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vetoed it while the UAR abstained from voting on the resolu­
tion. It later explained its stand saying that it was a 
friend of both India and Pakistan and hence its reluctance 
to side with either.50
During the Sino-Indian war of 1962, Nasser offered to 
mediate between the two warring parties and put forward his 
own proposals51 for settling the dispute which were, 
however, rejected by China. Later, at the Colombo Con­
ference, the UAR was instrumental in preventing the Con­
ference from adopting an anti-Indian and pro-Chinese stance. 
Nevertheless, the Indians were disappointed with the Egyp­
tian stand. They expected Nasser to come out more openly and 
emphatically on India's side just as Indians had supported 
Egypt in its hour of need. Moreover, many nonaligned Arab 
states maintained a discreet silence over the issue, pos­
sibly taking their cue from Nasser, India's closest friend 
who merely offered to mediate.52 
Again, during the Indo-Pak war of 1965 over Kashmir, Egypt 
maintained a neutral position which was considered helpful 
by India. At the Casablanca Conference of the Heads of Arab 
states in Sept. 1965, it was Nasser who played a key role in 
the Conference issuing a mild and balanced statement which 
appealed to India and Pakistan "to solve their differences 
by peaceful means in accordance with the principles and 
resolutions of the United Nations".53
The Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh acknowledged this
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in his statement in the Lok Sabha in Nov. 1965. "It is not 
secret that in Casablanca, it was mainly his (Nasser's) ef­
forts that resulted in the Arab Conference taking an impar­
tial attitude on this question. Even in the Security Coun­
cil, UAR's position has always been that this is a matter 
essentially between Pakistan and India ... and any inter­
ference from outside will not lead to any settlement". 54 
India too extended political and diplomatic support to 
Egypt during this period, though such support was never as 
complete and as unconditional as was made out in some 
quarters. Nehru himself, to start with, had some misgivings 
about the nature of Arab politics and the calibre of 
Nasser's leadership. After reading Nasser's book "The 
Philosophy of Revolution", Nehru wrote to the Indian Ambas­
sador to Egypt Ali Yavar Jung : "Egyptian or indeed Arab
politics appear to me to be extraordinarily immature and 
wrapped up in their petty problems with little understanding 
of what is going on in the world. When I met Nasser, I was 
attracted to him ; he is a likeable person. When I read a 
little book of his, I felt disappointed, that is, in regard 
to his intellectual calibre".55
Nevertheless, Nehru saw in Nasser a modern, progressive and 
a nationalist leader who, if cultivated with care, could 
play a positive and independent role in the Middle East. 
While the conversion of the largest Arab state to nonalign­
ment would keep the super power meddling in the region in
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check, encouraging nationalism and secularism in the region 
would de-emphasise the role of religion in the region and 
neutralise the Pakistani attempts to forge solidarity with 
the region on the basis of Islam.
THE SUEZ CRISIS, 1956
The nationalization of the Suez Canal by Nasser in July 1956 
following the decision of the US and the UK not to assist 
Egypt in the construction of the Aswan Dam precipitated a 
major crisis in the Middle East. The fact that Nasser's 
decision followed closely on the heels of his meetings with 
Nehru at Brioni and Cairo caused diplomatic embarrassment to 
India. Nehru made it clear to the Indian Parliament that his 
discussions with Nasser "did not relate to the Suez Canal or 
any aspect of Anglo-Egyptian relations".56
Though Nehru supported Nasser in public, he tried to 
restrain him in private. After the nationalization of Suez 
Canal, Nehru sent a cable to the Indian Ambassador in Cairo 
asking him to tell Nasser that "he had acted hastily and 
that public opinion in India was likely to be unfriendly".57 
Addressing the Indian Parliament, Nehru conceded that "The 
suddenness of the nationalization decision and the manner in 
which it has been implemented may have contributed to the 
violent reactions. But the very terms of the nationalization 
under the laws of Egypt are within the province of that
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Government".58 He also referred to Indiafs own vital inter­
est in the issue."India is not a disinterested party. She is 
a principal user of this waterway, and her economic life and 
development is not unaffected by the dispute, not to speak 
of worse developments, in regard to it".59
On Oct. 24, India made its own proposals60 to solve the 
Suez issue. The essence of the Indian approach was to nego­
tiate a peaceful solution which would safeguard the 
legitimate interests of the users of the Canal without in­
fringing in any way on the sovereign rights of Egypt. 
However, when the Israeli invasion of Sinai was followed by 
an Anglo-French military invasion of the Canal Zone, Nehru 
reacted quite sharply and described it bluntly as "a 
flagrant case of aggression" and "a reversion to past 
colonial methods".61 Later, India played an active role at 
the UN in securing the withdrawal of foreign troops from 
Egyptian soil and in vindicating Egypt's sovereign rights.
THE COOLING OF INDO-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS
Though the understanding and rapport that developed between 
Nehru and Nasser led to political coordination between the 
two countries' foreign policies in the 50s and early 60s, 
the Sino-Indian war and the death of Nehru soon after led to 
a certain chill in Indo-Egyptian relations. When Shastri 
visited Cairo in Oct. 1964, a reference to Peking's intran­
123
sigence in not accepting the Colombo proposals was deleted 
on Egypt's insistence.62 The Indians were disappointed by 
this lack of positive support from Nasser in regard to the 
vital issues affecting India - Kashmir and the Sino-Indian 
border dispute.63
Indians were also piqued by the reports in the Egyptian 
press that India's nonalignment was "in danger of being 
eroded by American assistance" following the Sino-Indian 
war.64
That the Indians were disenchanted with the attitude of the 
UAR was confirmed when Mrs.Gandhi deliberately chose to by­
pass Cairo on her way to Washington and spent instead two 
days in Paris in May 1966. G.H.Jansen commenting on the 
episode said: "It came as news to these friends of India
that India was tired of being nagged by the Arabs in to a 
position of total hostility towards Israel while the Arabs 
maintained an equivocal neutrality towards India's an­
tagonists, China and Pakistan".65
Though Mrs.Gandhi did visit Cairo in July 1966, there was 
very little of the old spark in the relations between the 
two countries. The joint statement that was issued was con­
fined to vague generalities and routine diplomatic niceties. 
"If the document reflected a measure of icy formality it was 
because in the type of relations which now exist between 
this country and the Arabs, any demonstration of excessive 
warmth is exceedingly difficult".66
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Though India extended total and vociferous support to 
Egypt during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the rout of the Arab 
armies left Nasser a weak and shattered man. The defeat also 
led to fresh thinking in Cairo which resulted in a new Arab 
strategy based on a broad Arab coalition which sought to 
rope in countries like Jordan and even Saudi Arabia which 
were hitherto ignored on ideological grounds. The withdrawal 
of the Egyptian forces from Yemen eliminated the main source 
of tension and friction between Cairo and Riyadh and paved 
the way for such a broad Arab coalition. However, the death 
of Nasser in 1970 and the advent of Anwar Sadat marked a new 
and more down-to-earth phase in Indo-Egyptian relations. 
During the Bangladesh crisis in 1971, Egypt maintained a 
studied silence which again disappointed the Indians. When 
Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed met Sadat in Cairo in July 1971, Sadat 
assured him that he would impress upon Pakistan the need for 
a political solution to facilitate the return of refugees. 
67However, Egypt continued to maintain a neutral and pas­
sive posture on the issue. The Ministry of External Affairs 
in New Delhi was irked by the fact that there was little to 
choose between the so called progressive and conservative 
Arab states in their approach to an issue which was of 
critical importance to India.68
However, M.H.Haikal, Editor-in-Chief of Egypt's leading 
daily A1 Ahram and a close confidant of Sadat disclosed in 
New Delhi in February 1973 that Soviet arms and assistance
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for Bangladesh passed through Egypt. "It is wrong to say 
that Egypt was completely silent. It did play an active and 
effective role" he said.69 But it is quite possible that 
the help that Egypt rendered to India was more due to Soviet 
pressure than any desire on its part to help an old friend 
in her hour of peril.
Moreover, Sadat's political priorities and orientation were 
so different from that of Nasser that the political under­
standing and affinity that existed between India and Egypt 
all but ceased to exist in the 70s. Sadat was a pragmatist 
and his ambitions for Egypt were rather modest. His first 
priority was the withdrawal of Israel from the Egyptian ter­
ritory. He also believed in free enterprise and was con­
vinced of the necessity of gaining American support as the 
only way of breaking the Israeli intransigence. Having 
thrown out the Russians, he launched a major offensive 
against Israel in coordination with Syria in Oct. 1973. 
After "unfreezing" the situation, he plumped for the 
American connection which eventually led to Egypt signing a 
separate peace treaty with Israel and substantial American 
economic and military assistance.
Meanwhile, during the same period, India moved closer to the 
USSR and hence there was a hint of political divergence be­
tween the two countries though there was no bilateral dis­
pute as such. Besides, India could not endorse the Egyptian 
strategy of separate peace with Israel without alienating
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the rest of the Arab world which had ostracised Egypt from 
the Arab fold and with whom India was trying to cultivate a 
more meaningful and profitable relationship. Hence, India*s 
cautious and qualified welcome to the Camp David Accord. 
Nevertheless, India firmly resisted pressures from various 
Arab countries to expel Egypt from the NAM at Havana in 
Sept. 1979.
The 70s and the 80s underlined the fact that apart from some 
political understanding, there was little else to Indo- 
Egyptian relations. Indo-Egyptian economic relations failed 
to take off despite repeated attempts of the two govern­
ments. Nasser, Tito and Mrs.Gandhi tried to provide a new 
direction to the developing countries by setting an example 
of promoting economic cooperation through mutual granting of 
tariff preferences and other concessions and incentives in 
selected areas. However, this laudable experiment proved to 
be a modest success.70
Indo-Egyptian economic relations were also plagued by trade 
imbalance between the two countries. Initially, the im­
balance was the result of Egypt buying more of Indian goods 
but failing to sell to India to the extent specified in the 
agreement. India1 s major import from Egypt was long-staple 
cotton. However, Egypt was not always able to fulfil its ex­
port commitment to India because of Egypt's preference to 
sell the same in hard currency areas.71 Later, the problem 
was compounded when India became a net Exporter of cotton.
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In 1975, India and Egypt agreed to terminate the rupee trade 
from 1975 and switch over to trading in convertible cur­
rency. By and large, Indo-Egyptian economic relations 
remained modest and low-key with little likelihood of any 
significant breakthrough in future either.
Indo-Egyptian attempts at technological collaboration also 
ended in total failure. The two countries sought to produce 
a supersonic military aircraft with India building the HF 24 
airframes while Egypt manufacturing the E 300 engines. The 
project fell through because of technical problems.72 In 
the words of one commentator "The whole project was a brain­
child of Mr. Krishna Menon, who conjured up the idea of 
mating an Indian-built airframe with an Egyptian -designed 
jet engine, as a piece of political fantasy during the 
heydays of nonalignment".73 
There were a number of other irritants in Indo-Egyptian 
relations in the late 70s and 80s. In 1976, Egypt approached 
India for spare parts for its MIG 21s which were more or 
less grounded because Soviet Union had suspended all 
military supplies to Egypt. India could not possibly have 
obliged Egypt because of its contractual commitments to the 
USSR. India sent a negative reply almost six months after 
the initial Egyptian request.74
Egypt was also sore that India voted in favour of a resolu­
tion condemning Egypt for signing a separate peace treaty 
with Israel at the Havana Nonaligned Summit in 1979 contrary
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to the assurance that it received from the then Indian For­
eign Minister Mr.S.N. Mishra. The two countries also failed 
to renew the agreement to train Egyptian nuclear scientists 
at Trombay and the acrimonious negotiations between Air- 
India and Egypt-Air over the flights from one country to 
another further vitiated the atmosphere between the two 
countries.75
To sum up, India's relations with Egypt acquired a larger 
than life image initially because of euphoria over nonalign­
ment, India's exaggerated fears over a hostile Islamic bloc 
and the colourful and charismatic personalities of Nehru and 
Nasser. However, the passage of time exposed the limitations 
of Indo-Egyptian relations both the in political and 
economic spheres. While India did gain something from this 
relationship, it must be emphasised that India's close iden­
tification with Nasser was a principal cause for the aliena­
tion of many Arab states which resented Nasser's leadership 
and policies but had no quarrel with India, thereby 
seriously circumscribing India's already limited options in 
the region.
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INDIA AND IRAQ
India's relations with Iraq, potentially one of the more 
significant and powerful countries in the Middle East, has 
been rather chequered and took an unusually long time to ma­
ture and consolidate. In the following pages, an attempt 
would be made to analyse the initial impediments in the 
development of Indo-Iraqi relations, the Baathist coup in 
1958 and its impact on subsequent Indo-Iraqi interaction 
and the factors that contributed to a breakthrough in their 
bilateral relations in the early 70s along with a brief dis­
cussion of future prospects.
Indo-Iraqi ties could be conveniently considered in two 
phases, the first phase lasting till 1958 when Iraq was un­
der monarchy and the second phase beginning with the coup in 
Iraq in 1958 which overthrew the monarchy and established a 
radical Baathist regime in Baghdad.
INDO-IRAQI RELATIONS TILL 1958
Indo-Iraqi relations started on a fairly positive note soon 
after India's independence when the two countries "urged by 
the mutual desire to establish peace between the countries 
with a view to the common benefit of their people and the
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development of their respective countries, (wished) to enter 
in to a Treaty of Friendship with each other...” in Nov. 
1952.76
However, as in the case of Iran, Nehru's penchant for non- 
alignment and Nasser again came in the way of India 
seriously cultivating Iraq on a bilateral basis. The monar­
chical regime in Iraq was, like other monarchies in the 
region, politically conservative. But its championing of Is­
lam was again politically motivated and meant to ward off 
the threat posed to the regime by radical Arab nationalism. 
"The rivalry between Egyptian and Iraqi leaders was not new: 
but "Nasserism" heightened and gave a new edge to old 
rivalries".77
Hence, Iraq's affinity with Pakistan even before the 
Baathist coup was primarily political rather than religious. 
More importantly, the Pakistani factor was of much less im­
portance in the Indo-Iraqi equation than it was in the Indo- 
Iranian equation simply because unlike Iran, Iraq saw no 
direct stake , political or security, in the stability and 
viability of Pakistan.
Nevertheless, India failed to take a fairly detached view 
of Pak-Iraqi ties and develop its relations with Iraq inde­
pendently of the Pakistan factor. This only goes to under­
line India's rather unwarranted obsession with Pakistan and 
Pan-Islam which led to unnecessary distortions and an­
gularities in India's Middle Eastern policy in general.
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It was the fear of radical Arab nationalism as represented 
by Nasser that prompted the regime of Nuri Pasha to 
gravitate, as a counter, towards Islam, Pakistan and even­
tually the Baghdad Pact.78
THE BAGHDAD PACT, 1955
The Iraqi decision to join the Western military alliance in 
1955 which came to be known as the Baghdad Pact was a blow 
to the development of Indo-Iraqi relations for various 
reasons. First. India, in general, was opposed to military 
alliances. Secondly, India was particularly worried about 
the Baghdad Pact because of Pakistan's membership of it. In­
dia feared that Pakistan could exploit its membership of the 
alliance to put pressure on India in relation to bilateral 
disputes between the two countries.
As Nehru pointed out to the Lok Sabha: "But, surely, nobody 
here imagines that the Pakistan Government entered into this 
Pact because it expected some imminent or distant invasion 
or aggression from the Soviet Union. The Pakistan newspapers 
and the statements of responsible people in Pakistan make it 
perfectly clear that they have joined this Pact because of 
India".79 Thirdly, Iraq started extending overt political 
and diplomatic support to Pakistan over Kashmir only after 
the latter had joined the Baghdad Pact.
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Looking back, one can not help wondering whether India 
should have allowed Iraq's membership of the Baghdad Pact to 
cloud Indo-Iraqi relations to the extent it did. Iraq was 
not unfriendly towards India nor was there any major 
bilateral dispute between the two countries. Iraq's motives 
for joining the Baghdad Pact had nothing to do with India. 
As Nehru himself pointed out, "other members of the Baghdad 
Pact have no hostility to India".80 As we have already 
seen, the Baghdad Pact failed to evolve along the lines of 
the NATO regarding common defence against third parties 
which greatly reduced its efficacy and solidarity.
However, Iraq did support Pakistan on the Kashmir issue much 
more vocally after both of them joined the Baghdad Pact. 
Iraq's basic stand has been that the Kashmir issue must be 
solved on the basis of a plebiscite and that the passage of 
time made no difference to this commitment which both sides 
had accepted earlier.
Iraq sent a aide-memoire to the Government of India in June 
1956, presumably at the behest of Pakistan, which referred 
to Iraq's concern over the Kashmir issue. It said: "The
Government of Iraq desires to point out that the Kashmir 
question is a factor of restlessness and tension and it has 
its effect on the security of this area, and Iraq being a 
member of the United Nations and the Baghdad Pact, feels 
that it can not but be interested in anything that upsets 
the security of this area, which is on the whole linked with
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the security of the world".81
At a Security Council meeting in Jan. 1957, the Iraqi repre­
sentative Mr. Jawad argued that "The passage of time has 
neither changed the principles upon which the future of 
Kashmir was to be decided nor has made the method of a pleb­
iscite less applicable now than it was eight years ago".82 
In Oct. 1957, the Iraqi representative Mr. Khalaf asserted 
in a Security Council debate that in relation to Kashmir "a 
solution is already prescribed by the Council and the Com­
mission through their resolutions, and all that is to done 
is to implement the resolutions".83
As can be seen from the above, the Iraqi support to Pakistan 
on the Kashmir issue was largely political and diplomatic 
and primarily meant to express its solidarity with a fellow 
member of the Baghdad Pact. To India's dismay and disap­
pointment this support continued even after the coup in Iraq 
in 1958 which installed a radical Baathist regime in Bagh­
dad.
THE 1958 BAATHIST COUP AND AFTER
The Baathist coup in Baghdad in 1958 was a significant and 
welcome development from the Indian point of view for a 
variety of reasons. First and foremost, the coup in Baghdad 
sounded the death-knell of the Baghdad Pact which India 
greatly feared and firmly opposed. As Nehru told the Rajya
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Sabha in Aug. 1958: "The whole conception and inception of
the Baghdad Pact was based on unreality. It ignored the 
great forces and ferments in Asia today and merely thought 
in terms of coming to agreements with a certain stratum of 
rulers and a small group at the top. And suddenly we find 
that the very basis of the Baghdad Pact is gone. Baghdad and 
Iraq have dropped out of it".84
Secondly, India expected that the advent of a Baathist 
regime in Baghdad would give "a boost to the forces of non- 
alignment and secularism in the Middle East".85 The 
Baathist regime did adopt a nonaligned stance in foreign af­
fairs and followed a genuinely secular policy both in the 
international and domestic spheres. This, in turn, no doubt, 
strengthened the forces of nonalignment and secularism in 
the region, a development which India could not but have 
welcomed with a sense of satisfaction and perhaps vindica­
tion.
Thirdly and lastly, India must also have hoped that the non- 
aligned and secular regime in Baghdad would, at least, 
dilute the strong political support that Iraq had been ex­
tending to Pakistan over the Kashmir issue. The fact that 
this did not happen for quite some time must have both dis­
appointed and probably surprised New Delhi. This is 
primarily because India's earlier reservations about the 
monarchical regime and expectations in relation to the post- 
1958 Baathist regime were both based on misperceptions.
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As has already been pointed out, even before the 1958 coup, 
Islam was hardly a consideration in Iraq's foreign policy 
pursuits nor was it a factor in Iraq's close ties with 
Pakistan. More importantly, India was never a factor in 
Iraq's aligned posture between 1955 and 1958. Hence, it was 
rather naive on the part of Indian policy makers to have ex­
pected a dramatic change in Indo-Iraqi relations in strictly 
bilateral terms even after 1958. Iraq's support to 
Pakistan's position on Kashmir continued beyond 1958 
primarily because Iraq considered Pakistan's friendship as a 
useful factor in its rivalry with Egypt for Arab leadership. 
The change of regime in Baghdad did little to scuttle the 
traditional rivalry between the Egyptians and Iraqis and the 
Baathist regime in Baghdad, despite its ideological affinity 
with Nasser, was not inclined to play a second fiddle to 
Nasser. As one scholar pointed out, "The most striking, and 
to many the most surprising, development was the extraordi­
nary rapidity with which antagonism between Iraq and Egypt 
reopened after a brief lull following the fall of the royal 
regime".
"Qassim perceived that Nasser aimed at a "leadership" of the 
Arab world which prejudiced independent action by Iraq in 
external affairs...". "Without explicitly stating it, Qassim 
unmistakably implied the equality of Iraq with Egypt within 
the framework of Arab nationalism".86 Thus, in the post- 
1958 period, "India's relations with Iraq took a turn for
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the better, although the major development in relations came 
between 1966 and 1976”.87
IRAQ AND THE SINO-INDIAN WAR, 1962
When the Sino-Indian border dispute erupted in to a full- 
scale war in Oct. 1962, Iraq extended strong support to In­
dia and criticised the Chinese actions quite explicitly. 
"Almowatin", a widely circulated Iraqi daily, editorially 
condemned the unprecedented and unreasonable Chinese aggres­
sion over a large territory of India and demanded that the 
Chinese withdrew to positions they held prior to 8 Sept. 
1962. The Chinese action, the paper went on, compelled India 
to take necessary measures to face it on a war basis, and to 
entrust the country's defence to Nehru and request arms from 
the West, which she was never inclined to earlier.88 
Another paper ”A1-Akhbar" said: "All endeavours to settle
this not too very serious geographical dispute have failed 
because the Chinese wished them to fail".89
There was also a message of support to Nehru from Iraqi 
thinkers, academicians and lawyers. The message said: 
"Irrespective of the arguments advanced by the two disputing 
sides, China's actions in imposing its military control over 
the territories she claims cannot be compatible with prin­
ciples of the International Law. We proclaim ourselves on 
the side of the Indian peoples in this dispute... ".90 The
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Iraqi Prime Minister Abdul Karim Dassim implicitly 
criticised China when he said: "The cause behind the fight­
ing was highhandedness in view and the insistence on impos­
ing this highhandedness".91
Incidentally, India and Iraq signed an agreement in Dec. 
1962 which accorded most favoured nation treatment to each 
other and as a result Iraq became an important market for 
Indian tea, jute, textiles and spices.92
THE IRAQI PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO INDIA, 1964
The Iraqi President Mr. Mohammad Arif paid an official visit 
to India in March-April 1964 and had extensive talks with 
the Indian Prime Minister Nehru. The first ever India-Iraq 
Joint Communique93 issued at the end of Iraqi President's 
visit reflected the growing political understanding between 
the two countries.
Both the leaders "acknowledged the identity of views between 
India and Iraq on world issues such as nuclear disarmament, 
colonialism, racial discrimination, arising from the policy 
of nonalignment followed by both countries and their common 
devotion to the objective of ensuring an early end of im­
perialism and colonialism in all their form and 
manifestations".
In an implicit reference to the Sino-Indian border dispute, 
they
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"upheld the principle that all disputes between states, in­
cluding boundary disputes, should be settled by peaceful 
means and not by resort to force, and that if aggression is 
committed in pursuit of territorial aims, its fruits must be 
denied to the aggressor".
The President of Iraq "expressed appreciation of the Colombo 
proposals and the hope that the People's Republic of China 
would also do everything necessary to facilitate direct ne­
gotiations between the two countries...".
Nehru "expressed his support for the just claims of the Arab 
countries to the waters of the river Jordan and for the 
rights of the Palestinian refugees wishing to return to 
their homes".
The Iraqi President "expressed the hope that the unfortunate 
differences between India and Pakistan would be resolved by 
reducing the current tensions between the two countries and 
creating the necessary atmosphere for direct discussions be­
tween India and Pakistan".
The Iraqi President also "expressed gratification at the 
fact that India was the homeland of 50 million Muslims ... 
who enjoyed the fullest freedom of religious faith and wor­
ship on a basis of complete equality under the law.
IRAQ AND THE INDO-PAK WAR, 1965
The Indo-Pak war over Kashmir in Sept. 1965 saw Iraq take a
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position which was consistent with her earlier stand in 
relation to the dispute. The Iraqi representative at the 
U.N. argued that f,a lasting solution of the Kashmir problem 
must be based upon the principles of the Charter and the 
decisions of the competent organs of this Organisation”.94 
Iraq did not accept the Indian contention that the plebi­
scite issue had become irrelevant in view of the free elec­
tions held in the Indian held Kashmir which was tantamount 
to self-determination of the Kashmiris.
The then foreign minister of India, Mr. Swaran Singh, making 
a statement in the Rajya Sabha in Nov. 1965 mentioned Iraq 
among other the Middle Eastern countries and said: "The rep­
resentatives of these countries made statements which cannot 
be construed as against our interests”. 95 So, the Iraqi 
position during the 1965 Indo-Pak war was not construed as 
unfriendly even by the Indian government.
The year 1966 was a turning point in Indo-Iraqi relations. 
In February 1966, it was announced in Cairo that Iraq had 
given up its pro-Pakistan stand on the Kashmir issue. It was 
believed that it was Nasser who had weaned the then Iraqi 
President Arif away from the earlier pro-Pakistan posture. 
96This development went a long way in simplifying and ex­
panding Indo-Iraqi relations.
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THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER'S VISIT TO INDIA, 1967
Dr. Adman Al-Pachachi, the first foreign minister of Iraq 
ever to visit India, came to New Delhi in March 1967. Ad­
dressing the Indian Council of World Affairs in New Delhi, 
he said that the close ties between India and the Arab world 
had led to the evolution of a common policy on international 
issues. On decolonization, nuclear disarmament, cold war and 
under developed countries, the approach of the two nations 
was identical.97
The Iraqi foreign minister said that Iraq supported India's 
stand on nuclear non-proliferation and stood by the resolu­
tion moved on the issue by the eight nonaligned powers at 
the 21st Session of the U.N. General Assembly. He also found 
a large measure of agreement between India and Iraq on the 
international issues that he discussed with the Indian for­
eign minister Mr. Chagla. He asserted that Iraq adhered 
strictly to nonalignment and rejected any other form of 
grouping of states like that envisaged at the Islamic Con­
ference. 98 The two countries also decided to set up an ex­
pert body to examine joint ventures that could be estab­
lished between the two.99
The Indo-Iraq Joint CommuniquelOO also reflected the warming 
up of Indo-Iraqi relations. It said that a treaty of non­
proliferation of nuclear weapons was essential to meet the
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"serious danger inherent in the spread of nuclear weapons". 
Such a treaty should be based on "the principle of an ac­
ceptable balance of obligations and responsibilities between 
the nuclear weapon states and the non-nuclear states".
The Communique expressed full support for the struggle of 
the people of Aden and the Protectorates to attain freedom 
and independence. It also supported the struggle of the 
Arabs of Palestine for the realisation of their aspirations. 
The year 1968 saw Indo-Iraqi cooperation extending to the 
field of defence as well. India's then defence minister Mr. 
Swaran Singh paid an official visit to Baghdad in Feb. 1968. 
As symbol of India's growing ties with Iraq, a fighter 
aircraft was presented to Iraq during Swaran Singh's visit. 
lOlOn his return from Baghdad, Mr. Singh disclosed that In­
dia would provide more military instructors to train the 
Iraqis and would increase the training facilities, par­
ticularly for Iraq's Airforce.102
In Feb. 1970, India and Iraq signed an agreement on Techni­
cal and Scientific Cooperation which envisaged "exchange of 
technical personnel, grant of scholarships, exchange of 
visits of experts, exchange and supply of technical documen­
tation and the equipment of indigenous manufacture, coopera­
tion and scientific work between the scientific and techni­
cal organizations and institutions of the two countries and 
provisions of consultancy services and carrying out 
feasibility of studies on subjects of mutual benefit".103
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From the Indian point of view, during the Bangladesh 
crisis"Iraq was not hostile although it did not adopt a vo­
cally sympathetic standpoint".104 After the crisis was 
over, Iraq became the first Arab country to recognise 
Bangladesh in Aug. 1972.
In June 1972, India threw its weight behind Iraq's decision 
to nationalise the Iraqi Petroleum Company. India's Foreign 
Minister Mr. Swaran Singh, in a statement, said that "India 
appreciates and supports the Iraqi Government's desire to 
exercise control over their natural resources, among which 
oil plays a vital part in the economy of the country".105 
The statement was significant because the nationalization 
decision had led to a bitter war of words between Iraq on 
the one hand and the US and the UK on the other and threats 
of economic sanctions against Iraq. Iraq believed to have 
agreed in principle to supply one million tons of crude to 
India annually for the Haldia refinery. It was also stated 
that there were prospects for joint exploration of oil.106 
The Iraqi Foreign Minister Mr. Murtadha Saeed Abdul Baqi 
paid an official visit to India in Aug. 1972. In the Joint 
Communiquel07 issued at the end of his visit, the two For­
eign Ministers expressed their common desire to share the 
experience gained in their respective national development 
processes.The two sides also reaffirmed their adherence to 
the principal of nonalignment. They considered Iraq's recog­
nition of Bangladesh a positive step. Mr. Baqi referred to
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the tense situation in the Gulf and along Iraqfs borders 
which threatened peace and cooperation in the region. Mr. 
Swaran Singh said India was fully aware of the dimensions of 
these problems.
THE IMPORTANCE OF GROWING INDO-IRAQI TIES
The upswing in Indo-Iraqi relations in the early 70s was 
significant not only in itself but also for the openings it 
provided for Indian diplomacy in the region. As one 
newspaper put it "Gone are the days when New Delhi's ap­
proach to the Arabs revolved round one or two countries in 
the region. India has acquired new friends in countries like 
Iraq and Yemen".108 Consequently, India's approach to the 
region became more balanced and broad-based.
The opening up of Indo-Iraqi relations was a major con­
tributory factor to the subsequent breakthrough that was 
achieved in Indo-Iranian relations. The Shah of Iran would 
in no way allow his principal Arab rival in the Gulf to cul­
tivate India, an emerging regional power, on exclusive 
terms.
More importantly, it was also a lesson for Indian policy 
makers that it was not necessary to make a 'either/or' 
choice between two contending countries and it was quite 
feasible to have good relations with both on the basis of 
mutuality of interests. India's success in cultivating Iraq
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without alienating Iran was ample proof of this.
India's deepening relations with Iraq also facilitated the 
subsequent process of political understanding and fruitful 
economic cooperation between India and various Gulf states. 
The broad understanding that India and Iraq were able to 
foster between themselves led to the signing of numerous 
agreements between the two countries.
The Indian Minister of Planning Mr. D.P. Dhar visited Iraq 
in Sept.-Oct. 1972 and the Joint Communiquel09 issued on 
the occasion reflected the widening and deepening of Indo- 
Iraqi economic ties.
In Oct. 1972, Iraq agreed in principle to give India a loan 
to cover the bulk of the foreign exchange requirements of 
the giant Mathura refinery, estimated at $75 million.110 
In Dec. 1972, the Planning Minister of Iraq Dr. Jewad Hashim 
visited India and met his Indian counterpart Mr. D.P. Dhar 
and they agreed that "a Joint Planning Committee would be 
set up with the objective of studying and utilising the 
planning activities of the two countries for mutual 
benefit".Ill
In April 1973, Iraq agreed to supply India 30 million tons 
of crude over a 10-year period for the refinery to be set up 
at Mathura during 1977-78. Iraq also agreed to extend a 
credit of $50 million in the shape of supplies of crude oil. 
112
In Aug. 1973, India and Iraq reached an agreement which per­
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mitted India's Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC) to 
search for oil in some specified regions in Iraq. 113 In 
Sept. 1973, India and Iraq agreed to establish a sponge iron 
plant in Iraq.114
SADDAM HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO INDIA, MARCH 1974
The Iraqi Vice-President Mr. Saddam Hussein visited India in 
March 1974 and had extensive discussions with Mrs. Gandhi 
and the Joint Communiquell5 issued on the occasion 
reflected the further deepening of political and economic 
ties between the two countries. The establishment of a per­
manent Joint Commission and the agreements for securing a 
loan on soft terms to import 2.8 million tons of crude oil 
during 1974 and the supply of 112 million tons of crude over 
ten years after Mathura refinery became operational were the 
major outcome of the visit.116 Mr. Hussein also expressed 
Iraq's opposition to foreign military bases in the Gulf 
region and the Indian Ocean.117
The visit reflected the close political affinity that ex­
isted between the two countries which, in turn, led to ex­
tensive economic cooperation. As one newspaper put it, 
"Iraq, committed to socialism and total independence in the 
field of foreign policy, is closest to India. Vice-President 
Saddam Hussein . . . represents these attitudes more emphati­
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cally than any Arab leader today".118
HRS. GANDHI'S VISIT TO IRAQ, JAN. 1975
Mrs. Gandhi's three day visit to Baghdad in Jan. 1975 was a 
definite success in both political and economic terms. The 
veiled warnings against any future Arab oil embargo and the 
big power naval activities in the Indian Ocean reportedly 
figured in the talks between Mrs. Gandhi and Mr. Saddam Hus­
sein. Both leaders agreed that not all world powers were 
reconciled to the new realities in the region.119 
The Joint Communiquel20 issued on the occasion reflected 
the close coordination that the two countries managed to es­
tablish in their general views on international affairs and 
specific issues of mutual interest and benefit.
Mrs. Gandhi "appreciated the successes achieved in con­
solidating the country's economic independence and gaining 
control over its national resources for the well-being of 
the people of Iraq".
The two leaders "stressed the continuing validity of the 
policy of nonalignment which had served the international 
community well".
They also emphasised the importance of "the Indian Ocean 
being a Zone of Peace free from foreign military bases and 
great power rivalry and tension".
Regarding Iraq's border dispute with Iran, Mrs. Gandhi
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"expressed the Government of India*s full awareness of the 
dimensions of these problems".
INDO-IRAQI POLITICAL HONEYMOON
The latter part of the 70s saw the establishment of the 
closest political and economic links between India and Iraq. 
This was largely due to the similarities in the problems 
that the two countries encountered during this period and 
their respective national ambitions and aspirations. There­
fore, it is hardly surprising that one Indian observer chose 
to comment in 1976 that "Among Arab states, Iraq is closest 
to India today in political terms".121
Both India and Iraq faced grave challenges to their national 
security and sovereignty in the early 70s, India in relation 
to Bangladesh crisis in view of the unsympathetic attitude 
of the West and Iraq in relation to gaining control over its 
oil resources from foreign companies in the face of threats 
of economic sanctions again from the West. Consequently, 
both India and Iraq were left with little choice but to move 
not only closer to the USSR but also to formalise their 
close ties with it in the form of Friendship treaties in 
1971 and 1972 respectively. As the challenges, which 
precipitated the friendship treaties were overcome, both In­
dia and Iraq "reverted to their normal foreign policy 
stance".122
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Nevertheless, this period was also characterized by an or­
chestrated campaign, mainly western inspired, that the USSR 
was trying to create a hostile ring round Iran and Pakistan 
by building an axis running from New Delhi through Kabul to 
Baghdad. It was also alleged that India and Iraq were 
secretly providing base facilities to the Soviet Indian 
Ocean fleet at Visakapatnam in the Bay of Bengal and Umm 
Qasr in the Shatt-al-Arab estuary in the Persian Gulf 
respectively which had no basis in fact whatsoever.123 
This is the reason behind both countries reaffirming, time 
and again, their commitment to nonalignment, their opposi­
tion to major power meddling in the Indian Ocean, their 
determination to pursue independent foreign policies and 
their emphasis on national self-reliance which they sought 
to attain by mutual cooperation in economic as well as tech­
nological spheres during this period.
IRAQ AND THE JANATA INTERREGNUM, 1977-79
The change of government in India made little difference to 
the buoyancy in Indo-Iraqi relations despite the fact that 
Iraq extended its full support and solidarity with the 
domestic policies of Mrs. Gandhi during the emergency period 
in India.124
A high level Iraqi delegation led by its Vice-President Mr. 
Taha M. Marouf visited India in July 1978 and had extensive
149
talks with the Indian Prime Minister Mr. Desai and his 
senior colleagues. They covered a wide range of subjects and 
a "broad measure" of agreement on the issues discussed 
emerged.125
The Joint Communiquel26 issued on the occasion was a 
reiteration and reaffirmation of the commonalty of percep­
tions and policies of the two countries in relation to major 
global and regional issues and problems and their determina­
tion to develop a common approach in tackling them.
INDO-IRAQI RELATIONS IN THE 80S
The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 
brought India and Iraq much more closer to each other 
politically. Both were opposed to the Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan and there was considerable similarity of views 
between the two on the developments in Afghanistan and the 
situation created by them in the region. Both agreed on the 
need to defuse the tension in the area and prevent the es­
calation of super power rivalry in the region including the 
Indian Ocean. Both were of the opinion that injection of 
arms in to the region would create further instability and 
heighten tension in the region.127
Commenting on the importance of the Indo-Iraqi ties, one 
newspaper said: "... the regime there (in Baghdad) is
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genuinely secular and nonaligned. Both these points are im­
portant for New Delhi: the first because the tide of Islamic 
fundamentalism is sweeping West Asia and a number of govern­
ments are finding it expedient to speak in the name of 
religion and second because the Soviet take-over in Af­
ghanistan and the US response to it have exposed the whole 
region to super power rivalry on a much bigger scale than it 
has been exposed ever before”.
It went on to add: "For years, both India and Iraq have been 
trying to pursue policies which could strengthen their 
political and economic independence and keep the region free 
from the control of the super powers".128
However, the fact remained that neither India nor Iraq was 
in a position to displease the Soviet Union over Afghanis­
tan. Though it was primarily the Soviet action which esca­
lated tensions in the region, both the countries reserved 
their strongest criticism for the Western response to it. It 
was also ironical that despite being two of the largest im­
porters of arms in the region (mostly Soviet) , India and 
Iraq chose to be critical of Western countries for large 
scale transfer of arms to the region as a response to the 
Soviet presence in Afghanistan.
IRAN-IRAQ WAR, SEPT. 1980
The Iran-Iraq war which started in Sept. 1980 caused con­
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siderable strain in Indo-Iraqi relations. When the war broke 
out, the Indian Foreign Ministry described it as an 
"unfortunate development" because both countries were non- 
aligned and had friendly relations with India.129 
However, there were reports in the foreign press that India 
had agreed to supply planes and tanks' parts to Iran in its 
war with Iraq. The Indian Foreign Ministry in a Press 
Release said that there was "no truth whatsoever in these 
reports". It described these reports as "mischievous and 
motivated, aimed at distorting India's objective and correct 
stand in Iraq-Iran conflict, the countries with whom India 
has equally friendly relations".130
When the Israeli Airforce bombed and destroyed Iraq's Osirak 
nuclear reactor near Baghdad on 7 June, 1981, India reacted 
sharply and condemned Israeli action as "stark adventurism 
and a blatant act of intervention and aggression".131 
As the Iran-Iraq conflict continued unabated, for the first 
time since the Iraqi revolution in 1958, Indo-Iraqi rela­
tions started showing strains. Iraq did not like the shift­
ing of the venue of the 7th Nonaligned Summit from Baghdad 
to New Delhi in 1983. According to the Gulf News Agency 
(GNA) , Iraq had informed India many times of its 
"dissatisfaction" with the NAM's role in ending the Iran- 
Iraq war. Iraq reportedly sent a low-level representation to 
Mrs. Gandhi's funeral to register its unhappiness.132 
To sum up, Indo-Iraqi relations, like Indo-Iranian rela­
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tions, took a much longer time to develop and consolidate 
than they should have primarily because of Nehru*s passion 
for nonalignment and Nasser. This was so despite the fact 
that the Pakistan factor was of much less significance in 
relation to Indo-Iraqi ties than it was in the case of Indo- 
Iranian ties.
The fact that there was no dramatic upswing in Indo-Iraqi 
ties even after the coup in Baghdad in 1958 and Iraq’s sub­
sequent withdrawal from the CENTO and its nonaligned orien­
tation only served to expose the basic untenability and far- 
fetchedness of some of the assumptions that underlay India's 
policy towards the region. It is of significance to note 
that Indo-Iraqi ties really flourished only after India had 
started cultivating Iraq in bilateral terms on the basis of 
mutuality of interests in the political sphere and com­
plementarity of interests in the economic sphere sub­
sequently.
Iraq will always be an important country for India in the 
Middle East because Iraq would continue to be a major factor 
in Middle Eastern regional politics and there has been no 
bilateral dispute whatsoever between the two countries over 
the years. Given the complementarity of political outlook 
and economic interests between the two countries, Indo-Iraqi 
ties would continue to grow occasional irritants not­
withstanding .
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CHAPTER 3
INDIA AND IRAN
Iran, apart from being a major and potentially one of the 
most powerful countries in the Middle East, is, perhaps, the 
most important country India has had to deal with in the 
region. This is primarily because Iran, from the beginning, 
considered that it had a direct and vital stake in the In­
dian subcontinent both from political and security point of 
view.
Consequently, Pakistan became an important factor in the 
Indo-Iranian equation for almost two decades and placed ar­
tificial restrictions on the development and maturity of 
Indo-Iranian relations which remained in "a state of 
somnambulance". While Iran was partly responsible for this, 
it appears, at least in retrospect, that India must accept 
the larger part of the blame for this sorry state of af­
fairs .
India signed a treaty of friendship with Iran as early 
as March 1950 wherein both the countries "recognising the 
ancient ties which have existed between the two countries 
for centuries and their mutual need for cooperation in 
strengthening and developing these ties and urged by their 
mutual desire to establish peace between the two countries 
with a view to the common benefit of their people and the
161
development of their respective countries (wished) to enter 
in to a treaty of friendship with each other”.1 
However, the following two decades of Indo-Iranian relations 
hardly bore any resemblance to the sentiments expressed in 
the friendship treaty and remained cool and low-key 
punctuated with moments of mutual suspicion and even hos­
tility. The following pages would be devoted to a critical 
discussion of the reasons that came in the way of Indo- 
Iranian relations developing to their full potential in the 
two decades or so following India's independence and the 
factors that contributed to a breakthrough in their rela­
tions in the mid 70s and a brief look at the future 
prospects.
THE INITIAL AFFINITY
When India and Pakistan became independent in 1947, in spite 
of Pakistan's anti-Indian propaganda and considerable sym­
pathy that existed in the Iranian press and the people in 
general for Pakistan, the Government of Iran remained unaf­
fected and was basically well disposed towards India, a fact 
acknowledged by Nehru himself.2 Even before India's inde­
pendence, Iran participated in the First Asian Relations 
Conference held in New Delhi in March 1947 and extended its 
friendship and goodwill to India.
Nehru too extended sympathy and support to Iran in 1946 in
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its dispute with the USSR in regard to Azerbaijan and the 
withdrawal of Russian forces from the Iranian soil, though 
he avoided any direct criticism of the Soviet Union. He made 
it clear that Indian opinion would strongly resent any ag­
gression on Iran or Turkey by any power.3 Again, when Iran 
nationalised the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951, India 
extended her support to Iran to help her get rid of the rem­
nants of Western imperialism in that country though India 
appealed to both Iran and Britain to settle the issue 
through negotiations.
More importantly, during this period, Iran also tried to 
steer clear of great power influence and pursue an indepen­
dent foreign policy akin to India's nonalignment under the 
Premiership of Mossadegh. As one observer put it, "Under 
Mossadegh, Iran refused like India to be drawn into one or 
other of the two great power blocs and clung tenaciously, if 
a little hopelessly, to her neutrality".4
However, unlike in India where there was a broad national 
consensus on India's nonaligned posture, Mossadegh's Na­
tional Front had to contend with two other contestants for 
power in Iran who were opposed to Iran's policy of 
neutrality namely the Shah, who favoured an alliance with 
the West in order to contain the Soviet threat and the Tudeh 
(Communist Party of Iran) which desired an alliance with the 
USSR on ideological grounds.5
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ALIGNMENT AND ALIENATION
However, the ouster of Mossadegh and the reinstatement of 
Shah in Aug. 1953 with the help of the Central Intelligence 
Agency put an end to Iran's experiment with neutrality and 
put her firmly in the Western alliance. The Shah never 
believed that neutrality would be in the interests of Iran. 
During the World war II, in spite of Iran's declared 
neutrality, Iran was occupied by the allied powers and 
Shah's father Reza Shah was deposed and exiled.
In Shah's own words "While studying the history of past 
fifty years, we have discerned and deduced that Iran has 
consistently been menaced and subjected to encroachments. 
Previous experiences of history have prompted us to conclude 
agreements and treaties with countries who are capable of 
combating these dangers and preventing them from recurring". 
6
However, Iran joining the Western alliance proved to be a 
turning point in Indo-Iranian relations in the sense that it 
created a political rift between the two major Asian nations 
which they failed to mend, despite a few feeble attempts, in 
the next two decades or so. The reasons for this are not far 
to seek.
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THE NEHRU FACTOR
Firstly, India displayed little understanding of the cir- 0 
1 ! cumstances which almost compelled the Shah to align himself 
with the West. He had genuine fears of a Russian threat to 
Iran particularly after Stalin delayed the withdrawal of 
Russian troops from Iran beyond the stipulated date of 2 
March 1946 at the end of the world war II. The Shah was also 
fearful that the Russians could destabilise his regime 
through the Tudeh Party which had close links with the USSR. 
The Shah's domestic position too was anything but secure 
having been installed in power by the Central Intelligence 
I Agency (CIA). Moreover, he considered alignment with the 
West as the only way of obtaining economic assistance and 
arms to which he attached the highest priority.7 
Nehru, on the other hand, had little time for aligned na­
tions in those early days of pristine nonalignment. His at­
titude to aligned nations, as has already been pointed out, 
was "self-righteous". Hence, Nehru showed little apprecia­
tion of the genuine fears and misgivings that haunted the 
Shah in relation to his country's security and integrity. 
Consequently, for years, a barrier has been created between 
Iran and India by Nehru's antipathy towards those in 
military alliance with the West.8
The Shah of Iran did make his first visit to India in Feb.
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1956 on India's invitation just four months after Iran had 
joined the Baghdad Pact. Despite the fact that the Shah 
spent 23 days in India, one of the longest visits ever made 
by any Head of State to India, it was obvious that the visit 
was anything but a success in political terms. The Shah 
tried to impress upon the Indian leaders that his country's 
close ties with Pakistan were not directed against India and 
would not be at the cost of India's friendship. He did refer 
to "differences" between the two countries but also em­
phasised their traditional bonds.9
President Rajendra Prasad, in his welcome address, was any­
thing but effusive. He said that "there may arise dif­
ferences of opinion among us, but the firm basis of under­
standing and mutual regard on which our bonds of friendship 
rest can always be depended upon to take such a strain well 
. . .".10
That no communique was issued at the conclusion of talks be­
tween Nehru and the Shah was an ample indication of the fact 
that the two leaders were on different political wavelengths 
and merely agreed to disagree.
Nehru made a return visit to Tehran in Sept. 1959. The visit 
only served to underline the political gulf that separated 
the two countries. According to Girilal Jain, Nehru's meet­
ing with the Shah was a "near disaster" because the two 
leaders thought in "very different terms".11 The Iranian 
Prime Minister Mr. M. Eghbal while welcoming Nehru merely
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stated that "there is no grave problem between India and 
Iran".12
The Joint Statement issued on the occasion was deliberately 
confined to vague generalities and pious sentiments in order 
to conceal or at least gloss over disagreements on specific 
issues.13 In a television interview, Nehru more or less 
confirmed the lack of political understanding between the 
two countries by stating that "Indo-Iranian friendship could 
be expanded especially in the field of culture, commerce and 
trade".14
THE NASSER FACTOR
The second factor that adversely affected Indo-Iranian rela­
tions was Nehru's close personal friendship with Nasser. 
Nehru's endorsement of Nasser as the leader of the Arab 
world and his policies as progressive and dynamic naturally 
did not go down well with the Shah who felt threatened by 
such policies.15
Shah was already apprehensive about the Soviet threat and 
the vulnerability of his own domestic position which was far 
from stable. Under the circumstances, Nasser's crusade 
against monarchies only tended to increase the Shah's sense 
of insecurity. The traditional Persian-Arab rivalries and 
suspicions and the sectarian divide between the Shi'ite Iran 
and the predominantly Sunni Arabs only accentuated the
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Shah's fears of isolation and encirclement.
Nasser's attempts at the unification of the Arab states like 
the formation of the UAR by the merger of Egypt and Syria 
made the Shah conjure up visions of a coalition of radical 
Arab states leaning heavily against Persian Iran.
The coup in Iraq in 1958 and the coming to the power of a 
radical Baathist regime in Baghdad only confirmed the Shah's 
worst fears. After the coup, the new regime not only started 
moving closer to the USSR but also reopened the Kurdish 
question.16 The Iraqi claims to Kuwait in the early 60s and 
the Civil War in Yemen and Egypt's active participation in 
it were perceived by the Shah as a direct threat to Iran's 
interests, particularly in the Persian Gulf.
Under the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the 
Shah of Iran did not take kindly to India's "special 
relationship" with Egypt and Nehru's political preference in 
favour of Nasser and nonalignment.17
ISLAM AND PAKISTAN AS FACTORS
The Shah tried to counter this threat from Arab radicalism 
as espoused by Nasser in two ways. First, he sought to make 
use of Islam as a counter ideology to Nasser's radical Arab 
nationalism. It is in this context that one should under­
stand the Shah's attempts to organise Islamic conferences,
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particularly in the 60s.
Secondly, he tried to counter Iran's sense of isolation by 
cultivating non-Arab Muslim countries like Pakistan with 
whom Iran had close ethnic and cultural ties. Ironically, 
jNehru's penchant for Nasser and nonalignment prompted the 
i Shah to move closer politically to Islam and Pakistan, a 
development which the Indian policy towards the Middle East 
was purported to counter and neutralise.
Though Shi'ite Islam was declared the State religion in 
Iran, the Shah of Iran was not a religious man in any sense 
of the term. Despite his political conservatism, Shah was a 
modern and forward looking monarch. In fact, under the Shah, 
the emphasis in Iran was on pre-Islamic Aryan Civilization. 
His title "Aryamehr" meant the "Light of the Aryans". In 
1971, the Shah celebrated in a grand and pompous fashion the 
25th Centenary of the founding of the Persian Empire by the 
Cyrus the Great emphasising Iran's Aryan ethos and and 
heritage.
Hence, Islam was hardly a factor in the Shah's support for 
an Islamic alliance in the 60s or his intimate relationship 
with Pakistan over the years. The Shah cultivated both Islam 
and Pakistan as a counterpoise to Nasserism and a possible 
Arab domination of the region.
Iran also firmly opposed the Pakistani attempts to give a 
religious colour to "Regional Cooperation for Development" 
(RCD) which came in to existence in 1964 to promote economic
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cooperation between Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. The Iranian 
foreign minister told the Majlis that "... incidentally,
Turkey, Pakistan and Iran are all Muslim countries but ...
this unity, alliance and concord has no direct connection 
with Islam, nor does it have any specific religious aspects. 
Other nations of Asia . . . may share in this regional 
alliance”.18 In fact, Iran even sounded India on joining 
the RCD as early as 1964 despite Pakistan's total opposition 
to such a move.19
It goes without saying that joining the Baghdad Pact had 
brought Iran and Pakistan closer both politically and 
militarily, a development which India could not but look 
upon with considerable disguiet and trepidation. As Nehru 
told the Lok Sabha "... Baghdad Pact and SEATO . . . have a 
direct effect upon us and naturally we have viewed them with 
suspicion and dislike".20
It must be stated that it was only after Pakistan joined the
Baghdad Pact that it could count on the support of Iran and
other Pact members on the Kashmir issue both at the U.N. and 
outside.21 This support, in essence, was based on the U.N. 
resolutions which sought to settle the issue on the basis of 
a plebiscite in Kashmir. Both Iran and Turkey supported 
Pakistan on Kashmir because they considered Pakistanis mem­
bership of the Pact as essential for its viability and 
success. Besides, Iran solicited Pakistan's support in its 
dispute with Iraq over the Shatt-al-Arab waterway and Turkey
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in its dispute with Greece over Cyprus.
Nevertheless, Iran joined the Baghdad Pact for motives other 
than those that prompted Pakistan to join the same and 
India-baiting was certainly not one of them. Nehru himself 
acknowledged this when he told the Lok Sabha in 1956 that 
"Other members of the Baghdad Pact have no hostility to In­
dia and they have not entered in to pact because of their 
anti-Indian feelings".22 Consequently, the partial cooling 
of Indo-Iranian relations following Iran's adherence to the 
Baghdad Pact was anything but irretrievable.
Moreover, the Baghdad Pact, in its actual terms, failed to 
acquire the sort of teeth and efficacy that the NATO managed 
to muster. The Pakistani attempt to convince Pact members 
that the threat to them could come from "any source other 
than the Communist nations" came to nought because of the 
opposition from the the US and Britain.23 Nor could Baghdad 
Pact countries agree that aggression against one being ag­
gression against all on the lines of the NATO. It also 
failed to raise a force of its own with a unified command. 
As a result, the Pak-Iranian cooperation was confined to 
joint military exercises and political support to each 
other. And the Pact more or less collapsed when the coup in 
Iraq in 1958 installed a radical Baa'thist regime in Bagh­
dad.
Though the Baghdad Pact was renamed CENTO and its Head­
quarters transferred to Tehran following Iraq's formal
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withdrawal from the Pact in 1959, the fast changing regional 
and international scenario in the 60s gradually made the 
Pact redundant.
THE CHANGING SCENARIO OF THE 60S
The onset of the 60s saw the evolution of the new weapon 
systems based on ICBMs and IRBMs which brought about a 
definite reorientation in American security perceptions 
towards the region. "By 1964-65 the US strategic interests 
in the area had shifted from the land-mass of the northern- 
tier to the Indian Ocean".24 Consequently, US policy 
towards Iran tended to be a little more relaxed in this 
period than it was earlier.
These changing American perceptions had serious implications 
for Iran which left her with no choice but to adjust her 
foreign policy posture to the emerging new realities25 like 
a) American reluctance to aid Iran in case of threat from 
sources other than the USSR b) the gradual decline in the 
economic and military aid from the US and c) the resentment 
over being discriminated against by the US in comparison to 
Pakistan and Turkey in the supply of sophisticated arms. 
Iran responded to the changing strategic scenario by trying 
to open up to the USSR, a process facilitated by the Iranian 
refusal to permit the US to install anti-Soviet missile 
bases in Iran.26 This was the beginning of the independent
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foreign policy that the Shah was to pursue with increasing 
vigour towards the end of the 60s.
THE SINO-INDIAN WAR, 1962
The Sino-Indian war over their disputed border in Oct. 1962 
saw Iran come out openly and strongly on the Indian side. 
The Prime Minister of Iran, in reply to Nehru*s message con­
cerning the Chinese invasion, stated on 3 Nov. 1962 that the 
"Government of Iran strongly condemns aggression in any form 
and supports India at a time when she has fallen victim of 
an aggression".27
In fact, it was reported that the Shah had advised Ayub Khan 
to send his troops in support of India following the Indian 
military debacle in the NEFA. Obviously, the Shah was not 
aware of the close links that Pakistan had already estab­
lished with China.28
Moreover, it was the so called Conservative states like 
Iran, Saudi Arabia and Jordan which extended support and 
sympathy to India during the Sino-Indian conflict whereas 
India's traditional friends including Egypt maintained some­
what a neutral stand over the dispute.29
THE INDO-PAK WAR, 1965
The Indo-Pak war of 1965 over Kashmir saw Iran extend moral
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as well as material support to Pakistan. Reacting to the 
crossing of international boundary by the Indian forces in 
to Pakistan near Lahore on Sept. 6, the Iranian Foreign Min­
istry declared that the "Indo-Pakistan war as an act of ag­
gression committed by Indian forces against Pakistan”.30 
At the U.N., the Iranian representative Mr. Vakil argued in 
favour of a settlement "in accordance with the Security 
Council Resolutions". He asserted that "A settlement, to be 
durable, must be achieved not on the basis of political ex­
pediency but mainly on the basis of law and justice; that 
is, on the basis of the principle of self-determination, to 
which both parties had previously subscribed".31 
On the Material side, the Iranian help to Pakistan was 
rather modest. It provided Pakistan with "whatever non­
military assistance it could".32 However, it was reported 
that Iran did supply jet-fuel, gasoline and some small arms 
and ammunition to Pakistan.33 Iran also sent medical sup­
plies and medical teams to Pakistan.
On the face of it, these Iranian actions could be construed 
as unfriendly to India. However, the Shah, in private, 
strongly urged Ayub Khan to bring the hostilities to an end. 
During the conflict, when the air-route to Moscow became im- 
possible, Iran immediately offered Air-India an alternative 
route through Tehran. When the war was still waging, the 
Shah sent one of his ministers on a friendly visit to India. 
Nor did Iran interrupt its oil supplies to India. Generally
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speaking, Iran acted as a restraining influence on Pakistan 
in the latter's disputes with India.34
More importantly, from the Indian point of view, the Indo- 
Pak conflict gave further fillip to Iran's quest for an in­
dependent foreign policy. The Shah was badly shaken by the 
American attitude to the Indo-Pak war. Despite its commit­
ment to Pakistan under CENTO, SEATO and the bilateral 
defence agreement of 1959, the US remained neutral in rela­
tion to the conflict. Moreover, the US arms embargo to both 
India and Pakistan worked out to India's advantage because 
India was almost self-sufficient in small arms and ammuni­
tion production whereas Pakistan was excessively dependent 
on the West for the same. As one Indian scholar pointed out, 
the Shah "was reacting more violently to the inability of 
the CENTO and to the USA to support their ally than to 
India's fighting with Pakistan".35
The Shah realised the limitations and the conditional nature 
of external assistance in safeguarding Iran's security and 
integrity and its basic unreliability. As a result, he 
"launched an accelerated weapons acquisition programme in 
1966-67 which was independent of the CENTO".36 
Besides, the Shah also tried to reduce his exclusive depen­
dence on the West by striking an arms deal with the USSR in 
1967 which included APCs and anti-aircraft guns. The deal 
was also meant to be a "lever" to persuade the West to sell 
sophisticated arms to Iran which worked "rather well".37
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THE CHANGING PAK-IRAN EQUATION
The 60s also saw a gradual change in the Pak-Iran equation, 
particularly after the Sino-Indian border war of 1962. 
First, the Shah did not approve of Pakistan getting too 
close to China. There were people in Tehran who believed 
that Chinese Communist influence had percolated in to the 
officer cadre of the Pakistani army. The Shah reportedly 
once remarked that his friendship with Pakistan was intended 
to prevent it from getting itself more deeply involved with 
China.38 Nor did Iran approve of China's ultimatum to In­
dia during the Indo-Pak war of 1965 and made it clear that 
China should not interfere in Indo-Pak issues.39 Iran also 
supported the Indian position at the preparatory meeting of 
the proposed Afro-Asian summit at Jakarta in April 1964 that 
Nonaligned summit should precede the Afro-Asian Conference 
and that the USSR should be invited to the latter. The In­
dian move was primarily meant to sabotage China's attempt 
to project itself as the leader of the Afro-Asian world fol­
lowing the Chinese military defeat of India in 1962.40 
Secondly, the 60s also exposed the limits of Iran's economic 
relationship with Pakistan, RCD notwithstanding. Economi­
cally, India was a bigger market. With a population of 25 
million, Iran's development strategy had to be export 
oriented.41 In 1958, India's trade with Iran was five times
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more than Pak-Iran trade. One reason for this was that 
India's oil needs and its oil imports from Iran were greater 
than that of Pakistan. But it must be noted that Iran's non­
oil trade with India was also far more significant than that 
of Pakistan.42
Thirdly, following the Sino-Indian war in 1962 and the sub­
sequent supply of American arms to India, Pakistan sought to 
upgrade its relations with China and normalise its ties with 
the USSR. "In 1963, bilateralism became the key concept in 
the new foreign policy of Pakistan, a policy in which links 
between two countries would exist quite apart from either's 
relations with any third country".43 In other words, it 
meant that Pakistan's ties with China or the USSR had little 
to do with US-Pak relations. By the same token, "This policy 
could also mean that Iran's relationship with Pakistan had 
little bearing on Iranian relations with India".44 
Fourthly, the 60s saw the development of certain discordant 
notes in the Pak-Iranian relations. Pakistan, in this 
period, tried to patch up with the Arab countries especially 
Egypt. Hence, Pakistan could not share Iran's hostility to 
Nasser and consequently Pakistan's support to Iran on 
regional issues slackened considerably. When a shooting in­
cident took place on the Iran-Iraq border in Dec. 1965, the 
Iranians were disappointed with the lack of response from 
Pakistan.45 Iran was also upset when Pakistan voted in 
favour of Bahrain's membership of UNESCO in Sept. 1966 im­
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plicitly acknowledging Bahrain's sovereign status which was 
not acceptable to Iran then.
Lastly and more importantly, the late 60s saw the emergence 
of a strategic environment which enabled the Shah to 
redefine and enlarge Iran's role as a regional power. As a 
consequence, it became imperative for the Shah to look 
beyond the Persian Gulf and Pakistan for understanding and 
support in favour of Iran's new regional policy.
There were a number of factors which facilitated Iran's 
quest for a more assertive role in the Persian Gulf region. 
The limited super power detente and Iran's own improved 
relations with the USSR enabled the Shah to shift his focus 
from his northern borders and concentrate on the Persian 
Gulf. The British decision in 1968 to withdraw its forces 
from the east of Suez by the end of 1971 dovetailed with 
Iran's new regional ambitions. The debacle that the Arabs 
suffered in 1967 at Israeli hands more or less destroyed the 
mythical appeal of Nasserism and left Nasser a weak and 
shattered man. This freed the Shah from his preoccupation 
with radical Arabism which he had considered a serious 
threat to his regime and devote his attention to Iran's ex­
panding role as a regional power.
Most importantly, by the mid 60s, the Shah had consolidated 
his domestic position considerably. The success of his 
domestic reforms known as the White Revolution, suppression 
of domestic opposition, Iran's rapid economic growth and the
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acquisition of sophisticated arms increased the Shah's self- 
confidence and enabled him to give real substance to what he 
termed as "independent foreign policy”.46
THE CHANGING TENOR OF INDO-ARAB RELATIONS
The 60s also saw the emergence of stresses and strains in 
Indo-Arab relations which necessitated the Indians to take a 
critical look at India's policy towards the Middle East. The 
disappointing response of the Arab countries to the Sino- 
Indian war of 1962 and the Indo-Pak war of 1965 brought 
about a widespread disillusionment in India and questions 
were raised about India's unqualified support to the Arabs. 
The humiliation that Egypt and Nasser suffered after the 
1967 military debacle awakened Indian policy makers of the 
risk of too much dependence on Nasser. The 1967 war also led 
to the emergence of Iran and Saudi Arabia as important ac­
tors in the region which India could not possibly ignore for 
long.
All these factors converged towards the end of 60s to create 
an environment which necessitated and facilitated both Iran 
and India to overcome their old inhibitions and misgivings 
and embark on a new course of mutual understanding and ac­
commodation on the basis of a growing consensus on a number 
of regional issues which were of concern and importance to 
both the countries.
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THE SHAH'S VISIT TO INDIA, 1969
It was in such a positive and relaxed atmosphere that the 
Shah's visit to India took place in Jan. 1969. During the 
visit, the Shah asserted that Iran wanted to pursue an inde­
pendent policy and stand on her own feet. 47 He did not 
mince words regarding Iran's role as a regional power. "We 
owe a responsibility not only to ourselves but also to the 
region" he said.48 He also made it clear that the CENTO had 
long ceased to have any military significance and would 
remain so despite the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia.49 He 
pointed out that India was a big country in the region and 
"a historical responsibility towards smaller nations of the 
region rests on her". 50 The Shah also saw "unlimited pos­
sibilities and wide scope for very great and significant 
cooperation between India and Iran".51
The Joint Communique52 which was issued at the end of the 
Shah's visit reflected, for the first time, anything ap­
proaching political understanding between the Shah and an 
Indian Prime Minister. Both sides agreed that "the preserva­
tion of peace and stability in the Persian Gulf is the ex­
clusive responsibility of the littoral states and there 
should be no interference by outside powers".
In relation to the Middle East, they expressed "anxiety and 
concern over the delay in the implementation of the Security
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Council resolution of Nov. 22, 1967 and the resultant growth 
of dangerous tensions in the region”.
The Shah "noted with satisfaction the Indian efforts to 
resolve all differences with Pakistan in a peaceful manner". 
Thus, when India and Iran were poised for a breakthrough in 
their relations, a couple of incidents caused consternation 
to both sides resulting in a temporary cooling off of rela­
tions between the two countries. India was annoyed by the 
support that the Shah extended to Yahya Khan in keeping In­
dia out of the Islamic Conference in Rabat in Sept. 1969 and 
Iran was piqued by the alleged cold-shouldering by India of 
a visit by the Shah's sister Princess Ashraf. As both sides 
were trying to set aside these minor differences in their 
larger interests, the developing crisis in East Pakistan 
vitiated the atmosphere between them so badly that Indo- 
Iranian relations went into cold storage for the next three 
years.
THE BANGLADESH CRISIS, 1971
Iran's attitude to the Bangladesh crisis was fairly consis­
tent with its earlier policy towards the Indian subcon­
tinent. Unfortunately, the crisis revived many of the old 
fears and suspicions that Iran and India traditionally en­
tertained about each other over the decades and proved to be 
a stumbling block when Indo-Iranian relations seemed to be
181
poised for a breakthrough.
From the very beginning of the crisis following the brutal 
Pakistani crackdown in East Pakistan and the exodus of mil­
lions of refugees to India, Iran maintained that it was an 
internal matter for Pakistan and strongly advised all powers 
against interfering in Pakistan's internal affairs.53 
Iran was quite perturbed over the situation in the subcon­
tinent primarily because it could have an unsettling and 
spill-over effect on Iran. The Shah made this clear in an 
interview with an Indian newspaper in June 1971. "An Indo- 
Pak settlement is the first imperative not only for the 
security, development and prosperity of the Indian subcon­
tinent but also of the neighbouring region and particularly 
Iran".54
When war broke out between India and Pakistan on 3 Dec. 
1971, Iran's response at the U.N. was much more muted than 
it was in 1965 when Iran condemned India as an aggressor. 
The Iranian representative at the U.N.55 Mr. Hoveyda 
expressed himself against "armed intervention on the part of 
India against the national territory of a member state" and 
interference in "affairs which were essentially within the 
national jurisdiction of Pakistan".
"No matter how grave has been the situation of Pakistan with 
regard to the humanitarian question of the refugees, nothing 
can justify armed action against the territorial integrity 
of a Member State".
182
He advocated a solution based on "an unconditional cease­
fire" and "withdrawal of troops from the territories oc­
cupied by both sides".
However, what really caused resentment and disquiet in India 
was Iran's assistance to Pakistan in the military sphere. 
The Shah himself made no bones about the increased flow of 
military supplies to Pakistan through Iran. From the Indian 
point of view, the Indo-Soviet treaty was expected to serve 
as a deterrent as much against the overt dangers of Chinese 
intervention as against covert threat of large scale flow of 
arms to Pakistan from Iran by the overland routes.56 In 
fact, it was reported that the USSR deployed troops along 
the Iranian border to deter the Shah from aiding Pakistan in 
its war with India over Bangladesh in late 1971.57 
Pakistan itself acknowledged the help rendered by Iran 
during the Indo-Pak war of 1971 in a Communique issued by 
Islamabad on 8 May 1973. During the war, Pakistan's entire 
Civilian aircraft fleet was sheltered in Iran and from there 
they were allowed to fly essential supplies to Pakistan from 
friendly countries. When the oil tanks in Karachi were set 
ablaze, Iran sent equipment and experts to put it out. Iran 
allowed the passage of strategic supplies to Pakistan via 
the land routes through its territory. Iran also met criti­
cal shortage of certain items including ammunition and 
aircraft, helped in maritime air- reconnaissance and offered 
a fully equipped military hospital.58
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Given Iran's close relations with the U.S. and President 
Nixon's strong opposition to the emergence of Bangladesh, 
one can not help wondering as to what extent the Iranian as­
sistance to Pakistan was at the American instance. 
Nevertheless, while what Iran did to help Pakistan was sig­
nificant, what it chose not to do was equally significant, 
if not more. Despite the threats that Iran would stop sup­
plying oil to India in case of war with Pakistan59 , Iran 
never carried out the threat. During the war, the palace 
sent word to the small Indian business community in Tehran 
to assure that it had nothing to fear from Tehran's support 
for Pakistan.60
Iran also resisted the Pakistani pressure to activate the 
CENTO and provide legal basis for its clandestine assistance 
nor did it indulge in any direct provocation nor interfere 
with the overflight of Indian aircraft.61 According to one 
Iranian scholar, "Iran's support in the 1971 war, remained 
verbal, moral and diplomatic and underscored the fact that 
this was the most that RCD states could do for each other". 
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THE POST-BANGLADESH PHASE
Iran extended total political and diplomatic support to 
Pakistan after the Indo-Pak war of 1971 in order to bolster 
Pakistan's weak bargaining position vis-a-vis India which
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held all the aces after its military victory. Iran openly 
committed itself to the integrity of what remained of Pakis­
tan and firmly supported the Pakistani position on the 
issues of 93,000 Pak POWs detained in India, withdrawal of 
forces from occupied territories, the proposed trial of 195 
POWs by Dacca on charges of genocide and the recognition of 
the state of Bangladesh.
The dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971 was seen by the Shah 
as part of a larger plan to encircle Iran. "At the core of 
the Shah's interpretation of the security threat ... was the 
perception of a pincer movement from Iraq to the west, India 
and Afghanistan to the east and the Soviet Union behind 
both”.63 The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Aug. 1971, the Iraq- 
Soviet Treaty of April 1972, the July 1973 coup in Afghanis­
tan and the secessionist movements in Baluchistan, 
Pakhtoonistan and Sind gave credence to such fears. The in­
creasing Soviet naval presence in the Arabian Sea and the 
Indian Ocean made Iran wonder if it had to counter the Rus­
sian threat not only from the north but from the south as 
well.
Under the circumstances, the Shah considered that Iran had a 
vital stake in the survival of the remainder of Pakistan for 
two reasons. First, Iran wanted a stable eastern flank and 
the Pakistani support in its rivalry with the Arab states. 
Secondly, any separatist movement in Baluchistan would give 
ideas to the large number of Baluchis living in Iran.
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The Shah told C.L. Sulzberger of the New York Times: "We
must see to it that Pakistan doesn't fall in to pieces. This 
would produce a terrible mess. An Indo-China situation of 
new and larger dimension. I dread to think of it". He went 
on to add ominously "But if Pakistan fell apart, the least 
we could do in our interest would be some kind of protective 
reaction in Baluchistan".64 The interviewer interpreted this 
to mean that Iran would annex Baluchistan before anyone else 
did.
Thus, "During 1971-73, an attempt was also made to project 
the possibility of an Indo-Iranian confrontation as a 
source of threat perception for India as well Iran".65 
Hence, the relations between India and Iran in this period 
"could be distinctly characterized as chilly".66 Neverthe­
less, the post-Bangladesh phase saw the transformation of 
the regional environment both in South Asia as well as the 
Middle East in such a decisive way that it made it impera­
tive for India and Iran to come to terms with each other in 
the light of new regional realities in both the regions.
The post-1971 period saw a decisive change in the power 
balance in the subcontinent in India's favour and it emerged 
as the pre-eminent power in South Asia. As a result, "New 
Delhi could afford to see and formulate its policy towards 
other countries, relatively independently of the Pakistan 
factor".67 Consequently, India, more sure of herself than 
before, was in a position to take the close Pak-Iranian
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relations in her stride and strive for better relations with 
iran for their own worth.
More importantly, as a result of the events of 1971, 
"India's security environment has greatly improved and the 
self-confidence of its foreign policy making elite has 
vastly increased".68 Hence, India, for the first time since 
independence, was able to "rid itself of its rather unheal­
thy preoccupation with Pakistan and the Indo-Pak power 
balance"69 and concentrate on playing a wider role in the 
international arena in consonance with her size, location 
and resources.
It was also about this time that certain changes were occur­
ring in the the Middle Eastern region which prompted Iran to 
formally don the role of a regional power. The British 
withdrawal from the Persian Gulf was completed on 30 Nov. 
1971 as part of its east-of-Suez policy. On the very same 
day, Iran occupied the three disputed Gulf islands of the 
Greater and Lesser Tumbs and Abu Musa, near the Straits of 
Hormoz. This act symbolically and dramatically heralded the 
emergence of Iran as a regional power, a role which had the 
tacit support of the US.70
However, "The core relationships in their foreign policy 
arenas that New Delhi and Tehran had now evolved, linked one 
with the Soviet Union, and the other with the United States. 
This was bound to create complications in their bilateral 
relationship, since such a relationship could not be
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divorced from the total environment in which Indian and 
Iranian foreign policies were shaped”.71 Nevertheless, the 
Arab-Israel war of 1973 introduced certain new elements in 
to the regional politics of the Middle East as well as South 
Asia which further pushed India and Iran to explore the pos­
sibility of a rapprochement between the two countries in a 
much more persistent and determined way.
THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR, 1973
The Arab-Israeli war of 1973 and the subsequent oil embargo 
which led to a steep increase in the price of oil resulted 
in Iran's income from oil jump from $ 4.9 billion in 1973 to 
$ 25 billion in 1975.72 The Shah sought to use his in­
creased oil revenues to a) build up a powerful military 
machine in line with his regional ambitions b) use Iran's 
phenomenal oil wealth "in influencing policies and winning 
friends" and c) ensure the rapid industrialization of Iran 
before its oil reserves ran out.73 The Shah realised that a 
friendly India could play a complementary role in the 
realisation of Iran's major political and economic goals in 
the changed regional context in South as well as the Middle 
East.
The good showing of the Arab forces in the 1973 war and the 
remarkable unity displayed by them during the war must have 
caused some concern to the Shah whose earlier security
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strategy for Iran was based on the Arab disunity.74 Hence, 
opening up to India was an opportune move on the part of the 
Shah.
The Shah was also upset with Pakistan's attempt to forge 
close links with the Arab states like Saudi Arabia, UAE and 
Libya which could have security implications for Iran in the 
longrun. He was particularly annoyed with Bhutto for hob­
nobbing with Gaddafi whom he referred to as "crazy fellow" 
75and refused to attend the Islamic Summit in Lahore in 
Feb. 1974 because of his presence.
The Shah was also aware of India's growing relationship with 
Iraq in the early 70s, his principal rival in the Gulf and 
the need to balance it by cultivating a fruitful relation­
ship with India in the economic as well as political 
spheres. He further realised that only by providing alterna­
tive sources of economic assistance and political support 
could he wean India away from the USSR.
The tripartite agreement among India, Bangladesh and Pakis­
tan in April 1974, finally cleared "the human and political 
debris left by the 1971 war"76 further paved the way for 
Indo-Iranian detente. India was able to convince the Shah 
that she too had a stake in Pakistan's integrity and sur­
vival. 77 As a result, the Shah gave up his earlier policy 
of shoring up Pakistan militarily vis-a-vis India and in­
stead accepted that "an Indo-Pak rapprochement as the surest 
way of stabilising Iran's eastern flank".78
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India too, on her part, had her reasons for making up with 
Iran. India did entertain serious misgivings about Pak- 
Iranian military links over the years.79 Indian policy 
makers realised rather belatedly that the only way India 
could dilute the close Pak-Iranian relations was by cul­
tivating Iran on a bilateral basis relatively independent of 
the Pak factor and creating a stake for Iran in the improve­
ment and consolidation of Indo-Iranian relations.
More importantly and in a much more broader context, Indian 
policy makers were also able to shed some of their past in­
hibitions and diffidence in their attitude to the Middle 
East as a whole which had earlier hampered India*s manoeuv­
rability in the region. As one indian scholar put it: ”The 
long period of Indo-Arab relations has created a certain 
thinking in a section of the Indian elite that an improve­
ment in India's relations with any other regional power, 
whether that power be Israel or even Iran can be only at the
cost of India's close ties with the Arab world".
"India has already lost some initiative in West Asia by 
taking a negative stand vis-a-vis the Palestine question. 
That should serve as a warning and should prevent India from 
taking a similar negative stand on the Arab-Iranian rela­
tions also".80 It is against this backdrop that Mrs. Gandhi
made her momentous trip to Tehran in April 1974.
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HRS. GANDHI'S VISIT TO TEHRAN, APRIL 1974
Mrs. Gandhi paid a four day visit Iran in April-May 1974. 
This was "the first time that there has taken place what can 
be called a meeting of minds between the Shah and the Indian 
Prime Minister".81
The Joint Communique82 issued at the end of Mrs. Gandhi's 
visit reflected the understanding and accommodation that the 
two sides were able to achieve on most major political 
issues and a substantial increase in the economic coopera­
tion between the two countries.
The Prime Minister of Iran "appreciated the initiatives 
taken by India" and "supported all efforts to settle out­
standing disputes between India and Pakistan through 
bilateral negotiations and through peaceful means".
Both sides "emphasised the vital importance safeguarding 
stability and peace in the Persian Gulf and settlement of 
issues by the littoral states themselves ... without outside 
interference".
Both sides called for the full implementation of the U.N. 
Security Council resolution 242 which "calls for complete 
withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied Arab territories, 
and a just solution of the Palestinian problem".
The two sides "reaffirmed their support for declaration of 
the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace...".
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The Iranian side explained the situation "on their western 
borders” and the Indian side expressed "full understanding 
of the dimensions of the problem”.
As one newspaper put it: "The economic gains to India and
Iran from the latest accords are obvious, but it is the 
political assumptions behind them which are far more 
significant”.83
THE SHAH'S VISIT TO INDIA, OCT. 1974
The Shah of Iran paid a return visit to India in Oct. 1974 
whose real significance lay in the fact that India was the 
last lap of his tour of a number of littoral states of the 
Indian Ocean namely Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and 
Indonesia. His tour was primarily meant to gain support for 
his proposal to establish an "Indian Ocean Economic 
Community". 84 The Joint Communique85 issued at the end of 
the Shah's visit more or less a repetition of the Joint Com­
munique issued during Mrs. Gandhi's earlier visit to Tehran 
in April 1974.
Even before he arrived in India, the Shah made certain 
statements which reflected the growing understanding between 
the two countries. In an interview to a Bombay Weekly, the 
Shah envisaged the possibility of collaboration of the In­
dian and Iranian navies in keeping the Indian Ocean free of
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big power rivalries.86 In Canberra, he accepted India's 
stand on its Peaceful Nuclear Test (PNT) at Pokhran in May 
1974 on two counts. "Firstly, I must accept the word of a 
friend and secondly, a policy of peaceful uses of nuclear 
technology was in the Indian interest".87
The political understanding and economic cooperation that 
India and Iran achieved in 1974 was sustained and con­
solidated till the Shah of Iran visited India again in Feb. 
1978 when the Janata Party was in power.88
THE SHAH'S VISIT TO INDIA, FEB. 1978
The fact that the change of government made little dif­
ference to the deepening of Indo-Iranian relations was amply 
demonstrated by the Joint Communique89 issued at the end of 
the Shah's visit.
It, inter alia, referred to "the close similarity of views 
of the two countries on international issues, regional 
problems and bilateral relations of India and Iran". It 
"stressed the full sovereign rights of all states with 
regard to their natural wealth and resources".It also said 
that both sides "have agreed to cooperate with each other 
for the development of nuclear science for peaceful 
purposes".
In an interview to a Bombay Weekly, the Shah described
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India's positive response to his proposal to forge an Indian 
Ocean Community as the "most encouraging development". 
Referring to Pak reservations about the idea, the Shah said 
that Pakistan should realise that the common market was not 
designed to "crush the small in the interest of the big" but 
to provide their economies opportunities to flourish within 
the organization.90 The Shah described "Asian Highway" as 
being central to his concept of "Asian Common Market" which 
would mean that eventually "this mass of land and popula­
tions and goods could be linked to the European mass".91 
As one newspaper pointed out, "Although the impression left 
by the Shah of Iran's four-day visit to India is mainly of a 
marked advance in economic cooperation between the two 
countries, the political understanding behind this important 
development should not be ignored". It went on to add "That 
the Shah spent four days in India and only four hours in 
Pakistan also indicates a certain change in his assessment 
of priorities".92
The Shah's change of priorities was due to a number of fac­
tors. Throughout the 50s and 60s, Pakistan was the stronger 
of the two countries. However, "An increase in Iranian power 
and prestige coincided with Pakistan's decline, which 
resulted from the 1971 defeat at Indian hands and the dis­
memberment of the country into Pakistan and Bangladesh".93 
Hence, there was a definite change in the Pak-Iranian equa­
tion in favour of the latter in the 70s, a fact acknowledged
194
by Bhutto himself when he bemoaned "Before, when I talked 
with him (the Shah) , I used to talk to him as a brother. 
Now, I have an audience".94
The growing disparity between Iran and Pakistan in the 70s 
also caused disquiet and suspicion in some quarters in 
Pakistan regarding the Shah's intentions in relation to 
Pakistan. His comments about "protective reaction" in 
Baluchistan caused a flutter in Pakistan and fears were 
expressed that Iran was trying to interfere in the internal 
affairs of Pakistan.95 Growing Indo-Iranian amity only 
added to the Pakistani fears. The Chief of the Pakistani Air 
Force, Nur Khan quite bluntly remarked that "Iran and India 
could come closer to each other. India could claim half of 
Pakistan up to river Indus, leaving rest of Pakistan to 
Iran. A weak Pakistan could also go under the hegemony of 
Iran as well".96
The Shah was also piqued by Pakistan's firm and open opposi­
tion to his grandiose scheme in relation to the Indian Ocean 
Community. Pakistan, quite deliberately, chose the eve of 
the Shah's visit to India to let its opposition to the idea 
be more widely known to the world.97
The Marxist coup in Afghanistan in April 1978 which brought 
the pro-Moscow government of Taraki to power revived the 
Shah's old fears of encirclement as the new government lost 
no time in supporting the Baluchistan and Pakhtoonistan 
demands. The Shah also reported to have said that Iran would
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intervene if Pakistan showed signs of cracking up.98 
Further, the Shah seemed to be in broad agreement with the 
Indian view that despite the Marxist leanings of its leader­
ship, the Afghans* fierce sense of freedom would make them 
rather unlikely stooges. He was not too impressed by the 
Pakistani attempt to project the happenings in Afghanistan 
as posing an immediate Soviet threat to the region which 
could be countered only by making Pakistan strong through 
arms aid.99
KHOMEINI'S IRAN AND INDIA
The fall of the Shah in Feb. 1979 and the appearance of 
Ayatollah Khomeini on the scene "did affect the momentum” of 
Indo-Iranian relations.100 The Indian foreign minister Mr. 
Vajpayee disclosed in Feb. that Khomeini had sent a repre­
sentative to India and that ” we had established contacts”. 
101A few weeks later, he told the Lok Sabha that the 
developments in Iran were "positive” and described Khomeini 
as the "father figure of Iranian revolution". "We are wait­
ing for the day when we can welcome Iran in the nonaligned 
movement" he added.102 In fact, "India viewed the revolu­
tion in Iran as a reflection of Iran's quest for identity 
and national self-assertion and a desire to charter an inde­
pendent course without outside Big Power influence".103 In­
dia was also among the countries to have been told by Iran
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that investments made during the Shah's time were safe and 
that further Iranian investments could be expected.104 
However, the Khomeini*s regime soon became totally preoc­
cupied with domestic problems like American hostages issue 
and a breakdown in law and order following the purges of 
suspected Shah's supporters. The Iraqi invasion of Iran in 
Sept. 1980 left little time for the new regime to follow a 
vigorous foreign policy.
India reacted very cautiously to the abortive US attempt to 
rescue its diplomats held hostage by Iran. The official 
statement said that whatever the extenuating circumstances, 
India could not condone such "military adventurism". While 
India was opposed to the violation of diplomatic immunities 
and sympathised with the fate of the American hostages, it 
felt that the US action "tended to complicate the situation 
further and to heighten the tension".105 Later, at a press 
conference, Mrs. Gandhi said that the US attempt to free its 
hostages in Iran could not be described as an attempt to in­
vade that country nor could it be called an interference in 
the affairs of another country.106 While India heartily 
welcomed Iran to the nonaligned fold, 107 it also had its 
misgivings about the new regime in relation to its Islamic 
fervour and its attempts to export it.
Generally speaking, while the two countries have a great 
potential to coordinate their foreign policies in relation 
to major regional issues and exploit the complementarity of
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their economies to the full, there could develop, in future, 
certain areas of friction and competition in their rela­
tions. 108 How effectively and how smoothly potentially con­
tentious areas such as the roles of their respective navies 
in the Indian Ocean and their attitudes to the Gulf states 
and their security concerns are going to be tackled by the 
policy makers on both sides would determine the nature of 
future Indo-Iranian interaction.
To sum up, Indo-Iranian relations failed to take off despite 
the absence of bilateral disputes between the two countries 
and even a certain harmony in their politico-economic inter­
ests. Nehru's preference for nonalignment and particularly 
Nasser put off the Shah of Iran considerably. India's exag­
gerated fears about Pakistan's ability to forge Islamic 
solidarity in the region against India led its policy makers 
to give more importance to the Pakistani factor in the Indo- 
Iranian equation than they should have. As a consequence, 
India failed to pursue, with required vigour and persist­
ence, the policy of bilaterally cultivating Iran on the 
basis of mutuality of interests despite the existence of a 
number of factors which would have facilitated such a 
course. That, perhaps, would also have been the surest way 
of weaning Iran away from Pakistan, a major objective of 
India's policy towards the Middle East.
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INDIA AND SAUDI ARABIA
One of the more amazing and puzzling aspects of India's 
policy towards the Middle East has been India's relationship 
or lack of it with Saudi Arabia over the decades. As one 
newspaper put it "Relations between India and Saudi Arabia 
in the 26 years since the first Indian Prime Minister 
visited that country were hardly the kind that should have 
governed two major Asian nations".109
THE INDIAN MISGIVINGS
The Indian political leadership, from the beginning enter­
tained misgivings about Saudi Arabia considering it as a 
feudal and theocratic state and was wary of cultivating it 
even on bilateral terms. Saudi Arabia was one of the major 
countries in the region in terms of its geographical and 
demographic size and economic potential even in the 50s. The 
fact that it was the guardian of the Holy shrines of Islam 
gave it an added aura in the Islamic world.
Given India's fears about the possible creation of an Is­
lamic bloc under the inspiration and the goading of Pakis­
tan, it was all the more important and necessary for India 
to have established an amicable and balanced relationship
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with Saudi Arabia which would have pulled the diplomatic 
carpet from under the feet of Pakistan and would have been a 
more effective impediment to the rise of any Islamic group­
ing than any other strategy that India could possibly have 
adopted. The reason why it was not done would remain as one 
of many mysteries that characterized India's rather 
unimaginative and timid policy towards the Middle East.
THE INITIAL HARMONY
It was not as if there were irreconcilable differences in 
the political outlook of the two countries, in spite of the 
admittedly conservative and traditional nature of the 
political leadership in Saudi Arabia. There were many in­
cipient tendencies in the policies of the Saudis even in the 
early years which could have been encouraged and promoted by 
India to its political advantage. The fact that India failed 
to do so was essentially because of India's own rather rigid 
and self-righteous posture in the 50s and 60s which thwarted 
India broadening and diversifying its political base in the 
region, as we shall see in the following pages.
It should be noted here that Saudi Arabia was one of the 
participants in the first Afro-Asian Conference ever held in 
Bandung in Indonesia in April 1955 and a signatory to the 
final communique issued after the Conference.
When Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact, the Saudi Embassy in
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Pakistan took the "unusual" step of issuing a press handout 
containing the text of the Radio Mecca broadcast which ex­
horted Pakistan to withdraw from the Pact and "return to the 
right path". It referred to Pakistan's action as "a stab in 
the heart of the Arab and Muslim states". 110 The strong 
Saudi reaction to the Baghdad Pact could not but have 
pleased India which herself vehemently opposed it for her 
own reasons.
KING SAUD'S VISIT TO INDIA, 1955
The first top level political contact between the two 
countries took place in Dec. 1955 when King Saud came to New 
Delhi for a brief visit. The joint-statement issued at the 
end of the visit reflected a certain harmony in the politi­
cal outlook of King Saud and Prime Minister Nehru. Both the 
leaders emphasised that "a peaceful and non-militant ap­
proach to the issues which divide the world is an urgent 
necessity". The two countries also fully subscribed to "the 
five principles, namely respect for sovereignty and ter­
ritorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in the 
internal affairs of other countries, mutual respect and 
equality and peaceful co-existence which alone in their view 
can provide a stable basis for peaceful and cooperative ex­
istence among the nations of the world".Ill
More importantly, King Saud, speaking as the guardian of the
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Muslim Holy places, publicly thanked Nehru and his Govern­
ment for their policy towards the Muslim minority in India. 
He declared: "I desire to say to my Muslim brethren all over 
the world with satisfaction that the fate of Indian Muslims 
is in safe hands” .112 This was a very significant state­
ment, from the Indian point of view, in view of the persist­
ent Pakistani criticism of the alleged discriminatory policy 
of the Indian Government towards its Muslim minority.
NEHRU'S VISIT TO RIYADH, 1956
Nehru paid a return visit to Riyadh in Sept. 1956. In the 
joint-statement that was issued on the occasion, both the 
sides reiterated "their adherence to the declaration made by 
the Bandung Conference which laid down the principles which 
should govern international relations". Referring to the 
Suez crisis, the King and the Prime Minister emphasised that 
"in spite of the difficulties and tensions that have arisen 
over this question, it is possible to reach a settlement ne­
gotiated between the parties concerned without any deroga­
tion from Eyptian sovereignty and authority and maintaining 
the interests of other countries in the unrestricted use of 
the Canal as an open waterway".113
When Nehru arrived in Riyadh, he was greeted with the slogan 
"marhaba rasool al salam" which led to a lot of controversy 
and resentment in Pakistan. The Saudi Embassy in Pakistan
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issued a statement explaining that the phrase meant "Welcome 
Messenger of Peace” and not "Welcome Prophet of Peace" as 
interpreted by the Pakistanis. But Pakistani feelings were 
not mollified. The Pakistani newspaper Dawn, in view of King 
Saud's and President Nasser's less than friendly attitude 
towards Pakistan, advised Pakistanis to "calmly and dispas­
sionately take all these bitter truths in to consideration 
and restrain to some extent their vain expectations from the 
so-called Muslim world".114
In view of all this, it is nothing less than astonishing 
that for the next 26 years, no Indian Prime Minister visited 
Saudi Arabia till Mrs. Gandhi only made a trip to Riyadh in 
1982. Neither the religious orthodoxy of Saudi Arabia nor 
Pakistan's perceived closeness to the Saudis over the years 
would fully explain the lack of verve in Indo-Saudi rela­
tions. Nor was there any serious bilateral issue that 
vitiated the political atmosphere between the two countries.
THE NASSER FACTOR
Looking back, the most plausible reason for this Indo-Saudi 
estrangement seemed to be political and ideological rather 
than religious. There is no gainsaying the fact that it was 
Nehru's endorsement of Nasser as the sole and undisputed 
leader of resurgent Arab nationalism that complicated 
India's relations with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia, probably
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more than any other country in the region, felt threatened 
by the radical Arabism espoused by Nasser.
Nor the threat from Egypt remained purely ideological. In 
the 60s, Egypt actively got involved in the civil war in 
Yemen. Egyptian troops trained the Republican forces and 
also actively fought the Royalist tribesmen in North Yemen 
in support of the Republic of South Yemen which was governed 
by a radical leftist regime. At the height of the civil war 
in North Yemen, as many as 70.000 Egyptian troops were in­
volved in it.115 This was often cited as one of the reasons 
for the defeat of the Arabs in the 1967 war. Moreover, 
during the Yemen civil war, Egyptian planes often bombed 
Saudi border towns like Najran with impunity without being 
challenged.116 Saudi Arabia, being a large country with a 
long coastline but with a relatively small population and a 
poorly trained and equipped army felt quite vulnerable and 
almost defenceless.
Under the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the 
Saudis were annoyed with India for backing Nasser so consis­
tently and so unequivocally even when he had acted rashly 
and overambitiously on occasions. Ironically, it was King 
Faisal's fears of Arab radicalism as represented by Nasser 
that prompted him to resort to Pan-Islamism as a counter 
strategy, a development India sought to resist and undermine 
by supporting Nasser.
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ISLAM AMD PAKISTAN AS A COUNTER
In fact, "King Faisal's dedication to Pan-Islamism had its 
genesis in the struggle for Arab unity and the Saudi- 
Egyptian rivalry for the leadership of the Arab world".117 
The Saudi attempts to organise various Islamic Conferences 
in the 60s should be seen in this context. Moreover, the op­
ponents of Nasser were branded by Cairo as "reactionaries" 
and "agents of imperialism" and a number of unsuccessful 
plots were organised by the UAR to overthrow various monar­
chies and conservative regimes in the region.118 
Against this background, it is anything but surprising that 
the Saudis looked upon Nehru's endorsement of Nasser's 
leadership of the Arab world with suspicion and resentment. 
Thus, it was India's own ideological reservations and mis­
givings about the so called conservative Arab states and a 
lack of balance and sensitivity in its policy towards them 
that was primarily responsible for India's lack-lustre 
relationship with Saudi Arabia in the 60s and even 70s. 
Hence, no consistent and determined effort was made to cul­
tivate Saudi Arabia which left India with no leverage worth 
the name with one of the most important states in the region 
and, at least since the mid-70s, one of the richest in the 
world.
It was in this context that Saudis sought the assistance of
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Pakistan in bolstering their defences in the late 60s. In 
Aug. 1967, the Saudi Minister of Defence and Civil Aviation 
visited Pakistan which resulted in a defence agreement be­
tween the two countries. As a result, Pakistani advisers 
were sent to Saudi Arabia to "help expand and modernize the 
Saudi Armed Force". The number of Saudi personnel in Pakis­
tani military training institutions also went up 
"considerably".119
India was quite quick to react to this development. The In­
dian Foreign Minister Mr. M.C.Chagla reportedly conveyed 
India's concern to the Saudi Ambassador regarding the 
"disquieting" newspaper reports both in India and abroad 
about the transfer of Saudi arms to Pakistan. Mr.Chagla said 
to have emphasised that any supply of military equipment to 
Pakistan would only increase tension in the region and make 
Indo-Pak rapprochement difficult.120
Indian policy seemed to have attributed the close Saudi-Pak 
ties more to Islamic solidarity than to mutuality of inter­
ests between the two countries. The only way India could 
have diluted Saudi-Pak amity was to try and cultivate the 
Saudis on the basis of mutuality of interests. However, 
Nehru's close identification with Nasser and his political 
distaste for the so called conservative Arab states came in 
the way of such a possibility.
If India supported Egypt because it promoted India's 
security by its progressive policies in the region, the
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Saudis felt threatened by such policies and sought to en­
hance their own security by opposing Nasser. In the process, 
the Saudis cultivated Pakistan in order to counter the 
forces Nasser represented and the lack of amity between 
Egypt and Pakistan facilitated this process. This also acted 
as a snub to India, intended or not, for throwing in its lot 
with Nasser.
Nevertheless, the Saudi support to Pakistan vis-a-vis India 
even against this background was cautious and calculated and 
was never so substantial as to totally alienate India.
KASHMIR
Regarding Kashmir, the Saudi position in general was that 
the issue should be solved in accordance with the right of 
self-determination of the people of Kashmir. It was at 
variance with the Indian position in so far as it refused to 
subscribe to the subsequent Indian position that the issue 
of plebiscite had become irrelevant in the changed cir­
cumstances of Kashmiris having elected their own government 
in free and fair elections.
At this juncture, it must be noted that even Nasser, the 
reason for Saudi distance from India, never supported 
India's position on Kashmir. His consistent stand on the 
issue was that that India and Pakistan should settle their
207
dispute through negotiations without outside interference. 
In view of India's own unwavering support to Nasser in rela­
tion to most Arab issues which was, no doubt, irksome to the 
Saudis, it would be difficult to describe the Saudi position 
on Kashmir as anti-Indian.
THE INDO-PAK WAR, 1965
During the 1965 Indo-Pak war over Kashmir, the Saudi repre­
sentative at the UN Mr.Sakkaf emphasised that Saudi Arabia 
"has had the best of cordial and brotherly relations" 121 
with both India and Pakistan. He recalled that the Security 
Council had "passed resolutions reaffirming the right of the 
Kashmir people to self-determination"122 which, of course, 
was a fact. In view of India's almost non-existent relation­
ship with Saudi Arabia in those years, it would be rather 
rash to characterize the Saudi attitude to India as 
unfriendly and hostile.
THE INDO-PAK WAR, 1971
During the 1971 Bangladesh crisis, the Saudi position was 
similar to that of many other countries which generally held 
the view that what was going on in East Pakistan was 
Pakistan's internal affair and that no other country had any 
right to interfere in the same. The Saudi representatives
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argued along the same lines at the UN throughout the crisis. 
Speaking in the General Assembly on 11 Oct. 1971, the Saudi 
representative Mr.Sakkaf said:” We believe what is happening 
in Pakistan is strictly and without any doubt the affair of 
the Pakistanis themselves, and therefore any outside inter­
ference in the internal affairs of Pakistan will surely con­
stitute a violation of our Charter”. 123 On the 7th Dec. 
1971, the Saudi representative Mr.Baroody, addressing the 
General Assembly, appealed to India ”not to forget the 
teachings of Mahatma Gandhi” and warned that the Indo-Pak 
conflict might "fan the flames of religious intolerance". 
124Mr.Baroody, speaking at the Security Council on Dec. 16 
1971, admitted that the conflict between the East and West 
Pakistan was "most probably for economic as well as for 
political reasons ... ". He also asserted that "only India 
and Pakistan can solve the problem, without interference 
from outside".125
By and large, the Saudi attitude to the Bangladesh issue at 
the UN was fairly balanced and conciliatory. Its position 
was akin to that of many other states, Muslim or non-Muslim, 
and it would be rather petulant to suggest that it adopted a 
hostile or unfriendly attitude towards India.
THE AFTERMATH OF BANGLADESH
However, the Bangladesh episode did have a serious bearing
209
on Indo-Saudi relations in the sense that it proved to be 
an obstacle in improving the political understanding be­
tween the two countries at a time when the situation in both 
the regions was conducive to such an exercise. Even in the 
60s, despite Saudi Arabia's image as a politically conserva­
tive and socially backward country, there were a number of 
elements in Saudi's regional policy which would have been 
consonant with India's own thinking and preferences in the 
region.
The most striking thing about the Saudis' regional policy 
was its moderation. The financial support to Egypt and Jor­
dan in their confrontation with Israel, the occasional ap­
peal for Islamic solidarity and the calls for Islamic summit 
and Jehad against Israel after the burning of the A1 Aqsa 
mosque might give an impression of religious orthodoxy and 
hawkishness.126 However, King Feisal always favoured a 
peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute and merely in­
sisted on the implementation of the Nov. 1967 Security Coun­
cil resolution which only called for the withdrawal of Is­
raeli forces to the pre-war positions.127
King Feisal was also more fearful of Communism than Zionism 
and was opposed to the increasing influence of the USSR in 
the region under the pretext of helping the Arabs against 
Israel. For him, the existence of the Jewish state would be 
more palatable than allowing the USSR to entrench itself in 
the region provided Israel could be persuaded to withdraw
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from occupied Arab territories.128
King Feisal was also firmly opposed to any foreign power 
filling in the so called vacuum created by the withdrawal of 
the British from the Persian Gulf in 1970. He was in favour 
of security being maintained by the states of the region 
themselves.129
The Saudis also realised the limitations of their relation­
ship with Pakistan about this time. Despite the mutual 
desire to increase "Islamic cooperation in industrial 
fields", there was very little progress in that direction 
because Pakistan's petroleum needs were quite low.130 This, 
in turn, made the Saudis realise the importance and useful­
ness of cultivating India for both economic and political 
reasons.
After the burning of the A1 Aqsa mosque in 1969, King Feisal 
called for an Islamic summit to discuss the issue. However, 
King Hassan of Morocco thwarted Feisal's efforts to have the 
summit at Mecca and managed to stage it in his own capital 
Rabat. Feisal was not satisfied with his status as the 
"Joint Convenor" of the summit. Since the agenda at Rabat 
was confined to the burning of the A1 Aqsa mosque and any 
new proposal on Palestine would not find favour with Iran 
and Turkey, Feisal came up with the idea of inviting India 
as a means of asserting his own authority and pre-eminence 
at the summit. India's anxiety to attend the summit in order 
to thwart any Pakistani attempts to rake up its bilateral
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issues with India suited Feisal admirably. However, 
Pakistan's President Yahya Khan's threat to boycott the sum­
mit in the event of India's participation carried the day 
and King Feisal's ploy backfired badly.131
Most importantly, the Arab debacle in the 1967 war reduced 
the prestige of Egypt in the Arab eyes and more or less 
destroyed the mythical appeal of Nasser. Nasser himself 
realised the need to adopt a new strategy in the changed 
circumstances. His crusade against monarchies and feudal 
elements only drove the conservative Arab states more and 
more in to Western arms. Nasser now decided to build a broad 
Arab national front by roping in even these states which 
were earlier detested on ideological grounds. Egypt's 
withdrawal of troops from North Yemen removed the most im­
portant irritant between Egypt and Saudi Arabia and symbol­
ized Nasser's new strategy of broad Arab unity. Nasser's 
death in 1970 marked the end of an era in Arab politics and 
the beginning of the end of India's "special relationship" 
with Egypt which certainly removed a cloud hanging over 
Indo-Saudi relations.
When everything pointed towards a new beginning in Indo- 
Saudi relations by 1970, the crisis in East Pakistan in 1971 
and the subsequent dismemberment of Pakistan put an end to 
any such hopes. After the fall of Dacca, Saudi Arabia ex­
tended total and continuous support to Pakistan in its deal­
ings with India. It also withheld its recognition to
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Bangladesh until it got the green signal from Pakistan in 
order to strengthen Pakistan's bargaining position vis-a-vis 
India and Bangladesh.132 The Saudi Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs Mr.Omar Saqqaf asserted that India's refusal 
to hand over the POWs to Pakistan and its decision to refer 
some of them to Dacca for trial as war criminals constituted 
"a flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention". India's at­
titude could result in "further deterioration" in the situa­
tion he warned.133
THE POST-1973 PERIOD
However, in May 1973, India struck an oil deal with Saudi 
Arabia "hitherto considered most unlikely of Arab 
countries".134 The Saudis agreed to supply 3.3 million tons 
of crude in three years from June 1973, at the rate of 1.1 
million tons per year.
But during the oil embargo that followed the Yom Kippur war 
of 1973, Saudi Arabia exempted 9 countries including Pakis­
tan, Malaysia and Britain from the cut in oil supplies. 
India's name, however, did not figure in the list.135 
Nevertheless, a few days later, the Saudi Charge d' Affairs, 
Suleman- el- Nasser assured New Delhi that there would be no 
cut in oil supplies to India. "Whatever is scheduled to come 
to India will come" he added.136
The Simla agreement of April 1974 signed by India, Pakistan
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and Bangladesh, the subsequent return of all POWs to Pakis­
tan and the normalisation of relations in the subcontinent 
paved the way for an Indian initiative to open a meaningful 
dialogue with the Saudis. The visit of D.P.Dhar, the then 
Minister of Planning, to Jeddah in May 1974 was designed to 
facilitate such a process.
THE SAUDI OIL MINISTER YAMANI'S VISIT TO INDIA/ 1975
Consequently, the Saudi oil Minister Mr.Ahmed Zaki Yamani 
paid a three day visit to India in Feb. 1975. In fact, 
Mr.Yamani was first invited to India in 1968 and the invita­
tion was renewed in 1973 when India made its first direct 
contact for oil with the Saudi National oil company. 
However, political misgivings about each other came in the 
way of Mr.Yamani accepting the invitation earlier.137 Sig­
nificantly enough, Mr. Yamani was the first Saudi dignitary 
to visit India since King Feisal's visit to India in 1955.
At a meeting with Mrs.Gandhi, Mr.Yamani reportedly expressed 
himself in favour of developing "closer and more extensive" 
bilateral ties with India, especially in the economic 
sphere.138 Later, at a press conference,139 he expressed 
confidence that a "new era" in Indo-Saudi relations could 
begin. He revealed that an agreement to set up an India- 
Saudi Arabia joint commission for economic, scientific and 
technical cooperation would be signed in New Delhi at the
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end of the month.
Mr.Yamani ruled out Saudi oil at concessional rates for In­
dia and also any Saudi credit for supply of crude to India. 
He said Saudi policy was to have one price for everybody and 
to sell oil only on cash basis. However, Saudi Arabia was 
prepared to extend long-term credit to India on soft terms 
for starting joint industrial ventures in either country. 
Regarding Pakistan, Mr.Yamani said: "Definitely, we are con­
cerned with the integrity of Pakistani territory. We are a 
Muslim country and in Saudi Arabia we are concerned with our 
brothers all over the world, in Pakistan and in India".140 
It was in the interest of Saudi Arabia to see that the dis­
pute between India and Pakistan came to an end.
The real significance of Mr.Yamani's visit lay in the fact 
that "... the Saudi oil Minister's visit revives a long 
neglected relationship".141 The new political climate in 
the subcontinent following the Simla agreement facilitated a 
new understanding between Saudi Arabia and India and led to 
a remarkable leap in Indo-Saudi economic relations in the 
next few years.
However, in the political sphere, the understanding between 
the two countries did not reach the sort of level it should 
have given the extent of commonalty of interests and percep­
tions on the major issues confronting both South Asia and 
the Middle Eastern regions. India's suspicions about Saudi's 
close military links with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia's mis­
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givings about the Indo-Soviet connection persisted despite 
the limited political understanding that the two countries 
managed to reach in the post Simla phase.
INDO-SAUDI TIES IN THE 80S
The fall of the Shah of Iran in early 1979, the Soviet inva­
sion of Afghanistan in Dec. 1979 and the breakout of a full- 
scale war between Iran and Iraq in Sept 1980 only served to 
reinforce and exacerbate the old suspicions and fears be­
tween India and Saudi Arabia . Saudi Arabia's domestic vul­
nerability, its fears over Khomeini brand of Islamic fun­
damentalism engulfing the whole region and the substantial 
Soviet military presence in Afghanistan only helped to in­
crease Saudi's acute sense of insecurity which drove her 
headlong in to a closer and more extensive military 
relationship with the US and Pakistan, a development India 
looked upon with considerable fear and suspicion. On the 
other hand, the Saudis did not take kindly to India's rather 
muted and low-key response to the Soviet invasion of Af­
ghanistan. 142
Ironically, it was these very fears and suspicions that In­
dia and Saudi Arabia entertained about each other that made 
them renew their efforts for better understanding and ap­
preciation of each other's point of view and strive for some 
common political ground which would act as a launching pad
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for both the countries to outgrow their mutual distrust and 
apprehension.
The Saudis were worried because the Soviet occupation of Af­
ghanistan and the massive American build up in the Indian 
ocean which had had an unsettling effect in the volatile 
Gulf region which was vital for Saudi's own security. They 
were also nervous about relying almost exclusively on 
American military protection which would be useful if an 
Iran-type of situation were to arise in Saudi Arabia. A sec­
tion in the Saudi hierarchy was also of the opinion that 
there was no harm in cultivating a country like India which 
could exert some influence on the USSR instead of courting 
only Pakistan in an extremely uncertain situation.143 
India, on its part, wanted to impress upon Saudi Arabia the 
need to use Saudi influence to find local solutions to 
regional problems without outside interference. India also 
hoped that improved relations with Saudi Arabia would act as 
some constraint on the Saudi inclination to partly under­
write the Pak arm purchases.144
PRINCE FAISAL'S VISIT TO INDIA, APRIL 1981
It was against this background that the Saudi Foreign Minis­
ter Prince Faisal visited New Delhi in April 1981. It was 
the first such trip by a ranking member of the Saudi royal 
family after King Saud's visit 25 years earlier. The visit
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emphasised the commonalty of approach of both countries to a 
number of mutually important issues.
Both the countries agreed that the Afghan issue should be 
resolved leading to the elimination of "foreign military 
presence".145 The Prince told the Indian Foreign Minister 
Mr.Narasimha Rao that Saudi Arabia was opposed to the estab­
lishment of foreign military bases in the Gulf and in Saudi 
Arabia. Both agreed that the Afghan problem should be solved 
through political negotiations.146 It was also emphasised 
that bilateral ties should be expanded and diversified "on 
the basis of mutual respect, non-interference in each 
other*s affairs and for mutual benefit".147
Later, at a press conference,148 Prince Faisal said that 
his country did not view her bilateral relations with any 
country in the light of her ties with a third country. Ad­
mitting Saudi Arabia's close relationship with Pakistan in a 
number of fields including military, he asserted that his 
country would like to have close ties with India on their 
"own value". He denied reports that two Pakistani divisions 
were stationed in Saudi Arabia.
It was quite obvious that India failed to get the sort of 
assurance that it was looking for from Prince Faisal in 
relation to Pak-Saudi relations particularly in the military 
sphere. Nor did Saudi Arabia share India's concern in rela­
tion to Pakistan's nuclear ambitions. Answering a specific 
question regarding Pakistan's nuclear bomb, he said Pakistan
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had denied such reports and "We have no reasons not to ac­
cept Pakistan's denial".
Though India and Saudi Arabia agreed on a number of issues 
in general terms, the divergence in their approach became 
apparent when it came to specifics. For instance, both 
agreed on a political solution regarding Afghanistan. But 
Saudi Arabia would do nothing either to stop or curtail 
Western assistance to the Afghan resistance as a first step 
in that direction. Nor was Saudi Arabia particularly recep­
tive to Indian misgivings regarding Saudi financing of 
Pakistan's military acquisitions from the U.S. in response 
to Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The Indian argument 
that it would create tensions in the region cut no ice with 
the Saudis.
MRS. GANDHI'S VISIT TO RIYADH, APRIL 1982
Mrs.Gandhi visited Riyadh in April 1982, the first by an In­
dian Prime Minister after Nehru's visit to the Kingdom way 
back in 1956. Though Mrs.Gandhi herself described her visit 
as "very successful" and as heralding a "new chapter" in 
relations between the two countries, the visit seemed to be 
of little more than symbolic value. However, as one Saudi 
paper put it, the end of a long "communication gap" was a 
welcome gain in itself.149
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The Joint Communique issued at the end of Mrs.Gandhi's 
visit to Saudi Arabia reflected a general agreement on a 
variety of issues but little else. On the contentious issue 
of Afghanistan, "the two sides called for a just and com­
prehensive settlement of the question on the basis of the 
withdrawal of all foreign troops, strict observance of the 
principles of non-intervention and non-interference, and 
full respect for the independence, sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, non-aligned status of Afghanistan and its member­
ship of the Organisation of Islamic Conference".150 
However, the fact that precious little was said about how it 
could be achieved was indicative of the fact that the two 
sides merely agreed to disagree on the specifics.
Though it was agreed that "the security and stability of 
the Gulf area is the responsibility of the Gulf states only, 
without any foreign interference or intervention", the 
unstated fact was that few Gulf states were in a position to 
defend themselves without outside help.
More remarkably, both sides "recognised that the stability 
and security of the Gulf region and that of the Indian sub­
continent were closely interlinked. "This was an implicit 
acknowledgement that just as India had a legitimate concern 
in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia too had a stake in the Indian sub­
continent. But in real terms, neither had the capability to 
pursue their interests much beyond their borders, legitimate 
or otherwise.
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Later, at a press conference in Riyadh,151 Mrs.Gandhi 
defended India*s approach to the Afghan issue. She said: 
"Our view is that there should be no foreign intervention, 
military or subversive or of any other kind. We have 
expressed our views very clearly, both privately and 
publicly, to the Soviet leaders about the presence of their 
troops in Afghanistan, but have refrained from condemning 
them. If one condemned them, one would have to condemn all 
those who were interfering in other parts of the world in 
various ways".
The closely controlled Saudi press did acknowledge India's 
independent role and positive influence in international af­
fairs. In the opinion of the "Saudi Gazette", "India repre­
sents the safety-lever and the curbing power to check for­
eign ambitions wanting to reclamp colonial domination on 
some of the Third World countries though in a different garb 
and through a new technique".152
According to "A1 Riyadh", "Mrs.Gandhi1s visit was sig­
nificant to Saudi Arabia as it comes at a very crucial time 
with Soviet forces in Afghanistan and the US fleet in the 
Indian Ocean".153
It need to be emphasised that the visit failed to elevate 
the limited political understanding that had already been 
established between the two countries to a new level. This 
was so because the general agreement on issues could not be 
extended to specific measures required to deal with any
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given issue. However, both countries displayed a certain 
maturity and sagacity in their approach to each other which 
enabled them to set aside minor irritants in their relations 
and emphasise and concentrate on those areas where their 
broad interests coincided in the long-run. As one newspaper 
commented, Mrs.Gandhi's visit appeared "to have given the 
two countries an opportunity to break out of the restrictive 
relationship they had got locked in to as a result of those 
old attitudes and suspicions".154
The visit, also, did not result in any substantial economic 
agreements which was a shade disappointing. Nevertheless, 
"It was perhaps appropriate in the context of the larger 
purpose behind Mrs.Gandhi's visit that bilateral economic 
cooperation should have been accorded somewhat secondary 
importance".155
To sum up, India failed to take advantage of certain early 
trends in Saudi policies which were complementary to those 
of India in relation to the Middle East thereby lost an 
early opportunity of developing a positive relationship with 
the Saudi Kingdom. India's own reservations about Saudi 
religious orthodoxy and political conservatism made it throw 
most of its support behind Nasser which only further 
alienated Saudi Arabia.
India also failed to realise that Saudi Arabia's intimate 
links with Pakistan in the 70s and 80s were based on con­
crete national interests of both the countries and had
little to do with religious affinity between them. India's 
undue emphasis on the religious factor made it treat Saudi 
Arabia almost as a lost cause for a considerable period of 
time which betrayed a lack of deep and intelligent under­
standing of the politics of the Arab world on the part of 
the Indian policy makers and placed artificial limitations 
on the growth of Indo-Saudi relations for decades.
It goes without saying that India's fixation with Pakistan, 
exaggerated fears about the emergence of an Islamic bloc 
cramped India' s diplomatic style in the Middle East. Be­
sides, Nehru's strong preference in favour of nonalignment 
and Nasser needlessly alienated the so called conservative 
states in the region with whom India had no bilateral dis­
putes whatsoever. Consequently, India's policy towards the 
region became ideologically rigid and politically diffident 
and resulted in avoidable distortions and angularities.
It is time India took a fresh look at its policy towards the 
Middle East in view of the momentous changes that occurred 
in the South Asian and the Middle Eastern regions in the 
post-1971 period and adjust its policies accordingly. 
India's claims to a regional role would gain credibility and 
substance only if India sheds some of her self-imposed in­
hibitions and begins to play a much more confident and posi­
tive role in a region which has been of utmost importance to 
her in the past and would continue to be so in future.
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CHAPTER 4
INDIA'S SECURITY AND STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
The fact that the Indian subcontinent has always had a vital 
link with the Middle East in security and strategic terms is 
borne out by both geography and history. This chapter seeks 
to critically evaluate the threat perceptions of the Indian 
policy makers in relation to the Middle East after indepen­
dence, the assumptions which underlay such perceptions and 
the strategies and policies they adopted to counter the 
same. This will be done in two parts, the first dealing with 
India's security concerns and responses in the region till 
the Bangladesh war in 1971 and the second thereafter.
The eastern Arab landmass constitutes a link between three 
continents, namely Asia, Africa and Europe. This region has 
variously been described as "the gateway of Asia and Africa" 
and the "backdoor of Europe" by geostrategists. Con­
sequently, this region has been a hotbed of international 
rivalry throughout recorded history. When the Suez Canal 
which linked the Red Sea with the Mediterranean was opened 
in 1869, "the Arab world became the nerve-center of interna­
tional communications, both over land and sea".l 
The British policy of preserving the Ottoman Empire in the 
19th century was primarily meant to safeguard its lines of 
communications to India from her European rivals. In fact,
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throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, the region be­
came a bone of contention among all major powers who had 
their covetous eyes on India. "Whether it was the British 
anxiety over the security of the imperial communication 
lines, Napolean's expedition to Egypt, Tsarist Russia's 
drive towards the Persian Gulf or the German drang nach os- 
ten, the ultimate object had invariably been India”.2 
Valentine Chirol, an Englishman, underscored the importance 
of the Middle East in India's defence calculations when he 
defined the region as consisting of "those regions of Asia 
which extend to the borders of India, and which are con­
sequently bound up with the problems of Indian political as 
well as military defences".3
INDIA'S SECURITY CONCERNS AND POLICIES IN MIDDLE EAST TILL 
1971
It goes without saying that one of the fundamental concerns 
that governed India's policy towards the region was 
security. Nehru was acutely aware of this fact when he told 
the Constituent Assembly in March 1949: "If you have to con­
sider any question affecting the Middle East, India in­
evitably comes into the picture".4
While the Middle East would have been an important region 
for India's security concerns under any circumstances, the
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partition of India and the creation of an exclusively Is­
lamic state, Pakistan, in the subcontinent and the bad blood 
that accompanied it made the Indian political leadership 
particularly sensitive to a region which was not only 
predominantly Muslim but also had geographical contiguity 
and close cultural ties with Pakistan.
While Pakistan has always been and will always be a very im­
portant factor in India's security calculations in relation 
to the Middle East, it must be mentioned that India's 
security concerns in the region were by no means confined to 
it. In fact, it will be argued that India's exaggerated at­
tention to the Pakistani factor over the years rather 
cramped its approach to the security issues in the region 
which impinged on India's own safety and security.5 As a 
result, India's security policy to the region became rather 
self-conscious and overcautious which, in turn, made it 
rather weak, unimaginative and largely ineffectual.
FEARS OF AN ISLAMIC BLOC
There were two major security concerns for India in the 
Middle East in the 50s and 60s which were primarily Pak- 
related. The first was the possible emergence of a Pak- 
inspired Islamic bloc to the detriment and discomfiture of 
India's security. Nehru admitted to a veteran journalist 
Durga Das that one of the principal reasons why he tried to
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cultivate progressive Arab leaders was to "counterbalance 
the conservative Muslim bloc, which stretched from Pakistan 
to Jordan and posed a threat to India*s security and 
secularism".6
Predictably, Pakistan did make an assiduous effort to forge 
an Islamic alliance among the Muslim states of the Middle 
East in the late 40s and early 50s. However, Pakistani ef­
forts came to nothing for a variety of reasons.7 It was 
Pakistan*s disappointment and disillusionment with Pan- 
Islamism as a means of achieving its political objectives 
that primarily prompted it to plump for the Western alliance 
in the mid-50s.
THE BAGHDAD PACT, 1955
The second major security concern that haunted the Indian 
policy makers during this period was Pakistan's joining of 
the Baghdad Pact in 1955. The Baghdad Pact, undoubtedly, 
constituted the most important challenge to India's security 
concerns in the Middle East in the 50s. The Pact was the 
result of the British drive to forge a military alliance 
among the Muslim countries of the region in order to 
safeguard its imperial interests, particularly oil and the 
Pakistani drive to bring about an Islamic grouping in the 
region as a counterpoise to India. "While the former
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threatened to bring the cold war between the East and the 
West to India's door step, the latter sought to isolate In­
dia from a region so vital to its security and economic 
well-being. By 1955, the two forces converged, and the Bagh­
dad Pact was born".8
Apart from his general opposition to military Pacts, Nehru 
reacted very sharply to the Baghdad Pact primarily because 
he saw a potential but real threat to India's security from 
it. Nehru told the Lok Sabha9 in March, 1956: "... SEATO
and the Baghdad Pact, apart from being basically in the 
wrong direction, affect us intimately. In a sense, they tend 
to encircle us".
He was quite sure as to Pakistan's motives in joining the 
Pact. "But surely, nobody here imagines that the Pakistan 
Government entered into this Pact because it expected some 
imminent or distant invasion or aggression from the Soviet 
Union. The Pakistan news papers and the statements of 
responsible people in Pakistan make it perfectly clear that 
they have joined this Pact because of India".
He was, however, "quite sure that the other members of the 
Baghdad Pact have no hostility to India...". He was also 
"prepared to accept completely the assurance given to me by 
the leaders of the United States of America. I am quite sure 
they did not mean ill to us".
Nevertheless, Nehru was quite disturbed by the possible 
security implications that these Pacts could have for India.
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His first fear was that "Countries get interlocked with one 
another, each pulls in a different direction and in a 
crisis they are pulled away in a direction they never 
thought of going". Secondly, he was also worried about 
Pakistan*s ability to cause mischief by taking advantage of 
its membership of these Pacts. "The danger is that any odd 
member of one of these pacts can set in motion something 
which would gradually pull in not only the members of the 
pact, but some other interrelated pact of which they are 
common members".
"That is why, both for larger reasons and for the narrow 
reason of self-interest, we have taken exception to SEATO 
and the Baghdad Pact" he explained.
But in purely military terms, the Baghdad Pact failed to 
pose the sort of threat to India that Nehru imagined or 
feared it could for a variety of reasons. First, the Pakis­
tani attempt to broaden the definition of aggression by in­
sisting that the threat to the Pact members could emanate 
from "any source other than the Communist nations" did not 
cut much ice with the US and Britain.10
Secondly, the Baghdad Pact failed to develop along the lines 
of the NATO for various reasons. It failed to agree, unlike 
the NATO, that aggression against any member country would 
be construed as aggression against all. It also failed to 
raise a formidable military force under a unified command. 
As a result, the cooperation among the Baghdad Pact
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countries was confined to joint military exercises and the 
like. When the coup in Baghdad in 1958 installed a radical 
Baa'thist regime in power, the Pact more or less ceased to 
exist.
Nehru, explaining the larger reason behind the collapse of 
the Baghdad Pact in the Lok Sabha in Aug. 1958 said: "The
major fact in West Asia is the growth of Arab nationalism in 
a very powerful, resurgent way.... This fact, which was 
patent, was neither liked nor appreciated by many powers, 
and an attempt was made to split the Arab countries, in 
fact, Arab nationalism".
"While the Governments carried on a cold war against each 
other, the people in almost every Arab country were power­
fully affected by this tide of Arab nationalism. Thus, in 
the countries associated with the Baghdad Pact, there was a 
hiatus between the Governments looking in another direction 
and rather ranged against this spirit of Arab nationalism. 
How big this hiatus was can be seen from the coup d'etat in 
Baghdad... ".11
NON-PAK SECURITY CONCERNS
Though Indian policy makers exaggerated the role of Pakistan 
and Islam in relation to India's security concerns in the 
Middle East, there were other important security considera­
tions for India in the region which had little to do with
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either Pakistan or Islam. "Closely connected with India's 
security interests was the question of the international 
communication lines which lie across the Arab world".12 
Even in ancient and medieval times, trade between the Indian 
subcontinent and Europe was carried through the Arab lands 
both on land and by sea. It was the unreliability of these 
routes because of the unsettled conditions in the region 
during the 15th century that prompted Vasco da Gama to dis­
cover a sea route to India. However, when the Suez Canal was 
thrown open to international traffic in 1869, the Middle 
Eastern route regained its significance.
The strategic significance of the Suez Canal for India's 
physical and economic well-being need not be overemphasised. 
"The Suez Canal indeed cut down the maritime distance be­
tween Bombay and London by 4500 miles and in course of time 
became the veritable life-line of world trade. About three- 
fourths of India's import and export trade passed through 
the Suez Canal".13 Besides, the Middle Eastern region be­
came an important halting station for India's air services 
to the West.
The vital importance of this waterway for India's economic 
plans in general and trade and commerce in particular was 
driven home in a telling fashion both during the Suez crisis 
in 1956 and the six-day Arab -Israeli war in 1967 when the 
Suez Canal was closed temporarily.
During the Suez crisis in 1956, Nehru was quite open about
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India*s vital interest in the normal operation of the Suez 
, r Canal. He told the Lok Sabha in Aug. 1956: "India is not a 
disinterested party. She is a principal user of this water- 
way, and her economic life and development is not unaffected 
by the dispute, not to speak of worse developments, in 
regard to it”.14
The then Minister of External Affairs Mr. Krishna Menon ex­
plained to the Lok Sabha in much more detail in March, 1957, 
India's vital stake in the Suez Canal. He emphasised that 
"the Suez Canal to a certain extent is much more our life­
line than it may be the life-line of the Western countries. 
In the autumn last year, 70 percent of our exports and 69 
percent of our imports passed through the Canal. This 
country carried somewhere about 650,000 tonnage through the 
Canal in that twelve-month period. Therefore, the re-opening 
which is vital to the progress of our Five Year Plans, to 
our economic life and to our food prices, is a matter of 
great concern to us".15
The story was not much different when the Suez Canal was 
closed to all traffic following the Arab-Israeli war in June 
1967. The then Commerce Minister Mr. Dinesh Singh told the 
Rajya Sabha in July 1967 that judging from the previous 
year's exports, the freight charges for 1967 might go up by 
roughly Rs. 1.8 crores per month as a result of surcharge
levied by shipping companies following the closure of the 
Suez Canal. He further said that if the closure of the Canal
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was for a short period, no assistance might be necessary to 
the exporting industries. If the closure was for a long 
period, assistance might be necessary and the Government 
would consider it then.16
The closure of the Canal also seriously affected India's 
food supplies from the US. The week-long detour round the 
Cape of Good Hope by ships carrying foodgrains to India dis­
rupted their even supply at a critical juncture.17 
Despite the fact that the normal operation of the Suez Canal 
was in the vital interest of India, she failed to contribute 
much towards that end primarily for two reasons. First, In­
dia refused to take any initiative to solve the Arab-Israeli 
dispute in view of Arab refusal to recognise and negotiate 
with Israel which made repeated conflicts and repeated 
closure of the Suez Canal almost inevitable. Secondly, ob­
taining the cooperation and goodwill of Israel was also 
necessary for the normal functioning of the Suez Canal. 
India's decision to more or less ignore Israel diplomati­
cally made any such possibility rather remote. Nor should it 
be forgotten that Israel could have been used as an alterna­
tive transit point for Indian economic dealings with the 
West in case of extreme emergencies. In fact, Israel offered 
transit facilities to India through Israel for India's trade 
with the West which, it was said, could have saved India Rs. 
38 crores a year in freight charges.18 But, India remained 
more or less a passive spectator, except during the earlier
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Suez Crisis in 1956, in relation to an issue which was of 
great and direct importance to her.
THE INDO-PAK WAR OF 1965 AND THE MIDDLE EAST
The first real test of India's fears and suspicions in rela­
tion to Pakistan's ability to garner support in the Middle 
East, particularly in the military sphere, in any possible 
conflict with India came in Sept. 1965 when war broke out 
between the two countries over Kashmir. Kashmir is the only 
Muslim majority state in India and Pakistan did try her best 
to give the conflict a communal colour in order to gain the 
support and sympathy of the Muslim Middle East.
While the diplomatic support to Pakistan from the Middle 
Eastern countries during the war was substantial, the same 
could not be said of military assistance. Among the Middle 
Eastern countries which provided material assistance to 
Pakistan during the conflict, Iran, perhaps, was the most 
important. Even Iran's material assistance to Pakistan was 
rather modest and limited. It supplied Pakistan with jet- 
fuel, gasoline and some small arms and ammunition. 19 
On the other hand, the Shah, in private, urged Ayub Khan to 
bring the hostilities to an end. More significantly, the 
Shah made no attempt to interrupt Iran's oil supplies to In­
dia. He even sent one of his ministers to India on a 
friendly visit when the war was still on. Thus, the military
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assistance that the Middle Eastern states provided to Pakis­
tan during the Indo-Pak conflict of 1965 was almost negli­
gible.
THE 1971 BANGLADESH WAR AND THE MIDDLE EAST
The Indo-Pak war in Dec. 1971 over the Bangladesh issue 
again saw the Middle Eastern states throw their diplomatic 
weight behind Pakistan but little else. Iran once again 
turned out to be the Middle Eastern country most concerned 
about the developments in the subcontinent and provided con­
siderable material assistance to Pakistan. In fact, India 
was so concerned about the possible Iranian assistance to 
Pakistan that it made no secret of the fact that it expected 
the Indo-Soviet Treaty to serve as a deterrent as much 
against possible Chinese intervention as against covert 
threat of large scale arms transfer from Iran to Pakistan. 
20It was also reported that the USSR deployed troops along 
the Iranian border in order to deter the Shah from helping 
Pakistan in its war with India over Bangladesh in late 1971. 
21
The extent of Iranian help to Pakistan during the Indo-Pak 
conflict became clear when Pakistan issued a communique on 8 
May, 1973 on the subject. During the conflict, the entire 
fleet of Pakistan's Civilian aircraft took shelter in Iran 
and they were allowed to fly essential supplies to Pakistan
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from there. Iran also sent fire-fighting equipment and ex­
perts when oil tanks in Karachi were set ablaze. Iran al­
lowed the passage of strategic materials to Pakistan through 
its territory. It also supplied certain items in critical 
shortage including ammunition and aircraft and helped in 
maritime-reconnaissance.22
Nevertheless, Iran, despite the threats to interrupt oil 
supplies to India,23 chose not to carry out the threat. 
More significantly, Iran resisted Pakistani pressures to ac­
tivate the CENTO to provide legal basis for Iran's assis­
tance to Pakistan. Iran also did not indulge in any direct 
provocation nor interfere with the overflights of Indian 
aircraft.24 As one scholar remarked, "Iran's support in the 
1971 war, remained verbal, moral and diplomatic and under­
scored the fact that this was the most that RCD states could 
do for each other".25
In addition to Iran, a few Middle Eastern countries provided 
token assistance to Pakistan during the conflict. However, 
it is suffice to say that the material assistance that 
Pakistan received from the Muslim countries of the Middle 
East during the Bangladesh war was neither substantial nor 
decisive and proved to be of little more than symbolic 
value.
The Indo-Pak wars of 1965 and 1971 exposed certain fallacies 
that seemed to have governed India's security policy towards 
the Middle East till then. First, India's misgivings that
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Pakistan would be able to gain the support of the Middle 
Eastern countries on the basis of Islamic solidarity in any 
conflict with India proved to be rather unwarranted and 
grossly exaggerated. The professions of Islamic solidarity 
on these occasions proved to be little more than rhetoric. 
Secondly, It also became very clear during these two wars 
that each Middle Eastern country weighed these conflicts in 
terms of its national interests and acted on that basis 
alone. For instance, Iran was the country which provided 
most assistance to Pakistan during these wars primarily be­
cause it considered Pakistanfs continued existence as a vi­
able state to be in Iran's national interest not as an ex­
pression of Islamic solidarity. Thirdly and lastly, there 
seemed to be very few countries in the Middle East which 
were capable of and willing to provide the sort of help to 
Pakistan which could tilt the scales in its favour in its 
conflict with India.
Besides, "India has neutralised the potential for active 
Middle Eastern or Gulf States' support to Pakistan in the 
latter's disputes with India, through an unwavering Indian 
alignment behind Arab-Islamic causes in the international 
forums. Minor forms of support - such as token arms and sym­
pathetic statements provided (to) Pakistan - have been ig­
nored to maintain and stabilise the larger framework of good 
relations with the Middle East and Persian Gulf states".26
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INDIA'S SECURITY CONCERNS IN THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 1971
The Indo-Pak war in Dec. 1971 over the Bangladesh issue and 
the subsequent dismemberment of Pakistan constitutes a 
watershed in India's strategic perspective in relation to 
the Middle Eastern region.
At one level, India's strategic gains were substantial. In­
dia won a moral victory over the US, a political victory 
over China and a decisive military victory over Pakistan. 
With the separation of Bangladesh, Pakistan was cut to half 
of its previous size, resources and population and it was 
reduced to one tenth of India's size. With the loss of it 
Eastern wing, Pakistan lost its strategic relevance for 
SEATO. From being the largest Muslim country in the world in 
terms of population, the population of what remained of 
Pakistan roughly equalled that of Muslims in India. 
Moreover, as a direct consequence of the Bangladesh crisis, 
"even Pakistan's tomorrow seemed uncertain as regional and 
separatist elements in the new Pakistan became bolder".27 
On the other hand, India's victory over Pakistan was as much 
military as it was psychological. For the first time since 
independence, India was able to rid herself of her unhealthy 
preoccupation with Pakistan and look beyond the subcontinent 
for a role commensurate with her size and resources. In 
fact, "India emerged as a dominant power in South Asia, with
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no formidable competition in sight”.28
Moreover, India's "north eastern flank no longer raised a 
serious security problem for its military strategists".29 
India, in the event of another war Pakistan, need no longer 
worry about fighting a two front war. Besides, with the col­
lapse of East Pakistan, the secessionist movements in north 
east India also received a serious jolt. It was also widely 
believed that it was the Bangladesh crisis that prompted 
Sheik Abdullah to come to some sort of political understand­
ing with Mrs.Gandhi over Kashmir in 1975.30
However, at another level, Pakistan's strategic position was 
considerably strengthened. The separation of East Pakistan 
"has resulted in a more concentrated Pakistani defence sys­
tem. . . ".31
Moreover, Pakistan's policy towards the Middle East, since 
the secession of East Pakistan became "more concerted and 
coordinated within the framework of a calculated strategy 
than it has ever been before". 32
In fact, the Pakistani President Z.A. Bhutto "effectively 
employed personal diplomacy as an instrument of foreign 
policy and succeeded in winning overwhelming political and 
diplomatic support from the countries of the Middle East for 
Pakistan's stand on the unresolved issues emanating from the 
war of December 1971".33 Bhutto toured eight Middle Eastern 
countries in Jan. 1972 and followed it up with another four­
teen in May-June of the same year. Countries like Iran,
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Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the UAE did not recognise
Bangladesh till Pakistan recognised it in Feb. 1974 as a
token of support to Pakistan.
Given the close cultural and ethnic links between Pakistan
and the Middle East, it is but natural that Pakistan tends 
to look towards the latter for support and sustenance. 
Moreover, "Pakistan enjoys a special position vis-a-vis this 
region by virtue of the fact that she occupies the sensitive 
transitional zone which links the Middle East with South 
Asia".34
At this critical juncture, the relationship between South 
Asia and the Middle East underwent a fundamental transforma­
tion as a result of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, the oil 
embargo that followed it and the subsequent steep rise in 
oil prices. "By 1968, ... it was hard to assess which region 
- the Middle East or South Asia - was more influential in 
relation to the other or within the wider international sys­
tem. By the end of 1973, however, there was no longer am­
biguity. In five years, the historic balance of relation­
ships had decisively turned, and seems likely to hold for 
the foreseeable future. The Middle Eastern - Iranian area 
had become the source of substantial influences playing on 
South Asia; there were virtually no influences at work in 
the opposite direction. The 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the 
Arab oil embargo had changed the situation in a flash".35 
The two super powers also got much more closely involved in
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the region, the US primarily because of oil and the USSR be­
cause of the proximity of the region, a development which 
could not but have caused disquiet in India.
The accumulation of petro-dollars in the Middle East in the 
mid- 70s following the oil bonanza resulted in the large- 
scale purchase of sophisticated and advanced arms by a num­
ber of states in the region, particularly Iran, Iraq, Saudi 
Arabia, Libya and some of the Gulf sheikhdoms. The Western 
countries, hard hit by the steep rise in oil prices were 
only too keen to supply these countries with extremely ad­
vanced weapon systems for economic gain regardless of the 
political consequences of such arms transfers to a region as 
volatile as the Middle East. "The security implications (for 
India) of these trends are more long-term and arise from 
Pakistan's military ties and involvements in the region, 
from the strategic interests and arms transfer policies of 
the great powers in both the Middle East and South Asia, and 
from various economic dependencies and linkages that have 
developed between the states of the subcontinent and the 
oil-exporting Islamic states".36
Hence, Pakistan started looming large in India's defence 
calculations in relation to the Middle East much more in the 
70s than any time before. The most important reason for this 
was the fact that quite a few Middle Eastern countries en­
visaged their own national interests to coincide with those 
of Pakistan much more during this period than ever
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before."Whatever the causes, Pakistan and the Middle East 
have converged economically, politically and psychologi­
cally. While the relationship is still evolving, it rests on 
a mutuality of interests that promises to be enduring”.37 
As a result, most of the security issues that confronted In­
dia in the 70s and 80s in relation to the Middle East were 
in some way or another Pak-related as we shall see in the 
course of this narration.
PAKISTAN AND IRAN
The dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971 despite its membership 
of the NATO and the SEATO had an unsettling effect on the 
Shah of Iran. He considered the survival of the remainder of 
Pakistan as vital to Iran's own security and stability 
primarily for two reasons. Firstly, Iran wanted a stable 
eastern flank and Pakistani support in its rivalry with the 
Arab states. Secondly, any secessionist tendencies in 
Baluchistan could cause disquiet in his own considerable 
Baluchi minority. In a broader context, he suspected and 
feared the development of a Moscow - New Delhi - Kabul - 
Baghdad axis to the detriment of Iran's security and 
regional ambitions.
Consequently, the Shah made a public and unequivocal commit­
ment to the territorial integrity of Pakistan in 1972 by 
stating that any attack on Pakistan would be considered an
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attack on Iran itself.38 Besides, the accumulation of 
petro-dollars following the hike in oil prices in the after- 
math of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war sent Iran on a massive 
arms purchase spree. In four years between 1974 and 1978, 
Iran spent $ 36 billion on arms purchases compared to about 
$ 12 billion spent by India during the same period.39 There 
was a genuine concern in India that Iran might transfer some 
of these advanced weapon systems to Pakistan in any future 
conflict between India and Pakistan. The then Foreign Minis­
ter of India Mr. Swaran Singh told the Indian Parliament in 
March 1973 that India's future defence planning would take 
into account not only the impact of new American arms sup­
plies to Pakistan , but also the possibility of arms being 
transferred to Pakistan through third countries such as 
Iran.40
However, the rapidly changing geopolitical situation in the 
world in general and in the regions of South Asia and the 
Middle East in particular in the 70s saw the convergence of 
the economic and strategic interests of India and Iran which 
were emerging as preponderant powers in their respective 
regions.
"Indeed certain common features are discernible in Iran's 
and India's security scenarios and their behaviour as 
dominant regional powers. Both attach the greatest possible 
value to the attainment of security autonomy, and both have 
to live with dependence on external security for a fairly
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long time. Both are therefore anxious to maintain and assert 
as much independence and initiative as possible within the 
framework of their relationship with their respective patron 
power".41
So both India and Iran saw the need to coordinate their for­
eign policies both to exploit the complementarity of their 
economic and security interests at the regional level and 
also to avoid any possible friction if not conflict between 
them. India convinced the Shah of Iran that it had a vested 
interest in the integrity of what remained of Pakistan and 
the Shah, in turn, categorically stated that unless India 
attacked Pakistan, it would not face, either directly or in­
directly, the arms Iran was acquiring.42 Isolating the 
Pakistan-factor from the Indo-Iranian relations enabled Mrs. 
Gandhi and the Shah to strive "to unite Iran and India in 
strategic cooperation for shared objectives in Southwest and 
South Asia".43
The Indo-Iranian strategic understanding was so sound that 
India chose to look rather indulgently at the acquisition of 
fancy weapon systems by the Shah and the latter readily ac­
cepted Indiafs rationale behind its Peaceful Nuclear Explo­
sion in May 1974. The Shah's grandiose scheme for the even­
tual emergence of an Indian Ocean Economic Community44 and 
his desire for close collaboration between the navies of In­
dia and Iran45 to keep the Indian Ocean free from outside 
encroachment underscored this understanding.
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However, the strategic understanding and cooperation between 
India and Iran more or less collapsed with the fall of the 
Shah and the triumph of Islamic revolution under the 
spiritual leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini.46 At one level, 
the Islamic revolution in Iran improved India's security en­
vironment. Khomeini's Iran embraced Nonalignment which as­
serted Iran's independent foreign policy posture. This 
resulted in the drying up of supplies of sophisticated 
weapons from the West, particularly the US. It also meant 
the end of military collaboration between Iran and Pakistan 
under the CENTO as Iran withdrew from the CENTO following 
the Islamic revolution. Khomeini's Iran was also less am­
bitious in its foreign policy endeavours compared to that of 
Shah both by design and necessity. The Islamic regime was 
completely pre-occupied with its domestic problems and as 
such had little time for external affairs nor did it have 
the same sort of ambition that the Shah had for Iran. 
Moreover, the tacit strategic support that Iran had from the 
U.S for its regional role under the Shah was neither sought 
by Iran nor extended by the U.S in the changed cir­
cumstances .
However, the security scenario for India exacerbated at 
another level following the Islamic revolution in Iran. The 
panicky reaction of the U.S to the fall of Shah, one of the 
"twin pillars" of U.S policy in the Middle East and the sub­
sequent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan increased and
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upgraded U.S military presence in the Indian Ocean which was 
of great concern to India. Iran*s alleged proclivities to 
export Islamic revolution also caused considerable disquiet 
in India, given its large but poorly integrated Muslim 
minority. Lastly, the Iran-Iraq war also put India in a 
diplomatic tight-spot. It had developed considerable politi­
cal understanding and a fruitful economic relationship with 
both which now seemed to be in some danger. Besides, MThe 
lessons of the Iran-Iraq war suggested the possibility of 
Arab financing of Pakistani wars against India in the 
future".47
Furthermore, the eclipse of Shah made it imperative for the 
U.S to shift its focus to its other "pillar" in the region, 
Saudi Arabia, which again had serious security implications 
for India.
PAKISTAN AND SAUDI ARABIA
With the fall of the Shah, Iran ceased to be the American 
sponsored policeman of the Middle Eastern region. The Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 which closely fol­
lowed on the heels of the Islamic revolution in Iran and the 
ouster of the Shah sent panic waves in the entire Middle 
East and revived the historical fears of the West in rela­
tion to the Soviet drive towards the warm waters of the In­
dian Ocean. As a result, Saudi Arabia became a willing
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strategic partner and the linchpin of U.S policy in the 
region in the 80s in order to contain the possible Soviet 
penetration of the region. The Reagan administration's adop­
tion of Pakistan as a frontline state so that it could act 
as a conduit to American arms to Afghan resistance brought 
the U.S, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan together in a strategic 
drive to insulate the region from further Soviet encroach­
ments .
The Saudi-Pak cooperation in the military sphere did not 
begin with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan but did 
elevate it to a new level. The initial contacts for coopera­
tion were made in 1963 though the first formal agreement was 
reached in 1967 wherein Pakistan agreed to send a small num­
ber of its officers to oversee the development of the Saudi 
army and the airforce.48The Saudis were reportedly impressed 
by the performance of the Pakistani armed forces against a 
much bigger Indian army during the Indo-Pak war of 1965. 
Generally speaking, The Saudi-Pak military links remained 
rather modest and sporadic in the 70s. However, the begin­
ning of the 80s saw the close convergence of Saudi-Pak 
security interests for a variety of reasons.
The Islamic revolution in Iran posed an ideological threat 
to the Saudi royal family as well as Zia ul Haq's military 
regime in Pakistan. Khomeini's branding of these two regimes 
as un-Islamic and his repeated calls for their overthrow 
caused great concern in both the countries. Saudi Arabia was
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particularly concerned about the disquiet in the Shia 
population in its eastern province following Khomeini1s tri­
umph in Iran. Pakistan too had a substantial Shia population 
and was concerned about the impact of Khomeini's exhortions 
on them. More importantly, even when the Shah was at the 
helm in Iran, Pakistan took with a pinch of salt Iranian 
assurances in relation to Pakistan's security and integrity. 
With the advent of Khomeini, Pakistan lost even that 
psychological assurance. In fact, "Pakistani-Iran relations 
since 1978 have had a deep-seated but unarticulated element 
of fear and unpredictability".49
The Marxist coup in Afghanistan in 1978 which was closely 
followed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 
1979 caused considerable panic both in Riyadh and Islamabad. 
The Saudis construed the Soviet action as a possible first 
step in the USSR's inexorable march towards the warm waters 
of the Indian Ocean. The Soviet presence in Afghanistan, 
Saudis feared, could embolden the Marxist regime in South 
Yemen whose hand was suspected in the attack of Muslim 
zealots on the Grand Mosque in Mecca, to indulge in further 
mischief.
The outbreak of hostilities between Iran and Iraq in Septem­
ber 1980 further underlined Saudi Arabia's military vul­
nerability despite her large arsenal. As for as Pakistan was 
concerned, the Soviet presence on its western borders was 
genuinely unsettling in view of the Indo-Soviet treaty and
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its own less than satisfactory relations with Afghanistan. 
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan also shared a deep sense of disap­
pointment and disenchantment with the U.S policy towards its 
allies and friends. The Saudis were particularly appalled by 
the American inability or unwillingness to stand by the Shah 
of Iran and help him in any tangible way in his hour of 
crisis despite the fact that he was the pillar of U.S policy 
in the region. Pakistan's disappointment with the American 
response to its wars with India in 1965 and 1971 hardly 
needs any repetition. "Faced with mounting threats, Riyadh 
and Islamabad thus embarked on a two-track policy of calling 
on Washington's help while augmenting their security through 
joint moves".50
In addition to these general reasons, there were a number of 
other smaller but not insignificant factors that facilitated 
the expansion and consolidation of military links between 
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. For Saudis, given their own acute 
manpower shortage and the political liabilities that accom­
panied the direct American presence in the kingdom, the 
Pakistanis seemed to provide the best way out. Pakistan 
possessed a significant military establishment and a well- 
trained and professional army which was tested in the 
battle-field. While Pakistanis were Muslims, they were not 
Arabs. As such, it was easier to isolate them from local 
politics.
For Pakistanis, the Saudi connection, in addition to the
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financial rewards that it provided gave them access to 
highly advanced U.S weaponry which they could not lay their 
hands on either because of monetary considerations or for 
political reasons. Pakistanis also could have hoped that the 
increasing Pak-Saudi military cooperation "might expand the 
U.S Saudi commitment, either implicitly or explicitly, to 
the defense of Pakistan”.51
However, information regarding the specifics of Saudi-Pak 
military collaboration are understandably sparse and 
nebulous. It was widely believed that Saudi Arabia, at least 
partly, financed Pakistan's purchase of forty F-16 fighters 
from the U.S.52
It was also reported that in 1980, the two countries reached 
an agreement wherein Pakistan agreed to station two of its 
army divisions in Saudi Arabia which would be equipped and 
maintained by the latter. Besides, two compensating divi­
sions were to be raised in Pakistan which again would be 
financed by Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, there was little 
evidence to suggest that the agreement was actually imple­
mented. Pakistan had only two brigades in Saudi Arabia as of 
1985.53 It was also widely rumoured that Pakistan declined 
to accede to the Saudi request to withdraw Shias from its 
troops stationed in Saudi Arabia on the grounds that such 
action would divide her professional army along sectarian 
lines and was hence unacceptable.
It goes without saying that Pak-Saudi military links caused
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great consternation and concern in New Delhi. The 
Washington-Riyadh-Islamabad axis not only facilitated Pakis­
tani access to sophisticated American weapons but also 
greatly reduced its financial burden by the Saudi underwrit­
ing of the costs of these weapons to a substantial extent. 
It left India with no alternative but to match the Pakistani 
weapon acquisitions which put the already overstretched In­
dian economy under great pressure. Besides, India also had 
to contend with the possibility that Saudi Arabia could 
transfer part of her newly acquired arms to Pakistan in any 
future confrontation between India and Pakistan.
Moreover, the politico-diplomatic significance of Pak-Saudi 
military ties was not lost upon India. "It serves notice on 
India and the Soviet Union that although Pakistan may not be 
a match against either one militarily, it now has a powerful 
ally with economic and political clout. The cost of any at­
tack thus becomes higher than it has been in the recent past 
... ".54
THE "ISLAMIC BOMB"
Another major source of concern to India in the 70s in rela­
tion to the Middle East was the potential threat posed by 
what was dubbed as the "Islamic bomb" to Indian strategic 
environment in general and national security in particular. 
The "Islamic bomb" was so called because it was alleged to
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be the product of Pakistan*s technology and the Middle East­
ern finance in the 70s. If true, this development could pose 
serious security concern to Indian policy makers and radi­
cally transform the strategic equation between South Asia 
and the Middle East mostly to India*s disadvantage. In 
analysing this issue, we would confine ourselves to the 
origins of the "Islamic bomb'*, how "Islamic'' it is and what 
are the ways and means in which India could counter this 
potential threat in the context of her own nuclear ambitions 
and capabilities.
Pakistan's quest for nuclear technology began in 1953 with 
the establishment of Pakistan Atomic Energy Committee which 
was soon upgraded to an Atomic Energy Commission primarily 
in response to India's expanding interest and activities in 
relation to nuclear technology. However, Pakistan's nuclear 
programme moved at a snail's pace until it came under the 
influence of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.55 Bhutto himself referred 
to the crucial role that he played in the development of 
Pakistan's nuclear programme from his death cell in 1979. "I 
have been actively associated with the nuclear programme of 
Pakistan from October 1958 to July 1977, a span of nineteen 
years. I was concerned directly with the subject as Foreign 
Minister, as Minister for Fuel, Power and Natural resources 
and as Minister in charge of Atomic Energy. When I took 
charge of Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission, it was no 
more than a signboard of an office. It was only a name. As­
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siduously and with great determination, I put my entire 
vitality behind the task of acquiring nuclear capability for 
my country”. And he went on to add, "Due to my singular ef­
forts, Pakistan acquired the infra-structure and the poten­
tial of nuclear capability".56
However, Bhutto's nuclear ambitions for Pakistan could be 
traced back to a much earlier period. Addressing the Na­
tional Assembly of Pakistan in 1965, Bhutto asserted: "If 
India builds the bomb, we will eat grass and leaves, even go 
hungry. But we will get one of our own, we have no 
alternative".57
Bhutto's zeal for nuclear capability for Pakistan, apart 
from rivalry with India and security considerations, seemed 
to have a technological dimension as well. In his book The 
Mvth of Independence, he argues: "India is unlikely to con­
cede nuclear monopoly to others and, judging from her own 
nuclear programme and her diplomatic activities ... it ap­
pears that she is determined to proceed with her plans to 
detonate a nuclear bomb. If Pakistan restricts or suspends 
her nuclear programme, it would not only enable India to 
blackmail Pakistan with her nuclear advantage, but would im­
pose a crippling limitation on the development of Pakistan's 
science and technology".58
Bhutto took over a dismembered and distraught Pakistan in 
December 1971 following the crisis in East Pakistan and the 
subsequent Indian military intervention which gave birth to
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Bangladesh. It was probably this humiliating defeat that 
crystallised Bhutto's thinking on the nuclear issue and set 
him irreversibly on the course to nuclear capability. 
According to Bhutto's former press secretary Khaled Hasan, 
Bhutto convened a meeting of Pakistan's top scientists in 
Multan in January 1972, one month after he took over as 
President. He reminded the gathering of Pakistan's humiliat­
ing defeat a month earlier at the Indian hands and his 
determination to see Pakistan acquire nuclear capability.59 
Soon after, Bhutto took personal political charge of 
Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission. In 1973, talks were in­
itiated with France for setting up a reprocessing plant at 
Chasma near Rawalpindi. Thus, Pakistan's quest for nuclear 
capability started in right earnest well before India's 
nuclear test.
India's nuclear explosion on May 18, 1974 at Pokhran in
Rajasthan not far from the Pakistani border, however, proved 
to be a mixed blessing for Pakistan. It acted as a spur and 
a convenient excuse for Pakistan to accelerate its own 
nuclear programme and justify it to its own people. On the 
other hand, it made it much more difficult for Pakistan to 
obtain external assistance in relation to both nuclear tech­
nology and materials because Western countries, following 
India's nuclear test, tightened the laws concerning nuclear 
proliferation considerably and kept a close watch on nuclear 
threshold states. Pakistan, which started negotiating with
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France in 1973 to buy a plutonium-reprocessing plant despite 
American pressures not to do so signed a deal for the same 
in 1976. However, France backed out of the deal in 1978 un­
der American pressure. While negotiations were going on with 
France, Pakistan thought it unwise to put all its nuclear 
eggs in one basket. Hence, as an alternative strategy, a 
determined bid was made to pursue the uranium-enrichment 
path to nuclear capability which culminated in the estab­
lishment of the Kahuta plant in which Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, 
popularly known as the father of the "Islamic bomb" is said 
to have played a vital role.60
Bhutto's political reaction to India's nuclear explosion was 
also uncompromising and defiant. He told a press conference 
in Lahore on 19 May, 1974: "Pakistan would never succumb to 
nuclear blackmail by India. The people of Pakistan would 
never accept Indian hegemony or domination in the subcon­
tinent. Neither would it compromise its position on the 
right of the people of Kashmir to decide their own future". 
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Pakistan also tried to use India's nuclear test to its ad­
vantage in other ways as well. Bhutto warned the U.S that 
unless it lifted its embargo on arms sales to Pakistan, Is­
lamabad would be forced to match India's nuclear capability. 
In the event, the U.S did lift its arms embargo on Pakistan, 
if only partially. Pakistan also suggested an Indo-Israeli 
collaboration in the nuclear test conducted by India in or­
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der to rouse the feelings of the Middle Eastern nations (to 
whom Pakistan was moving closer politically) against India's 
nuclear test and probably also as a ploy to attract Middle 
eastern petro-dollars to assist Pakistan’s own nuclear ef­
fort.
It was Bhutto's own reference to the "Islamic" nature of the 
Pakistani bomb in his testimony from his death-cell that 
added a new and ominous dimension to Pakistani nuclear 
programme. "The Christian, Jewish and Hindu civilizations 
have this capability. Only the Islamic civilization was 
without it, but that position was about to change".62 While 
there is no conclusive evidence to establish a definite link 
between Pakistan's nuclear programme and the Middle Eastern 
petro-dollars, there is sufficient circumstantial evidence 
not to brush aside such reports lightly. For instance, there 
were persistent reports that Libya was underwriting 
Pakistan's purchase of uranium from Niger.63 There were 
also reports of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Turkey assisting 
Pak nuclear activities.64
Be that as it may, the Pakistani professions of commitment 
to peaceful uses of nuclear technology started sounding 
rather hollow following a series of incidents in the 80s. In 
1984, Nazir Vaid, a Pakistani national was caught trying to 
smuggle 50 electronic switches out of the U.S which could be 
used for detonating nuclear bombs and was deported.65 At 
about the same time, Pakistan tried to purchase high-speed
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industrial cameras from the West which could be used for 
designing the conventional explosive trigger of a nuclear 
bomb.66 Again in July 1987, one Arshad Pervez was arrested 
in Philadelphia on charges of trying to smuggle Garaging* 
steel to Pakistan which could be used in the rotors of 
centrifuges.67
In an interview with an Indian journalist Kuldip Nayar in 
early 1987, Dr. Khan confirmed that Pakistan did possess 
nuclear capability.68 "What the CIA has been saying about 
our possessing the bomb is correct and so is the speculation 
of some foreign newspapers". 69 More importantly, Dr. Khan 
was quite outspoken about the implications of Pak bomb for 
India. "Nobody can undo Pakistan or take us for granted. We 
are here to stay and let it be clear that we shall use the
bomb if our existence is threatened". He went on to add, "I
personally think that the only way to stop nuclear warfare 
between us (India and Pakistan) is to come to an agreement". 
70Hinting at the futility of any Indian attack on Kahuta, 
Dr. Khan asserted, "India knows what price it would have to
pay for attacking Kahuta. In any case, the plant is well
protected and we have not put our eggs in one basket".71 
Though Dr. Khan vehemently denied giving the interview 
later, the timing of the interview was of utmost sig­
nificance. The Pakistanis knew that the real worth of 
nuclear weapons was their "deterrence value" not their "use 
value". The interview came at a time when the Indian army
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was conducting a massive military exercise called "Operation 
Brasstacks" close to the Pak border and there was persistent 
speculation of a preemptive strike on Kahuta either by India 
alone or in collaboration with Israel. It was also probably 
a hint to the Americans not to link the nuclear issue with 
the American aid package to Pakistan by presenting the 
Americans with a nuclear fait accompli.
Now let us examine India's possible response to the Pakis­
tani bomb in the context of India's own nuclear policies and 
ambitions. It is obvious that India sees in technology the 
means to achieve economic progress and military might which 
would revive India's political fortune and enable it to deal 
with the developed countries on equal terms and possibly 
from a position of strength.
Nehru was acutely conscious of this when he observed in 
1948, "Consider the past four hundred years of history, the 
world developed a new source of power, that is steam—  the 
steam engine and the like—  and the Industrial age came in. 
India with all her many virtues did not develop that source 
of power. It became a backward country in that sense; it 
became a slave country because of that ....now we are facing 
the atomic age; we are on the verge of it.... if we are to 
remain abreast in the world as a nation which keeps ahead of 
things, we must develop this atomic energy..."72
Nehru was also aware of India's potential strength and 
hence it was all the more important for her to take the lead
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in science and technology. "If we do not set about it now, 
taking advantage of the processes that go towards the making 
of atomic energy.. .we will be left behind... .That is not 
good enough for any country, least of all to a country with 
the vast potential and strength that India possesses."73 
It goes without saying that India's nuclear space 
programmes are amongst the most sophisticated, advanced and 
comprehensive in the world and are designed to and capable 
of meeting India's civilian and military needs 
simultaneously.74
In view of India's nuclear capabilities as demonstrated by 
the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) at Pokhran in 1974 and 
the simultaneous development of Rocket technology which 
would provide India, it it so desired with the required 
delivery systems, the inevitable question that arises is 
whether India would exercise its nuclear option and cross 
the nuclear threshold or would it persist with its current 
policy of voluntary nuclear abstention.
In trying to answer this question, first we must examine 
the basic attitude of India's political leadership to the 
issue of application and adaptation of science for military 
purposes. From the very beginning, the Indian leaders have 
not been either innocent of or averse to the idea of 
military applications of science. Nehru made this quite 
clear as far back as 194 6. "As long as the world is con­
stituted as it is, every country will have to devise and use
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the latest scientific devices for its protection. I have no 
doubt India will develop her scientific researches and I 
hope Indian scientists will use the atomic force for con­
structive purposes. But if India is threatened she will in­
evitably try to defend herself by all means at her 
disposal."75
He, more or less, reiterated this position while par­
ticipating in the Constituent Assembly Debates in 1948: 
"Indeed, I think we must develop it [nuclear technology] for 
peaceful purposes.... of course, if we are compelled as a na­
tion to use it for other purposes, possibly no pious senti­
ments of any of us will stop the nation from using it that 
way."76 Thus the Indian leaders, since independence, despite 
their pacifist and peaceful professions, have been aware of 
the military potential of scientific knowledge and had no 
qualms about making use of it if the situation demanded it. 
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It must also be borne in mind that India's nuclear 
development, in general terms, has been independent of 
China's or much later of Pakistan's nuclear threat. India's 
guest for nuclear technology began, in right earnest, in 
1948 when neither China nor Pakistan were factors in India's 
nuclear calculations. Moreover, India has had serious dis­
agreements with the super powers on the question of in­
stituting international controls on the nuclear programmes 
of developing countries. "India...viewed international con­
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trols in atomic energy as downright dangerous and dis­
criminatory, and as a form of economic and technological 
colonialism."78
Thus, India*s nuclear outlook has been that of a potential 
great power which is capable of and determined to follow an 
independent path in terms of its own national interests and 
perceptions in defiance of objections from other great 
powers. While China and Pakistan continue to influence 
India's nuclear policy, they have never been fundamental to 
it, though they could serve as convenient excuses when India 
decides to go nuclear.
It must also be noted that Indian nuclear and space 
programmes are unlikely to be inhibited by the economic 
costs involved. They have wide-ranging economic and 
civilian applications which tend to defray the costs in the 
long run by contributing to the overall development of the 
nation. India can also make its nuclear and space 
programmes cost-effective by entering the international 
market for construction of nuclear plants or satellites for 
civilian purposes or by providing launching facilities par­
ticularly for Third World countries.
Secondly, the probable answer to this question must also 
be discussed in the context of the two major objectives that 
underlie and govern all of India's foreign policy endeavours 
namely the attainment of great power status and the security 
of the nation.
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As we have already seen, it has been India's endeavour 
since independence to emerge as an independent and 
autonomous centre of power, an objective which it pursued 
with tenacity and relentlessness despite occasional setbacks 
and pitfalls. "The fact is that there has been a consis­
tency in India's policies of national centralization and 
unification since independence, as well as a foreign policy 
that has been global in its objectives. Criticism from out­
siders has not deflected India from its recognition of it­
self as a major nation that has achieved great power 
status."79
"Indeed, the most precious element in the concept of non- 
alignment has been the instinctive affirmation of India's 
will to be genuinely independent and a source of influence 
in her own right. If this is the role that India wills to 
play, it is inevitable that she must strive to posses suffi­
cient defensive military power, including limited nuclear 
capability, so that her image is not blurred by her vul­
nerability. It may sound strange to some, but it is true 
that limited nuclear armament has now become an inescapable 
requirement for the preservation of our real independence 
which constitutes the core of our non-alignment.80
This leads us to the crucial and related question of 
security which has been a dominant theme of India's external 
posture ever since independence. Simply put, the question is 
can India remain non-aligned and non-nuclear and still cope
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with the security threat? The answer, at least, in the 
long-run seems to be an emphatic no.
Let us now consider the options that are open to India if 
it chooses to remain non-nuclear. First, India can abandon 
its non-alignment and seek nuclear guarantees from the super 
power of its choice. Given India's experience in the matter 
in the 60s, this is easier said than done. Moreover, 
nuclear guarantees obtained even after a formal alignment 
have not been considered particularly effective or reliable 
by the Indians. To quote Mrs. Gandhi, "In the final 
analysis... the effectiveness of a nuclear shield would 
depend not on the spirit in which protected powers accepted 
it, but on the vital and national interests of the giver". 
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Abandonment of non-alignment, may also prove to be too 
high a price for such unreliable nuclear guarantees. As we 
have already seen, nonalignment is fundamental to India's 
foreign policy. It is both a strategy and an outlook. It 
is the essence of India's existence and continuance as an 
independent and autonomous entity and its abandonment would 
simply mean that India could not and would not go it alone.
Giving up nonalignment may also have serious internal 
repercussions for India. The internal stimulus for non- 
alignment is much more important than the external one. 
This explains the survival and strengthening of nonalignment 
despite an abatement in the cold war. The delicate internal
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balance which has been so assiduously built over the years 
on foreign policy issues in India may disappear giving room 
for significant internal bickering and strife which India 
can certainly do without.
If an aligned India is unlikely to get credible nuclear 
guarantees, there is little reason to believe that a non- 
aligned India would be able to do so. Hence, the logic of 
nonalignment inevitably leads India on the path of the 
development of nuclear weapons. If India were to achieve a 
credible nuclear deterrent, it would only strengthen and 
give substance and credence to its nonalignment. No credible 
nuclear umbrella would be provided to a nonaligned India. 
Nor could India's misgivings about being provided a credible 
nuclear shield even after alignment can be brushed aside 
lightly. Thus, alignment and development of nuclear weapons 
appear, at least, in the long-run to be mutually exclusive 
options for India. As Mrs. Gandhi made it clear in 1967, "We 
for our part may find ourselves having to take a nuclear 
decision at any moment and it is therefore not possible for 
us to tie our hands".82
In other words, "In a wider framework, India's national role 
conceptions are those of a big state. They seek symbolic, 
universalist, and pragmatic gains. The search for indepen­
dent political and military power is an inevitable con­
comitant of such societal self-images".83
While India has been justifiably concerned about
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Pakistan's nuclear programme, it is difficult for India to 
be self-righteous about it. India can not deny to Pakistan 
what it claims to be within its own right to pursue.
However, nuclear proliferation in South Asia might have 
serious implications to regional and even global security. 
It can undermine confidence in the nonproliferation regime 
and the will of the nuclear powers to maintain it. Given the 
strategic linkage between South Asia and the Middle East, it 
can suck in certain Middle Eastern states, particularly Is­
rael in to the equation with unpredictable consequences. Al­
ternatively, "The competition between Pakistan and India for 
political and economic advantages in the Middle East ... 
creates powerful albeit shortsighted temptations to use 
nuclear leverage in more substantial ways".84
Nevertheless, at the subcontinental level, given the 
necessary political wisdom and will, India and Pakistan 
could come to some sort of modus vivendi which would spare 
the region of many apocalyptic predictions that have been 
made in relation to possible nuclear holocaust in the 
region. Possession of nuclear weapons by both India and 
Pakistan could eliminate both conventional and nuclear con­
flict between the two countries and initiate a process of 
negotiation as the only feasible way of settling bilateral 
disputes. The recent agreement between the two countries not 
to attack each other's nuclear installations is a step in 
that direction.
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Nevertheless, the only practical way in which India can 
counter the threat of an "Islamic bomb", apart from keeping 
its own powder dry is to cultivate the Israeli option. Indo- 
Israeli interests converge in this crucial aspect and there 
is an urgent need for Indian policy makers to make Israel an 
integral part of their security thinking in relation to the 
Middle East.
ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM
Another major security concern of India in the 70s in rela­
tion to the Middle East was the growing tide of Islamic fun- 
damentalism85 in the region. India was always wary of Is­
lamic groupings in the region and opposed them consistently 
and firmly ever since independence. However, the rise of 
Saudi Arabia as an economic super power in the region and 
the Islamic revolution in Iran towards the end of 70s posed 
more of an ideological rather than a political threat to 
many countries including India.86
In the case of India, the threat is of considerable impor­
tance in the context of India's troubled secular polity, a 
large and vocal Muslim minority, the existence of an 
unfriendly and avowedly Islamic Pakistan and India's own 
delicate but substantial relations with the Muslim Middle 
East. In analysing this issue, we would strictly confine
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ourselves to the nature of the threat that Islamic fundamen­
talism poses to India and a critical appraisal of the ways 
and means that the Indian leadership adopted to deal with 
it.
"One of the cardinal tenets of Islamic Fundamentalism is to 
protect the purity of Islamic precepts from the adulteration 
of speculative exercises. Related to fundamentalism is Is­
lamic revival or resurgence, a renewed interest in Islam". 
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However, in a multi-religious country like India which has 
been undergoing a sustained process of modernization since 
independence, any religious revivalism and orthodoxy could 
create serious problems and come in the way of political in­
tegration of various religious communities for national pur­
poses .
Ever since independence, the policies and strategies adopted 
by the Indian political leadership to integrate the 
religious minorities, particularly Muslims, into the na­
tional mainstream have been rather half-hearted and diffi­
dent. The Pakistani factor and Hindu sensitivities to the 
Muslim Middle East in relation to the Indian Muslim minority 
put the Indian leadership on the defensive from the begin­
ning.
The external props that the Indian National Congress 
resorted to in order to persuade the Muslims to join the na­
tional political mainstream before independence spilled over
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in to the post-independence period was totally unnecessary 
and proved to be counterproductive in the long-run. The 
INC * s support to anachronistic issues like Khilafat, 
frequent appeals to anti-imperial solidarity and vociferous 
demands for justice to Palestinians did touch a respondent 
chord among Indian Muslims.
But these were grossly inadequate to induce Indian Muslims 
to join the national mainstream because they did not address 
the most fundamental issue that was exercising the Muslim 
community in India i.e. the political status of Indian Mus­
lims in India after the British departure. It was the INC's 
failure, whatever the reasons, to solve this basic problem 
that eventually led to the partition of India.
There is some justification for the INC to to resort to 
these external and artificial props in desperation in the 
face of an active divide and rule policy of the British and 
the veto they exercised over granting independence to India 
on the ground of keeping communal peace. However, the 
failure of such policies before independence and the depar­
ture of the British from India should have alerted the In­
dian political leadership to the irrelevance and un- 
tenability of such policies after India's independence. But 
that was not to be.
Nehru not only considered secularism as fundamental to 
India's survival as one nation but also described it as his 
greatest contribution to independent India. Nevertheless,
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Nehru failed to approach the issue head-on and left the job 
only half-done. The most striking failure of Nehru, in this 
sphere, was his reluctance and eventual failure to enact a 
common civil code for the entire country without which no 
country can realistically claim to have laid a sound basis 
for a secular society.
Admittedly, Nehru did have his reasons for not doing so. He 
was worried about the impact of such a measure on the Indian 
Muslim community which was experiencing a sense of 
psychological insecurity following partition and the com­
munal violence that accompanied it. Nehru was also concerned 
that any attempt at domestic reform in relation the Muslims 
might give the conservative elements in the community an op­
portunity and a pretext to raise the slogan of Islam being 
in danger. Besides, he felt that "The fate of India is 
largely tied up with the Hindu outlook. If the present Hindu 
outlook does not change radically, I am quite sure that In­
dia is doomed. The Muslim outlook may be and, I think, is 
often worse. But it does not make very much difference to 
the future of India”.88
But in the event, Nehru was wrong and the Muslim outlook did 
make a difference. It gave the conservative elements among 
Hindus a potent and plausible argument to accuse Nehru of 
double standards and of pampering the Muslim minority. There 
were demands that Hindu personal law should also be left un­
touched by the government. The fact that no other religious
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minority except the Muslims were given such a privilege made 
matters worse and there were accusations of appeasement. It 
also created the impression that Muslims were opposing and 
avoiding the family planning programme so vital to the 
nation*s progress on religious grounds and hence their 
loyalty to the country was suspect. This, in turn, enabled 
the extremist elements among the Hindus to argue that Mus­
lims would outnumber Hindus in due course in India and hence 
the latter should also oppose family planning.
As Dr. S. Gopal points out, "Paradoxically, in his efforts 
to make the Muslims feel at home in India, Nehru declined to 
enact a common civil code and insist on monogamy and rights 
of divorce, property and inheritance for all Indians of 
whatever faith. Nehru prided himself on what he had done for 
the emancipation of women, which was to him the test of a 
civilization; but he had to reconcile himself to the denial 
of equality, proclaimed by the constitution, to Muslim 
women. In the interests of unity and integration, this 
aspect of the social revolution, on which Nehru laid great 
store, was deliberately held back from completion”.89 
It is difficult to agree with Dr. Gopal, at least in 
retrospect, that Nehru's lack of decisiveness in this regard 
was in the "interests of unity and integration". If any­
thing, it had just the opposite efffect. Nehru had the stat­
ure, appeal and the necessary trust among people, both Hin­
dus and Muslims, to have pushed through such legislation. If
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he could not do it, it is unfair to expect any of his suc­
cessors to even touch it. Hence, a reform which Nehru him­
self considered to be of utmost importance was put more or 
less permanently in cold storage.
What was worse was the fact that the lesser and less 
scrupulous leaders that followed Nehru made the issue a 
political football to be kicked around for short-term elec­
toral gains. Sending an official delegation to the Islamic 
Conference in Rabat in 1969 and parading India as the third 
or fourth largest Muslim country in the world were the 
results of such attitude. As B.G. Verghese so aptly pointed 
out "the tragedy is that while secularism means modernity, 
in regard to Indian Muslims the concept of secularism has 
been retrogade, tradition-bound, even superstitious".90 
Moreover, in the 70s serious compromises were made in rela­
tion to India's secular credentials for short term electoral 
gains. The government's inability or unwillingness to deal 
with the real problems facing the Muslim community in India 
such as economic and educational backwardness and unemploy­
ment and the cosmetic and almost comical measures it 
resorted to (like more Urdu teachers, more news print for 
Urdu newspapers more Qawalis on radio and TV) to curry their 
favour would be of no avail in the long run.91 
On the eve of the general elections in December 1979, there 
were a series of dinners hosted by the ambassadors of Saudi 
Arabia, Libya and other Arab countries in honour of Mrs.
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Gandhi which could not dismissed as coincidental. It is pos­
sible that either Mrs. Gandhi was trying to project her 
image and that of her party in a favourable light to the In­
dian Muslims or the Arab diplomats themselves were im­
plicitly suggesting to the Muslim voters in India that they 
favour Mrs. Gandhi for the leadership of the country.
The editorial in one of the leading newspapers accurately 
portrayed the implications of these "political dinners". 
"The Muslim community, as one of our numerically and politi­
cally important minorities, deserves not only a fair but a 
generous deal, but any such arrangement arrived at with the 
patronage or support of a foreign government would be in­
tolerable. It would be bad for the foreign government con­
cerned and worse for the Muslim community in India and the 
local political leaders who promote or encourage such 
liaison in the name of building international bridges. The 
impact on members of the majority community of efforts to 
build an Islamic brotherhood across the oceans basically to 
gain a few million votes ... can prove to be disastrous".92 
There was also the case of conversion of Harijans to Islam 
in the village of Meenakshipuram in Tamil Nadu in the late 
70s reportedly with Middle Eastern money which caused con­
siderable communal tension in the country. The report of the 
Intelligence Bureau regarding the conversions was quite dis­
turbing. It said: "The proselytising effort of the Muslim
organizations and institutions has received a fillip because
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of the inflow of money from the Gulf region, Saudi Arabia 
and other Muslim countries and the Pan-Islamic Agencies. 
Promises of jobs and scholarships in the Muslim countries 
and deputation of some of the more promising of the converts 
to places like Madina University for higher religious learn­
ing are being made. As an atmosphere favourable for conver­
sions is created ... it is likely to attract more and more 
attention of the Muslim countries and foreign Islamic 
organizations".93
However, even such a potentially explosive issue was used 
for narrow political gains without any regard for its long­
term implications. The then Chief Minister of Kerala, Mr. K. 
Karunakaran allowed two "black-listed" visitors from Kuwait, 
Hashim-al-Rifai and Yakub-al-Rifai to visit Kerala in 
January 1986 to keep his Muslim League partners in good 
humour despite the fact that their entry in to India was 
banned by the Home Ministry. Hashim-al-Rifai was the Chair­
man of the World Muslim Minority Community, an international 
Muslim organization. It was this organization that reported 
to have provided huge sums of money for the conversion of 
Harijans to Islam in Meenakshipuram.94
The only real threat that Islamic Fundamentalism poses to 
India is that it could delay the integration of the Muslim 
community with the rest of the population for national pur­
poses. It is a threat to the extent that it "distorts" and 
"disorients" the Indian Muslims.95 However, the Islamic
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fundamentalists in India work on the "periphery” of the Mus­
lim community in India, not from its "core”.96 
To sum up, while Islamic fundamentalism is "not a major 
concern”, it is "always at the back of our mind”. 97 
Nevertheless, the best way to counter it is to address the 
real and material problems of the Muslims in order that they 
would be, psychologically and materially, in a position to 
resist fundamentalist appeals. The propensity for soft op­
tions and short-term gains of successive governments made 
India "more Islamic, in a very narrow way, than most Muslim 
countries".98
The Shah Banu controversy is a case in point.99 According to 
Vasant Sathe, an erstwhile Cabinet Minister in Rajiv 
Gandhi's Government, the reversal of the Supreme Court 
judgement made Rajiv's government lose credibility with both 
Hindus and Muslims. As he frankly stated "We ourselves are 
responsible for giving credence to this communal feeling be­
cause, in the name of secularism, we ourselves were not 
secular. In the name of pragmatism, the government had suc­
cumbed to fundamentalists".100 What is needed is a bold and 
imaginative policy which emphasises long-term gains as op­
posed to short-term electoral benefits.
THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN
The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 con­
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stitutes a watershed in India's security perceptions in 
relation to the Middle East. In fact, it crytallised and ag­
gravated most of the security concerns that India has had in 
relation to the region in the 70s. As a consequence of the 
Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan, "the traditional 
strategic divide in South Asia- between Pakistan and India- 
was now meshed with the Soviet-U.S. divide in the Persian 
Gulf, the Indian Ocean, and indeed in the global arena".101 
It heralded a "new cold war" between the two superpowers 
with all the attendant implications for India's security. 
President Carter made it very clear that "Any attempt by any 
outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region 
will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the 
United States of America, and such an assault will be 
repelled by any means necessary, including military force". 
102And the Carter Doctrine was born. The Carter administra­
tion went on to develop the concept of a "regional security 
framework" for Southwest Asia which envisaged a massive U.S. 
naval and military build-up in the Indian Ocean including 
Diego Garcia and some of the littoral states like Egypt, 
Oman, Kenya and Somalia.103
It was clear that "the developments of 1980 marked a major 
threshold in the evolution of U.S. strategy in the region. 
Not only was the U.S. military presence at its highest level 
in history but there was also an underlying conviction that 
this region represented a major strategic zone of U.S. vital
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interests, demanding both sustained attention at the highest 
levels of U.S. policy making and direct U.S. engagement in 
support of specifically U.S. interests”.104
More importantly for India, Pakistan became a ”front line" 
state and once again a key member in the U.S. military 
strategy in containing further Soviet inroads into the 
region. In fact, Pak-U.S. relations were at a low ebb fol­
lowing the overthrow and hanging of Bhutto by his army Chief 
Zia ul Haq, the seizure of Grand Mosque in Mecca by Muslim 
fanatics which resulted in the burning down of American Em­
bassy in Islamabad and the U.S. concern about Pakistani ef­
forts to acquire nuclear capability which led to the ter­
mination of all U.S. military and economic aid to Pakistan 
in April 1979. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, 
however, changed all this. A two-year $ 400 million package 
of aid was proposed by the Carter administration to Pakistan 
which was turned down by Zia as "peanuts". Nevertheless, ne­
gotiations continued between the two countries for Pakistan 
knew only too well that it was the only possible conduit of 
Western arms to the Afghan resistance after the fall of the 
Shah of Iran.
When Ronald Reagan took over as President in January 1981, 
he showed much less concern and sensitivity to Indian mis­
givings in relation to the proposed U.S. military aid to 
Pakistan than Carter did. Pakistan became a part of American 
"strategic consensus" vis-a-vis the USSR and in return the
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Reagan administration announced a package of $ 3.2 billion 
in economic and military aid to Pakistan over a six-year 
period including the sale of 40 F-16 aircraft. Besides, the 
Reagan administration virtually turned a blind eye to the 
Pakistani nuclear ambitions in order to forge a strategic 
alliance against the USSR when the Congress waived the 
provisions of the Symington Amendment to the Foreign Assis­
tance Act which would have prohibited such aid in the ab­
sence of progress on nonproliferation.
Another disturbing development, as far as India was con­
cerned, was the intimate links, particularly in the security 
sphere, that Pakistan managed to establish with the Gulf 
states after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Pak-Saudi 
military ties have already been discussed in some detail. 
Pakistan also managed to establish a military foothold in 
other Gulf states like Kuwait, the UAE and Oman. The Gulf 
states, including Saudi Arabia, given their meagre manpower 
resources, would be in no position to intervene directly in 
any Indo-Pak war. However, the substantial financial 
resources that these states command and the availability of 
compatible U.S. supplied war material in these countries as 
well as Pakistan could make the costs prohibitively high for 
India in any future war with Pakistan.105
India was also extremely concerned about the spread of Is­
lamic fundamentalism as a consequence of Soviet occupation 
of Afghanistan. The Western trumpeting of the struggle be­
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tween the Afghan resistance and the Soviet occupation forces 
as a "jihad" for short term gains and the close involvement 
of avowedly Islamic regimes like Saudi Arabia, Iran and 
Pakistan in it, India feared, could boomerang badly with 
serious implications for the whole region. Hence, "The pos­
sibility that an extremist Islamic government could take 
over in Kabul continues to excite very real Indian anxiety". 
106
There is very little doubt that India's rather subdued reac­
tion to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan caused con­
siderable consternation and disquiet in the Islamic world 
and "isolated India from the conservative Islamic countries 
of Southwest Asia".107 These countries were already suspi­
cious of India's treaty with the USSR and India's close 
political and economic ties with Iraq which had a similar 
treaty relationship with the Soviet Union. India's apparent 
acquiescence if not approval of the Soviet occupation of Af- 
ghanistanlOS gave further credence to the charge that India 
was acting as USSR's cat's paw in the region.
India's stand on Afghanistan also made its position in the 
Nonaligned movement rather uncomfortable and awkward. While 
India's treaty with the USSR diluted her Nonaligned creden­
tials considerably, India's perceived acquiescence to the 
Soviet occupation of a Nonaligned Afghanistan made matters 
worse.
Most importantly, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan
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struck a mortal blow to India's newly acquired and somewhat 
grudgingly acknowledged status as a regional power. The 
Soviet action posed "an unprecedented threat to India's 
hard-earned status as South Asia's regional power, disman­
tling the favorable balance of regional power in South Asia 
that India had been able to bring about with its victory 
over Pakistan in the Bangladesh war in 1971, and the South 
Asian security regime erected on that balance".109 It 
provided Pakistan with an opportunity to taunt India's in­
ability to do anything about regional security in relation 
to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan despite India's self- 
proclaimed role as a dominant power in South Asia. It ap­
peared as though India was over-anxious about her regional 
status without any stomach for corresponding respon­
sibilities.
To sum up, India's threat perceptions in relation to the 
Middle East seem to exaggerate the importance of Islam in 
forging military alliances. However, the reality has been 
otherwise. Pakistan's increasing military links with Middle 
Eastern states in the 70s and 80s were, unlike before, based 
on mutuality of interests and as such tend to be more more 
enduring. Consequently, India need to evolve realistic and 
imaginative policies to counter these threats effectively. 
India's traditional policy of supporting Arab causes in 
general and the Palestinian cause in particular is no longer 
adequate to counter the new and serious threats that could
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emanate from the region in the changed circumstances of the 
70s and 80s. For instance, neither India's pro-Arab stance 
nor consistent support to the Palestinian cause dissuaded 
Saudi Arabia from elevating its political and military 
relationship with Pakistan to new heights, in spite of In­
dian protests, in the late 70s and 80s following the Islamic 
revolution in Iran and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. 
Nor does it appear that any of the Middle Eastern states 
share India's concern and anxiety about Pakistan's nuclear 
ambitions and this stance is unlikely to change no matter 
how strongly India supports the Arab causes.
Pak-Saudi security links and Pakistan's increasing role as a 
provider of security services including direct presence in 
the Gulf Sheikhdoms has to be watched closely by India. The 
possible nuclearization of Pakistan could have serious im­
plications for the Middle East and rule out any soft op­
tions for India in this regard. Should such development lead 
to a nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan, there is 
every possibility that Middle Eastern countries could get 
sucked in to it in more than one way. Pakistan, given her 
limited resources, might be forced to depend more and more 
on the oil-rich countries of the Middle East to sustain such 
costly arms race with India. This may result in Pakistan 
playing a more direct and decisive role as a security 
provider in the region which could not but cause concern to 
India. Alternatively, it may place Pakistan under con­
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siderable obligation and even pressure to transfer nuclear 
technology to any of the Muslim countries of the Middle 
East. Any such eventuality would invariably drag Israel into 
the picture. ”The potential thus exists ... for some quite 
dramatic fusions of South Asian and Middle Eastern security 
interests as a result of developments in the nuclear arms 
race between India and Pakistan”.110
Given the seriousness and probability of these developments, 
India needs to take a bold and pragmatic view of the chang­
ing security scenario in relation to the Middle East. There 
seem to be only two dependable and realistic ways of dealing 
with the situation. One is to develop bilateral relations 
with the Middle Eastern states on mutuality of interests in 
order to discourage them, to the extent possible, from 
moving too close to Pakistan either politically or 
militarily. The second is to gradually upgrade India*s rela­
tions with Israel, particularly in the security sphere where 
the interests of India and Israel seem to coincide, in order 
to demonstrate to the Middle Eastern states that India was 
not devoid of options in the region and it would make use of 
them if forced to do so.
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CHAPTER 5
INDIA'S ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
India's economic interaction with the Middle East has always been 
a factor in the calculations of Indian policy makers ever since 
independence. However, in this chapter, we would concentrate on 
India's economic relations with the region since the oil boom in 
the mid-70s. In doing so, an attempt would be made to evaluate 
the relative importance of economic factors vis-a-vis India's 
politico-strategic interests in the region. It would be argued 
that despite the substantial increase in India's economic stake 
in the region, India has more enduring political and security in­
terests in the Middle East. While trying to put India's economic 
interests in the region in perspective, an attempt will be made 
to quantify India's economic dealings with the region and their 
importance in India's overall economic goals and strategies.
It is pertinent, at this stage, to make some general observations 
in relation to India's foreign economic policy before we proceed 
to deal with India's economic interaction with the Middle East in 
specific sectors. India is a large country with a huge population 
and fairly well-endowed with a variety of natural resources. As 
such, one need not overemphasise the importance of domestic 
market in India's plans for national development. "While there 
can be variations of emphasis, the centrality of the domestic 
market in India's developmental strategy cannot be denied. A con-
296
tinental economy of India’s size has no structural compulsions to 
pursue a path of export-dominated growth, let alone export led 
growth. If it must still push its exports, it is because exports 
help pay for those critical inputs which are so necessary to 
build a national economy. In other words, exports are a means, 
not an end in themselves".1
Secondly, India (or anyone else for that matter) neither an­
ticipated the oil bonanza nor was it ready to take full advantage 
of it. It was, more or less an accident which caught India nap­
ping in an economic sense. In the short-run, it only served to 
expose the limitations and obsolescence of India's industrial 
structure.
Thirdly and lastly, self-sufficiency has been a central and long­
standing goal of India's economic planning and development. As 
such, we need to examine India's economic ties with the Middle 
East in the light of this important objective of India's national 
endeavour.
Trade
India's trade with the Middle Eastern countries since the oil 
boom, though has gone up considerably in absolute terms, its 
share in the total imports of these countries has been remarkably 
small. Since the Indian businessmen enjoyed a large and well- 
protected domestic market, they hardly ever felt the urge or the 
need to export to the rest of the world on highly competitive
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terms. As one World Bank official put it, "From the very begin­
ning, the attitude of accepting exports as an integral part of 
policy has been missing in India" .2 So when the oil boom came 
in the mid-70s, India neither anticipated it nor was it ready for 
it.
Consequently, India failed to take full advantage of the buying 
spree that the oil rich Middle Eastern countries indulged in fol­
lowing the accumulation of petrodollars. A glance at Table 1 
would make this crystal clear. In 1955, when the combined imports 
of the Middle Eastern countries totalled about $ 1.4 billion, 
India's exports to these countries amounted to $ 45 million - a 
mere 3.3 per cent of the total. In 1975, when the imports of 
these countries were valued at $ 27 billion, India's share of it 
was $ 694 million and its share in the total imports fell to 2.6 
per cent. The decade after 1975, a period of phenomenal increase 
in the Middle Eastern imports from the rest of the world, India's 
share in it further declined to just 1 per cent.
Despite India's geographical proximity and age-old cultural and 
commercial ties with the region, India failed to penetrate the 
Middle Eastern markets to the extent it could have. The reasons 
for India's rather lack-lustre performance are many. The major 
reasons, however, are the inability of Indian exporters to ensure 
quality and delivery schedules at competitive prices. Poor pack­
ing is often mentioned as another factor. Besides, it has also 
been a matter of concern to the Indian Government that most of 
India's exports to the region continue to be perishable goods and
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consumer items rather than engineering goods and durables that it 
would like to sell in larger quantities.3
LABOUR
India1s labour exports to the Middle East have been substantial 
ever since the mid-70s. Table 2 depicts the steady increase in 
the annual labour outflows to the region from India which reached 
a peak in the mid-80s. Table 3, on the other hand, provides an 
estimate of the Indian migrant population in the Middle East be­
tween 1975 and 1987 when it reached its peak of about a million. 
However, "two important characteristics" distinguish the migra­
tion of Indians to the Middle East compared to the earlier 
migrants from India. Firstly, most of these migrants are at the 
"lower end of the spectrum of skills as also of incomes" whether 
in India before their departure or in their work place in the 
Middle East. Table 4 underlines this point in no uncertain terms. 
Secondly, an overwhelming proportion of these migrants are 
"temporary migrants" who would return to India after a definite 
period of work overseas, often not more than two years.4 
Given the fact that the Indian economy has always had a large 
labour surplus and also the temporary nature of migration to the 
Middle East, the impact of the Middle Eastern migration on 
unemployment in India at a macro level is almost negligible. 
Moreover, it looks as though India's manpower exports to the 
Middle East have already reached a plateau. India has also been
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encountering stiff competition from other labour exporting 
countries like South Korea, Thailand, Sri Lanka and Philippines.
REMITTANCES
Closely related to India's labour outflows to the Middle East is 
the remittances that the Indian migrant labour has been sending 
home ever since the oil boom in the Middle East. Table 5 details 
the estimated composition of remittances to India from various 
sources between 1974 and 1985. It is obvious from the above Table 
that from a modest figure of Rs. 259 million and about 11 % of 
the total remittances in 1974-75, the Middle Eastern component of 
India's overseas remittances has increased dramatically there­
after and constituted more than 50 % ever since 1977-78.
It goes without saying that the Middle Eastern remittances con­
stituted an important source of foreign exchange earnings for In­
dia in the late 70s and 80s. It played a considerable role in 
easing India's Balance of Payments situation and enabled it to 
enjoy a fairly large Foreign Exchange Reserves for considerable 
length of time.
However, it must be noted that the gross inflow of remittances 
constituted just 1.5 per cent of India's Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) in the mid-80s when the remittances were at their peak.5 
In the words of an Indian scholar, the Middle Eastern remittances 
had little more than a "cushioning effect" on India's Balance of 
Payments situation.6 Besides, the remittances from the Middle
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East constituted not only the money remitted to support families 
while abroad but also "once-and-for-all repatriation of savings 
on return home” in view of the temporary nature of emigration to 
that region. This is one of the principal reasons for the huge 
remittances from the region during the period under considera­
tion. It must also be borne in mind that greater part of India's 
Middle Eastern remittances were used up to pay for the oil im­
ports from the Middle East. There are also people who are worried 
about the impact of the Middle Eastern remittances on Indian 
economy in the long run."Some disturbing trends are discernible 
which will have a more lasting impact on the (Indian) economy and 
on society than the crucial but temporary relief provided by this 
money in meeting the country's external payments obligations".?
OIL
India's dependency on the oil imports from the Middle Eastern 
countries constitutes an important segment of India's relations 
with the region. Tables 6, 7, and 8 depict India's country-wise 
import of crude oil from 1971-72 to 1985-86. As Table 6 indi­
cates, India imported its crude oil requirements from 1971-72 to 
1976-77 from five Middle Eastern countries, namely Iran, Iraq, 
Saudi Arabia, U.A.E. and Egypt. But as Tables 7 and 8 
demonstrate, India thought it wise to diversify its oil imports 
from 1977-78 onwards for economic as well as political reasons. 
India's oil imports thereafter not only spread among more than a
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dozen countries but also one/third of them were non-Middle East­
ern countries.
India also, during the same period, made a vigorous and fairly 
successful effort to reduce its dependency on Middle Eastern oil 
both for economic and political reasons. Table 9 India's crude 
oil production between 1979-80 to 1986-87. Crude oil production 
in the seventies (1970-71 to 1980-81) had increased by 55 per 
cent, from 6.8 million tonnes to 10.51 million tonnes. In the 
next two years, output doubled to 21.1 million tonnes. A further 
24 per cent increase was achieved in 1983-84 and production 
reached 2 6.0 million tonnes.8
During 1984-85, crude oil production increased by 11.4 per cent 
to 29.00 million tonnes. As a result of increased production of 
oil, the level of self-reliance in oil improved to about 70 per 
cent during 1980-85.9
It should also be remembered that India has never had a problem 
in relation to oil supplies as such. Even during the two Indo-Pak 
wars in 1965 and 1971 when the political support of the Middle 
Eastern countries to Pakistan was considerable, the oil supplies 
to India were never interrupted. India's basic problem was the 
high price of oil and the fact that it had to pay for it in hard 
currency. However, the Middle Eastern countries made it very 
clear from the very beginning that they was no question of a dual 
price system for oil, one for the developing countries and one 
for the rest. Hence, the future price of oil will always be 
determined by the market forces and India's political support to
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the Arab causes would have no impact on it.
LOANS AND AID
It also instructing to see as to what extent India benefited from 
the Middle Eastern oil bonanza in terms of loans and aid. Table 
10 makes it very clear that India's traditionally good relations 
with the Middle East did not cut much ice with the oil rich
countries of the region so far as providing loans to India was
concerned. As the above Table clearly illustrates, the Middle 
Eastern component of the total authorised loans that India has 
been able to obtain between 1974-79 to 1985-86 has never exceeded 
5 per cent and as such is not very significant.
As far as aid is concerned, India has not been able to obtain a 
single dinar in the form of a grant as of 1986.10
CIVIL CONSTRUCTION AND INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS
As Table 11 makes it clear, India was one of the principal 
beneficiaries in relation to civil engineering and construction 
projects in the Middle East. India, enjoyed a natural advantage 
over her rivals in this area because of cheap labour and
proximity of the region. However, the same can not be said of
India's industrial projects in the region as Table 12 indicates. 
India's participation in the industrial projects in the region 
has been rather uneven and the demand also seems to be tapering
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off a bit.
Although India did make considerable gains from the tremendous 
upsurge in the purchasing power of oil exporting countries in the 
Middle East following the steep rise in the price of oil in the 
mid-70s, "it was more in the nature of a spill-over than anything 
else. It was not the outcome of any concerted effort. Looking at 
these gains, it is generally lamented that India missed an 
opportunity".11
Moreover, there is a need to appreciate the serious limitations, 
international as well as domestic, within which India had to 
respond to and take advantage of the Middle Eastern markets. In 
the international context, "it is not sufficiently recognised 
that the Arab Gulf market is, in its present orientation at any 
rate, closer to the Western market, whether in the matter of 
skills, technology, finance, or commerce. The entire industrial 
edifice is built on Western technology; the outlet or market for 
the hydro-carbon and petro-chemicals is in the West; and the in­
vestments too are from the West".12 Consequently, "All their 
economic policies and management are, therefore, geared to 
respond to the changing nature and sensitivities of the Western 
market".13 It must be, therefore, pointed out that these struc­
tural limitations impose severe restrictions on India*s efforts 
to increase its economic stake in the Middle East beyond a point.
There are also serious domestic constraints which would come in 
the way if India tries to expand its economic interaction with 
the Middle East in a big way. The Indian economy which has so far
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largely developed around its large and protected domestic market 
is facing serious constraints in penetrating highly competitive 
international markets. "The obsolescence of its technological 
base is becoming more obvious with India's increasing desire to 
participate in the external market”.14 It is difficult to en­
visage India overcoming this serious handicap at least in the 
shortrun given its institutional, financial and infrastructural 
constraints.
Above all, India's economic interaction with the Middle East 
should take in to account its own developmental priorities and 
strategies and should not be allowed to lead to distortions and 
scarcities in the domestic market.
All things considered, India's economic stake in the Middle East 
need to be seen in its proper perspective. The Middle Eastern oil 
boom was an accident. While it was extremely useful to India in 
the shortrun, its longterm viability and utility for India are 
doubtful. It looks as though it is a passing phase, an extended 
one at best. It only served to rationalise and justify India's 
traditional policy of friendship with the Middle Eastern states 
rather than being its outcome. India, in this sense, has more en­
during political and security interests in the region. It should 
be remembered that India's policy was not fundamentally different 
even in the 50s and 60s when India's economic stake in the Middle 
East was less than substantial. Besides, India's economic 
breakthrough with major Middle Eastern countries followed politi­
cal understanding and accommodation and not vice versa.
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TABLE 1
India’s share in total imports of Middle Eastern countries; 1955 to 1985
Total imports by country 
US $ millions
India’s exports 
to each country 
US $ millions
India’s %  share of exports to each country
1955 1975 1985 1955 1975 1985 1955 1975 1985
Bahrain 174 1,198 3,159 4.8 21.0 32.5 2.76 1.75 1.03
Iran 337 10,343 11,635 11.0 325.0 77.5 3.26 3.14 0.67
Iraq 272 4,215 10,556 4.8 76.0 29.0 1.76 1.80 0.27
Kuwait 94 2,390 5,934 7.4 56.0 99.8 7.87 2.34 1.68
Oman 8 1,047 3,080 1.4 23.0 52.7 17.50 2.20 1.71
Qatar 17 410 1,162* 2.9 13.0 26.5* 17.06 3.17 2.28*
Saudi Arabia 245 4,214 33,696* 1.3 72.0 215.6* 0.53 1.71 0.64*
UAE NA 2,669 7,043 NA 79.0 235.6 NA 2.96 3.35
Yemen,North 14 294 2,962 NA 19.0 21.8 NA 6.46 0.74
Yemen,South 210 313 1600 11.2 9.0 19.7 5.33 2.88 1.23
Total 1,371 27,093 80,827 44.8 694.0 810.7 3.27 2.76 1.00
*1984 Source: South , March, 1988, p.33.
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TABLE 2
ANNUAL LABOUR OUTFLOWS FROM INDIA: 1976-86
Year Number
1976 4200
1977 22900
1978 69000
1979 171000
1980 236200
1981 276000
1982 239545
1983 224995
1984 205922
1985 163035
1986 113649
Source: Ministry of Labour, Government of India, New Delhi.
The above figures refer to the number of Indian workers who obtained 
emigration clearance from the Protector General of Emigrants.
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TABLE 3
ESTIMATES OF THE INDIAN MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST: 1975-1987
Country 1975 1979 1983 1987
Bahrain 17250 26000 30000 77000
Iraq 7500 20000 50000 35000
Kuwait 32105 65000 115000 100000
Libya 1100 10000 40000 25000
Oman 38500 60000 100000 184000
Qatar 27800 30000 40000 50000
S. Arabia 34500 100000 270000 240000
U.A.E. 107500 152000 250000 225000
Others - 38000 21000 21000
Total 266255 501000 916000 957000
Source: Deepak Nayyar, International Labour Migration from India: A Macro-Economic Analysis,
Working Paper No.3, Asian Regional Programme on International Labour Migration, U.N. Development Programme,
New Delhi, 1988, p.14.
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TABLE 4
THE SKILL COMPOSITION OF LABOUR OUTFLOWS FROM INDIA: 1984-86
Number
1984
% Number
1985
% Number
1986
%
1. Unskilled workres 88575 43.0 55710 34.2 45577 40.1
2. Skilled workers 86041 41.8 86037 52.8 53432 47.0
3. White-collar workers 7477 3.6 5753 3.5 7351 6.5
4. High-skill workers 6495 3.2 7378 4.5 5958 5.2
5. Others 17361 8.4 8157 5.0 1331 1.2
Total 205922 100.0 163035 100.0 113649 100.0
Source: Ministry of Labour, Government of India, New Delhi.
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TABLE 5
ESTIMATED COMPOSITION OF REMITTANCES TO INDIA BY ORIGIN: 1974-85. (Rs. Million)
Year North Western Britain Middle East Other Total % of Middle
America Europe and Oil-exporting Developing Remittances Eastern
Australia Countries Countries Remittances
1973-74 432 189 442 74 287 1424 5.20
1974-75 670 349 443 259 481 2202 11.76
1975-76 1105 502 620 1316 694 4237 31.06
1976-77 1651 664 590 2704 628 6237 43.35
1977-78 1382 786 1026 4868 1111 9173 53.07
1978-79 1566 949 1013 4813 1097 9438 51.00
1979-80 2210 1192 1631 7904 1784 14721 53.69
1980-81 2100 1684 2548 12194 2771 21297 57.26
1981-82 3355 1866 2195 10975 2438 20829 52.69
1982-83 3363 1828 2494 13708 2915 24308 56.39
1983-84 3871 2119 2460 15000 3033 26483 56.64
1984-85 4589 2220 2550 17140 3320 29819 57.48
Source: Deepak Nayyar, op.cit., p.26.
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Table 6
COUNTRY-WISE IMPORTS OF CRUDE OIL 1971-72 TO 1976-77 : Qty: '000 Tonnes ; Value: Rs./Crores
Country 1971-72 1972-73 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77
Qty. Value Qty. Value Qty. Value Qty. Value Qty. Value Qty. Value
Iran 10014 116.12 9382 113.75 8885 250.04 6460 426.02 5782 451.09 5992 509.70
Iraq 40 0.51 213 3.71 1168 49.87 3099 217.22 2779 219.65 2984 247.01
S. Arabia 2897 30.39 2489 28.91 3821 116.48 4457 273.75 3817 279.17 4028 322.05
U.A.E - - - - - - - - 1246 101.85 967 90.92
Egypt - - - - - - - - - - 77 6.23
Total 12951 147.02 12084 146.37 13874 416.39 14016 916.99 13624 1051.76 14048 1175.91
Source: Ministry of Petroleum and Chemicals 
Government of India, New Delhi.
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TABLE 7
COUNTRY-WISE IMPORTS OF CRUDE OIL (Qty. 000 Tonnes : Value Rs. Crores)
COUNTRY 77-78 78-79 79-80 80-81 81-82 82-83
Qty. Value Qty. Value Qty. Value Qty. Value Qty. Value Qty. Value
Iran 6191 537.99 3601 299.37 3714 574.34 5901 1281.91 5035 1246.09 3456 797.78
Iraq 3349 288.42 5981 530.07 5758 762.58 3629 675.94 1623 400.92 3445 876.45
S. Arabia 2941 242.34 2410 193.22 3017 352.25 2520 503.44 3680 815.68 6189 1431.81
U.A.E. 872 79.68 1117 99.88 1417 198.42 1553 326.39 1605 410.84 1196 307.42
USSR 962 82.90 1548 128.63 1998 275.61 1782 362.97 2000 493.30 2588 610.80
Qatar - - - - 217 24.33 19 3.99 - - - -
Kuwait - - - - - - 419 92.93 - - - -
Egypt 192 14.87 - - - - 50 8.30 - - - -
Algeria - - - - - - 195 53.29 792 225.52 - -
Malaysia - - - - - - 51 11.42 - - - -
Mexico - - - - - - 129 28.39 - - - -
Venezuola - - - - - - - - 563 144.03 75 19.48
Total 14507 1246.20 14657 1251.17 16121 2187.53 16248 3348.97 15298 3736.38 16949 4043.74
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TABLE 8
COUNTRY-WISE IMPORTS OF CRUDE OIL (Qty. 000 Tonnes: Value Rs. Crores)
1983-84 84-85 85-86
Qty. Value Qty. Value Qty. Value
Iran 3340 743.42 1840 468.82 3456 868.32
Iraq 3500 778.36 2650 668.02 2147 541.05
S. Arabia 4600 1010.22 4520 1121.28 2398 595.14
U.A.E. 970 218.97 540 134.56 2173 503.70
U.S.S.R. 3430 761.70 3110 792.54 2570 647.25
Egypt - - - - 514 114.95
Qatar - - - - -
Kuwait 50 10.27 370 82.58 302 59.77
Oman - - 610 162.54 1584 356.61
Algeria - - - - - -
Malaysia - - - - - -
Mexico - - - - - -
Venezuela - - - - - -
Neutral Zone 80 18.11 - - - -
Total 15970 3541.05 13640 3430.34 15144 3686.79
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TABLE 9
INDIA'S CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION 1979-80 TO 1986-87
(Million Tonnes)
1979-80 80-81 81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 85-86 86-87
11.8 10.5 16.2 21.1 26.0 29.00 30.2 30.5
Source: Economic Survey 1984-85, p.17.
Economic Survey 1987-88, p.25.
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TABLE 10
AUTHORISED LOANS FROM THE MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES
(Rs. Lakhs)
1974-79 79-80 80-81 81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 85-86
Iraq 60.41 1.33 78.77 - - - - -
Iran 932.21 11.65 16.56 - - - - -
U.A.E. 52.50 - - - - - - -
Kuwait Fund 51.24 - - 52.50 30.03 30.66 - 14.70
Saudi Arabia Fund 58.96 - - - - 17.23 - 28.72
Abu Dhabi Fund 12.92 - - - - - - -
OPEC Special Fund 26.85 15.00 37.50 - 22.50 16.87 - -
Total 1195.09 27.98 132.83 52.50 52.53 64.76 - 43.42
Total authorised 
loans from all 
sources
6592.80 779.94 2896.80 2160.06 1878.28 1473.58 2594.95 3301.50
The % of Middle 
Eastern share
18.13 3.59 4.59 2.43 2.80 4.39 - 1.32
Source: Report on Currency and Finance 1985-86, pp.156-157. 
The Reserve Bank of India.
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Table 11
Civil Engineering and Construction Projects (Rs. in Crores)
1979 1980 1981 1982
(Cumulative)
Iraq 526.19 1040.20 967.38 173.51
Libya 473.83 114.95 600.43 107.14
PDRY 25.69 1.40 0.77 -
YAR 61.60 72.30 - -
Qatar 9.19 - 24.84 0.12
Kuwait 286.27 18.64 - 58.00
Saudi Arabia 43.15 - - 5.71
U.A.E. 185.76 64.29 0.27 0.21
Oman 32.00 5.38 2.09 -
Total 1643.68 1317.16 1595.78 344.69
Total for all 
countries 
including 
Middle East
1684.61 1324.10 1604.81 421.06
% of Middle 
Eastern share
97.57 99.48 99.44 81.86
Source: Handbook of Export Statistics, 1981-82, Project Export Supplement, p.14, 
Engineering Export Promotion Council, Calcutta.
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Table 12
Industrial Projects (Rs. Crores)
1980 80-81 81-82 82-83
(Cumulative)
Iraq 182.47 - - -
Saudi Arabia 106.82 15.12 23.99 -
Libya 194.28 17.44 - -
Iran 4.15 - 16.17 2.47
Kuwait 4.67 - - -
Qatar 2.48 - - -
Syria - - 10.18 11.20
Behrain - - - 1.80
Total 494.87 32.56 50.34 15.47
Total for all 
countries 
including Middle 
East
653.73 112.40 104.64 161.47
% of Middle 
Eastern share
75.70 28.97 48.11 9.58
Sources Handbook of Export Statistics, 1981-82,
Project Export Supplement, p.3, Engineering Export Promotion Council, Calcutta.
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CHAPTER 6
INDO-ISRAELI RELATIONS
"If unrequited love exists in international relations, then 
this is the story of Israel as a suitor and India as an 
unresponsive partner”.1 This comment from the Israel 
Economist sums up the nature of Indo-Israeli relations in 
the last four decades. Ironically, there has been no 
conflict of interests - at least in bilateral terms - 
between the two countries over the years. In fact, at times 
there has been the odd convergence of interests. 
Nevertheless, Indo-Israeli relations failed to 'take- off1; 
they remained cool but correct, friendly but low-key, 
intermittent but secretive.
It is no exaggeration to say that Israel has been one of the 
'blind-spots1 of India's foreign policy endeavours. In 
certain respects, it demonstrates the falsity and far- 
fetchedness of some of the assumptions that underlie it. 
What is more remarkable, and perhaps disturbing, is that no 
attempt seems to have been made to undertake a thorough re­
appraisal of India's policy to a region which has undergone 
momentous changes since the early seventies.
In the following pages, an attempt will be made to 
trace the Indian attitude to the Palestinian issue at the 
UN, the creation of the state of Israel and the factors and
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personalities that governed India's subsequent policy 
towards the Jewish state in the light of India's own broad 
foreign policy objectives in the region. In addition, it 
would be argued that the changing politico-strategic 
scenario at the global, regional and the subcontinental 
levels since the early 70's has made it imperative for India 
to have a fresh look at the state and status of the Indo- 
Israeli relations in the context of India's overall policy 
to the region.
BACKGROUND CONSIDERATIONS
India's policy towards Israel in the post-independent 
phase appears to be a hang-over of the attitude of the 
Indian National Congress (hereafter as INC) towards the 
Palestinian question.2 It's approach to the problem was 
influenced by moral, emotional as well as pragmatic 
considerations. While both Gandhi and Nehru had much 
sympathy for the long-suffering Jews, they considered it 
anything but moral to 'impose' the Jews on the reluctant 
Palestinians through unlimited immigration, and thereby 
reduce the Arabs to the status of second class citizens in 
their own land.
Nehru's response was emotional in the sense that he had 
participated in a prolonged and successful freedom struggle 
against British imperialism in India. He saw the Palestinian
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question as part of the larger issue of colonialism. He 
inferred that the British were pitting Jewish 'religio- 
nationalism' against Arab nationalism, in order to retain 
their tenuous imperial possessions in the region.
At a more pragmatic level, the INC and its leaders 
could in no way support any nationalism which was 
exclusively based on religion. That would have been 
fundamentally at variance with their professed secular form 
of nationalism. In short, Nehru saw a parallel between the 
Muslim League's demand for Pakistan and the Zionist demand 
for a Jewish State on the one hand, and an opportunity for 
the British to resort to their age-old divide and rule 
policy, on the other.
It is against this background that we need to look at 
India's approach to the Palestinian issue, after the British 
(finding the problem intractable) washed their hands of it 
by referring the matter to the U.N.
The INC, on the other hand, was no longer a national 
movement to adopt a highly moralistic attitude to issues. It 
had, under the stewardship of Nehru, transformed itself into 
a full-fledged political party committed to the preservation 
and promotion of India's national interests in a balanced 
and pragmatic manner. But as it turned out, India's policy 
towards Israel, once it came in to existence, was neither 
balanced nor pragmatic and failed to subserve India's 
interests in the region, as we shall see in the course of
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this chapter.
AT THE U.N.
On 2nd. April 1947, the U.K. requested that Palestine 
be placed on the agenda of the next regular session of the 
General Assembly, and "to summon, as soon as possible, a 
special session of the General Assembly for the purpose of 
constituting and instructing a special committee to prepare 
for the consideration" of the Palestinian problem.3 On 21st. 
and 22nd. April, five member countries (Egypt, Iraq, Syria, 
Lebanon and South Africa) requested the Secretary General to 
include an additional item on the agenda of the Special 
Session viz. "The termination of the Mandate over Palestine 
and the declaration of its independence".4
The Special Session of the General Assembly was 
convened on 28th. April 1947. After a lengthy discussion in 
the General Assembly, the First Committee took over the 
issue for a threadbare discussion. It decided to refer the 
issue to a Special Committee. However, the drafting of the 
resolution containing the Special Committee's terms of 
reference led to an acrimonious debate and procedural 
wrangling. Nevertheless, the General Assembly finally 
adopted a resolution constituting a Special Committee 
comprising eleven members, including India.5 The purpose was 
to "ascertain and record facts and to investigate all
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questions and views relevant to the problem of Palestine.” 
During these debates, the Indian representative Mr. Asaf 
Ali6 adopted a balanced and conciliatory approach to the 
Palestinian question. He described it as "a question, 
fundamentally, of human rights”. He referred to Jews as 
"friends” and recalled that in India "the Jews have never 
suffered throughout their history", and "have always been 
treated with the best regard". Stating that the issue must 
be settled amicably by the Arabs and the Jews between 
themselves, he underlined the untenability of religion as 
the sole basis of statehood.
The Special Committee, known as the United Nations 
Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), held its first 
meeting on 26th. May 1947 and finalised its report7 on 31st. 
August 1947. The UNSCOP Report contained twelve general 
recommendations of which eleven were unanimously approved. 
These eleven recommendations, inter alia, provided for the 
termination of the Mandate, independence for Palestine after 
a transition period under U.N. supervision, preservation of 
the Holy places, Minority rights, economic union, and an 
appeal to both the parties to eschew violence.
Furthermore, the Committee came up with two alternative 
plans:-
l.Plan of Partition with Economic Union: This was 
supported by seven members of the Committee (Canada, 
Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, The Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and
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Uruguay), and came to be known as the 'Majority Plan'. It 
envisaged the partition of Palestine into two states, one 
Arab and the other Jewish, with the internationalisation of 
Jerusalem under U.N. jurisdiction.
2. Federal State Plan: This was supported by three 
members (India, Iran and Yugoslavia) , and came to be known 
as the 'Minority Plan'. This plan called for an independent 
State of Palestine comprising an Arab state and a Jewish 
state, with Jerusalem as their capital. The federal State 
would have a federal government, and governments of Arab and 
Jewish states. The federal government would look after 
defence, foreign relations, and communications, whereas the 
Arab and Jewish governments would have full power over their 
respective local self-government. There was to be a single 
Palestinian nationality and citizenship, with guaranteed 
equal rights for all minorities and free access to the Holy 
places.
The General Assembly referred this report to the Ad Hoc 
Committee on the Palestinian Question on 23rd. Sept. 1947. 
The Ad Hoc Committee met from 25th. Sept. to 25th. Nov. 
1947. Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, who led the Indian 
delegation to the U.N. at the 1947 Session, explained 
India's stand on the Palestinian issue to the Ad Hoc 
Committee on 11th. Oct. 1947.
Mrs. Pandit asserted that peace in Palestine and the 
Middle East was of vital importance to India because of its
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geographical proximity to the region. She insisted that the 
Palestinian question be separated from the issue of 
displaced Jews in Europe. The latter should be handled 
independently as a responsibility of the U.N. The 
fundamental issue was the termination of the Mandate without 
delay and the recognition of Palestine as an independent 
State. Palestine was predominantly an Arab country, and 
this predominance should not be altered to the disadvantage 
of the Arabs.
However, India had much sympathy for the Jews and was 
aware of their great contribution to world culture. Once 
Palestine became independent, the Jews could be given wide 
autonomy in areas where they were in the majority. India 
herself had suffered in the past because of the different 
interpretations of the promises of the governing power and 
hence she could not but sympathise with the Arab viewpoint.8
Later, the Indian representative at the U.N., Mr. 
Bajpai, argued against the contention that since the U.N. 
had approved of the partition of Palestine by two-thirds 
majority earlier, it should be consistent and endorse the 
plan in order to maintain its own dignity. He reminded the 
members that majorities were not 'infallible' and said that 
India 'fortunately' had not been among the majority. India 
had opposed partition earlier and did so now, because it was 
convinced by its own experience and by history that brute 
force never solved this kind of problem.9
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However, as it turned out, the Zionists accepted the 
Majority Plan which partitioned Palestine into a Jewish and 
an Arab state. But the Arabs rejected both the Majority and 
Minority Plans because the former destroyed the territorial 
integrity of their homeland and placed a large Arab 
population in the proposed Jewish state as a permanent 
minority, and the latter because of its implicit 
partitionist content.
Three Sub-Committees were appointed and various 
modifications were suggested with a view to arrive at an 
agreed solution. Ultimately, however, the Majority Plan 
submitted by UNSCOP was adopted by the General Assembly with 
certain modifications.
The Plan was adopted by vote - 33 in favour, 13
against, and 10 abstentions. India voted against the Plan 
along with the Arab countries, and Afghanistan, Cuba, 
Greece, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. The U.K., Ethiopia, 
Yugoslavia, and several Latin American countries abstained. 
The other permanent members of the Security Council favoured 
the Plan.
Interestingly, the Indian delegation and its leader 
Mrs. Pandit, it appears, were disgusted when they were asked 
to vote against the partition Plan.10
326
THE FIRST RUMBLINGS
After the partition Plan was adopted, the Arab Higher 
Committee rejected the Plan and refused to cooperate in its 
implementation. Instead, it requested the British government 
to hand over Palestine to * its Arab peoples*. Thereafter, 
sporadic attacks against the Jews began on 30th. Nov. 1947 
and gradually spread to the rest of Palestine. The Arabs, 
with the help of about six to seven thousand volunteers from 
neighbouring countries seemed to have had the upper hand 
till the end of March 1948.
However, in early April 1948, the Israeli Haganah 
reversed this trend, scored a chain of victories, and 
consolidated the Jewish hold over the zones assigned to them 
by the General Assembly resolution. On 14th. May 1948, the 
Provisional Government with Ben Gurion as the Prime Minister 
and Defence Minister, issued its declaration of independence 
and announced the creation of the State of Israel.
On the 15th. May 1948, the regular armed forces of 
Trans-Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt, along with a 
small force from Saudi Arabia were sent to Palestine to deal 
with the nascent State of Israel.
The Secretary General of the Arab League justified the 
Arab action on the ground that, with the end of the Mandate, 
there was no legally constituted body to administer law and
327
order, and to protect life and property in Palestine. The 
Arab states would hand over the government to the 
Palestinian Arabs once law and order was restored.
However, the Arab forces failed to achieve their 
military objectives as the Israelis, in the meantime, were 
able to acquire arms from Europe and elsewhere, and to 
recruit a number of Jewish veterans of World War II. After 
three broken truces, the General Armistice Agreements 
between Israel on the one hand and Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan 
and Syria on the other were negotiated on the Greek island 
of Rhodes in Jan. 1949.
INDIA'S POSITION: A REFORMULATION
As can be seen from the foregoing analysis, India's 
attitude towards Palestine had gone through two distinct 
phases. First, it considered the Palestinian problem as a 
colonial question and regarded the elimination of 
colonialism (i. e. the ending of the British Mandate and the 
establishment of independent Palestine) as the fundamental 
issue. India regarded the Jewish question as a minority 
problem, to be settled by extending to the Jews the rights 
and safeguards normally accorded to minority groups in other 
countries. In this phase, its criticism was primarily 
directed against the British exploitation of the Arab-Jewish 
differences to perpetuate its rule over Palestine.
328
The second phase began with the large scale migration 
of Jews from Central and Eastern Europe to Palestine between 
1935 and 1947 primarily because of Nazi persecution. While 
India profoundly sympathised with the suffering of the Jews, 
it was opposed to a separate State for Jews in Palestine on 
two grounds. First, it regarded any state exclusively based 
on religion as untenable. Secondly, it considered a remote 
historical connexion with the area as an insufficient ground 
for the creation of a separate Jewish State. Hence, it 
supported the Minority Plan, which envisaged a single 
Palestinian State based on federal principles.
The Indian approach to the Palestinian question 
contained two important elements. First, it opposed the 
partition of Palestine as a solution, which was consistent 
with her own domestic stand vis-a-vis the Muslim League*s 
demand for Pakistan. Hence, India advocated substantial 
autonomy for Jews in areas where they were in majority.
Secondly, it de-emphasised the religious basis of the 
conflict between the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine. 
Rather, it sought to project it as a political struggle, 
which again was calculated to dilute Pakistan's efforts to 
flaunt its Islamic credentials to gain support and sympathy 
in the region. Such a stand was also taken by India in order 
to subserve its domestic political requirements as a multi­
religious state.
Explaining India's stand Nehru said, "we took up a
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certain attitude in regard to it which was roughly a federal 
State with autonomous parts. It was opposed to both the 
other attitudes which were before the United Nations. One 
was partition which has now been adopted; the other was a 
unitary State. We suggested a federal State with, naturally, 
an Arab majority in charge of the Federal State but with 
autonomy for the other regions —  Jewish regions.”
"After a great deal of thought we decided that this was 
not only a fair and equitable solution of the problem, but 
the only real solution of the problem. Any other solution 
would have meant fighting and conflict. Nevertheless our 
solution. .. did not find favour with most people in the 
United Nations. Some of the major powers were out for 
partition; they, therefore, pressed for it and ultimately 
got it. Others were so keen on the unitary State idea and 
were so sure of preventing partition at any rate or 
preventing a two-thirds majority in favour of partition that 
they did not accept our suggestion."
"When during the last few days somehow partition 
suddenly became inevitable and votes veered round to it, 
owing to the pressure of some of the powers, it was realised 
that the Indian solution was probably the best and an 
attempt was made in the last 48 hours to bring forward the 
Indian solution, not by us but by those who wanted a unitary 
State. It was then too late."
"I point this out to the House as an instance, that in
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spite of considerable difficulty and being told by many of 
our friends on either side that we must line up this way or 
that, we refused to do so, and I have no doubt that the 
position we had taken was the right one and I still have no 
doubt that it would have brought about the best solution.”11 
It should be noted here that the creation of Israel 
had followed the partition of the Indian sub-continent by 
just a few months and, this inevitably influenced and shaped 
India's perceptions and policies towards the region in 
general and towards Israel in particular.
When Israel applied to the U.N. for admission, the 
matter was put to vote in the General Assembly on 11th. May 
1949. Israel was admitted to the membership of the U.N. by 
37 votes to 12 with 9 abstentions. In addition to the six 
Arab States, India, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Ethiopia 
and Burma voted against the resolution. Explaining India's 
stand the Indian delegate stated that "India could not 
recognise an Israel which had been achieved through the 
force of arms and not through negotiations."12
India's reason for voting against Israel's admission to 
the U.N. is rather curious. It is an open secret that both 
the Arabs and Jews indulged in violence and terror. In fact, 
it was the Arabs who used armed force to overturn the U.N.'s 
decision to partition Palestine, whereas Israel had accepted 
the decision.
Moreover, the State of Israel was a reality by then and
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could not be wished away. Hence, it would have been 
advisable for India to have either abstained or absented 
itself, rather than vote against Israel*s admission. Such a 
decision would have been tactful, realistic and perhaps even 
fair.
It is this ambivalence on the part of India which later 
led to diplomatic hair-splitting with regard to the 
recognition of Israel and exchange of ambassadors which 
should have followed each other logically.
RECOGNITION ISSUE
Once the State of Israel was proclaimed, its Provisional 
Government approached various countries, including India, 
for recognition. This was confirmed by Nehru (while 
answering a question from H.V. Kamath) in the Constituent 
Assembly when he said that "a telegram containing the 
request for recognition was received from Mr. Moshe 
Shertok, the Foreign Minister of the Provisional Government 
of Israel, in the middle of June 1948 and the Government of 
India decided to defer consideration of this question”.13
Explaining further he said, "The obvious reasons were 
that a new State was formed and we had to wait. Normally we 
should have to be satisfied and know exactly what the 
international position is before taking any step".14
Dr. B. V. Keskar, the Deputy Minister of External
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Affairs, commenting on the delay in recognising Israel 
stated, "The Government of India are closely studying the 
situation and are keeping in touch with the latest 
developments. The Government of India will take appropriate 
decisions as soon as they consider the time is ripe for 
it".15
It is obvious from the above that the Indian Government 
delayed the recognition of Israel because the situation in 
the Middle East in relation to the Arab-Israeli dispute was 
still fluid and confusing. India thought it wise to delay 
the recognition rather than accord premature recognition to 
the Jewish State.
More importantly, India was aware of the hostile 
attitude of the Arab states to Israel and their refusal to 
recognise it. The Arab governments imposed economic 
sanctions against Israel and Egypt maintained that it was in 
a state of war with Israel. Egypt also felt that 
"Recognition of Israel would encourage the Zionists to 
pursue their aggression and their incursions on Arab 
rights...".16 Moreover, India had hopes of co-ordinating 
her foreign policy pursuits with these countries in the 
interest of Afro-Asian solidarity.
India also had to contend with the emerging 'Pakistan- 
factor1, which, if not handled with care and delicacy, could 
complicate its relations with the Muslim Middle East. 
Pakistan refused to recognise Israel, and had declared that
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"recognition of Israel was constitutionally wrong and 
morally unjust”.17 Any hasty action on India's part could be 
used by Pakistan as a political stick with which to beat 
India.
Moreover, even after partition (and the communal 
holocaust that accompanied it) , India was left with a large 
Muslim population which was still recovering from the 
physical and psychological wounds of partition and was going 
through an acute sense of insecurity. A Muslim member of the 
Indian Constituent Assembly, Begum Aizaz Rasul, was echoing 
these sentiments when she asked Nehru, "Will the Honourable 
Prime Minister keep in mind the fact that there are a large 
number of people living in the Indian Dominion whose wishes 
and sentiments in this regard should be kept in view 
regarding the recognition of the State of Israel, and they 
are definitely opposed to it ?"18 Nehru's reply was that the 
"Government have to keep in mind all the factors governing a 
particular situation."19
Answering another question in the Constituent Assembly 
in Dec. 1949 on the same issue, Nehru explained the 
reasoning of his government: "The Government of India have
had the question of the recognition of Israel under constant 
review. Israel is now a member of the United Nations and its 
recognition by other member States cannot obviously be 
indefinitely deferred. The Government of India would like to 
act in this matter, which has been the subject of some
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controversy among nations with whom we have friendly 
relations”. 20 A few months later, he went a step further and 
stated that "the fact of Israel being there as a State is 
recognised by us.”21
India*s recognition of Israel eventually came on 17th. 
Sept. 1950, in the form of a terse 1 one-liner* from the 
Government of India: "The Government of India has decided to 
accord recognition to the Government of Israel.”22
However, the Government communique also contained a 
fairly detailed account of the factors and circumstances 
that prompted the Indian Government to accord recognition to 
Israel. It was explained that "as in the case of Communist 
China, India's decision to recognise Israel is the 
recognition of an established fact".23 For "the Government 
of Israel has been in existence for two years and there is 
no doubt that it is going to stay".24
Again, "India and Israel have been working together for 
the last two years in the United Nations and other 
international bodies, and Israel has been throughout this 
period collaborating with other members of the United 
Nations for furthering the cause of world peace and 
establishing better economic and social conditions in all 
parts of the world".25 Hence, "continuing non-recognition is 
not only inconsistent with the overall relationship but even 
limits the effectiveness of the Government of India's role 
as a possible intermediary between Israel and Arab
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states”.26
Stating that "India will always value the friendship of 
Egypt and other Arab states” the Government of India 
emphasised that ”the recognition of Israel does not mean 
that there is no difference between India*s attitude and 
that of Israel over questions like the status of Jerusalem 
and Israel's frontiers. These questions would be judged by 
India on merits and due regard would be given to Arab 
claims".27
It is clear, therefore, that the delay in India's 
recognition of Israel had little to do with India's 
opposition to partition of Palestine as imagined in some 
quarters. India had to take into consideration a number of 
factors, both internal and external, and weigh them in terms 
of its own national interests before it could cross the 
Rubicon. Hence, India's cautious and belated recognition of 
the Jewish State was both understandable and justified.28
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
However, what cannot be easily understood or justified 
is, having recognised the State of Israel, India refused to 
establish diplomatic relations with it which was both 
illogical and ill-advised. Scholars like K.P.Mishra argued 
that India's recognition of Israel was a reflection of 
India's desire to " subscribe to the principle of defactoism
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even if it was at the risk of some misunderstanding or 
alienating the sympathies of some of her best friends in the 
world”.29
India, he further, argued made a distinction between 
"recognition as a legal act and the establishment of 
diplomatic relations as a purely political act..."30, 
presumably in deference to the sentiments of the Arab 
countries
Nevertheless, it is not difficult to see that Mr. 
Mishra has adopted a purely legalistic approach to an 
essentially political question. This line of reasoning 
almost appears like a convenient after-thought. Moreover, it 
was neither consistent with the official communique issued 
by the Government of India nor with the subsequent 
behaviour of the Indian Government which came very close to 
establishing diplomatic relations with Israel.
The communique itself referred to the Indo-Israeli co­
operation in the U.N. and other international bodies to 
promote world peace, and to the possibility of India acting 
as a go-between between the two warring parties. The Indian 
Government could not possibly have envisaged such a role for 
itself without the necessary diplomatic apparatus to 
facilitate such a process.
In fact, India all but established full diplomatic 
relations with Israel in 1952. In early 1952, the Director- 
General of the Israel Foreign Office, Mr. Walter Eytan, came
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to Delhi as a guest of the Indian Government, and had 
negotiations with the Indian officials about diplomatic 
relations between the two countries. Nehru agreed that it 
was time the issue was 'reconsidered'.
In Mr. Eytan's own words, "Before Israel's 
representative left New Delhi, he was informed that the 
Prime Minister (Nehru) had approved the proposal. He was now 
questioned in detail on housekeeping problems: what was the 
cost of living in Israel, would it be better for India's 
minister to buy or rent a house, what were the prospects of 
hiring servants ? A draft budget for the Indian Legation was 
being prepared, though the formal decision to establish 
diplomatic relations still remained to be confirmed by the 
Cabinet. This was to be done as soon as the new Government 
was set up following the elections a few weeks later".31
However, nothing came of these talks and Eytan was left 
wondering as to the reason for this "sudden change of mind" 
on the part of the Indian Government.
Michael Brecher32 unravelled this mystery almost a 
decade later. According to him, it was Maulana Azad's 
'forceful intervention' against normalising relations with 
Israel that was responsible for India's backtracking. He was 
the Minister of Education in Nehru's Cabinet, and was a 
close friend of the Prime Minister. He 'exerted great 
influence' on India's Middle East policy till his death in 
1958.
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Maulana was worried about the repercussions of such a 
move in the Arab world, particularly at a time when the 
Kashmir dispute was raging both in and outside the U.N.. 
Such a move could provide Pakistan an opportunity to fish 
in troubled waters. He was also sensitive to the unsettling 
effect it could have on the Indian Muslims. These were 
weighty arguments and carried the day, probably against 
Nehru*s own better judgement and preference.
However, an Israeli Consul was permitted to function in 
Bombay in 1953, but no counterpart was established in 
Israel.
Be that as it may, there is still no convincing 
explanation as to why diplomatic relations were not 
established at the time of extending recognition to Israel. 
Exchanging ambassadors two years after recognition, as 
Brecher pointed out, "would suggest a conscious act of 
friendship" and "this was precisely the Indian error".33 
Both Nehru34 and Krishna Menon35 admitted as much, but why 
it was not done is a question which probably would never be 
answered, at least in a satisfactory manner.
This inexplicable slip looks all the more inexcusable, 
at least in retrospect, for it pushed the Indian policy into 
a groove from which India found it impossible to extricate 
itself over the years. In the process, India, instead of 
playing a positive and purposeful role in the Middle East, 
seemed to have settled down for something akin to diplomatic
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self-abnegation in the region.
Nehru was half-apologetic when he tried to explain 
India's stand on the issue again in 1958 at a Press 
Conference in New Delhi. "This attitude was adopted after a 
careful consideration of the balance of factors. It is not a 
matter of high principles, but it is based on how we could 
best serve and be helpful in the area... After careful 
thought, we felt that while recognising Israel as an entity, 
we need not at this stage exchange diplomatic personnel".36
While this attitude was certainly not a 'matter of high 
principle', it is difficult to see as how it was "based on 
how we could best serve and be helpful in that area". In 
fact, it made India forego whatever leverage it had with 
Israel, foreclosed even the limited diplomatic options it 
had earlier, and reduced India to a passive spectator in the 
region.
Answering a question in the Rajya Sabha on the same 
issue in 1960, Nehru made a rather ambivalent statement, 
"...As for Israel, the position is somewhat different, 
because we have recognised Israel but we have not built up a 
diplomatic mission there nor have (we) an Israeli mission 
here. That obviously, as the Hon. Member also knows, is very 
much entangled in important and rather international 
issues".37 This statement sounds more like a rationalistaion 
and an apology, rather than an explanation of India's 
curious approach to the issue in question.
340
While India has always had close bonds of friendship 
with the Muslim countries of the Middle East, it is not 
often emphasised that there was also much mutual admiration 
and goodwill between the Jewish and Indian leaders, in spite 
of India*s opposition to the Zionist demand for a Jewish 
State and the subsequent partition of Palestine.
The Jewish leaders had great admiration and love for 
Indian leaders like Gandhi and Nehru. Gandhi was revered for 
his moral leadership and spiritual disposition. Gandhi had 
very close and trusted Jewish friends from his South African 
days which prompted him to remark ”1 am half a Jew myself”. 
Some of them tried to win Gandhi's approval for the Zionist 
aspirations in Palestine, without much success.38
Nehru was admired because "his was the voice of 
rationalism, modernity, progress, and westernisation".39 He 
had profound sympathy for the Jewish sufferings under Nazi 
tyranny. He also had entertained the "idea of starting a new 
university that would be staffed wholly or mainly by 
(Jewish) refugee intellectuals" in India. Unhappily enough, 
this idea proved to be a non-starter because of the lukewarm 
attitude of the British administration. 40 Interestingly, 
Nehru's autobiography was translated into Hebrew in the 
thirties, when Nehru was relatively less known outside 
India.
There was also tremendous goodwill and affection for 
India among Jews in general because the Jewish communities
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which settled down in India over the centuries experienced 
no anti-Semitism whatsoever. This almost unique experience 
of Indian Jews endeared India to Jews the world over and 
they looked up to India with gratitude and respect.41
There was also an ideological affinity between the 
ruling classes of the newly formed states of India and 
Israel. "Socialist Israeli leaders expected to find a common 
language with Asian socialist leaders such as Nehru and U 
Nu, and to open paths to them on the basis of their common 
socialist ideology.”42 In the early fifties, the socialist 
parties of Israel Mapai and Histadrut played a key role in 
forging ties between Asian leaders of similar ideological 
persuasions which culminated in the first Asian Socialist 
Conference in Rangoon in 1953 to which Israel was an 
invitee.
Moreover, there was some convergence of political 
outlook between Israel and the Non-Aligned stance that was 
being adopted by increasing number of Afro-Asian countries, 
with India being one of its leading lights. By joining the 
Nonaligned Movement (NAM), "Israel hoped to rid itself of 
charges levelled against it by Nehru and other Asian leaders 
that Zionism came to Palestine under the protection of 
British bayonets", and "between 1948 and 1950 there was a 
marked preference among its leaders for pursuing a foreign 
policy independent of the two superpowers of the cold 
war".43
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According to an Israeli scholar,44 there were, at least, 
five general factors that moulded Israel's "attempt at 
maintaining an international orientation of non-alignment". 
The first factor was "the recognition of the unity of the 
Jewish people, scattered throughout the world and in each of 
the two blocs, and the responsibility for its condition and 
fate".
The second was "the historic fact that the State of Israel 
had been established through the consent and support of both 
world blocs; Israel was to a certain extent grateful to both 
superpowers and anxious to sustain good relations with them 
in order to overcome the difficulties of realizing 
independence". The third was "concern for world peace and 
the desire to abstain from encouraging great power rivalry 
by aligning itself with one of them".
The fourth was "the desire to maintain internal peace within 
the country's Labor movement". "Israel's extremely delicate 
situation during its formative years provoked fears within 
the leadership of a political conflict with the Israeli 
Left, which was viewed as an important political power...". 
These fears necessitated attempts at "forming an undisputed 
basis for Israel's international policy".
The fifth and the last factor was "self-esteem". The 
"conception of ... a nation with its own morality and 
responsibility, seeking to be free of any external links so 
as to be able to choose its own path according to its own
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concepts, principles and aspirations”.
"The political line of nonalignment was thus motivated by a 
positive foreign policy consideration unlinked to 
international power combinations as well as a pragmatic 
assessment of the current international constellation...". 
Brecher refers to this as the "non-identification" phase of 
the Israeli foreign policy. Israel hoped that non-alignment 
would open the door for her to the Afro-Asian world. It 
would enable her to "combat growing political enemity and 
economic boycott practised against it by the Arab States", 
and "break through the wall of hostility which Arab States 
attempted to erect around its borders".45
Given all these factors, Israelis hoped that Nehru, a 
"non-Muslim but highly respected by the Arabs, would be 
willing and able to moderate Arab hostility and, perhaps, 
provide a bridge between Israelis and Arabs".46
However, that was not to be. India’s decision not to 
establish diplomatic relations after recognising Israel 
definitely impaired whatever chances there were for India’s 
mediatory role in the region. This is in complete contrast 
to India's approach to China.
In the case of China, India not only recognised China 
to the obvious displeasure of the U.S., but also went out of 
its way to facilitate its integration in the international 
community. The latter was done on the ground that isolating 
China would only drive it further into the Russian hands.
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The same logic was not applied in the case of Israel. 
It is difficult to envisage as to what extent such a course 
would have helped the cause of peace in the region. However, 
the very fact that it was not given an honest chance is 
somewhat of a misfortune in itself.
To be sure, at least a part of the responsibility for 
what had happened lies on Israel's shoulders. At one stage 
India was prepared to accept Israel's representative in New 
Delhi, but Israel's insistence on reciprocity precluded any 
such possibility which certainly was a mistake on Israel's 
part.47
There was another complication as well. Countries such as 
the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. which recognised Israel 
immediately after its creation, established their embassies 
in Tel Aviv. However, by the time India recognised Israel, 
Western Jerusalem became its capital. Israel's insistence 
that all new embassies should be located in Jerusalem was 
not acceptable to India.48
It goes without saying that India could have established 
diplomatic relations with Israel. That it was not done 
proved to be a serious handicap in India's dealings with the 
region thereafter.49
The passage of time only exacerbated the Arab-Israeli 
dispute. Gradually India ceased to be a factor in 
potentially the most destabilising dispute in a region, 
which was of utmost importance to India, as India found to
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its dismay at Bandung.
BANDUNG, 1955 
A. The Background
The Bandung Conference of 1955 was a turning point in 
the history of Indo-Israeli relations, in the sense that it 
symbolised the culmination and crystallisation of various 
undercurrents which affected them. The conference took 
place at Bandung in Indonesia from 18th. to 24th. April 
1955. This Afro-Asian conference was sponsored by five 
countries, namely India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Ceylon and 
Burma. They declared that all independent States would be 
invited.
However, it was decided to exclude Israel from the 
Conference despite the fact that Israel was recognised by 
many States including three of the sponsors India, Burma and 
Ceylon.50 The way this decision was arrived at was important 
because it sort of set the pattern for almost all future 
Afro-Asian conferences in dealing with the Arab-Israeli 
dispute.
B. The Decision-Making
There were two informal meetings in Colombo (Ceylon) 
and Bogor (Indonesia),51 which served as preparatory
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meetings for Bandung.
At Colombo, the Pakistani Prime Minister, Mr. Muhammad 
Ali, introduced a draft resolution which described the 
creation of Israel as a violation of international law, 
condemned Israel's aggressive policy, and expressed concern 
over the plight of the Palestinian refugees.
Nehru while sympathising with the Arabs, pointed out 
that since India recognised Israel, he could not condemn it 
as a violation of international law. Moreover, the Pakistani 
resolution would adversely affect the U.N. efforts to settle 
the dispute. After some debate, it was decided to delete two 
paragraphs from the Pakistani resolution and retain only the 
reference to the Palestinian refugees.
At Bogor, U Nu told Nehru that if Israel were not 
invited to Bandung, Burma might stay away. Nehru, while 
accepting that on the basis of logical and geographic 
principle Israel ought to be invited, pointed out that an 
Arab boycott of Bandung would mean that the whole of the 
Middle East would go unrepresented. In which case, India 
should consider whether her own participation would be 
worthwhile.
Pakistan and Indonesia were strongly opposed to Israeli 
participation from the beginning. Burma was now rather 
subdued in her support to Israel. Ceylon was in favour of 
inviting Israel, and proposed that the Arabs should be 
"approached and reasoned with." Indonesia pointed out that
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the Arab League had already warned that an invitation to 
Israel would be considered an unfriendly act. Nehru summed 
up the discussion by saying that though such invitation 
might be justified, he did not think the matter should be 
pressed against the wishes of the Arab states. And so it was 
decided.
At the conference itself, Nehru maintained a very 
balanced approach to the Palestinian question, taking a 
principled stand and at the same time keeping India's 
interests in mind. First, he sought to relegate the 
religious factor into the background by emphasising the 
political nature of the conflict.
He also refrained from directly criticising Israel. He 
told the delegates to understand "the forces behind the 
(Zionist) movement" and added, "Obviously it becomes a 
matter of power politics..."52
He also took exception to Mr. Ahmad Shukairy, a 
Palestinian, (a member of the Syrian delegation) who, in the 
course of his speech said that a negotiated settlement was 
not possible. Nehru asserted that, "sometime or other, 
whether you are enemies or whether you have fought a war, 
there must be negotiations. There is always some kind of 
settlement...After all, one can settle things either by 
compulsion, that is by pressure or by negotiation".53
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C. The Decision
The final communique issued after the conference had 
this to say on the Palestinian issue: "In view of the
existing tension in the Middle East, caused by the situation 
in Palestine and of the danger of that tension to world 
peace, the Asian-African Conference declared its support of 
the rights of the Arab people of Palestine and called for 
the implementation of the United Nations resolutions on 
Palestine and the achievement of the peaceful settlement of 
the Palestine question".54
"Although the practical significance of this resolution 
was limited, the symbolic victory of the Arabs was not".55 
Nasser, who represented Egypt at Bandung later remarked "It 
is just a resolution. However, it has some moral value".56
D. The Aftermath: The Collective Perspective
Nevertheless, the Bandung Conference had some really 
important consequences for all the parties involved. First, 
Israel was rejected as an Asian country by the majority of 
Afro-Asian countries. After Bandung, Israel had no chance 
whatsoever of participating in any of their official or 
unofficial gatherings.
"The Third World is regarded in Israel as a potentially 
powerful catalyst for effecting an Arab-Israel 
reconciliation. Friendly with both Israel and the Arab
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States, desirous of maintaining stable relations with both 
protagonists, basically unhampered by preconceptions or 
prejudices regarding either, and neutral in the dispute, 
Third World nations are seen in Jerusalem as a force which 
will provide moral backing for - indeed, will insist upon - 
the commencement of direct negotiations between the 
protagonists as a first stage toward conclusive peace 
agreements”. 57 The Bandung Conference put paid to any such 
hopes.
Secondly, as a logical consequence of this, Israel was 
also excluded from the NAM which was predominantly Afro- 
Asian and was formally launched in Belgrade in 1961. This in 
essence meant that the 'no war-no peace' stance of the Arabs 
was acquiesced (if not accepted) by the majority of Afro- 
Asian nations. This, in turn, sidelined both the Non-Aligned 
as a collectivity and India as a country (which was on good 
terms with both the Arabs and the Israelis) as possible 
mediators between the two antagonists. The result was a 
dangerous and potentially explosive deadlock.
Thirdly, it was also clear by then that the superpowers 
were trying to manipulate and exploit this dispute to 
further their own narrow interests in the region. A 
peaceful solution to the problem at this stage would not 
only have been easier, but it would also have minimised the 
chances of superpowers to meddle in the affairs of the 
region (which again was the avowed objective of the NAM).
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E. The Aftermath: The Indian Perspective
Nehru realised this explosive situation, but expressed 
his helplessness to do any thing to stem the rot in his 
talks with Brecher. It is worthwhile to quote at length 
Brecher's interview with Nehru just after Bandung 
Conference.
NEHRU....Arab nations and Israel don't sit together. 
They do sit at the United Nations, but apart from that, they 
just don't sit. And one is offered this choice of having one 
or the other. It is not logical, my answer, but there it is. 
When the proposal was made for Israel to be invited... it 
transpired that if that were done the Arab countries would 
not attend...our outlook on this matter was based on some 
logical approach. Our sympathies are with the Arab nations 
in regard to this problem. We felt that logically Israel 
should be invited but when we saw that the consequences of 
that invitation would be that many others would not be able 
to come, then we agreed. Our approach, obviously, if I may 
add, is that it is good for people who are opponents to 
meet.
BRECHER. Yes, but the Arabs have refused every 
invitation to sit and talk about the question of peace in 
West Asia.
NEHRU. It is obvious that there is the way of war to 
settle the question and, if you rule out war, then the only
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way is to meet - or allow things to drift.
BRECHER. But drift has the great risk surely that it 
may itself lead to war.
NEHRU. Yes, I know, but actually there is no other 
way.58
Therefore, the Bandung Conference only allowed "things 
to drift" with regard to the Middle East. Moreover, it had 
inadvertently contributed to the Palestine issue reaching a 
boiling point.
F. The Aftermath: The Israeli Perspective
The impact of the Bandung Conference on Israel was 
"devastating". It felt both humiliated and isolated. As one 
high ranking Israeli official put it: "Bandung was our
greatest diplomatic setback. It was the greatest trauma we 
ever suffered. That two and one half billion people could be 
united in such a way against 1.8 million people in Israel 
was in itself soul-shattering to all of us in the Foreign 
Ministry".59
The general sense of insecurity and concern that 
enveloped Israel following the reverses it suffered in the 
international arena prompted Ben-Gurion to return from his 
self-imposed seclusion, and take over as the Prime Minister 
from Sharett. Sharett was considered too "soft" in foreign 
affairs and, was also thought to have placed too much faith 
in the U.N. and the major powers to ameliorate Israel*s
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deteriorating security environment.
"The change in leadership was interpreted at home and 
abroad as signifying a stiffening of foreign policy and a 
more aggressive Israeli stand on all fronts".60 
Consequently, the year 1956 saw an "agonising reappraisal" 
of Israel's foreign policy so that the future policy would 
be "geared to facts, not hopes".
"In the long run, the reappraisal brought about 
powerful diplomatic drives upon Afro-Asia. In the short run, 
it dictated a stiffening of Israel's policy vis-a-vis her 
neighbours, which led directly to the 1956 Sinai Campaign 
[the Suez crisis] , designed to extricate her from the 
unendurable daily provocations and an adverse balance of 
power".61
THE SUEZ CRISIS, 1956
The Suez crisis of 1956 constituted a watershed in 
India's relations with Israel. Here, we would confine our 
analysis to the impact this crisis had on Indo-Israeli 
relations.62
When the U.S. and the U.K. withdrew their offer of 
assistance to the construction of Aswan Dam, Egypt reacted 
by nationalising the Suez Canal. While efforts were still 
underway to settle the dispute, Israeli forces invaded Sinai 
on 29th. Oct. 1956. To make things worse, Israel was joined
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in this adventure by the U.K. and France a few days later, 
in accordance with the prior understanding reached with 
Israel.
India's reaction to this development was sharp and 
forthright. An official statement issued on 31st. Oct. 
denounced Israeli aggression as a flagrant violation of the 
U.N. Charter, and in opposition to all the principles laid 
down in the Bandung Conference.63 Nehru publicly branded 
Israeli action as "clear naked aggression", and was critical 
of the British and French backing it received.64
Whatever might have been the provocations, the open 
Israeli attack on Egypt created much anger and resentment in 
India. The fact that Israel collaborated with ex-colonial 
powers like the U.K. and France, in attacking a Third World 
country dissipated whatever sympathy and understanding the 
Indian leadership and the intelligentsia had had for Israel.
The attack also gave credence to certain notions which 
existed in certain quarters in the Afro-Asian world about 
Israel. It reinforced the view that Israel was an outpost of 
Western imperial interests, and that it was essentially a 
European country in the wrong continent.
Nevertheless, the Suez crisis did have a silver lining 
as far as India was concerned. India's posture towards 
Israel till then was rather inconsistent and awkward. 
"Indian attitudes subsequent to 1956 almost betrayed a sense 
of relief that what was an uncomfortable posture could now
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be continued with a feeling of moral righteousness."65
The Suez Crisis came at a particularly awkward moment 
for Israel. It took place on the very day the former Israeli 
foreign minister Moshe Sharett*s meeting66 with Nehru in New 
Delhi. Sharett himself was strongly against the Sinai 
campaign but having presented with a fait accompli, he had 
no choice but to defend Israel’s action.
Nehru was highly critical of Israel's aggressiveness 
and imperviousness to the fate of Arab refugees. Regardless 
of the merits or otherwise of the Israeli Sinai campaign, 
one unfortunate outcome of this action was that whatever 
possibility that might have existed for full diplomatic 
relations between India and Israel had now definitely 
receded.
Israelis, on their part, were not exactly amused by the 
vacillation and ambivalence that characterised the Indian 
Government's approach to the Jewish State. "Israeli 
attitudes have run the gamut, from expectation to hope to 
disappointment to dismay, and, finally, to anger."67
They found the Indian attitude to Israel to be at 
variance with what India had been preaching in international 
forums like friendship with all, judging issues on their 
merits, and accepting political facts of life. Their 
disappointment in Nehru was intense; it was as if their 
personal trust in Nehru was shattered.
Ben-Gurion made a pointed reference to this when he
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said, "I cannot understand how Mr.Nehru fits his behaviour 
to Israel with Gandhi*s philosophy of universal friendship. 
Mr.Nehru gave definite promises to the Director-General of 
our Foreign Ministry eight years ago that he would soon 
establish normal diplomatic relations with Israel, but so 
far he has not kept his word."68
Later, in an article reviewing Israel's position in 
world politics, Ben-Gurion was sharply critical of Nehru. He 
said, "Nehru too claims allegiance to neutrality....He is 
not even neutral in regard to Israel and the Arabs, for he 
has close ties and normal relations with the Arab countries
—  but he has stubbornly refused to establish diplomatic 
relations with Israel, and in his frequent visits to the 
Middle East he has on every occasion —  and not by accident
—  overlooked Israel".69
At this juncture, it must be emphasised that 
"difficulties of finance and personnel" were never the 
consideration in India not establishing diplomatic relations 
with Israel. Nor was it ever the thought that Israel was not 
important enough for India to have full fledged diplomatic 
ties, as alleged in some quarters.70
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COVERT CONTACTS
A. The Early Initiatives
It was India* s inability or unwillingness to take 
initiative of any sort or adopt a more active diplomatic 
posture towards the Arab-Israeli dispute, that more or less 
compelled it to keep its relationship with Israel under the 
wraps. Whatever may have been India*s official and public 
posture towards Israel over the decades, there is no 
gainsaying that India has always maintained a working but 
covert relationship with the Jewish State.
Surprisingly enough, there have been extensive contacts 
between the two countries - official and private - at 
various levels.71 This in itself is ample proof of the fact 
that Israel is not as insignificant a factor in India's 
policy calculations as it appears. To dismiss Israel as 
expendable to India's policy concerns in the Middle East 
seems to be a mere rationalisation at best.
After Israeli foreign minister Moshe Sharett's secret 
visit to India in 1956, another approach was made to Nehru 
in Washington by the then Israeli foreign minister Abba Eban 
in 1960. Nothing came of this meeting either.
It was about this time that the Israeli Foreign Office 
instructed its officials not to broach the subject of 
diplomatic relations with their Indian counterparts again.
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As Yaakov Shimoni, the Deputy Director-General of the 
Israeli Foreign Ministry explained, "Until then our policy 
was to ask for an exchange of ambassadors on every possible 
occasion...but we have some pride left....We were tired of 
being told, * Please do not worry us1 and being put off 
repeatedly".72
B. The Sino-Indian War, 1962
The next important contact between the two countries 
was at the time of the Sino-Indian war of 1962. The Indian 
military debacle shook Nehru, and in his hour of need he 
turned to Israel.73 India mainly sought light mortars of 81- 
and 120- millimeters from Israel. Even in times of such 
grave national crisis, New Delhi could not get over her 
self-imposed inhibitions with regard to Arab sensitivities 
to such a deal.
Hence, Israel was asked if the weapons could be 
delivered in ships that did not fly the Israeli flag. Ben- 
Gurion^ blunt reply was, "No flag, no weapons". In the end, 
the Israeli cargo ship 'Jarden' arrived in Bombay with 
"automatic rifles, mortars, grenades, etc". The Israelis, on 
their part, imposed no preconditions such as exchange of 
ambassadors, and responded promptly to the Indian call for 
help.
In Jan. 1963, the then Chief of the Indian Army Gen. J. 
N. Chaudhuri invited his Israeli counterpart Gen. Shateel
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and the Chief of Military Intelligence, who were on an 
official visit to Burma, to visit Delhi on their way back 
for an exchange of views following India*s military debacle 
against China. This could not possibly have done without 
Nehru*s knowledge and approval.74
C. The Indo-Pak War, 1965
Again, India received a modest amount of military 
hardware from Israel during the 1965 war over Kashmir with 
Pakistan. According to Israeli Consul-General Yaakov Morris, 
Israel supplied heavy mortars to India during the conflict. 
He also said that Israel supported India's case on Kashmir, 
and had stated in the U.N. that Kashmir belonged to India.
He offered transit facilities through Israel for Indian 
trade with the West which could have saved India Rs. 38 
crores a year in freight charges. Israel would also 
appreciate Indian efforts to bring Israel and the Arabs to 
the conference table so that they could have direct 
negotiations.75
MOMENTS OF PETTINESS
While India maintained covert contacts with Israel ever 
since her creation, its public stance vis-a-vis Israel often 
lacked diplomatic finesse, and at times almost bordered on 
pettiness and uncivility.
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For instance, the Israeli Consul in Bombay wanted to 
hold the National Day reception of his country in New Delhi 
in April 1964. But the Indian Government refused him 
permission on the ground that he would exceed his functions 
as Consul in Bombay.
The establishment of the Indo-Israeli Friendship 
Society in Aug. 1964 annoyed the Arabs. In Oct. of the same 
year, the presence of an office bearer (Miss Romila Thapar) 
of the Indo-Israeli Friendship Society, at a dinner given by 
the Ministry of External Affairs (in honour of a Lebanese 
newspaper editor) led to a walkout of the Ambassadors of 
Lebanon, Iraq and Morocco, and the Arab League 
representative. The Lebanese Ambassador was later summoned 
by the Ministry of External Affairs and questioned about his 
undiplomatic action in leading the walkout.76
In May 1966, the Food and Agriculture Minister Mr. C. 
Subramaniam told the Lok Sabha that Israel offered to supply 
fertilisers to India but India declined the offer because of 
"political considerations". On being asked whether people 
should be allowed to starve because of the government's 
politics, he replied "We had to take into account other 
reactions. In the judgement of the Government, we thought we 
need not accept it".77
Reacting sharply to the above incident, The Times of 
India editorially commented that India's handling of the 
Israeli offer showed, "a deplorable lack of finesse". "In
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fairness to Arab countries, it must be mentioned that there 
is no reason to believe that they would have attributed 
sinister motives to such an innocent and marginal contact 
with Israel1*. It advised the government that its policy 
should be based on "mature considerations and not on 
inhibitory fears”.78
Again in 1966, the Calcutta Police permitted Arab 
demonstrations to come close to the Israeli President Shazar 
who was passing through India on an official visit to Nepal. 
The Indian Government refused to let President Shazar rest 
overnight in New Delhi, and sent no official to greet him at 
the airport when his plane stopped for refuelling.79
There was an outcry both in the Lok Sabha and in the 
Indian Press over the "curt and uncivil treatment" meted out 
to the Israeli President by the Indian Government.80
It is difficult to imagine the possible motives behind 
the actions of the Indian Government in the series of 
incidents narrated above. It could not possibly be 
attributed to India*s abhorrence of Israeli policies, for 
India always had a working private relationship with 
Israel. If it was meant to please the Arabs then, it is an 
insult to Arab intelligence for the Arab States themselves 
always weighed their actions in terms of their concrete 
national interests and not in terms of petty and frivolous 
considerations.
Perhaps, the more probable explanation for these
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indefensible, inexplicable and almost laughable actions of 
the Indian Government was its extreme self-consciousness and 
timidity, in its dealings with the region in general and 
with the Arab-Israeli dispute in particular.
THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR, 1967
The uneasy and fragile peace that obtained in the 
Middle East after the Suez Crisis could not have been 
maintained indefinitely. What was needed was a mere spark to 
set off the powder keg which the region had become on 
account of the Arab-Israeli dispute.
The recurring Syrian commando raids into Israel 
provoked an Israeli threat of retaliation in May 1966. This, 
in turn, led to Damascus invoking the military pact it had 
signed with Egypt in 1966. Nasser responded by saying that 
the U.A.R. would fight if Israel attacked Syria.
Meanwhile, the U.N. Secretary-General U Thant flew to 
Cairo for discussions with the leaders of the U.A.R. on 
21st May. Then came the U.A.R.'s decision to close the Gulf 
of Aqaba to Israeli shipping and to other shipping carrying 
strategic goods for Israel. And the die was cast.
On 6th. June the Israeli Air Force, in a preemptive 
strike, more or less destroyed the U.A.R. Air Force in a 
couple of hours. This was followed by a rout of the Arab
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armies by the Israeli forces. In the six days that the war 
lasted, the Israelis seized the Sinai, the Gaza, the Golan 
Heights, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from the Arabs.
The way the Indian Government handled this crisis 
generated much heat and controversy within the Government, 
in the Parliament and in the national press.
On 25th. May 1967, the Minister of External 
Affairs, Mr.M.C. Chagla made a statement in both the Houses 
of Parliament. The first sentence he uttered - "The creation 
of Israel has given rise to tension between Israel and the 
Arab countries"81 - caused much resentment. Some members 
interpreted it to mean that he was questioning the very 
existence of Israel.
Regarding the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba, he said 
that the Indian Government had accepted that "the Gulf of 
Aqaba is an inland sea and that the entry to the Gulf lies 
within the territorial waters of UAR and Saudi Arabia".82 
Mr. Chagla seemed to implicitly acknowledge and justify the 
U.A.R.'s right to close the Gulf of Aqaba to Israel.
Addressing the Lok Sabha again in July 1967, Mr. Chagla 
justified his statement about the creation of Israel by 
saying that it was a "factual statement", and reminded the 
members that India had recognised Israel.83
Regarding the Gulf of Aqaba (i.e. whether it was in the 
territorial waters of the U.A.R. or whether it was an 
international waterway), Mr. Chagla quoted statements made
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by Mr. Dulles in 1957 and the British Foreign Secretary Mr. 
George Brown in 1967 to justify the Indian Government's 
stand.84
What Mr. Chagla seemed to conveniently forget was the 
fact that the issue, by then, had gone beyond legal 
semantics, and that the closing of the Gulf of Aqaba could 
have meant cutting off Israel's lifeline.
How long could Israel have tolerated such a situation 
to continue while waiting for international mediation to 
solve the problem is anybody's guess. There could be very 
little doubt that it was Nasser's rash action of closing the 
Gulf of Aqaba that precipitated the crisis which resulted in 
another Arab military debacle.
However, Mrs. Gandhi seemed completely impervious to 
this reality when she told the Lok Sabha on 6th. June 1967, 
"I do not wish to utter harsh words or use strong language. 
But on the basis of information available there can be no 
doubt that Israel has escalated the situation into an armed 
conflict, which has now acquired the proportions of a full 
scale war".85
The attitude of the Indian Government to the conflict 
predictably came under severe attack from the opposition. 
The Swatantra Party felt that India should be neutral 
between the Arabs and Israel. The Jana Sangh accused the 
government of being "a war monger". The Praja Socialist 
Party felt that India had gone too far in supporting the
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U.A.R. One Jana Sangh member even accused the government of 
converting India in to the 14th. Arab state. Some MPs 
enquired if the government's anti-Israeli policy would 
jeopardise American food aid to India. These opposition 
parties had their own reasons for being critical of the 
government's blatantly pro-Arab policy.86
What did come as a surprise, though, was the fact that 
"Dissatisfaction with the West Asia policy is as widespread 
as it is strong. It is by no means confined to the ranks of 
the opposition;... Even within the Cabinet's Foreign Affairs 
Committee, serious doubts were expressed by some of the most 
senior Ministers before they agreed to the policy statement 
eventually made by Mrs. Gandhi in Parliament....The 
angularities, excesses and distortions of the West Asia 
policy have apparently become the enemy of its pith and 
substance".87
On 20th. July, it was reported that there were sharp 
exchanges between Mrs. Gandhi and the members of the 
Congress Party Parliamentary Executive over the government's 
Middle Eastern policy. Some of the members later admitted 
that the party was split on the issue, and that many of its 
members were opposed to the Government's line. The issue 
became so contentious that Mrs. Gandhi felt compelled to 
threaten a General Election to demonstrate popular support 
for her government's Middle Eastern policy.
A couple of days later, amid rumours of opposition to
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her the Middle Eastern policy from the Deputy Prime Minister 
and Finance Minister Mr. Morarji Desai and the Defence 
Minister Mr. Swaran Singh, she denied that there was rift in 
the Cabinet over the issue.88 Nevertheless, "enough had 
happened to indicate that opposition to the Government’s 
Middle East policy was sufficiently widespread to bring its 
very existence into jeopardy".89
Moreover, this was the first time that there was such 
extensive criticism both in the press and the public about 
the Indian Government's attitude to the Arab-Israeli 
dispute. All the major newspapers were critical of India's 
unqualified and unwarranted support to reckless Arab 
actions, such as ordering the withdrawal of the U.N.E.F. and 
the closing of the Gulf of Aqaba which precipitated the 
crisis and made conflict inevitable.90
Moreover, an opinion poll was conducted by the Indian 
Institute of Public Opinion in the middle of July on the the 
Middle East conflict in the cities of Delhi, Bombay, 
Calcutta and Madras. Two out of three respondents in these 
cities were opposed to India extending unqualified support 
to the Arabs, and were of the opinion that India needs to 
take a "more objective and impartial stand" on the Arab- 
Israeli dispute.91
To cap it all, India chose to play a partisan role in 
the U.N. in favour of the Arabs in spite of the fact that it 
was one of the non-permanent members of the Security Council
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at that time. India's Permanent Representative Mr. G. 
Parthasarathy, more or less endorsed the Arab and 
particularly the U.A.R.'s position in the dispute,92 and 
placed the responsibility for the "grave situation" 
prevailing in the Middle East "squarely on Israel".93
Mr. Chagla, addressing the Fifth Emergency Special 
Session of the U.N. General Assembly on 21st. June, stated 
that "The first thing to be insisted upon, and to be 
implemented, has to be withdrawals, total and unqualified, 
immediate and unconditional, of all Israeli forces from all 
Arab territories".94
India also introduced a Draft resolution95 along with 
Mali and Nigeria. It envisaged Israeli withdrawal from 
occupied territories, right of every State to live in peace 
and security, a just settlement of the question of Palestine 
refugees, and freedom of navigation in accordance with 
international law in the area.
The Israeli foreign minister, Mr. Abba Eban, 
predictably rejected the Indian resolution on the grounds 
that it was formulated without consulting Israel, and that 
it prejudiced Israel's negotiating position in advance. "The 
suggestion that Israel should move from the cease fire lines 
without a peace treaty defining permanent and secure 
frontiers is unacceptable" he said.96
It is difficult to believe that India expected Israel 
to take this resolution seriously, as a possible basis for
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solving its dispute with the Arabs. To expect Israel to 
withdraw from occupied lands without an overall settlement 
is rather naive. In fact, this is in complete contrast to 
India*s own approach to regaining the territory it lost to 
China during the Sino-Indian war of 1962. It is possible 
that the resolution was intended more as a demonstration of 
India*s support to the Arab cause rather than as a fair and 
realistic basis for negotiation.
Incidentally, it may be of interest to note that Syria 
off-handedly rejected the Indian resolution on the Middle 
East together with that of the U.S. Both these drafts were 
unacceptable to Syria because they subjected Israeli 
withdrawal to conditions.97
India was much more directly involved in the six-day 
war than any other Middle Eastern conflict. Apart from the 
fact that India was one of the non-permanent members of the 
Security Council at the time of the conflict, an Indian, 
Maj. Gen. Inder Jit Rikhye, commanded the U.N. Emergency 
Force in the Gaza and Sinai, and a battalion of the Indian 
Army was a part of that force. When the fighting broke out 
on 5th. June, the Indian contingent came under artillery 
fire and air-straffing from the Israelis (in all 
probability, by mistake).98 Fourteen Indian soldiers were 
killed, twenty-one wounded, and nineteen reported missing. 
Mrs.Gandhi described these attacks as "deliberate and 
without provocation", and asked the House to "unreservedly
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condemn this cowardly attack".99
There can be little doubt that this incident cost 
Israel considerable sympathy in India. However, there was 
opposition to a move in Parliament to condemn this attack on 
the ground that Indian troops should have been withdrawn 
from the battlezone earlier. Later, the Israeli Government 
expressed condolence and offered to pay compensation, but 
the Indian Government rejected both the offers.
Purely from a military point of view, though, Israeli 
achievements in the brief war seemed to have impressed quite 
a few Indians. The Indian defence minister, Swaran Singh, 
told the Lok Sabha that "India is deeply impressed by the 
achievements of the Israeli armed forces and particularly 
their tactics of speedy mobilization at extremely short 
notice. It was, therefore, keen to find out how Israel had 
been able to mobilize her entire force in less than 24 hours 
and in such a manner that it ensured positive results".100
Major Ranjit Singh, a member of Lok Sabha and founder 
member of the Indian Parliamentary Defence Council, visited 
Israel for a on-the-spot study of the six-day war. He 
recommended a defence system similar to that of Israel, 
against China and Pakistan. Moshe Dayan reportedly told Mr. 
Singh that Israel used to its advantage, the tactics 
employed by the Indians against Pakistan in 1965.101
The Jewish Chronicle [London] referred to Ma j. Singh's 
visit and said: "India urgently needs a system of defence
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similar to Israel*s 'Nahol' [soldier farmer] settlements to 
safeguard her frontiers from Chinese and Pakistani 
aggression. Major Singh believed that there were many 
similarities between the origin, course and outcome of the 
six day war and those of Indo-Pak war of 1965".102
The Arab military debacle only reinforced Arab 
intransigence and hostility towards Israel. The Arab summit 
in Khartoum in Aug. 1967 passed a resolution which contained 
three 'Nos': No recognition, No negotiation, and No peace 
with Israel. Politically, the Arab-Israeli dispute was back 
to square one.
Notwithstanding the publicly partisan attitude of the 
Indian Government during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, India 
maintained cordial but low-key contacts with Israel 
thereafter. The Israeli foreign minister, Abba Eban, 
attended a reception for Mrs. Gandhi in New York in Oct. 
1968.103
Mrs.Ruth Dayan, wife of Israeli defence minister Moshe 
Dayan, visited New Delhi to attend an International Labour 
Organization Conference of experts on the role of 
handicrafts in the national economy. Speaking at a reception 
held in her honour in New Delhi, she hoped for greater 
understanding between India and Israel.104
Though India always maintained that its support for the 
Arabs was based on the merits of their case and was 
independent of other considerations, the fact of the matter
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was that India always expected a quid pro quo from the Arabs 
in terms of their support for Pakistan (in relation to its 
dispute with India).
After the Rabat fiasco in 1969, the Indian foreign 
minister, Dinesh Singh, had an half-hour meeting with the 
Israeli foreign minister, Abba Eban, at the "latter*s 
request” in New York on 3rd.Oct. 1969. The meeting was 
primarily intended to underscore the point that friendship 
implied "reciprocity" to those Arab countries which sided 
with Pakistan to keep India out of the Islamic summit in 
Rabat.105 However, the fact that India's insistence on Arab 
"reciprocity" found no takers in the Arab world was clearly 
demonstrated within a couple of years during the Bangladesh 
crisis.
THE BANGLADESH CRISIS, 1971
The Bangladesh crisis, and the lack of understanding 
shown by the the Middle Eastern countries to the influx of 
millions of refugees into India (following the military 
crackdown in East Pakistan), once again brought under a 
microscope India's policy to the region, especially India's 
relations with Israel.
Israel's response to the crisis was prompt and 
predictable for obvious reasons. Dr.DOV. B. Schmorak, the 
Director of Foreign Publicity of the Government of Israel,
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said at a news conference in New Delhi that, Israel had 
great sympathy for the sufferings of the people of 
Bangladesh. He also pointed out that Israel had already 
announced its decision to extend aid for the relief fund. He 
added for good measure that Israel would welcome the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with India.106
In July 1971, the ruling Congress Party member, Sant 
Bux Singh, supported the opposition-demand of India 
exchanging ambassadors with Israel. This demand was made in 
view of the lack of understanding displayed by the the 
Middle Eastern countries in relation to developments in East 
Pakistan.107
Amid reports that the Indian Government was 
reconsidering her Middle East policy on account of the 
attitude of the countries of that region towards the 
Bangladesh issue, the Indian foreign minister, Swaran Singh, 
told the Rajya Sabha in July that there was no change in 
India's support to the Palestinian cause, because India's 
stand on the issue was in consonance with "justice and facts 
of the situation".108
During the war, India received some military hardware 
and logistical support from Israel. According to Dr. Swamy,
D.P.Dhar "organised a certain crucial weapons" import from 
Israel.109
In Jan. 1972, India scotched all rumours that it was 
going to establish diplomatic relations with Israel. An
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official spokesman described the rumours as "totally false 
and baseless”. However, one can not help wondering as to why 
the Indian Government chose not to upgrade its relations 
with Israel during the Bangladesh crisis. This would have 
been a diplomatic slap on the face of the Arabs not to take 
India's support for granted. Public opinion in India, 
generally speaking, would have welcomed such a move.
The Press was certainly critical of the treatment 
meted out to Israel. One newspaper commented that India's 
policy reflected "neither the realities of power in the area 
nor the civilities of customary diplomatic behaviour" but 
only the "myopia of a lobby in South Block ".110
Another opined that "India will benefit more through 
opening up its options in West Asia. It is an overdue move 
and if in making it our relations with some of the Arab 
states suffer a temporary setback well then, isn't India 
strong enough to take that in her stride ?".lll
Obviously, the Indian Government considered discretion 
to be the better part of valour and chose not to take the 
plunge. Looking back, it looks as though it was a good 
opportunity that India let go. Consequently, India was 
hardly in any position to do anything positive or 
constructive when the Arab-Israeli stalemate was shattered 
in Oct. 1973 by the booming Arab guns.
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THE YOM KIPPUR WAR, 1973
When Egypt and Syria launched a simultaneous and 
surprise attack on Israel on 7th. Oct. 1973, the Indian 
Government reacted in a way which had almost become 
customary by now.,fThe Government have consistently declared 
that the cause of the tension in the area is due to Israeli 
aggression and refusal to vacate territories occupied by 
armed force. This intransigence on the part of Israel is 
clearly the basic cause leading to the present outbreak of 
hostilities. Our sympathies are entirely with the Arabs 
whose sufferings have long reached a point of explosion" 
said the official statement.112
The next day, foreign minister, Swaran Singh, talking 
to pressmen in New Delhi stated that "justice denied for 
long creates frustration. And that is what happened in West 
Asia".113
Mrs.Gandhi, talking to pressmen in Gauhati on 10th. 
Oct., said that India could not do much to end the conflict 
in the Middle East. "Actually it is for the Arab states and 
others to decide what to do. Because all these times 
something was possible, but somehow the situation went on 
deteriorating".114
Indiafs Permanent Representative at the U.N., Samar 
Sen, demanding the withdrawal of Israel from occupied
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territories stated that "it will be both unfair and unjust 
for the Council to ask for a cease-fire, which will leave 
vast territories of Egypt, Jordan and Syria in the illegal 
occupation of Israel".115
India's stand once again reflected a total support to 
the Arabs and conveniently ignored certain unpleasant facts 
in relation to the conflict. While Israeli intransigence was 
berated no reference was made to the Arab refusal to
A i|
negotiate. The fact that the Arabs had initiated the 
hostilities was by-passed. Moreover, India's stand at the 
U.N. seemed to justify the Arab use of force to regain the 
lost territory.
Suffice to say that India's stand on the issue was 
neither constructive nor realistic. It once again betrayed a 
desire to curry favour with the Arabs by assuming a 
vociferously pro-Arab stand with little regard to the facts 
of the situation a tendency which it displayed again when it 
chose to side with the Arabs in branding Zionism as a form 
of racism at the UN a couple of years later.
ZIONISM-AS-RACISM RESOLUTION, 1975
It goes without saying that India made a major blunder in 
1975 by voting for the U.N. General Assembly resolution 
No.3379 which determined that "Zionism is a form of racism 
and racial discrimination".116, at the 2400th Plenary
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meeting on 10th. Nov. 1975. India always maintained that the 
Arab-Israeli dispute was a political one, which was 
consistent with her own secular approach to politics. It 
also deemphasised the importance of religion in the Middle 
Eastern politics which again was in her own enlightened 
self-interest.
Hence, it would have been more prudent and more 
consistent with her own stand if India had either abstained 
or even absented itself from voting. By voting for the 
resolution, India had diluted her own principled stand on 
the issue, and made a mockery of her own long-term 
interests. India's Ambassador to the U.S., T.N.Kaul's, 
explanation that the Indian support to the resolution was 
not an act against Israel or Jews but to protest against 
what he termed "anti-Arabism” .117, sounds rather 
unconvincing and simplistic.
THE JANATA GOVERNMENT AND ISRAEL
When the first non-Congress Government was formed in New 
Delhi in 1977 following Mrs.Gandhi's electoral debacle, 
hopes were raised of a fresh look at the successive Congress 
Governments' foreign policy. The fact that the Janata Party, 
during its election campaign, promised to subscribe to 
"genuine nonalignment" gave rise to such speculation. When a 
former Jana Sanghite and a vocal critic of traditional
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Indian policy towards the Middle East Mr.A.B. Vajpayee took 
over as foreign minister, expectations rose even further. 
However, the Janata Party*s foreign policy initiatives, such 
as they were, proved to be "much ado about nothing".
The Israeli foreign minister, Moshe Dayan, paid a 
secret visit to India in Aug. 1977, which he himself 
described as "somewhat odd and not very important".118 The 
visit had to remain secret because the then Director of the 
Intelligence Bureau, John Lobo, told Morarji that he could 
not guarantee Dayan*s safety in India if he came openly.
Dayan met both Morarji and Vajpayee. Morarji reiterated 
India's traditional stand on the Middle East saying that 
Israel should withdraw from occupied territories which 
should be proclaimed a Palestinian State. Regarding 
diplomatic relations, he said that it should have been done 
at the time of recognition and he could not do it now. He 
further said that he would be out of office if Dayan's visit 
became public but he took the risk for the sake of peace.
Then Moshe Dayan raised a very pertinent point. "Now, 
when his [Morarji's] help was needed on behalf of peace, he 
could do nothing, since he had no diplomatic relations with 
Israel; and once peace was attained, and India were to 
establish such relations, its help would no longer be 
necessary".119
However, it must be admitted that the Janata Government 
was in no position to take such a momentous decision for it
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was a weak coalition Government. Only a strong, cohesive and 
confident government could have made such a major foreign 
policy decision.
Besides, the foreign minister, Vajpayee, was a former 
member of the Jana Sangh, and as a member of the opposition, 
was a vocal critic of the Congress Party*s Middle East 
policy. When he took over as the foreign minister, he was 
very much on the defensive in relation to the Middle East, 
and was bending backwards to assure the Arabs of continued 
Indian support.
More importantly, India*s economic stake in the region 
had increased substantially after the oil boom, and the 
Janata Government was understandably loathe to do anything 
that might jeopardise it.
For instance, in Dec. 1977, Vajpayee flatly denied that 
his government had anything to do with a reported statement 
by an official of his Ministry that Sadat's visit to Israel 
was a "bold step". Prem Bhatia, writing in Nagpur Times, 
described this as "a most unedifying example of the Janata 
Government's slavery to the policy of timidness in the 
conduct of international affairs which has come down to the 
present regime from its predecessor".12 0
Finally, when Sadat's courageous and bold initiative 
broke the decades of diplomatic silence between the Arabs 
and Israel, and led to the signing of Camp David Accord, 
the Janata Government's reaction was extremely cautious and
muted. Vajpayee stated at a press conference that India did 
not welcome it because:
1. Palestine was the hard core of the the Middle 
Eastern problem, and there could be no peace unless the 
rights of the Palestinians were restored;
2. The Accord was silent on the status of Jerusalem;
3.The PLO was not accepted as the representative body 
of the Palestinians.121
A few weeks later, the Janata Government extended a 
qualified support to Camp David saying that it "cannot but 
commend the efforts to bring about a peaceful solution to 
the problems of an area which has seen dangerous 
conflicts".122
However, the proof of India's real appreciation of the 
signing of the Camp David Accord came later when India 
firmly opposed the move by some Arab countries to expel 
Egypt from the NAM for signing a separate peace treaty with 
Israel. Morarji told Cuba that he would stay away from the 
Havana summit if any effort was made to exclude Egypt from 
the conference.123
The Janata Government's contacts with Israel continued 
even after Dayan's visit to India. When Morarji went to 
London to attend the Commonwealth Conference, he met the 
Israeli defence minister, Weizman, who urged closer contacts 
between the two countries. The Israelis offered their 
military technology to India including the Mirage III, the
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Kaffir jet fighters and the Merkevah tanks through third 
countries.
V.Shankar, the Principal Private Secretary to the Prime 
Minister, visited Israel for four days in early 1979 to 
explore this offer. But no deal could be struck because the 
Janata Government fell in July 1979.124
But Dayan's visit to India remained a secret till Mrs. 
Gandhi made it public in early 1980, after she returned to 
power following the collapse of the Janata Government. At a 
press conferencel25 in May 1980, Vajpayee said that Dayan 
"came on his own initiative, in cognito and without any 
prior knowledge of the External Affairs Ministry". He said 
he had earlier denied the visit in "national interest". "I 
am also constrained to say that the closest relationship 
between the two countries was in 1962, 1965 and 1971 and not 
during my tenure in the external affairs Ministry" he added. 
He accused Mrs. Gandhi of using the episode for electoral 
gains [Assembly elections], and retorted that "The eye-patch 
of Mr. Moshe Dayan is insufficient to cover the price-rise 
for sugar, baby food and all essential commodities".
However, according to Dr. Swamy, Mrs. Gandhi's 
government did not snap the links established by the Janata 
Government with Israel. Defence deals worth about Rs.60 
crores were negotiated with Israel through third party 
contacts.
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THE ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON, 1982
The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 brought about a 
strong condemnation from India. India's foreign minister, 
Narasimha Rao, addressing a function organised by All India 
Indo-Arab Friendship Association on 19th. June in New 
Delhi, said: "This naked aggression adds yet another sordid 
chapter to Israel's already infamous history of misdeeds. It 
is an action indicative of intransigence, utter disregard of 
basic human values and international public opinion, and 
open defiance of them".
"It is an attempt to exterminate a people whose hearths 
and homes Israel has occupied illegally for well over three 
decades..." he added.
He implicitly criticised the U.S. for not restraining 
Israel by saying that Israel must be "made to see reason by 
those who are in a position to do so".126
Mrs. Gandhi minced no words when she told the Lok Sabha 
on 9th. July 1982: "This Israeli action is a flagrant
violation of all canons of international law and behaviour. 
It is indicative of an arrogance which has shown callous 
disregard for the rights of other nations and peoples". She 
called upon "nations who are in a position to influence 
Israel to take immediate steps to lift the siege of West 
Beirut and withdraw its troops to its own territory".127
India also rushed medicines, medical equipment, and
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food stuffs to Lebanon. Two medical teams were sent to 
Damascus to render aid to the injured.
THE PAKISTANI BOMB AND INDO-ISRAELI COOPERATION
Even before India's virulent criticism of Israel's 
invasion of Lebanon had died down, there were reports in the 
international press that India and Israel were in touch with 
each other, because of their mutual concern about Pakistan's 
nuclear programme. It was reported that Israel was worried 
that Pakistan might pass on its nuclear technology to its 
Arab friends.
Mrs.Gandhi, the report said, seriously considered a 
pre-emptive strike against Pak nuclear targets in 1982 but 
decided against it because of the fear that Pakistan would 
inflict equal damage to Indian nuclear installations.The 
Indian officials were quite dismissive about such 
speculation but reports persisted that India and Israel had 
held secret discussions about Pakistan's nuclear 
progress.128
It is difficult to vouch for the authenticity or 
otherwise of these rumours. However, going by past 
experience, it is fairly likely that there could have been 
some sort of cooperation between the two countries in 
monitoring Pak's nuclear programme, and in coordinating 
their security policies to counter this potential and mutual
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threat. It is plausible that this was one of the reasons why 
Mrs.Gandhi's Government resisted strong pressures both from 
the Arab Ambassadors and in the Parliament to close down the 
Israeli Consulate in Bombay in 1981.129 Again, in July 
1982, the Indian foreign minister Mr.P.V. Narasimha Rao 
assured the Lok Sabha that the "strong” demand for the 
closure of the Israeli Consulate was under "very serious 
consideration".130 However, the Indian Government thought 
it wise not to carry out its threat.
INDO- ISRAELI RELATIONS: A REAPPRAISAL
India's lackluster and low-key policy towards Israel 
ever since its creation is just an element of India's 
generally timid and passive posture towards the the Middle 
East as a whole, and is not a result of any unfriendly 
feelings towards the Jewish State. The creation of Pakistan 
and its efforts to cultivate its co-religionists in the 
Middle East in the name of Islamic solidarity put Indian 
policy makers on the defensive from the word go.
"The fact that the Muslims constitute the predominant 
section of the inhabitants in the region led to the belief 
that supporting the Muslim Arab states against the Jewish 
state of Israel per se, would be sufficient to promote 
India's interests. Implicit in it was the assumption that
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conflicts in West Asia were virtually coterminus with the 
Arab-Israeli conflict".131
Consequently, India's policy towards Israel tended to 
become more and more of a by-product of such attitude. 
India, having recognised Israel, refused to establish 
diplomatic relations with it, ostensibly in deference to 
Arab sentiments.
Thus, India, consciously or unconsciously started using 
Indo-Israeli relations to balance Pak-Arab relations, and as 
a result India's policy towards Israel was cast in a very 
rigid mould. This is very obvious from the way the Indian 
Government, over the years, made subtle threats to upgrade 
its relations with Israel whenever it felt slighted by the 
Arabs.
However, it can not be "reasonably argued that India 
obtained a quid pro quo from the Arab countries in her 
disputes with Pakistan. As a matter of fact, none of the 
Arab countries, including Egypt, ever supported India on the 
issue of Kashmir".132
On the other hand, "It is also entirely possible that 
if Indian policy had been more flexible and imaginative at 
certain crucial stages... India might have been instrumental 
in bridging the gap between the Arabs and the Israelis".133 
It is really doubtful if Arabs would have reacted 
harshly and concertedly if India had exchanged ambassadors 
with Israel at the time of recognition. After all, the Arabs
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have been doing business with scores of other countries that 
have had diplomatic relations with Israel. Nor was India an 
insignificant and nondescript country for the Arabs to just 
brush her aside.
On the whole, however, Indians were aware of the 
importance and usefulness of contacts with Israel. Hence, 
they followed a dual policy towards Israel: "private contact 
with and public denunciation of Israel”.
Whatever little balance India had displayed in its 
relations with Israel, simply disappeared with the emergence 
of Mrs.Gandhi on the Indian political scene. Her domestic 
electoral strategy of cultivating the depressed classes and 
minorities particularly Muslims as her "vote-banks" 
contributed in no small measure to this development. Mrs. 
Gandhi, instead of addressing the real problems and fears 
that haunted the Indian Muslims and trying to solve them on 
a longterm basis, adopted a vociferously pro-Palestinian and 
overtly anti-Israeli stance in order to gain the support of 
the Indian Muslims on the cheap.
According to one scholar "The first five months of Mrs. 
Gandhi*s Premiership were marked by an unmistakable 
hardening of this [anti-Israeli] attitude in comparison not 
only with the Nehru era but even with the immediately 
preceding Shastri regime”.134
The verbal excesses that India has committed in 
criticising Israel and supporting the Arabs helped neither.
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Supporting the Arabs against Israel is a negative way of 
earning their goodwill. Moreover, it cannot go on for ever. 
India can and should base her relationship with the Middle 
Eastern countries on a more positive and concrete basis 
which can be more durable. Nor should India allow the Arab- 
Israeli dispute to dominate its thinking vis-a-vis the 
Middle East. An overtly anti- Israeli stance in no way 
benefits the Indian Muslims. The policies pursued by 
successive governments over the years have made India 
irrelevant in the region - ignored by Israel and taken for 
granted by the Arabs.
Whatever may have been the compulsions of such a policy 
in the 1950s and 1960s, it can not be justified in the 1970s 
and 1980s when the strategic environment in the 
subcontinental, regional and global terms has undergone 
radical changes.
After the Bangladesh war in 1971, the balance of power 
has shifted decisively in favour of India in the 
subcontinent, and Pakistan's pretensions to parity with 
India were put paid. India has been in much more confident 
frame of mind in relation to its security concerns regarding 
Pakistan.
Pakistan itself has moved closer to the Middle Eastern 
countries particularly Iran and Saudi Arabia since its 
dismemberment. The Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 
made Pakistan a frontline State, and a recipient of massive
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American military and economic aid. With the threat of 
Islamic bomb looming large over the horizon, India cannot 
but consider Israel as a potential ally in any future 
dealings with the Middle East.
The attitude of the Arab countries themselves towards 
Israel has undergone changes in the 1970s. After the Camp 
David Accord in 1978, Egypt has normalised its relations 
with Israel. Without Egypt, the Arab military option against 
Israel is non-existent.
Saudi Arabia, along with Israel has been part of 
American strategic consensus vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. The Fahd 
Plan has implicitly acknowledged the existence of Israel as 
a State too. With its enormous wealth, Saudi Arabia would 
wield considerable influence in the region for a long time 
to come and given their political preferences, they are most 
likely to use this influence on the side of moderation and 
reconciliation. Iran's relations with Israel under the Shah 
were good though not publicised. Even Khomeini's Iran bought 
arms from Israel for its war with Iraq.
There have been reports that China has been importing 
arms and technology from Israel. 135 The U.S.S.R., too, has 
softened its attitude towards Israel in the 1980s.136 It has 
exchanged consular delegations with Israel, and has also 
adopted a liberal policy in relation to Jewish emigration 
from the U.S.S.R.
Even the Palestine Liberation Organization's attitude
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to Israel has undergone a remarkable change over the last 
two decades. Under Arafat's charismatic, moderate and 
pragmatic leadership, the PLO's approach to Israel has 
softened over the years, and is now much more conciliatory 
and realistic.137
Besides, Israel has been one of the most powerful and 
stable countries in the region over the last two decades or 
so. Any policy which fails to take cognizance of this simple 
truth is doomed to failure. In short, the power realities in 
the region by themselves necessitate a reorientation of 
India's policy towards the region in general and Israel in 
particular.
Given the nature of the American political system, the 
Jewish lobby in the U.S. would continue to wield political 
influence which would be out of all proportion to its 
numbers. India would be well-advised to take advantage of 
this peculiarly American phenomenon and have the Jewish 
lobby on its side.138 This would facilitate India's 
dealings with the U.S., and also counter whatever influence 
Pakistan has built up in the U.S. Congress and outside over 
the years.
Apart from increased trade, India can also benefit from 
Israel's experience in drip irrigation, desalination, 
horticulture, poultry farming, solar energy and medicine.
Indian policy makers over the years have shown a 
remarkable lack of sensitivity to the changing scenario in
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the region, and seemed to have been obsessed with playing it 
safe all the time. By and large, India has failed to develop 
a we11-thoughtout, balanced and integrated approach to the 
Middle East. Its approach to the region has been piecemeal 
in nature, smacked of ad hocism, and suffered from 
inexplicable political diffidence and self-consciousness. 
This is nowhere better demonstrated than in Indiafs 
relations with Israel over the decades. It is nothing less 
than scandalous that India failed to include Israel as an 
integral part of its policy towards a region which has been 
of utmost importance to her from the beginning. India's 
claims to regional preponderance would sound rather hollow 
if India failed to act with confidence and imagination in a 
region where it has so much at stake.
This is not to advocate that India should immediately 
upgrade its relations with Israel. The change should be 
gradual and incremental, and can be done, perhaps, even with 
the prior consultation of India's Arab friends. That way, 
India would regain its leverage with Israel, and serve its 
own enlightened interests as well as those of the Arabs in 
general and Palestinians in particular, much more positively 
and effectively than she was able to in the past.
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CHAPTER 7
INDIA AND THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
India's policy towards the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(the PLO) , has been one of the less understood but more sen­
sible aspects of India's policy towards the Middle East. In­
dia, of course has been closely following and concerned with 
the Palestinian issue from the very beginning.1 
In this chapter, an attempt would be made to study the In­
dian attitude to the Palestinian question in two parts, the 
first part dealing with the Indian approach to the issue 
after the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 till the 
assumption of leadership of the PLO in 1969 by Yasser 
Arafat and the second with the Indian attitude to the PLO 
thereafter.
In doing so, the emphasis would be on examining and analys­
ing the motives and calculations behind India's consistent 
support to the Palestinian cause. It would be argued that 
India's support to the Palestinians was, of necessity, 
rather unspectacular and less than substantial even in 
material terms. Since India was in no position to extend 
anything more than diplomatic support to the Palestinian 
cause, it need to be examined whether India used this option 
with dexterity and imagination. It would also be discussed 
whether India's non-relationship with Israel, which was
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deliberately cultivated to keep the Arab states in good 
humour, came in the way of India making a more effective 
contribution in furthering the Palestinian cause. Finally, 
it would be argued that the mere extension of vocal support 
to the Arab causes in general or the Palestinian issue in 
particular is a totally inadequate basis for promoting the 
Indian interests in a region which has been undergoing
tremendous changes in the last decade.
INDIA AND THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION TILL 1969
Though India*s political elite consistently and firmly 
upheld the cause of the Palestinian Arabs even before India 
won independence, one could discern a subtle change in their 
attitude to the issue after India became free in 1947 and 
particularly after the creation of the state of Israel in 
1948 in spite of India*s steadfast opposition to partition. 
While India did vote against the partition of Palestine and 
subsequently against the admission of Israel to the U.N. in
the General Assembly, Indian attitude to the issue, at this
stage, was governed by two important factors. First, Israel 
was, by then, a reality which simply could not be wished 
away. India could not but take cognizance of this basic fact 
regardless of what the Arabs felt or thought about it. 
Secondly, India was now an independent country and as such 
it could not get carried away by its emotional pre-
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independence sentiments towards the Palestinian issue. It, 
now, had to weigh the issue in terms of its concrete na­
tional interests in the sense that principle had to yield 
some place to pragmatism.
DIFFERENCES IN THE INDIAN AND ARAB APPROACHES
The Indian attitude to the Palestinian issue, from this 
point onwards, was characterised by the recognition of the 
reality of the State of Israel, a firm belief in the neces­
sity and possibility of solving the Palestinian issue 
through negotiations and a deep concern for the fate of the 
Palestinian refugees who were uprooted from their homes as a 
result of the Arab-Jewish conflict over Palestine.
In view of India's vociferous support for the Palestinians 
Arabs in the latter years, it is not often realised that In­
dia was one of the earliest countries to recognise the State 
of Israel. India, in fact, extended formal recognition to 
Israel on 17th Sept. 1950 in spite of considerable opposi­
tion from the Arab countries. According to the Official 
Communique, "... India's decision to recognise Israel is the 
recognition of an established fact".2 However, there seems 
to be so little awareness even in India with regard to 
India's recognition of the State of Israel that even a min­
ister of state of external affairs, as late as in the 1980s, 
having been asked if India recognised Israel de jure, could
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only mumble "I don't know" after a lot of dithering.3 
India also thought that it was both necessary and feasible 
to solve the Palestinian issue through negotiations. It was, 
of course, in India's interest to settle the issue amicably 
and through negotiations which would ensure peace and 
stability in a region which was so close and important to 
India. The Official Communique, in fact, makes a direct 
reference to this when it states that continuing non­
recognition "limits the effectiveness of the Government of 
India's role as a possible intermediary between Israel and 
Arab states".4
India, at this stage, recognised the problem of displaced 
Palestinians only as a "refugee" problem. Hence, the accent 
of India's approach was on the early return and rehabilita­
tion of the displaced Palestinian Arabs and the need to look 
after them till then. Thotigh India abstained from voting on 
the U.N. General Assembly resolution No. 194 (III) of 11 
Dec. 1948, its basic stand, thereafter, was in consonance 
with it.
The resolution, inter alia, states that "the refugees wish­
ing to return to their homes and live at peace with their 
neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest 
practicable date and that compensation should be paid for 
the property of those choosing not to return..." and efforts 
should be made to "facilitate the repatriation, resettlement 
and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and
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the payment of compensation... ”.5
It is absolutely important to emphasise these three elements 
in India's approach to the Palestinian question in order to 
demonstrate that there have been fundamental differences in 
the Indian approach and that of the more extremist elements 
among the Arabs and the Palestinians to the issue from the 
very beginning though these differences have been somewhat 
obscured by India's loud and consistent support for the 
Palestinian cause over the years.
Firstly, it is often overlooked that India never associated 
itself in any way with the extreme Arab demand for the liq­
uidation of the state of Israel. Once India recognised the 
existence of Israel as an established fact, it implicitly 
accepted the position that whatever solution put forward for 
solving the Palestinian refugee problem should address and 
take care of the legitimate security interests of the Jewish 
state.
To cite just one instance, in one of the preparatory meet­
ings in Colombo for the Afro-Asian conference in Bandung in 
1955, the Pakistani Prime Minister Muhammad Ali introduced a 
draft resolution which, inter alia, described the creation 
of Israel as a violation of international law. Nehru took 
serious exception to this and pointed out that since India 
recognised Israel, he could not condemn it as a violation of 
international law.6 India maintained this position firmly 
and consistently over the years which certainly is a major
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departure from the traditional Arab/Palestinian position of 
not accepting the existence of the State of Israel and an 
open commitment to its destruction.
Secondly, India never endorsed the Arab position of refusing 
to negotiate with Israel. India, over the years, stuck to 
the position that only direct negotiations between the Arabs 
and Israel would provide a way out of the Arab-Israeli 
stalemate. Nehru himself, time and again, "probed in his 
talks with Arab leaders, especially Nasser, into whether 
there was an opening for reconciliation with Israel, but he 
had always come up against a wall of steel".7 
However, Nehru refused to give up. At the Bandung con­
ference, he took exception to Mr. Ahmad Shukairy, a Pales­
tinian and a member of the Syrian delegation, who, in the 
course of his speech said that a negotiated settlement was 
not possible in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nehru 
maintained that "sometime or other, whether you are enemies 
or whether you have fought a war, there must be nego­
tiations. There is always some kind of settlement... After 
all, one can settle things either by compulsion, that is by 
pressure or by negotiation".8 Thus, India, from the begin­
ning, desired and supported a negotiated settlement to the 
Arab-Israeli dispute despite the fact that such a stand was 
not entirely to the liking of the Arabs.
Thirdly, India was genuinely concerned with the plight of 
the displaced Palestinians, though at this stage, India
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merely considered them as "refugees” and even thought it 
possible that some of them, at least, could be absorbed by 
various Arab countries. Hence, India extended consistent 
support to all efforts aimed at providing immediate relief 
as well as long term rehabilitation of the Palestinian 
refugees. This can be seen from the stand taken by Indian 
representatives and delegations at the U.N. over the years.
INDIAN SUPPORT TO THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AT THE U.N.
A member of the Indian delegation, Mr. Akbar Ali Khan, 
making a statement9 at the United Nations Special Political 
Committee in Nov. 1958 argued that "The responsibility for 
relief and rehabilitation of the refugees is the respon­
sibility of the United Nations because the refugees would 
not have become a homeless people had it not been for a 
political decision taken by the United Nations, and in spite 
of their opposition".
He further argued that "compensation is not a benefit to be 
conferred by someone on someone else - we feel that compen­
sation is a natural human right which never can be denied, 
irrespective of political considerations".
He asserted, somewhat over optimistically that "it is not 
beyond the ability of the Arab states and Israel to work out 
some arrangement whereby it will be possible for the
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refugees to have the right to go back as citizens of Israel 
or be compensated in order to begin their lives elsewhere”. 
He also opposed any "sudden conclusion of the activities” of 
UNRWA (the United Nations Relief and Works Agency), or any 
attempt to "impose a political solution on people who are 
not as yet ready for such solutions". He supported the con­
tinuation of UNRWA activities "with stress on vocational and 
educational needs, and appeal to all governments to con­
tribute to the funds of the agency".
India's Permanent Representative C.S. Jha, making a state­
ment 10 on the report of the UNRWA in Nov. 1959 stated that 
"the problem of Palestine refugees is not merely an in­
tensely human problem; it is also one of great political im­
portance and indeed affects the entire complex of political 
relations in the Middle East. It can not be treated in 
isolation and purely in terms of economic rehabilitation". 
Stressing the importance and need for UNRWA to continue its 
activities, Mr. Jha said that his own Government "fully 
recognising the nature of the problem and moved by 
humanitarian considerations has made contributions, both in 
cash and in kind". It has not been possible for us to make 
more than token contributions because of India's own colos­
sal expenditure towards the rehabilitation and resettlement 
of its own over nine million refugees".
A member of the Indian delegation Mr. C.D. Pande, making a 
statementll at the U.N. Special Political Committee in Nov.
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1960 bemoaned that "It is indeed tragic, that, for the 
twelfth successive year, we are considering the problem of 
the Palestine refugees". He emphasised that "The problem of 
Palestine refugees needs to be dealt with now while time is 
still on our side in a more earnest manner than hitherto". 
He acknowledged that "the problem forms part of a wider 
question but the lives of so many people can hardly await 
final solutions". He envisaged a "more active" role for the 
Conciliation Committee in this context.
THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR AND THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE
The six day Arab-Israeli war of June 1967 was a watershed in 
the history of the Middle East. The rout of the Arab armies 
and the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, the Gaza, the 
Golan Heights and East Jerusalem changed the whole com­
plexion of the Middle Eastern politics. Inter alia, it dis­
abused the Palestinians of any hope that the Arab countries 
on their own would be able to deliver them from their physi­
cal misery and uncertain political future. This realisation 
prompted the Palestinians to think in terms of self-reliance 
and self-help and a determination to shape their own des­
tiny. Moreover, the Israeli occupation of new territories 
not only brought millions of Palestinian Arabs under direct 
Israeli rule but also compounded the refugee problem by dis­
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placing thousands of Palestinian Arabs afresh.
The Indian response to these developments have been both 
prompt and profound. The India-UAR Joint Statementl2 issued 
during Mrs. Gandhi's visit to Cairo in Oct. 1967 underlined 
"the urgency of finding a just solution to the problem, 
especially the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the ter­
ritories occupied by them since June 5".
More importantly, the statement also expressed "support for 
the just rights of the Palestinian people". The term 
"Palestinian people" was significant because this was the 
first time that such an expression was officially used and 
was, perhaps, meant to acknowledge and approve the moves 
made by the Palestinians to steer their future as they 
deemed fit.
Mr. D.P. Dhar, a member of the Indian delegation, making a 
statementl3 at the U.N. Special Political Committee in Dec. 
1967 reiterated the new Indian position which recognised the 
Palestinians as a people and not merely refugees when he 
said: "It can not be over-emphasised that the conflict of
June 1967 and the consequent occupation of vast Arab ter­
ritories has greatly complicated the situation in West Asia. 
It is our firm belief that lasting solutions of the many 
problems existing at present can be worked out only when the 
key issue of the refugees is dealt with and steps are taken 
to ensure the just rights of the Arab people of Palestine on 
the basis of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) . It will
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be appreciated that the refugee question is not only a 
humanitarian question of great importance but central to the 
political stability of the entire area".
He also argued that without greater contributions from more 
prosperous countries, UNRWA "could hardly be expected to 
maintain, much less expand, its humanitarian assistance to 
the refugees ...". He pledged that for its part India would 
"maintain its previous level of contributions, apart from 
direct bilateral assistance to the states concerned for the 
benefit of refugees".
INDIA AND THE PLO
India, as has already been pointed out, both welcomed and 
supported the moves made by various Palestinian factions to 
come together in order to present a united front to Israel 
and enable them to pursue their interests without being too 
dependent on external help. India also could not but have 
welcomed the removal of Mr. Ahmed Shukairy from the Chair­
manship of the PLO in 1968 as a direct consequence of the 
six day war which spelt disaster for the Arabs. Many in the 
Arab world felt that it was his inflammatory utterances 
which made Israel fear that an Arab attack was imminent and 
resort to a pre-emptive strike. Another sore point was his 
insistence that he should be accepted as the head of a 
government in exile. Not surprisingly, he became a source of
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discord among Arabs and Tunisia reportedly refused to attend 
some top level Arab meetings because Mr. Shukairy*s par­
ticipation in them as the head of a Palestinian delegation. 
14
It was about this time that the Indian Government plumped 
for the largest of the various Palestinian factions that 
came under the umbrella of the PLO namely A1 Fatah and its 
leader Yasser Arafat. India*s preference for A1 Fatah and 
Arafat is understandable. Firstly, A1 Fatah was essentially 
nationalistic in its approach and shunned the ideological 
militancy of some of the other PLO factions and that was to 
India's liking. Secondly, it also tried to steer clear of 
mixing religion with politics by characterising its struggle 
with Israel as political rather than religious. Its secular 
credentials could not but endear itself to the Indian 
leadership which was so concerned about religious resurgence 
in the region and and the Pakistani ability to exploit it to 
India's discomfiture. Thirdly and lastly, India saw in 
Arafat a pragmatic and charismatic leader who more than 
anyone else could carry the various factions of the PLO 
along with him and when the time came for eventual settle­
ment, he would be able to deliver it from the Palestinian 
side.
An A1 Fatah delegation visited India in Sept. 1969 on the 
invitation of the Indian Association for Afro-Asian 
solidarity. During the visit, the delegation called on the
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Indian Foreign Minister Mr. Dinesh Singh and requested per­
mission to open an office in India. Mr. Singh assured the 
delegation that the Government of India would consider its 
request sympathetically.15 Besides, the A1 Fatah delegation 
collected Rs. 80,000 for their cause. The money was left in 
a trust as no permission was sought to take it out of India. 
16
In Aug. 1970, the Indian Foreign Minister Mr. Swaran Singh 
assured the three A1 Fatah delegates Abu Ghassan, Abu Bashar 
and Abu Javad that he would favourably consider their 
request for opening an information centre in New Delhi.17 
The Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi, addressing the Third 
Conference of Non-Aligned countries at Lusaka on Sept. 9, 
1970 made a pointed reference to the Palestinian issue when 
she said: "Israel should be prevailed upon to comply fully
with the U.N. Security Council Resolution of November, 1967. 
We cannot deny to the people of Palestine their inalienable 
right to the homelands from which they were exiled”.18 
However, when fighting broke out between the Jordanian 
troops and the Palestinian commandos in Jordan in Sept. 
1970, India maintained a neutral stance by taking the view 
that it was an internal affair of Jordan.19
THE BANGLADESH CRISIS AND THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE
The Bangladesh crisis and the lack of understanding shown by
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the Arab countries to the influx of millions of refugees to 
India and the economic burden and the social tensions that 
the influx generated made some people in India to call in to 
question the wisdom of continuing India*s strong and un­
wavering support to the Palestinian refugees. A Member of 
Parliament Mr. Kishan Kant pointedly asked the Indian 
government whether it would consider the possibility of 
treating the Arab refugee problem as an internal problem of 
the Arab countries in view of the Arab stand that the crisis 
in then East Pakistan was an internal affair of Pakistan. 
The Indian Foreign Minister Mr. Swaran Singh wisely ruled 
out any such possibility saying that India's stand on the 
Palestinian refugees was in consonance with "justice and 
facts of the situation". The government did not think that 
it should reverse its policy because "certain Arab 
countries are not in complete accord with our stand" (in 
relation to Bangladesh).20
However, the Indian representative Mr. I.J. Bahadur Singh 
while making a statement21 at the special Political Com­
mittee at the U.N. on Nov. 26, 1971 shrewdly drew a parallel 
between the problem of the Palestinian refugees imposed on 
the Arab states by Israel and the intolerable burden of 
refugees that Pakistan's inhuman policies in the then East 
Pakistan imposed on India's fragile economy and delicate so­
cial fabric. Inter alia, he said: "We ourselves at this very 
moment are burdened with nearly 10 million refugees. The
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Palestine refugees pose the largest unsolved problem whereas 
the East Bengal refugees confront us by their numbers and 
suffering with the most unprecedented tragedy of modern 
times".
"The very fact that a section of a population is obliged to 
take refuge in a neighbouring state or states is indicative 
of the gross violations of human rights. The international 
community cannot absolve itself from its duty by paying con­
science money for the pitiful maintenance of refugees in 
camps".
"The only solution to the problem of refugees is that they 
go back to their hearths and homes".
"Refugees are a direct responsibility of the state which has 
forced them to flee and not of the state who has come for­
ward to their succour".
"Israel has disrupted the economy of Jordan, Lebanon and 
Syria by forcing refugees on their territory. The influx of 
these refugees has created political pressures, social 
problems and economic difficulties for these countries. To 
hold these countries to ransom for the ultimate solution of 
the fate of the refugees is unjust and inhuman".
"We maintain that Israeli responsibility towards its 
refugees is independent of her relations with her neigh­
bours. Arab neighbours of Israel are not bound either 
legally or morally to negotiate, cooperate or discuss the 
subject of refugees with Israel. Israel must take back its
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refugees. It is her duty to create a climate of confidence 
in which these refugees go back to their homes in safety 
with dignity and honour enjoying full right of self- 
determination” .
”In spite of our own burden to which I have already referred 
my government has decided to increase its 1972 contribution 
to UNRWA by 20% of the level of its 1971 contribution”.
By drawing a close parallel to the refugee situation in the 
Middle East and in the Indian subcontinent, the Indian rep­
resentative implicitly but pointedly warned the Arab states 
against adopting double standards in relation to the refugee 
situation in the subcontinent. Thus, while the Indian 
government refused to use its support to the Palestinian 
people as a bargaining chip to persuade the Arab states to 
support the Indian stand in relation to Bangladesh crisis, 
it did not hesitate to make it clear to Arab states of the 
untenability and unacceptability of their stand that the 
crisis in East Bengal was an internal affair of Pakistan. 
India also chose to express its solidarity and commitment to 
the Palestinian cause by resisting pressures to establish 
diplomatic relations with Israel in reaction to unsym­
pathetic attitude adopted by most of the Arab countries in 
relation to the Bangladesh issue.22
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THE MUNICH MASSACRE, SEPT. 1972
The Indian government reacted sharply to the slaying of 11 
Israeli athletes by Palestinian commandos in the Olympic 
village in Munich on Sept. 6, 1972. A statement of the Min­
istry of External Affairs said: "The act resulting in this 
tragedy was senseless and condemnable. It remains so 
whatever the dissatisfaction and frustration leading to it. 
There is no justification for dragging terrorism into the 
arena of sports". It went on to add "Terrorist activities of 
this type are deplorable and damage the very cause which is 
sought to be advanced".23
The Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi too was quick to con­
demn the Munich massacre. She said: "This shocking and
senseless violence cannot but be condemned in the strongest 
terms. Such a dastardly act of hatred can never solve any 
problem".24
THE YOM KIPPUR WAR AND THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE
When the uneasy peace in the Middle East was broken by the 
surprise attack launched by Egypt and Syria on Oct. 7, 1973, 
the Ministry of External Affairs came out with a statement 
25which was totally supportive of the Arabs. It said: "The 
Government have consistently declared that the cause of the
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tension in the area is due to Israeli aggression and refusal 
to vacate territories occupied by armed force. This intran­
sigence on the part of Israel is clearly the basic cause 
leading to the present outbreak of hostilities”.
"Our sympathies are entirely with the Arabs whose sufferings 
have long reached a point of explosion”.
"The immediate implementation by Israel of the U.N. resolu­
tion No. 242 of 1967 constitutes a solution which can arrest 
the tragic march of events threatening the peace of the 
region and the world at large”.
Meanwhile, India's Deputy Permanent Representative at the 
U.N. Mr. N.P. Jain, addressing the Ad Hoc Committee of the 
General Assembly for the announcement of voluntary contribu­
tions to UNRWA on Nov. 30, 1973, announced a contribution of 
Rs. 100,000 in kind. He also mentioned that India had been 
awarding scholarships directly to the Palestinians which 
would continue the following year as well. He further said: 
"This should reflect our concern for and firm principled 
support to the unfortunate Palestinian refugees whose suf­
fering remains unabated and who continue to need not only 
our moral sympathy but also material support. The extent of 
tragedy can be realised if it is recalled that a whole new 
generation has been born in refugee camps with no future in 
sight".26
A little later, Mr. Swaran Singh, the Indian Foreign Minis­
ter, addressing the Rajya Sabha in Dec. 1973, reiterated
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India*s firm support to the Palestinians when he said: ”The 
arrogance of Israel and the support she has received from 
her mighty friends . . . had driven the Palestinians to 
measures of desperation”.
He asserted that ”The rights of the Palestinians must he re­
stored and their homeland assured to them. Our attitude 
towards this situation in this conflict is based on firm and 
unalterable principles. These are principles not only of 
equity and justice and steadfast friendship and solidarity 
but also principles of international law and behaviour”.27
INDIA STRENGTHENS THE PLO'S DIPLOMATIC OPTION
Though India has always been in favour of a political and 
diplomatic solution to the Palestinian problem, it threw its 
entire weight behind the PLO's quest for diplomatic recogni­
tion in the post-1973 period primarily for three reasons. 
Firstly, India realised that the PLO itself was much more 
amenable to and appreciative of the need for and efficacy of 
a diplomatic offensive at this particular juncture. 
Secondly, India was also aware that such a course would 
strengthen the hands of Arafat and the A1 Fatah within the 
PLO whose ideological moderation suited India*s political 
preferences in the region admirably. Thirdly and lastly, In­
dia was worried that unless the momentum for peace and a ne­
gotiated settlement that the Yom Kippur war had generated
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all round was carefully nurtured, there was always the pos­
sibility that it might lead to a new political stalemate in 
the Middle East in which Palestinians would be the worst 
sufferers. Consequently, India sought to help the PLO gain 
international political acceptance as a reasonable and 
moderate organization and live down its image as a terrorist 
outfit by canvassing its case in the U.N. and outside so 
that when the time for the final settlement came, the PLO 
would have gained sufficient respectability and credibility 
to participate in the negotiations as an independent or­
ganization genuinely representative of the Palestinian 
people.
ALGIERS DECLARATION, MARCH, 1974
The qualitative upgradation in the Third World's diplomatic 
support to the PLO came in March, 1974 when the Bureau of IV 
Conference of Non-aligned countries adopted a declaration28 
in Algiers on the Middle East and the question of Palestine. 
It emphasised that just and durable peace in the region 
could be obtained only on the basis of "two indispensable 
fundamental prerequisites”.
"Restoration of the Palestine people's national rights, 
foremost among which is the right to return to its homeland 
and exercise its right to self-determination" and 
"Ensuring global recognition of the Palestine Liberation Or­
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ganization as the legitimate and sole representative of the 
Palestinian people and its struggle, and considering it a 
fundamental party in all the efforts exerted to establish 
just peace”.
The recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to 
self-determination and the acceptance of the PLO as the 
legitimate and sole representative of the Palestinian people 
by the international community became the underlying theme
of the Third World's diplomatic offensive from this point
onwards. India played a key role in this process both in the 
U.N. and outside.
India's Foreign Minister Mr. Swaran Singh, making a state-
ment29 at the U.N. General Assembly on Sept. 26, 1974
called for the implementation of the Security Council 
resolution 242 of 1967 as the basis of a "just and enduring 
peace”in the Middle East. He insisted that "The restoration 
of the legitimate rights of the Palestine people is another 
corner-stone in the structure of a lasting peace". He fur­
ther warned that "If the catastrophe of another war in the 
Middle East is to be avoided, Israel should end its aggres­
sion and the legitimate rights of the Palestine people 
should be restored to them".
INDIA'S DRAFT RESOLUTION, OCT. 8, 1974
On Oct. 8, 1974, India co-sponsored a draft resolution in
417
the U.N. General Assembly calling for the PLO's participa­
tion in the deliberations of the General Assembly on the 
Palestinian question. The draft resolution30 was as 
follows:
The General Assembly,
Considering that the Palestinian people is the principal 
party to the question of Palestine,
Invites the Palestine Liberation Organization, the repre­
sentative of the Palestinian people, to participate in the 
deliberations of the General Assembly on the question of 
Palestine, in plenary meetings.
Explaining and justifying India's sponsoring of the 
aforementioned draft resolution, India's Permanent Repre­
sentative R. Jaipal made a statement31 in the U.N. General 
Assembly on Oct. 14, 1974. He contended that "The draft
resolution ... seeks to invite the Palestine Liberation Or­
ganization to participate in our deliberations because that 
organization represents the people of Palestine whether or 
not the PLO has been elected by the Palestinian people is 
neither material nor relevant at this stage. The fact is 
that the PLO is recognised by all the Arab states and many 
others as the political organization, representing the 
Palestine people".
"We cannot simply imagine a situation in which the PLO has
418
been denied a hearing by us. We are dealing with the future 
of some 3 million people of Palestine. They can no longer be 
treated simply as refugees to be maintained indefinitely on 
international charity nor can they be dismissed as 
terrorists”.
Commending the adoption of the draft resolution, Mr. Jaipal 
was careful to point out that ”in adopting it, we are not in 
any sense threatening the security or the existence of the 
state of Israel. We shall, in fact, only be granting the 
Palestinian people the right to be heard before their future 
is decided".
RESOLUTION OF THE RABAT ARAB SUMMIT, OCT. 28, 1974
In the meantime, the Seventh Arab Summit in Rabat in Oct. 
1974 passed a resolution32 which formally recognised the 
PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian 
people which further reinforced and strengthened the 
diplomatic process set in motion by the Algiers Nonaligned 
Summit to confer legitimacy and acceptance on the PLO by the 
international community. The Rabat Arab resolution, inter 
alia, recognised the right of the Palestinian people
"to return to their homeland and to self-determination”.
"to establish an independent national authority under the
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leadership of the PLO in its capacity as the sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestine people, over all liberated 
territory”.
and "to preserve Palestinian unity and not to interfere in 
Palestinian internal affairs".
ARAFAT ACKNOWLEDGES INDIA'S ROLE
Acknowledging India's positive and purposeful contribution 
to the Palestinian cause at the U.N., the PLO Chairman Yas­
ser Arafat conveyed his "deep gratitude" and "appreciation" 
for the attitude of the Indian delegation at the U.N. in 
calling for the participation of the PLO delegation in the 
General Assembly discussion of the Palestinian issue.33
ARAFAT'S ADDRESS TO THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, NOV. 13, 1974
As a consequence of the sustained and persistent diplomatic 
effort made by various Third World organizations and move­
ments, the Chairman of the PLO Mr. Yasser Arafat was invited 
to address the U.N. General Assembly on Nov. 13, 1974. In
his historic address,34 Mr. Arafat traced the origins of
the Palestinian problem, the sufferings of the Palestinian 
people and the great injustice done to them over the years. 
Implicitly stressing the PLO's willingness and preference 
for a peaceful solution to the issue, Arafat warned the
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world body, "Today, I have come bearing an olive branch and 
a freedom fighter*s gun. Do not let the olive branch fall 
from my hand".
India*s Foreign Secretary Mr. Kewal Singh while making a 
statements5 at the U.N. General Assembly on Nov. 19, 1974, 
seized on the opportunity to emphasise and endorse the 
moderation and reasonableness that permeated Arafat’s 
address to the U.N.. "We are glad that the President of the 
Palestine Liberation Organization Mr. Yasser Arafat was in­
vited to address this Assembly and what we heard, was a 
voice of reason, a passionate appeal for justice. In Mr. 
Arafat's speech, we found echoes of the same values to which 
we are also dedicated i.e. democracy, secularism, human dig­
nity and common nationhood for multi-racial, multi-religious 
groups".
He also tried to explain the desperation and frustration 
that prompted some Palestinians to violence and terrorism. 
"Why should we be surprised if a people who have been 
deprived of their homes and normal existence, were reduced 
to such frustrations that they did not look upon the inter­
national community to restore to them their legitimate 
rights to return and resettlement".
He emphasised that "India adheres to the resolution adopted 
by the fourth summit conference of Heads of State and 
Government of non-aligned countries and accepts the decision 
of the Arab summit of October, 1974 held in Rabat that the
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Palestine Liberation Organization is the representative of 
the Palestine people”.
INDIA'S DRAFT RESOLUTION, NOV. 21, 1974
Encouraged by the response and emboldened by the success of 
its labours at the U.N. in favour of the Palestinian cause, 
India introduced another draft resolutions6 on Nov. 21,
1974 in relation to the Palestinian issue. It, inter alia, 
reaffirmed "the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people 
in Palestine"
"to self-determination without external interference"
"to national independence and sovereignty"
and recognised that "the Palestinian people is a principal 
party in the establishment of a just and durable peace in 
the Middle East".
INDIA RECOGNISES THE PLO, JAN. 10, 1975
As a logical corollary to India's sustained effort to help 
the PLO gain diplomatic recognition in the comity of na­
tions, India extended formal recognition to the PLO by 
granting diplomatic status to the PLO's representatives in 
New Delhi on Jan. 10, 1975. India was the first non-Arab
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country to extend such recognition. Reacting to India*s 
decision to extend diplomatic status to the PLO, its Chair­
man Yasser Arafat said that the move would give the struggle 
of the Palestinian people *'a very big push forward”.37 
The Annual Report (1974-75) of the Ministry of External Af­
fairs of the Government of India looked back with satisfac­
tion on its efforts in relation to promoting the Palestinian 
cause in the year in question. The Report opined that ”In 
the regional context, the decision of the Rabat Summit meet­
ing of Arab leaders that the Palestine Liberation Organiza­
tion is the sole representative of the Palestinian people 
highlighted the fact that no solution of the West Asian 
crisis would be possible without the Palestinian people 
being a party to that solution”.38
Displaying a mood of self-congratulation, the Report said 
that ”The (Indian) Government . . . sponsored/supported 
resolutions in the General Assembly of the United Nations 
which accepted the status of the Palestine Liberation Or­
ganization and accorded her an Observer Status”.39 
Explaining India*s decision to extend diplomatic recognition 
to the PLO, the Report said that "In view of the widening 
relationship and recognition achieved by the PLO in other 
parts of the world and in the U.N.O. ... the Government of 
India agreed to the request of the PLO to open a separate 
office in New Delhi”.40
Addressing the plenary session of the ministerial meeting of
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the Coordinating Bureau of Nonaligned countries in Havana on 
March 18, 1975, the Indian Foreign Minister Mr. Y.B. Chavan 
acknowledged with satisfaction the progress made by the PLO 
in its diplomatic endeavours. "The comprehensive considera­
tion of the question of Palestine in the last General As­
sembly session in which the PLO participated enabled the 
adoption of a resolution reaffirming the inalienable rights 
of the people of Palestine. This was a significant landmark 
in the long struggle to secure the vindication of Pales­
tinian rights, especially their right to national indepen­
dence and their right to participate in the establishment of 
a just and durable peace in the Middle East. We are 
gratified that today there is increasing recognition as well 
as support in the international community for the full res­
toration of these rights".41
AT THE U.N.
India's Permanent Representative Mr. R. Jaipal making a 
statement42 in the U.N. General Assembly on Nov. 5, 1975
bemoaned that "For over 27 years the United Nations has 
stood by and done virtually nothing for the Palestinian 
Arabs except to treat them as refugees".
He made a pointed reference to the PLO's desire for a peace­
ful settlement of their problem and reminded the U.N.'s 
responsibility in arriving at an amicable settlement. "They
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(the Palestinians) have now come to the United Nations with 
an olive branch, for the gun is out of place here”.
”We consider this to be good and healthy development. It 
represents the desire to turn away from paths of violence to 
ways of non-violence and negotiation”.
"It is vital that the United Nations should therefore adopt 
decisions that give hope to the Palestinian Arabs, because 
to do otherwise would be callous and cruel".
Mr. Jaipal, again making a statement43 in the U.N. General 
Assembly on Dec. 4, 1975 on the situation in the Middle
East, referred to the plight of the stateless Palestinians 
being at a disadvantage to pursue their interests in an ef­
fective way and the need for the U.N. to come to their 
rescue. "The sovereign Arab states, using the attributes of 
their sovereignty, are in a position to take care of them­
selves, but the Palestinian Arabs are not yet in a similar 
situation" he averred.
He also tried to allay Israeli fears in relation to its 
security. "We see no inherent contradiction between the na­
tional rights of the Palestinian Arabs and the right of the 
State of Israel to exist. A fallacy is being deliberately 
propagated that the rights of the Palestinian Arabs conflict 
with the right of Israel to exist. The purpose of this fal­
lacy could only be to deny the Palestinian Arabs their in­
alienable rights. It is entirely absurd even to contemplate 
the extinction of the State of Israel, which has asserted
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its right to exist in no uncertain manner. It is difficult, 
therefore, to comprehend Israel's fears for its safety, ex­
cept in purely psychological terms”.
As can be seen from the foregoing analysis, India, ever 
since the Yom Kippur war, sought to strengthen the 
diplomatic option of the PLO by canvassing its case in 
various international forums. In doing so, it sought to sof­
ten the PLO's image as a terrorist organization and tried to 
project its image as a moderate and reasonable organization 
which, in the past, was driven to violence and terrorism in 
desperation and frustration. Thus, the PLO's endeavours for 
international diplomatic recognition and legitimacy started 
bearing fruit in the mid 70s. After acquiring an Observer 
Status in the U.N. in 1974, the PLO's diplomatic march 
proceeded without a hitch. It became a member of the NAM in 
1975 and that of the "Group of 77" in 1976.
India, at this stage, seemed to be urging moderation on the 
part of the PLO, a sense of urgency and purposefulness on 
the part of the U.N. and flexibility and reasonableness on 
the part of Israel as essential for a negotiated settlement.
THE JANATA GOVERNMENT AND THE PLO
When the Janata Party came to power in March 1977 and par­
ticularly when a former Jana Sangh member and a vocal critic 
of the Congress Party's traditional policy of friendship to
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Arab countries Mr. A.B. Vajpayee took over as the Foreign 
Minister, speculation became ripe that India*s policy 
towards the Middle East might come under review and even 
revision. However, there was very little difference, in 
terms of substance, in the foreign policy approaches of the 
Janata Party and its predecessor. The Janata Government lost 
no time in reaffirming and reiterating India*s strong sup­
port to the Arabs in general and the Palestinians in par­
ticular.
Addressing the Plenary Session of the Conference of Foreign 
Ministers of the Coordinating Bureau of Nonaligned countries 
on April 7, 1977 in New Delhi, the Janata Foreign Minister
Mr. A.B. Vajpayee made it a point to emphasise India*s 
traditional position in relation to the Middle East. He as­
serted that "Israel must vacate occupied Arab territories. 
The inalienable rights of the Palestinian people should be 
recognised. It is our hope that ways and means will soon be 
found to implement the relevant Security Council Resolutions 
and that there will be an early resumption of Geneva Con­
ference with the participation among others of the PLO”.44 
Nevertheless, the Israeli Foreign Minister Mr. Moshe Dayan, 
visited India secretly on Aug. 14, 1977 at the invitation of 
the Janata Prime Minister Mr. Morarji Desai. In his talks 
with Mr. Dayan, Morarji exhorted that Israel must make peace 
with the Arabs. While he wanted the Arabs to guarantee the 
existence of Israel, the solution to the Palestinian problem
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according to him was "to establish a Palestinian State in 
the Arab territories which you (Israel) will' evacuate". He 
refused to accept Dayan's argument that a Palestinian State 
would endanger Israel and that the Palestinian refugees 
should be absorbed by the Arab countries in which they lived 
just as Israel absorbed almost a million Jews who came to 
Israel from various Arab countries. Nor did Morarji consent 
to exchange of Ambassadors between the two countries nor a 
visit by his foreign Minister to Israel even in secret.45 
However, the Janata Government reacted sharply to the 
regularization of Israeli settlements in the occupied ter­
ritories in Aug. 1977. The Ministry of External Affairs, in 
an official release said on 27 Aug. 1977, "... India has al­
ways been against acquisition of territory by any country by 
the use of force. India is thus against continued occupation 
by Israel of territories that it has occupied since the June 
1967 Arab-Israeli war. Moreover, India along with the vast 
majority of the members of the United Nations has strongly 
urged that no step should be taken which would further com­
pound and complicate the fulfilment of United Nations 
Resolutions which include the one passed in December 1976. 
India, therefore, strongly deplores the action taken to 
regularise existing Israeli settlements in occupied areas 
and to authorize new ones. This is not only contrary to in­
ternational opinion but goes against the efforts being made 
towards a search for a lasting solution of the Arab-Israeli
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conflict and the restoration of the legitimate rights of the 
Palestinian people”.46
Later, a member of the Indian delegation Mr. Ram Dhan, 
making a statement in the U.N. General Assembly on Nov. 23, 
1977 urged the early resumption of the Geneva peace con­
ference for a just solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute. He 
insisted that such a solution should be based on certain 
principles like territories occupied by conquest should be 
vacated, right of Palestinians to national self- 
determination and the right of all states in the region in­
cluding Israel to exist within secure boundaries.47 
Again, a week later, Mr. A.C. George, a member of the Indian 
delegation, addressing the U.N. General Assembly urged that 
the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including 
a national state of their own, should be recognised by the 
Security Council. It was also essential that the PLO should 
be invited to participate in any negotiations for a peaceful 
settlement.48
The Annual Report (1976-77) of the Ministry of External Af­
fairs reiterated the Janata Government's commitment to the 
Arab cause in general and that of the Palestinians in par­
ticular in no uncertain terms. "The Government of India con­
tinued its firm support for the Arab states in their efforts 
to obtain a just solution of the Arab-Israeli problem, based 
on Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied in 
1967 and the realisation of the legitimate rights and
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aspirations of the Palestinian people”.49
THE JANATA AND THE CAMP DAVID ACCORD, SEPT. 17, 1978
Nevertheless, the Janata Government felt it necessary to 
reassure the Arab countries of the continued Indian support 
to the Arabs. Hence, the Annual Report (1977-78) of the Min­
istry of External Affairs was quick to point out that ”The 
Minister of External Affairs (Mr. Vajpayee) lost no time in 
allaying the misapprehensions among Arab countries about 
India's support to the Arab cause".50 However, the report 
made no effort to conceal India's positive response to 
Sadat's bold initiative in the Middle East. "India has been 
watching developments taking place in West Asia since the 
visit of President Anwar Sadat to Israel which has resulted 
in a tremendous change in the West Asian scene".51 
However, when the Camp David Accord was signed on Sept. 17, 
1978, the Arab world including the PLO denounced Egypt for 
betraying the Arab cause. Sadat was accused of destroying 
Arab solidarity by signing a separate peace treaty with Is­
rael. India had to take in to account the strong and nega­
tive reaction of the Arab world to the Camp David Accord. 
The Indian Foreign Minister Mr. Vajpayee said at a press 
conference that India did not welcome the Camp David Accord
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because it suffered from three major shortcomings. 1) Pales­
tine was the hard core of the Middle Eastern problem. There 
could be no lasting peace until the inalienable rights of 
the Palestinian people were restored. 2) The PLO has not 
been accepted as the representative body of the Palestinians 
and 3) The Camp David agreement is silent on the status of 
Jerusalem.52
Nevertheless, when the Arab states made a concerted effort 
to expel Egypt from the NAM in 1979 for signing a peace 
treaty with Israel, India stood by Egypt and firmly opposed 
any such move. The Indian Prime Minister Mr. Desai told the 
hosts of the 6th Nonaligned Summit Cuba that he would not be 
able to attend the Summit if any attempt was made to expel 
Egypt from the NAM.53
The Annual Report (1978-79) of the Ministry of External Af­
fairs summed up India's response to the dramatic develop­
ments in the Middle East following Sadat's peace initiative. 
"India noted the dramatic changes that took place in the 
region as a result of the Camp David Agreements between 
Egypt and Israel. It was India's belief that a comprehensive 
solution of the West Asian problem could only be possible on 
the basis of a unified stand by the Arab states and that a 
durable peace could be achieved only with the withdrawal of 
Israeli troops from all Arab territories occupied by it and 
by the restoration to the Palestinian people of their right 
to self-determination and to a State of their own".54
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The then Foreign Minister of India Mr. S.N. Mishra, leading 
the Indian delegation to the Havana Summit of the Nonaligned 
countries in Sept. 1979, expressed his misgivings about the 
Camp David Accords much more explicitly in his speech55 at 
the Conference. He said that "The Egypt-Israeli treaties 
have caused fears and misgivings which have led to the ex­
acerbation of the situation particularly by dividing the 
Arab world. It is for Egypt to remove these misgivings”. He 
asserted that "Any solution which ignores the fact that 
Palestine is at the core of the issue, stands no chance of
success". He was emphatic that "The inalienable rights of
the Palestinian people, whose sole representative is the 
PLO, including the right to their own state is central to a 
satisfactory settlement".
Later, elaborating India's position on the Camp David Ac­
cords at the U.N. on Nov. 28, 1979, India's Permanent Repre­
sentative Mr. B.C. Mishra said that India did not dispute
the sovereign right of any state to enter into treaties and
agreements on bilateral matters. However, such agreements 
could not presume to settle matters affecting others who 
were not contracting parties. India could not agree that any 
agreement to which the PLO was not a party should seek to 
impose on the Palestinian people a pre-determined settle­
ment . 56
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OBSERVANCE OF PALESTINIAN DAY IN NEW DELHI, NOV. 29, 1979
A special function to observe the "International Day of 
Solidarity with the Palestinian People” jointly organised by 
the Indian Council for Cultural Relations and the PLO was 
held in New Delhi on Nov. 29, 1979. Presiding over the func­
tion, the Minister of State for External Affairs Mr. B. 
Barua said: "Today, when an increasing number of people, all 
over the world, are coming to see and understand the justice 
of Palestinian demands, we Indians not only feel a sense of 
gratification but also a sense of vindication for our own 
long standing and consistent policies".57
Taking a dig at the Western nations which made a diplomatic 
volte face in relation to the Palestinian issue after the 
oil crisis in the mid 70s, he said: "The concern and
solidarity shown in India to the Arabs in general and the 
Palestinians in particular, is not a phenomenon of the 70s 
nor has it ever been motivated by any considerations of 
economic expediency".58
He promised that "The Indian people will always remain 
trusted friends of the Palestinian people and let me assure 
you that we will never waver in our support for their 
cause".59
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INDIA EXTENDS FULL DIPLOMATIC STATUS TO THE PLO, MARCH, 1980
The 1980s saw the intensification of India's efforts to fur­
ther strengthen the PLO diplomatically and politically in 
order to wean it away from violence and terrorism and to 
build up its image as a responsible organization which was 
amenable to reason and negotiation. As a part of this ongo­
ing process, the Indian Foreign Minister Mr. P.V. Narasimha 
Rao announced in the Parliament on March 26, 1980 that India 
had decided to accord full diplomatic recognition to the Of­
fice of the PLO in New Delhi. Describing the move as yet 
another "logical step", Mr. Rao announced that the Indian 
Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi had invited Mr. Arafat "to pay us 
an official and friendly visit". He added that "Chairman 
Arafat's visit to this country (India) will symbolize not 
merely Indo-Palestinian friendship, but also Indo-Arab 
solidarity".60
ARAFAT'S VISIT TO INDIA, MARCH, 1980
The Chairman of the PLO Mr. Yasser Arafat paid a three day 
official visit to India between 28th and 30th of March 1980. 
Mrs. Gandhi, speaking at a dinner given in his honour, 
described Arafat as "a valiant fighter against aggression
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and oppression" and India's support to the Palestinian cause 
as "time-tested and consistent". She said that sympathy for 
the Palestinians "has been a part of independent India's 
foreign policy from its very inception". According to her, 
the PLO "has striven to provide its people a distinct and 
forceful identity". She described Mr. Arafat's visit as 
"another milestone in Indo-Palestinian and Indo-Arab 
friendship".61
Mr. Arafat, in his speech, described India as an "eternal 
friend". However, he strongly denounced the Camp David Ac­
cords as "a new conspiracy against our national liberation, 
against our national rights". He also expressed the PLO's 
determination to "continue the just struggle by all means, 
including armed struggle" which his hosts might have found a 
little uncomfortable to explain away . He emphasised that 
the "Indo-Palestinian relations ... is another new and im­
portant bridge between our two peoples as well as between 
India and the Arab peoples".62
In a TV interview in New Delhi, Mr. Arafat said that with a 
"great country" like India steadfastly supporting the Pales­
tinian cause, "I am sure of our success. We are approaching 
our success". He admitted that the "Camp David conspiracy" 
was a setback to the Palestinian cause but Palestinians have 
resisted conspiracies and emerged successful. They would 
continue to struggle for "sooner or later, success is ours. 
I have no doubt" he said.63
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The first ever India-PLO Joint Statement64 issued in New 
Delhi on March 20, 1980 reflected the close political under­
standing that the two leaders were able to achieve in rela­
tion to issues which were of importance to them.
Mrs. Gandhi reiterated that "a just peace and a comprehen­
sive solution to the Middle East crisis" can be found only 
with the "full participation of the Palestine Liberation Or­
ganization as an equal partner in any settlement". Such a 
settlement should be based on "complete withdrawal of Is­
rael from all occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, in­
cluding Jerusalem" and "the establishment of an independent 
state in Palestine".
Both leaders, in an implicit reference to the Russian inva­
sion of Afghanistan, agreed that "the deescalation of ten­
sions could only be achieved through political and 
diplomatic measures and not by military confrontation 
through induction of arms".
Mr. Arafat expressed his "appreciation for India's balanced, 
constructive and measured response to the critical situation 
in the region".
Though India's full diplomatic recognition to the PLO was, 
in general, meant to strengthen the PLO's diplomatic option, 
there were, at least, three immediate considerations that 
weighed with the Indian Government in taking such a step. 
First, India considered it in her interest to strengthen the 
radical elements in the Arab world to "counterbalance the
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resurgence of Islamic fundamentalists” who were trying to 
give a "religious twist” to what was essentially a political 
crusade against Israeli domination. Secondly, India was also 
impressed by the "refreshing moderation" that Arafat himself 
had been displaying in promoting the Palestinian cause.65 
Thirdly, India, also perhaps, thought it wise to clear the 
"misunderstanding" created in the Islamic world about the 
initial Indian posture with regard to the Soviet interven­
tion in Afghanistan by reaffirming her support to the Pales­
tinian cause.66
Addressing the Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly 
on Palestine on July 22, 1980, the Indian Foreign Minister
Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao reiterated India*s stand that the 
Camp David Accords could not presume to have settled the 
Palestinian issue because they were not negotiated with the 
full participation of the PLO which represented the Pales­
tinians. 67
The first ever Indian Parliamentary delegation, led by the 
then Lok Sabha Speaker Mr. Balaram Jakhar attended the 15th 
Session of the Palestine National Council (PNC) in Damascus 
in April, 1981. Addressing the PNC, Mr. Jhakar said: "I can 
assure you that every Indian is with you in your cause. For, 
this is not only a Palestinian cause, it is a cause of 
freedom loving people all over the world".68
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INDIA SUPPORTS THE FAHD PLAN, NOV. 20, 1981
The official spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs 
welcomed the Fahd Plan69 as "a declaration of the basic 
principles of peace in West Asia”.
He said that "The Saudi initiative has rightly included the 
recognition of the Palestinian issue as one of the important 
elements of any comprehensive and durable West Asian 
settlement”.
"The Saudi initiative is in line with India*s general posi­
tion, consistently stated in various national and interna­
tional forums. India, therefore, welcomes the Fahd Plan... 
".70
India's support for the Fahd Plan was primarily because it 
was in line with India's general position on the Arab- 
Israeli dispute. Nevertheless, there were, at least, two 
other important considerations which must have weighed with 
the Indian government in supporting the Fahd Plan. Firstly, 
the post-1973 period saw the emergence of Saudi Arabia as an 
important actor in the Middle Eastern politics because of 
its oil reserves and subsequent petro-dollar wealth. The PLO 
itself became quite dependent on the Saudis for financial as 
well as diplomatic assistance. Given Saudi Arabia's politi­
cal preferences in the region, it was likely to use its
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newly acquired leverage with the PLO only to moderate its 
stance vis-a-vis Israel. Hence, India thought it wise to ex­
tend its support to the Fahd Plan. Secondly, the move was , 
at least, partly aimed at improving India*s bilateral rela­
tions with Saudi Arabia which were, at this stage, not as 
good as they might have been, given Saudis' misgivings about 
India's initial response to the Soviet intervention in Af­
ghanistan and the Indian attitude to Pakistan. By supporting 
the Fahd Plan, India was not only acknowledging the impor­
tance of the Saudi role in the region but also emphasising 
the similarity of views of India and Saudi Arabia in regard 
to the Palestinian issue.
ARAFAT'S VISIT TO INDIA, HAY, 1982
The Chairman of the PLO Mr. Yasser Arafat made his second 
visit to India as a Head of State in exile in May 1982. The 
visit was important for it took place against the background 
of 1) Israeli threats to invade Lebanon and 2) the resur­
gence of Islamic fervour in the region as a consequence of 
the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanis­
tan.
Mrs. Gandhi speaking at a dinner, given in honour of Mr. 
Arafat described him as "the symbol of a people affire with 
the spirit of freedom". She also assured him that "Support 
to Palestine was a plank of our foreign policy".71
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Mr. Arafat, in his reply, expressed his gratitude for "the 
strong and very important support which you extend to our 
just cause and national struggle”.72
The Indo-PLO Joint Communique73 issued on May 23, 1982
reflected the close understanding and similarity of views 
that existed between the Indian government and the PLO 
leadership.
Mrs. Gandhi stressed that Mr. Arafat’s visit provided "an 
extremely valuable opportunity for carrying forward the on­
going dialogue between India and the PLO and has highlighted 
the two sides' deep interest in closer and regular contacts 
at all levels".
The two leaders expressed their concern over the "Israeli 
acts of violence and aggression against the Palestinian 
people in the occupied territories and their continuous ag­
gressive acts and threats of invasion of South Lebanon aided 
by the regular flow of highly sophisticated imported 
weapons".
They also expressed their "full support for the gallant 
uprising of the Palestinian people in the occupied 
territories".
The statement implicitly criticised the U.S. for supplying 
sophisticated arms to Israel.lt also seemed to betray a 
sense of frustration and helplessness in view of the strong 
American support to the Jewish state.
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ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON, JUNE 6, 1982
India reacted very harshly to the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon in June, 1982. The Indian Foreign Minister Mr. P.V. 
Narasimha Rao speaking at a function in New Delhi on June 
19, referred to the "enactment of a savage drama involving 
the butchery of our Palestinian brothers and sisters”.
He described it as "an attempt to exterminate a people whose 
hearths and homes Israel has occupied illegally for well 
over three decades, a people who have been forced to find 
shelter and sustenance elsewhere and who have resolved to 
win back their territory, their rights and their dignity". 
"We will stand firm in our support for freedom and statehood 
for the Palestinians, under the leadership of the PLO. Their 
losses are our losses, their victories are our victories" he 
added.74
India also rushed medicines, medical equipment and food 
stuffs to Lebanon.
The Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi, making a statement 
in the Lok Sabha on July 25, 1982 came out strongly in
favour of the Palestinian people. She asserted that "Israeli 
attempts to wipe out the Palestinian Movement cannot succeed 
in the long run. A popular movement, based on the legitimate 
aspirations of the Palestinian people, cannot be put down by
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the use of arms. History is replete with instances of the 
failure of military force to crush such popular movements”. 
75
Later, speaking at a public reception in Calcutta in Aug. 
1982, the PLO Ambassador to New Delhi Mr. Faisal Ahudaha ac­
knowledged the support extended by India at a critical stage 
to the PLO. He said: ”1 can say that India has come to our 
aid even more than some of our closer neighbours”. 76 
The Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi sent a message to the
PLO Chairman Mr. Yasser Arafat in Sept. 1982 in which she
praised the PLO's spirited resistance to the Israeli inva­
sion of Lebanon.77
The Annual Report (1982-83) of the Ministry of External Af­
fairs opined that "the situation in West Asia held the dan­
gerous possibility of a wider conflagration, due to the wan­
ton and unabashed Israeli aggression against Lebanon and the 
PLO ".78
The Indians seemed to be particularly appalled by the
savagery of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the in­
numerable civilian casualties that accompanied it. In a 
broader context, the timing of the Israeli invasion raised 
doubts in the Indian mind whether Israel was really serious 
about a negotiated settlement with the PLO or whether it en­
tertained any secret hope of settling the issue militarily 
with the willing support of the U.S.. India was also worried 
that the Israeli invasion might also bring the extremist
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elements in the PLO to the forefront and reverse the process 
of moderation and accommodation that the PLO had been pursu­
ing under Arafat's leadership.
THE 7th N0NALI6NED SUMMIT AND THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION
The 7th Nonaligned Summit held in New Delhi in March, 1983 
took special interest in the Palestinian issue and India, as 
the Chairperson of the NAM, played no mean role in it. "The 
New Delhi Message"79 issued by the Nonaligned countries on 
the occasion expressed customary support the Palestinian 
cause. They also sent a message of solidarity with the 
Palestinian people which, inter alia, strongly condemned the 
Israeli "attempt to quell legitimate opposition by the 
Palestinians in the occupied territories".
"These brutal and illegal acts by the occupying power in its 
policy of establishing new settlements continue to pose 
grave threats and constitute serious obstacles to a peaceful 
settlement".
"The Heads of State or Government join in sympathy and 
solidarity with the Palestinian people in their just 
struggle and assure them of unstinting support".80
NAM COMMITTEE ON PALESTINE
The 7th Nonaligned Summit held in New Delhi also resolved to
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set up a NAM Committee on Palestine in order to closely 
monitor the developments in relation to the Palestine issue 
and initiate "some action" in the face of rapidly 
deteriorating situation in the Middle East.
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PALESTINE, AUG. 1983
The Indian Foreign Minister Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao read out 
a message81 on behalf of the Indian Prime Minister Mrs. 
Gandhi at the International Conference on the question of 
Palestine at Geneva on Aug. 29, 1983. He argued that various 
resolutions and pronouncements that were made in relation to 
the Palestinian issue were derived from "basic and well- 
established norms, premises and principles which the inter­
national community has accepted, upheld and urged in several 
other situations and circumstances". He bemoaned that "it is 
only in the case of the Palestinians that double-standards 
are being deliberately applied".
He was also critical of the exaggerated importance that was 
being accorded to the security concerns of Israel to the 
negligence of of the other aspects of the problem. "It is 
obvious that security is equally vital and important to all 
the states in the region and there is no logic in treating 
the security of only one of them as pre-eminent over all 
others".
He expressed the suspicion that Israel's belligerency was
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"being encouraged in an attempt to bring about permanent 
geo-political and demographic changes in the region at the 
expense of the Palestinians".
NAM COMMITTEE MEETING ON PALESTINE, OCT. 1983
Inaugurating the first meeting of the NAM Committee on 
Palestine on Oct. 30, 1983, the Indian Foreign Minister Mr. 
P.V. Narasimha Rao said that "The pre-occupation of the Non- 
aligned Movement with West Asia is a fundamental one". He 
also emphasised "the need for a comprehensive rather than a 
piecemeal approach to the question".82
The first meeting83 of the Committee was held in New Delhi 
on 30-31 Oct. 1983. The meeting was attended by Algeria, 
Bangladesh, Cuba, India, the PLO, Senegal, Yugoslavia and 
Zambia. The Committee urged that a process of negotiation 
should be launched without delay. However, for any such 
process to succeed, "two fundamental considerations must be 
accepted".
1) Recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to 
self-determination
2) The PLO must be represented on an equal footing with 
equal rights in all efforts, deliberations, conferences and 
negotiations on the question.
At the request of the PLO, the Committee discussed the ques­
tion of securing a separate seat for the Palestine Arab
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State at the U.N. to be occupied temporarily by the PLO with 
the status of Observer.
FACTIONAL FIGHTS WITHIN THE FLO, NOV. 1983
Reacting to the internal squabbles within the various fac­
tions of the PLO, a spokesman of the Ministry of External 
Affairs urged the Palestinians to remain united and to 
devote all their efforts and energies towards the attainment 
of their common goal. "Any divisions among the ranks of the 
valiant Palestinian people will only give comfort to their 
enemies" he said.
Meanwhile, the Charge de1 affairs of the PLO in New Delhi, 
Mr. Jamil Hajaj appealed to Mrs. Gandhi to intervene in the 
PLO crisis in her capacity as the Chairperson of the NAM. He 
accused the Syrian President Assad of masterminding the con­
flict within the various PLO factions in Tripoli. Mr. Jamil 
said that Assad was trying to convert the PLO into a "Syrian 
puppet organization and use it as a bargaining chip to wrest 
the Golan Heights from Israel".84
However, India's capacity to intervene in the dispute was 
limited and it was no surprise that India chose not to get 
too actively involved in any mediation effort.
INDIA THROWS ITS WEIGHT BEHIND ARAFAT, NOV. 1984
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The serious differences within the various factions of the 
PLO over Arafat's responses to the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon and the subsequent evacuation of the PLO fighters 
from Lebanon threatened the continuation of Arafat's 
leadership of the PLO. However, both India and the NAM were 
in favour of Arafat continuing at the helm of the PLO and 
strengthen the PLO as a united body of the Palestinians. 
Arafat's moderation and the need for unity within the ranks 
of the PLO were the reasons behind India's support to 
Arafat's leadership. The new Indian Prime Minister Mr. Rajiv 
Gandhi sent Mr. S.L. Yadav, the Deputy Chairman of the Rajya 
Sabha (the upper House of the Indian Parliament) to attend 
the crucial 17th Session of the PNC in Amman in Nov. 1984 
which was to decide the fate of Arafat's leadership of the 
PLO. It was a matter of satisfaction to India when Arafat's 
leadership of the PLO was confirmed by the PNC.85
NAM COMMITTEE MEETING ON PALESTINE, APRIL, 1985
India was "instrumental" in the convening of a meeting of 
the Nonaligned Committee on Palestine in New Delhi in April,
1985. The Committee recommended the convening of an 
"international conference under the aegis of the United 
Nations" in order to obtain "a comprehensive, just and 
durable peace in West Asia".86
India also strongly condemned the Israeli bombing of the PLO
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Headquarters in Tunis in Oct. 1985. The Indian Prime Minis­
ter Mr. Rajiv Gandhi sent messages of solidarity and support 
to the PLO Chairman Mr. Arafat and the Prime Minister of 
Tunisia.87
EVALUATION OF INDIA'S SUPPORT TO THE PLO
At this stage, it is essential to take a critical look at 
India's support to the PLO over the years, its nature, con­
tent and its efficacy in promoting the Palestinian cause. 
India vehemently opposed the partition of Palestine and the 
creation of the Jewish state till the very end. However, 
once the partition became an accomplished fact, India recog­
nised the state of Israel despite its earlier reservations. 
Concomitantly, India never subcribed to the maximalist 
demands of the PLO calling for the liquidation of the state 
of Israel. Nor did India accept the PLO's view that armed 
struggle was the only way to liberate Palestine. India, from 
the beginning, urged a negotiated settlement as both pos­
sible and desirable. In consonance with this position, India 
extended strong diplomatic support to the PLO in order to 
wean it away from terrorism and strengthen its diplomatic 
option. Hence, India urged ideological and methodological 
moderation on the part of the PLO and stressed the impor­
tance of unity within PLO ranks in order to present a united 
front to Israel.
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Though India treated the Palestinians as "refugees” till 
1967 and supported their cause in the U.N., it recognised 
the Palestinians as a "people” thereafter and extended its 
support to their right to self-determination and a state of 
their own.
Over the years, India extended consistent diplomatic, moral 
and material support to the Palestinians. Though there were 
reports of India*s military assistance to the PLO,88 the 
former India Foreign Secretary Mr. A.P. Venkateswaran was 
quite emphatic that India's support to the PLO was strictly 
"humanitarian".89
If one were to prepare a balance sheet on India's support to 
the PLO, it appears to a mixed blessing. On the credit side, 
India's support to the PLO enabled it to encourage and nur­
ture secular forces in the region. It helped prevent the 
Arab-Israeli dispute from degenerating into a religious con­
flict between the Arabs and the Jews and enabled the 
majority of Arabs to see it as a political struggle between 
Arab nationalism and Israeli domination. This, in turn, kept 
in check, any tendencies towards Islamic resurgence in the 
region which Pakistan could have taken advantage of to the 
detriment of India.
India also tried to use its support to the Palestinian cause 
as an instrument to improve its bilateral relations with a 
number of Arab countries. To cite just one instance, the PLO 
Chairman Yasser Arafat "is generally believed to have played
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a not unimportant role in bringing New Delhi and Riyadh 
closer together... ”.90 It goes without saying that India*s 
firm support to the PLO enhanced India's general standing in 
the region and was a positive factor in improving India's 
bilateral relations with the Arab states.
As a consequence of India's consistent support to the PLO, 
India, probably was, spared of terrorist attacks and threats 
which seriously affected many Western and even Arab states. 
Given the presence of a substantial number of Muslim 
minority in India, the Indian support to the Palestinians 
also acted as a sop to the domestic Muslim constituency 
which all political parties in India were only too eager to 
exploit.
On the debit side, in the absence of diplomatic relations 
and consequent lack of leverage with Israel, India could not 
play a positive and purposeful role in bridging the gap be­
tween the two adversaries and pave the way for an eventual 
settlement. India's support to the Palestinians was seen as 
one-sided in Israel and hence Israel paid no heed to what 
India had to say on the subject. This impression need to be 
disspelled if India were to be taken seriously by Israel. 
India's total and unqualified support to Yasser Arafat and 
the Al Fatah made it difficult for India to see the Pales­
tinian issue in its entirety and true complexity. "For 
years, New Delhi has gone headlong into a policy of support 
for Mr. Yasser Arafat, without comprehending the constantly
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shifting sands in the region. Indications are that New 
Delhi's policy may be under review, to take in the nuances 
of developments in West Asia".91 India's total identifica­
tion with Arafat and Al Fatah left it with no leverage what­
soever with other major factions of the PLO. More impor­
tantly, Jordan remains a crucial link in any possible solu­
tion of the Palestinian issue both on account of the history 
and geography of the region.92 And India's relations with 
Jordan over the years have been rather cold and distant. 
Consequently, India has to overcome these impediments if it 
were to play any sort of role in relation to the Palestinian
issue, let alone solving it.
India's attempt to use its support to the PLO to improve its 
bilateral relations with the Arab countries, though success­
ful to some extent, has its limitations in the long run. The 
PLO's relations with Arab countries are uneven and variable. 
Many Arab governments are suspicious and even scared of the 
PLO and its radical rhetoric. Therefore, India would be 
well-advised to base its relations with the Arab states on 
mutuality of interests which are more enduring and solid in 
the long run.
India's vociferous support to the PLO also put it on a
diplomatic spot whenever there were terrorist attacks on
soft targets. Hence, India adopted a rather ambivalent at­
titude towards the PLO's terrorist methods. It opposed ter­
rorism in principle and condemned specific acts of ter­
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rorism. But in the same breath, it tried to explain away the 
PLO's terror tactics as acts of desperation and frustration 
caused by Israeli intransigence and oppression.
It goes without saying that India's firm and consistent sup­
port to the Palestinian cause has been just and can be jus­
tified on moral as well as practical grounds. India's stand 
in relation to the Palestinian issue has been in consonance 
with the norms that governed India's foreign policy en­
deavours and objectives in general. As such, there was no 
way India could have taken a different stand on the Pales­
tinian issue without jeopardising its general standing in 
the international community. The critics of Indian policy 
towards the Middle East often made the mistake of question­
ing India's support to the Palestinians as an example 
thereby undermining the credibility of such criticism. In­
stead, they should have taken a critical look at India's 
bilateral relations with the Arab states independent of the 
Palestinian issue. It would have been cynical and extremely 
shortsighted of India to have used the Palestinian issue as 
a bargaining chip. The issue was never whether or not India 
should have supported the Palestinian cause but whether 
there were alternative strategies which India could have 
adopted and utilised to serve the just cause of the Pales­
tinians much more effectively and successfully than it ac­
tually did.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
It is no exaggeration to say that the Middle East con­
stitutes the most important region for India in political, 
security and economic terms beyond the Indian subcontinent. 
At this juncture, it is not inappropriate, to examine in 
some detail, the circumstances and personalities that went 
into the making of India's Middle Eastern policy at the time 
of India's independence if only to show that it was not as 
if such a policy was axiomatic and that it could have been 
considerably different in a different political context and 
under different political personalities.
Independent India's foreign policy, for one thing, could 
not have and did not begin on a clean slate. The ideological 
and emotional baggage of the pre-independence days did have 
an impact on free India's foreign policy orientation. It was 
in this context that one need to have a second look at 
Nehru's role as the formulator of India's foreign policy. 
Nehru, like many other leaders of his generation, was essen­
tially a product of India's freedom struggle and was 
Gandhi's personal choice to lead the newly independent In­
dia. It was Gandhi's intervention, time and again, that 
prevented others in the Congress party like Patel from 
successfully challenging Nehru's dominance. However, Nehru's
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position as the principal spokesman of the Congress on for­
eign affairs was firmly established even before independence 
primarily because other prominent leaders in the Congress 
hardly evinced any interest in the subject. As Michael 
Brecher points out, ”No one in the Congress or the Govern­
ment, not even Sardar Patel, ever challenged his control in 
this sphere”.10 Besides, Nehru remained his own Foreign Min­
ister until his death.
Another possible reason for Nehru*s near total control over 
foreign policy could have been that at the time of indepen­
dence, there was no established foreign policy bureaucracy 
nor institutional memory to serve the new political elite 
who were novices in the art of conducting foreign affairs in 
the modern age. This was so primarily because Indian foreign 
policy was completely subordinated to that of the British, 
to subserve the latter's colonial interests under the 
colonial dispensation. It was run from London for all in­
tents and purposes and remained so to the very end of 
British rule in India. With no established traditions and 
practices to act as precedents, it was not surprising that 
Nehru had a field day in conducting India's external affairs 
immediately after independence.
Nehru himself disclaimed any personal credit for formulating 
India's foreign policy and said that it was "completely 
incorrect" to call it "Nehru's policy". In his own words, 
"Looking back, India's policy has not been some sudden
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bright inspiration of an individual, but a gradual growth 
evolving from even before independence. The inevitable line 
that we took subsequently has followed that thinking as a 
matter of course”.11 Nevertheless, while India's foreign 
policy stance, in a broad sense, would have remained very 
much the same even under a different leader, it is quite 
possible that some nuances and details in its orientation 
could have been a lot different.
At this juncture, it is worth pondering over the question as 
to how Sardar Patel would have handled India's foreign rela­
tions even within the broad parameters that India's im­
mediate historical experience and geography had determined 
at the time of India's independence. The value of such an 
exercise, of necessity, would remain academic and even 
speculative but it could throw some light on the fallacies 
and weaknesses that crept into India's foreign relations un­
der Nehru particularly in relation to the Middle East. For 
instance, Patel seemed to have made a very realistic and 
clinical assessment of the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 
1950 and appeared to have had a better appreciation of its 
implications for India and the measures and steps that India 
needed to take to meet the changed situation on India's 
north-eastern borders than Nehru.12 Nehru's policy to 
China was, at least, partly influenced by considerations of 
anti- imperialism, Asian solidarity and empathy with 
socialist line of thinking which precluded him from exercis­
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ing the sort of cold and ruthless logic of realism that per­
meated Patel's outlook.
The issue of Kashmir has been one of the principal pre­
occupations of India's foreign policy and had implications 
for India's Middle Eastern policy as well. A thoroughgoing 
realist like Patel "would probably have dealt with the Kash­
mir question rather differently from the very beginning". 
13It is unlikely that he would have made the sort of 
unilateral declaration that Nehru made in relation to hold­
ing a plebiscite in Kashmir regarding its final accession to 
India. Patel, who kept away from the Kashmir issue by agree­
ment with Nehru, reported to have once remarked, "If only 
Jawaharlal would let me handle Kashmir, I could settle it 
quickly. Instead, he is fumbling all over the place".14 
It goes without saying that India's Middle Eastern policy, 
in addition to the objective conditions that existed at that 
time bore the imprint of Nehru's ideological predilections 
and intellectual preferences which did not necessarily serve 
India's longterm interests in the region. It is quite pos­
sible that a realist and an ideologically less fussy person 
like Patel would have avoided these pitfalls and defined 
India's interests in the region with much more clarity and 
precision and pursued them with vigour. Nehru failed to 
give a modest but clear-cut and concrete definition of 
India's interests in the region and as such India's policy 
towards the Middle East remained rather incoherent and
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vague.
It is very clear, at least in retrospect, that Nehru enter­
tained exaggerated fears about the emergence of an Islamic 
bloc which could have posed a threat to India*s security and 
secularism. Consequently, the Pakistani-factor was given 
much more weight than it should have been in India's deal­
ings with the Middle East. As a result, India expended most 
of her time and energies trying to counter a threat which 
was almost non-existent. "While Pakistan could, at times, 
gain some marginal advantage over India on relatively unim­
portant issues by playing its 'Islamic' card, these in­
stances were so few and far between that they did not 
require the expenditure of Indian diplomatic and political 
energies far disproportionate to the actual threat they 
posed to Indian interests".15
Nehru's penchant for Nonalignment was also a factor in 
India's rather rigid and doctrinaire approach to the region. 
While a country of India's size, location and population was 
justified in adopting a Nonaligned policy, Nehru's prescrip­
tion of it for all the third world countries was unrealistic 
and uncalled for. While India's Nonaligned stance was 
primarily in relation to the super powers in the context of 
cold war, it still had to cultivate individual countries 
which were of importance to her on a bilateral basis. This 
was so because the projection of Nonalignment was not an 
adequate basis to evolve bilateral relations with individual
462
states in the Middle East. Nehru*s "self-righteous1 stance 
against aligned countries in the region precluded any such 
possibility. Nehru also made a somewhat artificial and un­
necessary distinction between conservative and radical 
states in the region which prompted him to adopt a Cairo- 
centric policy which needlessly alienated some Middle East­
ern states which were opposed to Nasser but otherwise well- 
disposed to India.
India's policy to the region, more or less, reduced Middle 
Eastern politics to the Arab-Israeli dispute thereby pushing 
India into a political and diplomatic straitjacket. India 
sought to win the support of the Middle Eastern states or at 
least neutralise their support to Pakistan by extending 
vociferous support to the Arab and Palestinian causes and by 
ignoring Israel after formally recognising the Jewish state 
in 1950. However, neither support to the Arab causes nor a 
reflexive anti-Israeli stance are a reliable and realistic 
basis in the longrun to promote India's interests in the 
region.
In view of the changing Arab perspective in relation to Is­
rael in the late 70s and 80s and the moderation and accom­
modation displayed by the PLO, India needs to take a fresh 
look at the problem instead of sticking to its traditional 
and somewhat outworn stand on the issue. India's changing 
defence perspective in relation to the Middle East in the 
context of Pakistan's "Islamic bomb" and its closely evolv­
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ing security relationship with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf 
states does not permit it to persist with its customary 
policy of totally ignoring Israel.
India*s rather timid and diffident approach to the Middle 
East also led to a serious distortion in India's domestic 
policy in relation to India's emergence as a modern and 
secular state. Though Nehru set store by secularism, the 
fear of a conservative Muslim bloc ganging up against India 
externally and obscurantist Mullahs inciting the Indian Mus­
lims with the slogan that Islam was in danger internally 
dissuaded Nehru from attempting basic reforms in relation to 
the Indian Muslim community.
As such, India lost a golden opportunity to project herself 
as a modern, progressive and secular country by clearly 
identifying herself with and promoting such forces both in 
the domestic and international context. This would have 
created a positive interaction between the domestic melieu 
and international environment, and established a creative 
link between foreign and domestic policies. However, Nehru 
faltered because of his unfounded fears and left a hiatus 
between India's foreign and domestic policies. The resultant 
impression was that the Government was trying to appease the 
Muslims in India and not integrate them.
Such a policy did not serve the long-term interests of the 
Indian Muslims either. As one writer commented on India's 
banning of Salman Rushdie's controversial book The Satanic
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Verses, "Pre-emptive measures such as the ban on 'The 
Satanic Verses' serve the limited purpose of satisfying sec­
tional interests, but in the longrun a policy of appeasement 
does not help even those who are sought to be appeased. For 
there is always the danger that those who benefit from such 
a policy today can also get hurt the next time around when 
other sectional interests assert themselves”.16 
In fact, it was "our failure to make our secular policy work 
internally that made us support the Arabs more and more", 17 
a hangover of pre-independence days.
India, it seems, has failed to develop a coherent and in­
tegrated policy towards the Middle East and her policy 
responses to the region smack of ad hocism. It seems to 
abound in inconsistencies, contradictions and angularities 
which appear to be largely self-inflicted. As a result, it 
became rather rigid and self-conscious and tended to be 
reactive than active, passive rather than positive. The most 
serious indictment of India's Middle Eastern interaction 
came from the former Foreign Secretary of India, Mr. A.P. 
Venkateswaran. "It is a relationship without a quid pro quo. 
Any relationship that does not involve a quid pro quo is in­
dicative of bad diplomacy since the first principle of 
diplomacy is reciprocity”.18
Consistency of policy in a rapidly changing region ceases to 
be a virtue beyond a point. The Indian political leadership 
and the foreign policy bureaucracy need to cultivate more
finnesse, sophistication and sensitivity in dealing with 
the Middle East in order that India is not caught napping or 
overtaken by new developments there in the troubled days 
ahead.
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